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The aim of this study was to investigate the role of social
processes in scientific investigation, and to relate the products
of scientific activity to particular features of the social context
in which that activity took place. The group of scientists under
examination shared a common interest in the interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics. This is not a "typical scientific specialty; it
lacks "both a cohesive social structure and an agreed set of theories
and practices. It is argued that social and cognitive factors
interact in a complex way to bring about and maintain this fragmented
state. In particular, methodological differences are identified as
a major cause of disputes in this field. A sub-group of physicists
performed experimental tests of Quantum Mechanics. Accounts of the
behaviour of these physicists in terms of general codes of scientific
conduct (norms) seem to be unsatisfactory; instead, we must refer
to many specific features of their local social context. The
construction and evaluation of knowledge-claims can also be best
described by referring to the cultural context of this work. These
conclusions support a relativist view, in which the outcome of
scientific activity is not uniquely determined by empirical data,
but is flexible, and can reflect social pressures from inside or
outside science. However, social and cultural factors may also set
limits on this flexibility. The concept of plausibility is introduced
as a way of characterizing the role of the social and cultural
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The broad aim of this thesis is to investigate, for a particular
area of scientific research, the effect of social processes on the
generation, transmission, and reception of scientific knowledge.
The topic to he examined is the recent history of attempts to
criticise, reinterpret or reformulate the theory of Quantum Mechanics.
In this introductory chapter, I shall outline the main features
of my theoretical framework, together with those of alternative
theoretical models of science. Where there is conflict, I shall try
to show that the sociology of knowledge, as I interpret it, provides
a more satisfactory account of the actual processes which make up
scientific research. In other chapters of the thesis, I shall draw
on elements of my theoretical framework to account for my empirical
findings without, for the most part, further defence of the validity
of this framework. In my conclusions, I shall return to the question
of conflicting theoretical frameworks, and will show how my empirical
material clarifies some of the issues. In addition, I will draw on
my findings to extend and develop some theoretical concepts.
Having introduced and defended my theoretical framework, the
next part of this introductory chapter will consist of a discussion
of methodological issues. This will include not only details of how
my study was carried out, hut also consideration of the limitations
of interactive studies such as this one. The final part of this chapter
will consist of a hrief account of the contents and conclusions of
the other chapters of this thesis.
Theoretical Background.
In the last few years, developments have occurred in a number
of different disciplines, all of which have important implications
for empirical studies of science. In this section, I shall review
some of these developments in the philosophy of science, history of
science, and sociological theory. In addition, I shall examine a
number of empirical studies in which these important theoretical




"Modern philosophy of science has allowed an extra dimension - time -
into descriptions of the nature of scientific knowledge. Theories
are now seen as linked to each other, and to observations, not by
fixed bonds of logic and correspondence, but by a network, each link
of which takes time to be established as consensus emerges and each
link of which is potentially revisable - given time."^
A number of authors have been responsible for this change in
the philosophy of science. Although Popper is often cited in
discussions of 'scientific method' as a supporter of the 'hypothetico-
deductive method', he does not claim that the application of such a
method automatically leads either to an unequivocal solution to
problems of theory-choice, or to inevitable improvements in our
scientific knowledge. Certainly, he claims that diligent attempts
to falsify our current theories provides the best hope of progress,
but at the same time he stresses the conjectural, tentative and
3
temporary nature of our current theories.
Lakatos also examined the concept of falsification, and pointed
out that scientists always have a choice between developing or
rejecting a theory whose predictions have been falsified. It emerges
from Lakatos' work that an apparently falsified theory can be 'saved'
by developing auxiliary hypotheses which account for the apparent
discrepancy between the theory's predictions and empirical findings.
It is impossible to know in advance whether such hypotheses will
prove fruitful or will turn out to be 'ad hoc'. Lakatos himself
chose to adopt an evaluative approach to the history of science,
by performing 'rational reconstructions', showing how historical
events led up to our present knowledge.^ Yet his findings emphasise
the contingent nature of the processes by which we arrived at our
current beliefs, so that it is difficult to justify the special
status which Lakatos gives to these beliefs.
Other philosophers and historians, such as Polanyi, Kuhn and
6
Hesse, have stressed the interlinking of scientific concepts,
techniques and theories into a self-consistent whole. Testing of
hypotheses and evaluation of results involve the use of different
parts of the same network. The implication is that the network is
never tested against reality in any direct sense; such tests are
mediated by theory-laden, and therefore conjectural, concepts and
practices.
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Taken as a whole, these views suggest that historical studies
of science should not he concerned with showing 'where scientists
went wrong' in developing theories other than our present ones.
Instead, a sympathetic approach to historical contexts is likely to
reveal the existence of 'good' science which differs from our own
not in terms of rationality hut in terms of theoretical presuppositions,
technical practices, and goals.
As a methodological prescription for historians of science,
this may he unexceptionable. However, this view also has epistem-
ological implications which, for some authors, may he less palatable.
According to this view, scientific knowledge no longer has a clear,
direct relationship with the natural world. Scientific method is
now seen as a set of social processes, and knowledge is generated
and evaluated according to socially-determined criteria. In addition,
both the knowledge and the criteria can change over time with no
assurance that such changes are irreversible. As a result, it
becomes more difficult to justify the view that one set of scientific
beliefs is unequivocally 'better' than any other set. Wittgenstein's
views on the conventional nature of knowledge have been particularly
7
influential in providing support for this relativist position.
Developments within sociological theory have progressed along
Q
similar lines. Phenomenologists, such as Berger and Luckmann , have
examined more general features of social life, such as socialization
processes. By demonstrating how an actor's perceptions, meanings,
attitudes and roles are structured by his social interactions,
these authors provide a useful general model which can be applied
to the professional socialization of scientists. This model is,
for example, remarkably similar to Kuhn's description of scientific
training in which the neophyte is introduced to the world-view
generated by the current paradigm.
Ethnomethodology, adopting a similar perspective, has described
the processes by which individual actors 'make sense of' the world.
Examples studied by ethnomethodologists include microsocial inter-
9
actions and classification procedures. The results indicate that,
at least for 'everyday' or 'common-sense' reasoning, meanings are
continually negotiated in the process of social interaction. As
well as providing a mechanism for the construction of meanings,
<o
ethnomethodology also raises interesting epistemological issues.
For example, Garfinkel describes an experiment in which subjects
interacted with a 'psychological counsellor' who answered their
questions either with 'yes' or 'no'. Although the counsellor's
responses were in fact purely random, subjects were able to
assimilate these responses and to construct an account of the
u
counselling session in which the advice they received was self-
consistent and indeed sensible."^
Although ethnomethodologists did not immediately extend their
findings to scientific reasoning, some sociologists of science have
now done so. Authors such as Woolgar and Latour"'""'" have concluded
that scientific meanings and accounts are generated in very similar
ways, and that any particular account produced by scientists has
the same epistemological status as any particular account produced
u
by a subject in Garfinkel's cc^iselling experiment. In both cases,
empirical data are interpreted, evaluated, reconstructed and ordered
according to an internalised set of criteria, with no assurance that
the account produced is either unique or more valid than any other
possible account.
It is of course possible to take a position of methodological
relativism without necessarily accepting the full epistemological
12
implications of relativism. For example, Barnes and Bloor have
argued in favour of a symmetrical view of rival belief systems, with
no a priori distinction between 'true' and 'false' beliefs, but
13
unlike Collins J they have not consistently defended epistemological
relativism.
At this point, let us summarize the main features of the
theoretical framework described above. Scientific knowledge can be
depicted as an interrelated network of concepts, observations,
theories and procedures. Phenomena are interpreted and meanings are
defined through processes of social interaction and negotiation in
which actors draw on the resources of their culture to provide
theories, models and analogies. Thus, scientific knowledge is theory-
laden, context-dependent, and conjectural. We should adopt a
symmetrical approach to both accepted and rejected beliefs in science.
In order to further clarify the implications of the framework,
"7
it may "be useful to look at another description of science based on
a different perspective.
Some authors draw a clear distinction between 'external' and
'internal' influences on the development of science. According to
these authors, the intervention of external influences represents
a disturbance and distortion of science; 'good' science, it is
claimed, proceeds along directions which are determined purely by
internal, esoteric or technical considerations.
This distinction is greatly weakened within the new framework.
According to this view, scientists operate within a social and
cultural context in which a whole range of concepts may be utilised
as metaphors and models; in addition, scientists can construct
accounts which simultaneously meet contemporary scientific criteria
of adequacy while also serving some wider social interest. The
14
latter does not invalidate the former. One need not of course
assume that every scientist is consciously concerned with achieving
some political, end; however, studies such as Shapin's"^ have indicated
that social interests can operate even within apparently esoteric
technical debates.
Another concept which conflicts with the new framework is that
of 'scientific norms', as described by Merton and his supporters.
The normative view begins with the observation that scientists'
behaviour regularly follows certain patterns, and with the assumption
that such patterns serve the function of organising science in such
a way as to maximise its efficiency as a social system. For this
reason, this view is often described as 'functionalist'.
Usually, supporters of the normative view adopt a specific
epistemological position, namely, that the products of scientific
activity constitute reliable, objective knowledge. However, it is
quite possible to argue that norms serve a regulatory function in
a social system without expressing any opinion on the value of the
products of that system. (One can, for example, construct a normative
account of the social structure of a criminal fraternity.) Thus, an
epistemological critique of scientific knowledge does not necessarily
weaken the normative view.
There are, however, other difficulties with this view."*"^ There
is, firstly, the purely empirical problem of identifying the norms.
As research has continued, a bewildering variety of norms and
counter-norms has been added to Merton's original list of four.
However, this problem is only a manifestation of a more fundamental
difficulty. As Wittgenstein, Garfinkel and many others have pointed
out, 'the meaning is the use'; that is, no rule can specify
completely all possible future situations, so that rules inevitably
require interpretation. These interpretive procedures are not
formalized, and different actors "will inevitably interpret rules in
different ways. The meaning and import of the rule will depend on
how an actor chooses to define and use that rule. Thus, we can never
unproblematically identify a situation in which a rule has been
broken; any situation can be interpreted in many different ways.
This 'negotiability' of norms would be bad enough if there was
a single well-defined set of norms. Yet we know that a whole range
of norms and counter-norms have been proposed. If actors can cite
different (conflicting) norms in different (conflicting) ways when
they describe a particular action, then it becomes difficult to
sustain the view that norms in some way automatically regulate
behaviour and sanction deviance.
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Becker, in a more general study of deviance , arrived at
similar conclusions. His 'labelling theory', closely linked with
phenomenology, argues that the judicial system does not identify
deviants: it creates them. Since the judicial system has the power
to enforce its categories on actors in a very direct way, an actor's
'real' status (deviant or innocent) is virtually irrelevant. He
has little choice but to accept the identity conferred on him by
the courts. Although Becker's conception has been criticised by
18
later ethnomethodologists for still being too absolutist , it
provides useful insights for a discussion of science.
If scientific norms do not control behaviour, and yet scientists
continue to cite norms in their accounts of their own and others'
actions (which they do), what then _is the role of norms in such
19
accounts? It has been argued, most notably by Mulkay , that norms
are used to characterize actions rather than to directly constrain
them. Scientists do not have access to the powerful sanctions
available to the judicial system. Nevertheless, an account of a
rival's actions which depicts him as infringing a norm may have some
°r
rhetorical utility. Conversely, depicting one's own actions in
terms of conformity to a norm may usefully serve a legitimizing
function. Of course, given the diversity of norms, and the flexib¬
ility of interpretive procedures, any particular action can be
described in a number of conflicting ways. For example, a decision
to withhold an empirical result may be described as sensible caution
or as intolerable secrecy. Thus, according to this view, norms
provide a set of resources which can be actively used by scientists
to generate particular accounts of actions in order to attribute
particular meanings to those actions.
Let us summarize the main features of this alternative view
of science, together with the major criticisms of this view. Perhaps
the central concept in this view is the distinction between 'good'
and 'bad' or 'healthy' and 'pathological' science. As discussed
earlier, it is difficult, on philosophical grounds, to draw a clear
distinction between successful and unsuccessful theories. However,
proponents of the alternative view claim that 'bad' science is still
identifiable in terms of scientists' conduct. For example, good
science should proceed along lines determined by 'internal' technical
criteria; science which is influenced by external social or political
interests is condemned. However, historical studies suggest that
this internal/external distinction is artificial, and does not
represent scientists' own perceptions of their work.
Norms appear to provide another means of discriminating
between good and bad science. However, the proliferation of norms,
and the fact that norms must be interpreted in order to apply them
to any particular situation, makes it difficult to argue that norms
actually govern scientists' behaviour.
Thus, these attempts to discriminate between good and bad
science have not been wholly successful. This provides further
indirect support for the symmetrical approach to scientific beliefs
advocated earlier.
In recent years, the views described earlier as the 'new
theoretical framework' have been applied with a great deal of success
in a number of empirical case-studies. Some have been concerned with
20
the role of 'external' influences of science. Others, perhaps less
21
radical, have examined contemporary scientific specialties . In
I o
many cases, such studies have shown that social processes within
science (such as informal communication networks and the organisation
of research groups) can have important effects on the ways in which
scientific knowledge is generated and perceived. A number of recent
studies of science have examined the construction of knowledge in
22
contemporary science from a relativist standpoint . Such studies
have identified an important role for non-empirical factors in the
generation and assessment of knowledge-claims.
Thus, there is already a great deal of empirical evidence in
support of the theoretical framework outlined earlier. Hopefully,
we have now reached the stage where there is no need to provide a
comprehensive defence of these views at the beginning of every
empirical case-study. Collins has expressed similar sentiments, in
his introduction to a collection of empirical relativist studies:
"Authors feel that every new report must defend the relativist
position anew. This collection, it is hoped, in addition to its
substantive contribution, will reveal clearly the flourishing
empirical programme associated with relativism and thereby obviate
the necessity for further defences and re-affirmations."23
Certainly, further empirical evidence in support of relativism
is not unwelcome, and at various points throughout this thesis I
will show how my empirical findings do provide support for this
theoretical framework.
However, there are also other aims. As Shapin puts it:
"An empirical sociology of scientific knowledge has to do more than
demonstrate the underdetermination of scientific accounts; it has
to construct its explanations by showing the historically contingent
connections between knowledge and the concerns of various social
groupings. "2^-
and
"work is often thought to be completed when it can be concluded
that 'science is not autonomous' or that 'science is an integral
part of the social context'. These are not so much conclusions as
starting points for much more explicit analyses of the manners in
which social facts relate to scientific knowledge."25
Therefore, I will try to construct a comprehensive, self-
consistent and empirically accurate account of the structure and
development of the particular area of science being studied, in
which the products of scientific activity are related explicitly and
in detail to various features of the social context.
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In addition, and particularly in the final chapter, I shall
return to a more general consideration of theoretical issues,
and I shall try to develop my theoretical framework in the light
of my empirical findings.
Methodology of this Investigation.
This study began in the autumn of 1975 with a broad examination
»
of the literature both on the sociology of science and on the
interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (hereafter QM). Given my
institutional location, the former was relatively unproblematic.
However, access to the technical literature on QM was more difficult
since (as I shall discuss later in this thesis) the study of the
interpretation of QM is not a recognised specialty in physics.
Consequently, there are few reviews, specialised journals or
special categories in abstracting services devoted to this field.
Papers were therefore initially collected on a 'snowball' basis by
following up citations, and by use of the Science Citation Index to
locate papers which cited key papers from previous years. Once some
general review texts were found, this task became considerably
easier. In addition, as my contacts with physicists developed, I
began to receive a regular supply of reprints and unpublished
material.
About a year after the study began,, a questionnaire was
constructed and sent to a number of physicists, mathematicians
and philosophers. The initial criterion employed to select respondents
was that they should have published at least one paper on the
interpretation of QM. Initially, names were drawn from my literature
survey, although additional names were obtained from early replies
to questionnaires. The questionnaire has been included in this thesis
as Appendix A.
In all, a total of 168 questionnaires were sent out. Reminders
were sent out approximately six weeks later if no reply had been
received by that time. Eventually, a total of 107 replies were
received. This response rate {66%) was, I feel, artificially lowered
for two reasons. First, a number of potential respondents were only
known to me through papers published ten or more years previously,
and in some cases their address at the present time could not be found.
I z
In such cases, the last known address was used. Thus, either "because
the questionnaire did not reach them, or because their involvement
with QM was long past, a low response rate from such people might
well have been expected. Secondly, approximately 30 questionnaires
were sent to physicists whose names were obtained from earlier
replies on the grounds that they were on the mailing lists for
these respondents' reprints. This is clearly a much weaker criterion
than that used to select the first batch of recipients. Again, a
smaller response rate is to be expected. When such people are excluded,
the response rate increases.
A further problem with the questionnaire was the particular
social and cognitive structure of this field. As will be discussed
in Chapter Four, scientists who study the interpretation of QM
have no clearly-defined social identity and no formal institutional
structures. In addition, a vast range of topics are studied in this
field using many different methodologies. On several occasions I
discovered that although I perceived a scientist as someone who
worked on these issues, the scientist himself denied this, claiming
that his work was in cosmology, philosophy, or some other field.
For all these reasons, it soon became clear that little would
be gained by drawing quantitative conclusions from the questionnaire.
Its main purposes, then, were threefold. First, it provided me with
a great many individual, often anecdotal, accounts of certain features
of this activity, and at several points in this thesis I will refer
to one or more replies. Second, it brought to my attention a number
of people whose names had not appeared in the literature, yet who
were to some extent involved in the interpretation of QM. Third, the
replies enabled me to identify, and clarify, important features of
this field, such as points of dispute, methods of recruitment
to this work, and respondents' differing perceptions of the major
events in the history of QM. I was then able to follow up these
points in greater depth in correspondence and interviews.
Interviews were carried out at three different stages in the
project. By a complete coincidence, John Bell, a physicist who is
deeply involved in the topic being studied, gave a talk in Edinburgh
early in 1976. Through him, I learned that an important conference
on experimental tests of QM was to take place in Sicily a few weeks
I 3
later. I was able to attend this conference and interview many of
the participants.
In the first half of 1977> I interviewed most of the rather
small number of physicists in Britain who are involved in the interp¬
retation of QM.
In the autumn of 1977> thanks to the generosity of the Science
Research Council, I was able to travel widely in Canada and the USA
to interview a large number of physicists, mathematicians and
philosophers. This field trip was particularly useful in studying
experimental work on local hidden variables, and extracts from
interviews with experimenters, obtained on this trip as well as in
Sicily, form a major part of the evidence to be presented in chapters
five and six.
In addition to my own interviews, some physicists agreed to
answer questions, from a list supplied by me, put to them by other
researchers who were able to contact them while carrying out their
own fieldwork abroad. I am grateful to Andy Pickering, who
interviewed John Bell, and to Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, who
performed the other interviews in this category.
In both the questionnaire and interviews, respondents were
assured that, if they wished, their comments would remain anonymous
in any written reports which might emerge from this study. A
substantial number of respondents indicated that they had no
objections to having their remarks attributed specifically to them.
However, the general approach adopted in this thesis is that whenever
a comment might be interpreted as 'sensitive' (for example, comments
on the work of other scientists) anonymity has been preserved. The
original tapes of the interviews, and transcripts, have of course
been preserved.
Appendix B lists those individuals who were interviewed in the
course of this study. In general, interviews lasted about A-5-60
minutes and were tape-recorded. Only one interviewee objected to
taping, and notes were taken during this interview.
Finally, I also corresponded with a large number of people,
mainly to clarify points which they made in replying to a questionnaire.
In a small number of cases, blank tapes and a list of questions were
sent to respondents who dictated their replies onto the tape. This
*4-
technique was used in place of interviews for people who were not
directly accessible. In terms of the amount of detail supplied, this
proved far superior to written correspondence.
Methodological Problems.
It is obviously vital that any claims made in this thesis should
be supported by an adequate amount of empirical evidence. However,
it is also necessary that this empirical evidence must itself be
reliable and representative. In this section, I shall discuss the
problems associated with the assessment of data.
I begin with the assessment of data gained from the published
work of other researchers. By providing references in all such cases,
the reader is at least at liberty to examine the original sources
for himself. When quoting studies of other scientific specialties,
I have restricted myself to studies which are generally held to be
of an acceptable standard by the majority of workers in this field.
Most of my data on the history and social structure of my own
field of study was gained either by personal contact with physicists
or by reference to established texts of good reputation. In the
remaining cases, I tried wherever possible to obtain 'second opinions'
on my sources. For example, in Chapter Four, I shall discuss a
case-study by Pinch which deals with the reception of Bohm's
work. Bohm himself assured me, in an interview, that Pinch had
27
made no factual errors. In addition, Pinch's study overlaps with
my own to a large extent, and I was able to check his references
for myself.
There are only two topics in the thesis where I was unable to
check the validity of references and the accuracy with which the
content of cited material is represented. Both occur in Chapter Three,
and deal with the origins of QM in Germany and the reception of QM
in the Soviet Union. In both cases, language difficulties were
compounded by the inaccessibility of the material cited by my own
secondary sources. I have therefore been forced to rely on these
sources to a large extent. However, this does not seem to constitute
an overwhelming problem. In the case of German QM, my main source is
the work of Forman, whose study of this period has attracted a great
deal of attention; to the best of my knowledge, the validity of Forman's
data (as opposed to his conclusions) has not been questioned.
Similarly, in the case of the Soviet Union, my main source is Graham's
2Q '
work , and again his empirical findings have been available for a
number of years. I also refer to two other authors who have made
30
largely independent studies of Soviet QM.
There is another sort of methodological problem which does not
refer to the details of any particular study, but instead applies
to any research project which involves gathering data about
respondents' attitudes, opinions and reasoning. As discussed earlier
in this chapter, it is a central feature of the 'new' sociology of
scientific knowledge that scientists' accounts of their actions do
not necessarily constitute an objective, comprehensive description
of their 'real' motives. Indeed, the whole notion of 'real' motives
is brought into question. Scientists' accounts, like those of laymen
studied by ethnomethodologists, may invoke a wide range of
explanatory structures, which may vary according to the actor's
perception of the requirements of the context in which the account
is presented.
31
This problem has been recognised by sociologists of science.
32
For example, Pinch, in a study of solar neutrino scientists^ , found
(contrary to his predictions) that scientists who were closely
involved with a particular research topic were not in general willing
to admit to having doubts and uncertainties about their work. Pinch
did not conclude that the theoretical basis for his predictions is
incorrect; instead, he argued that these scientists perceived him
as a representative of the public, and not as a confidant. (Solar
neutrino research had recently been fairly well-publicised, making
such a perception plausible.) In other words, the context of the
interview, as perceived by the interviewee, influenced the sort of
account which was deemed to be appropriate.
However, an alternative interpretation is possible. Perhaps
Pinch's theoretical prediction is wrong, and such scientists do
not have doubts about the validity of their work'. Unfortunately, Pinch
does not discuss this possibility or explain why he believes his
interviewees took this interpretation of his status.
33
Gilbert, v on the other hand, explicitly recognises the
ic
possibility that by (perhaps -unconsciously) structuring an interview
in a certain way, the interviewer and interviewee produce a rather
artificial picture of scientists' motives and perceptions, and that
some sociological theories may derive much of their apparent
empirical support from such artefacts.
Whereas Pinch claims his interviewees perceived him as a sort
of journalist or public investigator, Gilbert notes that in his
experience interviewees treated h'im rather like a student. As a
result, he suggests that he
"was treated to a very particular view of the careers of these
scientists, one which resulted from their initial conceptions of
the roles which they assumed they and I should play during the
interview....Topics which were considered to have no place in the
conventional picture of science were omitted or mentioned only in
passing, just as they would be when teaching students.
To suggest that one particular account is 'distorted' or
'biased' may seem to imply, incorrectly, that a 'true' or 'objective'
account can exist. However, although every account is selective, it
is important at least to be aware of the ways in which a particular
context influences the sort of account produced. Gilbert suggests,
albeit tentatively, that models of scientific 'migration' between
specialties or problem areas may be based on accounts in which
scientists, perceiving and structuring the interview as a teacher -
student context, presented the sociologist with a description of
their careers as a succession of separate 'problems'. In another
context, scientists might well have produced different accounts, in
which a desire for promotion, success, or a job in a particular
location may appear as the main motivating factor.
In a nutshell, then , if a scientist tells us that the reason
he did X was because he thought it would lead to Y, this reason is
not necessarily to be taken as a statement of some unique objective
truth, but as an account, given in the artificial context of an
interview, and no doubt framed within the requirements of that
context. It may be interpreted as a legitimation, a rationalisation,
or a rewriting of history by hindsight. The same question asked by a
colleague, in an informal context, or asked by the original
interviewer a few years later, may well yield a different answer.
How are we to cope with this problem and justify our interpretations
of interview extracts?
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One possible solution is simply to concede that there are no
'real' reasons, that any one interpretation is just as valid as any
other, and that sociologists are concerned with generating accounts
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according to their own criteria of reasonableness.
Another possibility is to obtain feedback from interviewees,
which will at least help to ensure that the researcher does not
consciously or unconsciously select extracts which do not accurately
reflect interviewees's opinions on the matter being discussed. To
this end, an unpublished paper , with an analysis similar to that
of Chapters Five and Six, was sent to all the physicists who were
quoted within it. Comments were invited, and although few people
chose to reply, no-one claimed to have been misrepresented, and no-one
claimed that any factual errors had been made, either in my descriptions
of the physical principles involved or the events which occurred in
the field. Of course, this solution does not fully come to grips
with the problem of the physicist's perception of his interaction
with the researcher; if the researcher is perceived as a student
during the interview, this perception may well persist in later
correspondence.
Another possible solution might be to define the interview
context in some other way, not in the hope of removing all structuring,
but with a view to avoiding the most obvious (and most confining)
constructions, such as student - teacher, or scientist - journalist.
This approach would presumably mean providing the interviewee with
information about what sociologists do, and the sociological
hypotheses being tested. The danger is, of course, that either the
interview becomes sidetracked into a discussion about sociology
(so that the student - teacher relationship is simply reversed'.) or
the scientist, in a spirit of helpfulness, may actively shape his
account to meet the sociologist's expectations. In my own fieldwork,
the first possibility did occur on several occasions. It is, by
definition, difficult to be sure about the second possibility.
Another way of assessing the validity of accounts is to try,
wherever possible, to get a number of points of view on any
particular issue. In this way, we may hope that individual
idiosyncracies will be identified. To illustrate this point, I
shall discuss two examples from my own case-study.
I 2
Both concern an experimental test of QM carried out by-
Richard Holt at Harvard University. Holt's results wer^ in conflict
with QM; this was a very surprising result, and Holt spent more
than a year checking his apparatus for sources of error. Although
none was found, Holt did not conclude that his result was correct.
(This episode will be discussed in detail in Chapters Five and Six.)
The only published support for Holt's result came in a series
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of papers by Paul Werbos of the University of Maryland. Werbos
was interviewed on my behalf by Hanry Collins, and he reiterated his
view that Holt's result was correct. He cited Holt's time-consuming
careful checks of his apparatus, and added that, as a student at
Harvard, he had observed at first hand the "tremendous psychological
pressures" on Holt to encourage him to reject his own result.
In Chapter Five, I shall argue that it was indeed in Holt's
best interests to check his apparatus carefully. However, Holt
himself denies that he was under any pressure to reject his result
prematurely or without justification. Neither Holt, nor either of
the other two Harvard physicists to whom I spoke, claimed to have
heard of Werbos.
There is other relevant evidence which helps us to resolve this
apparent problem of interpretation. It turns out that Werbos works
in the Department of Political Science at the University of Maryland.
(This information was not provided in Werbos' published papers on
Holt's experiment.) He was indeed a student at Harvard, but not a
physics major. He is in fact an amateur physicist. (He is also a
Rosicrucian, and has published papers on cosmology and physics in
qO
the Rosicrucian Digest. These papers contain extremely unorthodox
views.) Given a choice between accepting Werbos' account, or of
postulating an elaborate cover-up by the Harvard physics department,
it is not difficult to decide to give little credence to Werbos'
39version of events.
The second example concerns an anecdote which was related to
me both by Holt and by another physicist, who had heard it from Holt
at an earlier date. It again deals with the reception of Holt's
result by his colleagues at Harvard. According to the other physicist,
Holt was under pressure not to publish his results, and a senior
member of the department said to him, "you're not going to publish
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that, are you?". Holt recites the same story, claiming that this
comment was a .joke. Holt used this anecdote to illustrate the
amusement with which his rather embarrassing result was received.
Other evidence is available to help us choose between these
accounts. For example, Holt did not attempt to 'cover-up' his result.
An unpublished manuscript was widely circulated among the group of
physicists who were involved with these tests of QM. The decision
not to publish was not immediate'or easy, as we shall see in Chapter
Five. In addition, it is difficult to avoid making subjective
judgements about interviewees' demeanour. I was impressed by the
relaxed, amicable frankness with which Holt discussed his anomalous
result.
These examples illustrate the processes by which conflicting
accounts can be evaluated. Similar processes of cross-checking and
gauging interviewees' credibility are of course advisable in all
cases, even when there is no conflict. If our interviewees are
unanimous in making a particular claim, we may feel it is a 'safe
bet' to accept the claim, but we cannot be sure that this feeling
AD
is justified.
There is, then, no complete solution to the problem of
interpreting accounts. However, the above discussion at least
reminds us of the problems, and perhaps encourages us to approach
scientists' statements (and PhD theses'.) with a critical awareness.
In the last analysis, of course, it is the reader who must judge
the plausibility of my own account.
Thesis Structure.
In the remainder of this thesis, I shall apply the theoretical
framework described above to the area of scientific activity
concerned with the interpretation of QM. This will involved detailed
discussion of the similarities and differences between a number of
alternative interpretations, and (particularly in Chapters Five
and Six) some rather technical details about experimental tests of
QM. Some of these details will be presented as and when they are
required in the thesis. However, it seems desirable to deal with
more general aspects of the physics in a single location. This is
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the function of Chapter Two.
Chapter Two will not attempt to provide a comprehensive account of
all known interpretations; such a task, as many authors have discovered,
is virtually impossible. Instead, I shall simply outline the main
features of a few specific interpretations. These will be chosen
on two grounds; first, to provide as strong a contrast as possible;
second, to provide sufficient information for the reader to follow
the technical aspects of the discussion in later chapters. Chapter
Two is therefore fairly long. However, many of the philosophical
issues in the interpretation of QM are subtle, but also interesting
and accessible to the general reader. A full discussion is therefore
justifiable.
In Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six I deal with the
relationship between physicists' work and their 'social context'.
The term 'social context' is rather vague; it may be taken to
refer to 'culture' in its widest sense, or the 'scientific community',
or (at a smaller level) the 'research group'. Each chapter will
deal with social context on a different scale.
Chapter Three is concerned with the relationship between science
and its global social context; that is, the entire society, or other
subsections of society outwith science. This chapter has two main
sections. The first examines the evolution of QM in two rather
different cultural contexts: Weimar Germany in the 1920's and the
Soviet Union from the 1920's to the 1960's. I will try to show that
in both contexts the development and presentation of QM was strongly
influenced by pressures originating outside the physics community.
While most observers would agree that such influences can and do
occur, many would argue that they constitute distortions of the
'normal' scientific processes. Such an argument is difficult to
maintain here, since the Weimar Republic produced the accepted theory
of QM. Other authors have argued that the Soviet context was
particularly harmful to physics. I shall criticise this argument,
and conclude that a distinction between 'good' and 'bad' external
influences is unhelpful.
The second part of Chapter Three examines what one might call
the other side of the coin: namely, the influence of QM on other
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subcultures. Qjyi has been cited as relevant for such areas as biology,
theology and parapsychology. Authors have pointed to features of QJ4
and used them to argue in favour of beliefs in these other contexts.
I shall argue that QJM's usefulness in such debates is as a rhetorical
resource. It does not compel adherence to any particular opinion
about parapsychology, theology and so on. A whole range of conflicting
accounts can be generated from QM. I shall examine the concepts of
'valid' and 'invalid' uses of QM*, and shall try to show that these
concepts are not useful.
In Chapter Four I will examine the personnel who study the
interpretation of QM, and I will investigate the social relationships
between these people. In this chapter, 'social context' refers to
the particular scientific subgroup. I will show that this field is
not a typical scientific specialty, either in cognitive or in
sociological terms. The cognitive and sociological status of this
field are not independent; each influences the other.
The concept of methodological differences will emerge from this
analysis as a central feature of an adequate description of this
field. Such differences help to explain not only the lack of consensus
and coherent social structure, but also the way in which disputes
are conducted. In order to develop this point, I shall examine
an earlier study of a dispute in QM, in which the author adopts a
slightly different position from my own. I shall defend my own
account, and then apply the concept of methodological differences
to another dispute in this field.
The general implication of Chapter Four is that a cognitive
dispute in science, which may apparently centre over the status of ;
a theoretical concept or the validity of empirical data, can often
be attributed to more fundamental general differences between the
rival parties. Different scientists may use a particular term to
mean quite different things. Such differences in meaning, arising
from differences in usage, can create and perpetuate disputes.
Chapters Five and Six deal amost exclusively with experimental
tests of QJM carried out by a small group of physicists in the last
twelve years. The social context is thus scaled down even further
to the 'local' group of people working on a specific set of problems.
These two chapters are concerned with the microsociology of
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interactions between scientists who are, by and large, personally
acquainted with each other. The general argument will be that this
local context plays a highly significant part in determining the
way in which the process of scientific investigation is carried out.
Many authors would concede that 'internal' factors can
influence certain features of science, such as the direction of
research, the presentation of results, and so on. However, many would
claim that such social factors cannot affect the content of science,
and this argument would be expressed particularly forcefully when
applied (as here) to empirical science.
Although I shall reject this distinction, it does at least
provide a convenient way of subdividing my findings. Chapter
Five will therefore deal with the behaviour of the physicists
involved: their decision to become involved in the experiments,
the way they presented their results, the presentation and reception
of anomalous results, attitudes to non-empirical work on QM, and so
on. In each case, I shall try to show the influence of the local
social context. Such influences are widespread and powerful; yet
they do not lead to noticeably aberrant or 'unscientific' behaviour.
In fact, far from being the cause of distortions of the normal
scientific process, I shall argue that such social influences are
central features of this process, which must be taken into account
when constructing an explanation of this process.
In Chapter Six, I shall examine the content of scientific
beliefs. By discussing the validity of assumptions, the epistemological
status of anomalous experimental results, and the status of untested
hypotheses, I shall argue that scientists' evaluation of such
knowledge-claims does not rely solely on generalized procedures or
'scientific method'. Instead, the validity of 'facts' is heavily
dependent on 'tacit knowledge' - that is, on the cultural background
which physicists bring with them when they tackle a new problem. Not
only do physicists find it difficult to articulate this set of
beliefs, but even a full articulation would not logically justify
the way in which scientists evaluate knowledge-claims. The conceptual
framework which is employed in the evaluation of knowledge is
empirically adequate rather than uniquely valid.
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I shall use the term 'plausibility structure' to refer to this
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conceptual framework. The plausibility of an idea or procedure is
a function not only of empirical evidence but also of the extent
to which all observers share the same cultural background or
plausibility structure. This has two important implications which I
shall investigate. First, the attribution of plausibility is not
an unproblematic classification but an active interpretive process.
It can be influenced by a number'of factors other than empirical
evidence; I shall try to demonstrate how the plausibility of one
particular hypothesis was altered purely as a result of one
physicist's manipulation of that hypothesis, without the intervention
of any empirical data. The second implication is that empirical
evidence cannot enforce consensus if actors do not share the same
plausibility structure; I shall examine several features of the
experimental tests of QM about which consensus was not obtained,
and I shall relate this to the social location of the actors involved.
The final chapter of this thesis will attempt to draw together
the results of the preceding chapters, and to derive some more
general conclusions. Many of the findings of this case-study are
in close agreement with other empirical studies of science, and
provide much supporting evidence for the general theoretical
framework outlined earlier in this chapter. The empirical findings
of this study will also be used to develop and extend some aspects
of this theoretical framework.
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Chanter Two
Interpretations of Qjuantum Mechanics
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide a technical background
to the theories, interpretations, and experiments with which the
rest of the thesis is concerned. Much of the physics involved is
dealt with in standard textbooks* and review articles on Quantum
Mechanics (hereafter QM) and its interpretation."'" Accordingly,
other bibliographic references in this chapter are mainly restricted
to cases where the work of an individual author is particularly
relevant, or where the point being made is not dealt with in the
standard texts cited in footnote 1,
The major figures involved in the development of QM, such as
Bohr, Born, Schrodinger, Heisenberg and Einstein, are well-known.
In addition, the majority of this thesis deals with fairly recent
critiques of QM in which these physicists played no part. For these
reasons, I shall not provide detailed biographical information on
such figures. However, I shall discuss a number of physicists, such
as Bohm and Bell, who are less well-known, yet who have made major
contributions to the interpretation of QM. Biographical inforuation
on such authors will be provided in footnotes. Other physicists will
be cited in this chapter not because their work is of major importance
but because they have written useful reviews, or because they provide
good illustrations of general trends. While all such publications are
fully referenced, biographical information seems unnecessary in such
cases.
In order to grasp the significance of the proposals described
in this thesis, it is important that we draw a strong distinction
between the mathematical formalism of QM and the interpretation of
that formalism. Such a distinction would be virtually meaningless
for many branches of 'classical' physics, since most of the symbols
which appear in classical physics refer in a well-defined way to real
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observable quantities. QM can be expressed in terms of symbols,
but the identification of symbols with elements of reality, or even
with observable quantities, is less clear-cut.
For example, the symbol v|/ (the Greek letter psi) occurs in
u?
Schrodinger's formulation of QK, notally in bis famous wave equation,
which for a single particle (such as an electron in a hydrogen atom)
can be written as t- <%~rT (rs - \j) u) -.= O
y vy + ^ ° ■
Vb is a function (the 'wave function') whose variation in space
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and time can be well-defined for specified conditions. Nevertheless,
according to the orthodox interpretation of QM (the 'Born interpretation
of VJJ ') , vy does not represent an observable physical quantity. Instead,
it refers to the probability that a given observable will have a
particular value at a specific point in space and time.
Schrodinger himself did not construct or even accept this
interpretation of his wave function. Taking as an example a single
electron, Schrodinger's original idea, was that vp represented the
spatial distribution of charge at any given time. This led to
serious problems of interpretation in situations where y had non-zero
values over a large region of space (implying that the electron's
charge was 'smeared out' over this volume), yet where the electron
could be shown experimentally to be localized at essentially a single
l\.
point. It was Born who proposed that the value of l|i at a point
represented the probability that the electron would be found at that
point. Schrodinger strongly opposed this interpretation, but was
> <
unable to construct a consistent alternative.
Used as an operational rule for generating predictions about the
values of observables, the Born interpretation is unexceptionable.
What is more, the predictions yielded are remarkably consistent with
the results of actual measurements. Nevertheless, many critics of
orthodox QM, including Schrodinger, wished to give greater ontological
significance to the wave function. They argued that ^ represents a
real wave, whereas according to the Born interpretation vp simply
represents our knowledge about the values of observables.
Attitudes towards the wave function suggest that the debate over the
interpretation of QM can be characterised in terms of a simplistic
but helpful dichotomy. Many supporters of orthodox QM adopted a
positivistic or operationalist approach, arguing that any talk of
'reality', which is not rooted firmly in the procedures by which we
actually measure things in experiments, is vacuous. To them, the Born
interpretation is a procedure which generates accurate empirically -
testable predictions, and is therefore quite acceptable. Critics, on
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the other hand, argue that the aim of physics is to'describe reality,
and that the formalism of QM is unsatisfactory because it bears only
a very indirect relationship with reality. Most critics agree that
the formalism yields accurate predictions, but they reject any
operationalist interpretation of this formalism. In general, critics
want something more; however, as we shall see, there is little
agreement over what this 'something more' should be. The aim of this
chapter is to provide a brief, and by no means comprehensive, survey
of some proposed interpretations of QM.
Rather than simply provide a list of interpretations, I have tried
to impose what I hope is a useful classification system. I have
identified a number of aspects of QM which have served as major areas
of activity in debates over interpretation. In each case, I shall
discuss the implications of orthodox QM, together with several
reinterpretations of QM. However, it must be conceded that this
classification is an artificial one, and that a few alternatives to
orthodox QM, such as hidden-variable theories, have been developed in
a number of different directions so that these theories will be
discussed under more than one heading. Nevertheless, I would argue
that the classification scheme is still a useful way of getting to
grips with what often seems a bewilderingly diverse field.^
Measurement Theory
The concept of measurement plays an important part in QM.
Although every physical theory is concerned with observations and
predictions, QM is fairly unique because of the rather strange relation¬
ship between the elements of the formalism and observable quantities.
As discussed in the introduction, there is no direct connection
between ^ for (say) an electron, and the position of that electron.
Instead, the values of VjJ in different parts of space represent the
probability of locating the electron in a particular part of space at
that time. Many authors have tried to analyse in detail the relationship
betweeen and observables, and a large number of mathematical,
physical, and even psycho-physical mechanisms have been postulated in
an attempt to justify and explain the undeniable, but rather obscure,
link between vp and real physical systems.
In many cases, conceptual difficulties such as those encountered
in the analysis of measurement are best illustrated by reference to
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specific examples. However, if the point in question is to be made
clear, it is often necessary to discuss rather idealized situations.
For example, we wish to discuss the behaviour of a single photon of
light, while ignoring the technical difficulties of generating and
observing single photons. In other words, 'thought-experiments'
(Gedankenexperimente) are used. Such thought-experiments have been
common in discussions of QM from the time of the early debates
between Einstein and Bohr in the, 1920's.
As a way of introducing the problem of measurement, consider the
following thought-experiment. Light is directed towards a semi-silvered
mirror. The metallic backing of the mirror is made sufficiently thick
to ensure that exactly half the light reaching it is transmitted, and
half is reflected. (Since this is a thought-experiment, we are at
liberty to assume that no light is absorbed.) According to QM, light
exhibits both wave and particle properties. Rather than saying that
the reflected and transmitted light waves have equal intensity, we
can just as correctly say that the numbers of reflected and transmitted
photons are equal.
If the intensity of light is reduced, we arrive eventually at
a situation where only one photon is in flight at any one time.
We must then describe the semi-silvered mirror by saying that it
assigns equal probabilities to transmission and to reflection.
That is, an incident photon has a 50-50 chance of being reflected
or of being transmitted. There is no doubt that the individual
photon follows only one of these options; if detectors are placed
on either side of the mirror, one (and only one) will detect the photon.
However, QM provides us with no way of predicting which way a
photon will go. The photon's wave function, 1^/ , behaves like an
ordinary wave and on reaching the mirror it splits up into two
components of equal magnitude. Obviously, these components will grow
further and further apart as time goes on, but their amplitudes
remain equal. According to QM, this is equivalent to saying that no
matter how long we delay the detection process, the two outcomes
remain equally probable. But this is all that QJM provides us with.
This is apparently quite different from the classical treatment of
equally probable events, such as the likelihood of getting headd. or
tails when tossing a coin. Because there are many factors affecting
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the outcome of any particular toss (for example, the angular velocity
of the coin, its mass distribution, air currents) it is very difficult
in practice to predict the outcome with, certainty. Normally, only
the probabilistic prediction of 50% heads and 50% tails is practical,
and this prediction will only be accurate for a large number of trials.
Nevertheless, according to the classical view it is possible in
principle to provide a complete description of all the relevant
variables and so to provide an accurate prediction for each individual
attempt. What is more, there is no doubt that, in the classical
picture, the outcome of an event (heads or tails) is definite and real
even if we fail to observe it. In contrast, the QM prediction for
the photon is fundamentally probabilistic; we can never predict with
certainty the outcome of a single event. In addition, according to
the Schrodinger equation, the two halves of the wave function spread
apart for an indefinite amount of time unless and until the photon
interacts with a detector so that we can definitely assign the photon
to one side or the other of the mirror. This point is a subtle one,
and a further example may help to clarify it.
Before moving on to this example, it must be conceded that the
distinction between a classical and a quantum picture is seldom quite
so clear-cut in practice. In the first place, the 'perfect determinism'
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of classical physics is itself an idealization. In the second place,
statistical predictions, such as those provided by QM, are often the
only sort of prediction which can be meaningfully tested. For instance,
to check the QM prediction for the photon in the example just quoted
(that is, 50% chance of transmission and 50% chance of reflection) it
is necessary to observe a large number of photons and compare the
numbers detected on each side of the mirror. Otherwise, we could not
differentiate the QM prediction from other predictions such as 60%
transmission and ^0% reflection. In a similar way, the only practical
way to tell if coins or dice are 'loaded' is by throwing them many
times and seeing if all possible outcomes occur with equal frequency.
Thus in both classical and quantum models, predicted outcomes for
individual events have little relevance.
Nevertheless, a distinction between classical and quantum models
can still be drawn, even though the distinction is more philosophical
than practical. Another thought-experiment is often used by critics of
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Q^ to highlight this distinction. This experiment was first discussed
by Schrodinger, and is commonly referred to as 'Schrodinger's Gat'.
Schrodinger described a 'Hollenmaschine' (which can be translated
either as 'infernal machine' or as 'time bomb'), which basically
consists of a closed steel chamber containing a cat and an atom
of radioactive material. The half-life of the radioactive material is
one hour. If the atom decays, and emits radiation, a Geiger counter
is activated and this, in turn, via a relay, releases a hammer which
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breaks a flask of cyanide gas. The cat is then killed by the gas.
When the box is closed, the observer is aware that the radioactive
atom has not yet decayed. One hour later, there is a 50% chance that
the atom will have decayed and that the cat will have been killed,
though the observer cannot know what has happened if the box remains
closed. The wave function describing the atom evolves in time,
beginning with a certain value (corresponding to an undecayed atom)
and thereafter becoming a mixture (technically, a superposition)
of two states, V , , and V , .. The relative magnitudesundecayed ' decayed
of these two components change with time, and after exactly one hour
their coefficients are equal. In principle, the component
dJ , , becomes smaller and smaller (as it becomes more likely
t undecayed
that the atom will have decayed) but the value of its coefficient
reaches zero only after an infinite amount of time. As in the case
of the photon and the mirror, QM cannot tell us what has actually
happened, but only what is likely to happen.
There is nothing to prevent us from constructing a similar
description of the apparatus as a whole, including the cat. The
obstacles to this in practice are immense, because of the enormous
number of interacting atoms in a macroscopic object such as a Geiger
counter, let alone a complex living organism such as a cat. However,
there is no theoretical limit of this sort to the scope of QM, so that
the assumption is valid within a thought-experiment.
Then, at any time, the global wave-function of the box and its
contents is a superposition of V , , , ... ,* * r undecayed atom, live cat
anc^ Vdecayed atom, dead cat*
According to QM, this superposition is the most detailed description
possible, yet we are not accustomed to thinking of cats as being
partly alive and partly dead. The difficulty is similar to that
of the photon and mirror. However, because Schrodinger's thought-
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experiment deals with macroscopic objects, the apparently paradoxical
nature of this twilight state of being is displayed much more
dramatically.
As with the photon, it would be possible to argue that vp
merely yields statistical predictions for a large number of identically-
prepared systems. That is, what QM tells us is that if one hundred
such boxes were prepared, then on opening the boxes after an hour
approximately fifty cats would be dead and fifty would be alive.
However, many people are more reluctant to ignore the fate of an
individual cat than of an individual photon. Schrodinger's Gat is
therefore widely cited as an argument in favour of a more detailed
description of individual physical systems.
It must be stressed that a purely operationalist interpretation
of QM is perfectly self-consistent. If the formalism is treated
purely as a means of generating empirical predictions, which are
then tested empirically on a large number of systems, then no paradox
exists. One is not obliged to discuss the fate of individual systems,
and it is perfectly rational to take the positivist view that the
fate of the cat before the box is opened is a meaningless question
because it is, by definition, not an empirically-testable issue.
Critics of 'orthodox' QM often claim that this positivist view
is part of the orthodox interpretation, and it is certainly true
that some of the physicists who developed QM made positivist
statements. However, there is no clear consensus as to what constitutes
orthodoxy.
Niels Bohr is often credited with being the spokesman of orthodoxy.
Indeed, many physicists use the term 'the Copenhagen interpretation'
as a description of orthodoxy. (Bohr worked in Copenhagen.) Bohr's
own views on QM are rather vague, dsspite the profusion of his
writings on this subject. Indeed, the generation of coherent (but often
conflicting) 'Copenhagen' interpretations from Bohr's written statements
is a thriving industry.
Bohr did not try to. construct a formal (mathematical) representation
of measurement. Instead, he stressed forcefully the logical distinction
between microsystems (describable only by QM) and macroscopic systems
such as measuring instruments.Bohr claimed that the latter must be
described classically. Insofar as this view can be called a measurement
3 I
theory, it is one which emphasises the transition "between micro and
macro levels. This proviles a solution of sorts to the problem of
the 'schizophrenic cat', which seemed to he in a mixture of two
different states. Bohr would argue that the paradox arises because
we have extended a quantum-mechanical description into an area
where such a description is inappropriate.
According to some critics, one problem with this view is that
the exact nature of the micro-macro transition is left unexplained.
Even Jammer, a fairly neutral commentator, describes the transition as
"a somewhat questionable or at least obscure feature of Bohr's
conception of quantum-mechanical measurement."9
In the area of measurement theory, the use of the term
'Copenhagen Interpretation' as a label for orthodoxy is rather
misleading, because when most critics of QM (and indeed a good many
textbook authors) refer to the orthodox view they are describing
a theory proposed by von Neumann, not by Bohr or his colleagues
in Copenhagen. Von Neumann proposed a formal treatment of the transition
from an unobserved (mixed) state to an observed (precise or pure)
state. In a sense, this proposal constitutes a formalised version,
and hence perhaps a justification, of Bohr's more qualitative
account. However, some authors would argue that von Neumann's
description is a distortion of what Bohr had in mind. Rather than
dwell any longer on such disputes, -let us examine von Neumann's
proposal in more detail.
A major feature of this theory is that the wave function is
explicitly attributed to an individual microsystem, and not merely
to a statistical ensemble of such systems. For example, in the case
of Schrodinger's cat, ^ takes the form of a superposition of two
components, \jJ and ^alive" When a measurement is made, \p
'collapses' or 'reduces' to one of these components. The probability
that any particular outcome will occur is given by the size of the
coefficient of for that outcome. This in turn is affected by the
physical circumstances. For example, the probability of the transition
f"7 V dead """S a^er one hour, 0*75 after two hours, and so on.
This view, then, claims that v|> is affected by the physical
act of measurement. It can certainly be argued that von Neumann's
version of 'Copenhagen' is very similar to the (usually unarticulated)
viewpoint of the average working physicist. Von Neumann's view
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makes it possible to think in terms of single photons or atoms being
observed individually, and the resulting outcomes being obtained
quite naturally in the proportions predicted by QM.
However, by giving a clear formal role to the act of measurement,
this approach also raises a number of problems. In particular, it
differentiates between measuring processes and all other physical
interactions. The behaviour of is normally governed by the
Schrodinger equation, in which is defined as a function of space
and time, and in which, for any particular physical conditions,
the value of \y at any point evolves in a completely causal manner.
There is nothing in the Schrodinger equation which could account for
the reduction of ^ from a superposition to a single component.
Therefore, von Neumann's proposal involves a new addition to the
mathematical formalism of QM; this additional element is known as
the projection postulate, since ^ is 'projected' onto a single
component, (in an analogous way, the shadow of a three-dimensional
object can be projected onto any of a number of different possible
planes, giving rise to a variety of two-dimensional images.)
The projection postulate comes into play whenever a measurement
is made. But a measurement is a physical interaction, and as such it
ought to be describable by means of Schrodinger's equation. For
instance, the fate of the cat in the steel box could be recorded by
means of a cine camera inside the box. Alternatively, the cat itself
may be considered to observe its state (alive or dead) at any moment.
But the interactions involved in these observations, whether with a
photographic film or with feline brain cells, are presumably physical
interactions (albeit very complex ones). They can therefore be incorp¬
orated in the Schrodinger equation, at least in principle, so that
the 'global' wave function can be thought of as a superposition of
(atom undecayed, film showing live cat, cat feeling alive) an^"
atom decayed, film showing dead cat, cat no longer feeling alive).
Thus reduction may not take place at all. For if we use more
sophisticated observation techniques, such as heartbeat monitors
attached to the cat and leading to a tape recorder outside the box,
we are simply extending (and complicating) the chain of physical
interactions, and hence enlarging the scope of the global wave
function. But as long as these interactions are physical, they could
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be incorporated into a Scnr'odinger equation, and the superposition
would never be reduced to a single component.
The 'orthodox' response to this apparent problem is to deny
that there is a problem. The difficulty, it is argued, stems from
trying to think of ^ as a physically real quantity, and from trying
to decide what exactly a measurement 'does' to y . Instead, according
to this view, y should be treated as a mathematical tool, so that
reduction becomes an operational -procedure rather than a physical
event. There is then no need to worry about what is 'really happening'
to y - indeed, the question becomes meaningless. An analogy is
provided by the use of complex numbers, which involve J-l, usually
symbolised as i.~^ i is clearly an imaginary quantity, yet it is very
useful as an aid to calculation in a number of fields.
This view of reduction is perfectly self-consistent yet, as
stated earlier, it is objectionable to a number of critics who feel
that the symbols used in equations should relate in some way to
reality. Let us now examine some other responses to the 'measurement
problem'.
Some authors, such as Einstein and Ballentine,argue that QM
yields only statistical information. (As we have seen, there are
many contexts in which the predictions of QM can only be checked by
measuring the distribution of outcomes among a large number of
events.) This 'Statistical Interpretation' allows its supporters
to believe in the real existence of individual microsystems while
arguing that QM does not fully describe such systems, y provides
a (correct) statistical description of an ensemble of such systems,
and 'reduction' is merely a way of saying that a single measurement
constitutes a selection of one microsystem from this ensemble. This
interpretation leaves open the question of whether a more detailed
account of each individual system is possible.
Other groups of critics lay more emphasis on the detailed
physical events which go to make up a measurement. In other words,
such critics accept the fundamental distinction between measurement
(where von Neumann's projection postulate comes into play) and other
physical processes (where it does not).
For example, Daneri, and (DLP) argue that
in the interaction between a microsystem and a macroscopic
3V
measuring apparatus, an irreversible change takes place in U7 as
12
a result of the shift in scale from micro to macro . As with many
interpretations of QM, there is much disagreement over the mathe-
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matical validity of this theory , and over whether it is or is
not consistent with the Copenhagen interpretation. Since DLP, like
Bohr, stress the distinction between micro and macro systems, it has
been claimed both by DLP and by Rosenfeld (a former co-worker and
staunch supporter of Bohr) that DLP's view is consistent with Bohr's
more qualitative theory of measurement. Indeed, since it provides a
formal mathematical treatment of the transition, DLP claim that
their theory constitutes
"an indispensable completion ^d a natural crowning of the basic
structure of present-day QM."
However, Bub disagrees, claiming that because DLP continue to use
QM once they have reached the macro level, they are
"basically opposed to Bohr's ideas.
Bohr, according to Bub, argued that micro and macro levels
require quite different conceptual frameworks, the former being
quantum-mechanical and the latter classical.
DLP's proposal has not gained a great deal of support from other
physicists. However, it provides a good illustration both of a
particular approach to the measurement problem (examining the transition
between micro and macro levels) and of the sort of doctrinal disputes
which accompany much of the activity on the interpretation of QM.
Other authors, such as Bohm and Pearle, have suggested that the
conflict between the Schrodinger equation and the projection postulate
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can be resolved by modifying the Schrodinger equation. They claim
that by adding a non-linear term to this equation, a superposition
will spontaneously (and causally) reduce to a single component on
measurement. This additional term is deemed to refer to an underlying
set of 'hidden variables' (HVs). Conventional QM provides only an
approximate or statistical view by averaging over a whole range of
such HVs. Since these theories imply that reduction is a physical
process which occurs over a finite (non-zero) period of time, they
raise the possibility of experimental tests. If a system could be
examined part-way through the process of reduction, for example by
performing two measurements separated by a very short time interval,
i<r
we mignt observe behaviour which is inconsistent with QM. Such an
experiment has been carried out, and the details will be discussed
later in this chapter.
Another sort of interpretation also invokes non-linear elements
in the Schrodinger equation, but argues that these reflect not
physical but psychological processes. It has been claimed that von
Neumann himself was sympathetic to this view but its main protag-
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onists have been London and Bauer, and, more recently, Wigner
One of the clearest arguments in favour of this view has become
known as the argument of 'Wigner's friend'.
Recall that, with the photon and mirror, and the Schrodinger
cat, even a series of detectors, observing the system and each other,
would not produce a reduction of ^ because they themselves could be
included in the superposition. However, we know that if we ourselves
were to look at the system, it would appear to be clearly in one or
other of its possible states - for example, the cat would either be
dead or alive. According to London and Bauer, human observers have
special properties which can cause reduction to occur:
"The observer...has with himself relations of a very peculiar
character; he has at his disposal a characteristic and quite familiar
faculty which we call the 'faculty of introspection'. For he can
immediately give an account ojghis own state... ^andj create for
himself his own objectivity."
That is, although we may be able to imagine photons, cats and chains
of detectors as inhabiting a shadow world of 'potentialities', it is
clear that we ourselves do not. As one reviewer put it,
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"The buck stops here."
Wigner takes the argument further, claiming that if a friend
makes the observation and then reports his findings to me, it is
unnatural to suppose that it is my perception of his statement which
causes the reduction, and that until I had heard what he said my
friend was in a mixture of two states. Thus unless we accept a
solipsist position, we must concluded that all conscious observers
can reduce wave functions.
Here again, the possibility of an experimental test is raised.
For if such psychophysical interactions exist, it is possible that
we may be able to detect or control them. As before, I shall postpone
discussion of such experiments until later in this chapter.
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I shall turn now to the last measurement theory which I wish to
discuss. Like the various non-linear theories, this interpretation
can he called 'realist', since it takes y to represent a real
physical entity. However, the reality implied hy this theory is a
rather strange one. The theory in question is the 'Many Worlds
Interpretation' (MWl), first proposed hy Everett, and later popul-
20
arised hy DeWitt and Graham
MWI claims to take the formalism of QM at its face value. Since
the projection postulate is not part of the original formalism, it
is rejected. Therefore, reduction does not occur and hence all the
elements in a superposition are equally real; consequently, all possible
outcomes of a measurement are equally real. Since we only see one
particular outcome for any given measurement, it is concluded that
21
when a measurement is made the universe splits into a number of
near-identical branches, one for each possible outcome, and the only
difference between these universes is the outcome observed for this
particular interaction. We are unaware of other branches (which include
copies of ourselves) because QM provides no way of crossing from
one branch to another.
Physical interactions are occurring all the time all over the
universe, and these are effectively measurements. The rather "bizarre
conclusion reached is that
" [the] universe is constantly splitting into a stupendous number
of branches, all resulting from the measurementlike interactions betweeen
its myriads of components. Moreover, every quantum transition taking
place on every star, in every galaxy, in every remote corner of the
universe is?splitting our local world on earth into myriads of copies
of itself."
This completes my brief survey of measurement theories. In
Chapter Four, I shall discuss the construction and reception of
such interpretations in more detail. The purpose of the present
chapter is simply to provide some technical background for this
discussion. Table 1 provides a summary of the central distinguishing
features of the various interpretations dealt with here. I must stress
that I have dealt with only a few of the many versions of measurement
theory which have been proposed. However, those selected are
representative of the main theoretical and philosophical divisions
within the field, and provide a useful basis for characterising and
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Table 1
Interpretation Status of wave-function ^ Status of reduction of ^
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would require HVs, but
these may not exist
Not a physical process,
merely a way of expressing
the fact that a measurement
on an ensemble of systems
which yields a certain
value constitutes a
selection from an ensemble
whose systems have a whole
range of values for the
observed parameter
analysing an otherwise very complex scene.
Any attempt to provide a complete account of measurement in
QM would require at least a separate thesis. Jammer, in an encyclo¬
paedic work on the interpretation of QM, devotes an entire chapter
of fifty pages to measurement theory, and concludes by noting
"the immense diversity of opinions, and the endless variety of theories
concerning quantum measurements"
and he lists 2k authors "to name, only a few" whose theories could not
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be discussed due to lack of space .
The Incompleteness of QM: (l)The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.
In this section, I shall turn to another area of disagreement
within QM. We have already seen how critics claim that QM provides
an inadequate description of measurement. Here we deal with QM's
limitations on the results of experiments; this is most easily
summarised by referring to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle
/ \ 2k
(HUP) . In a sense, this is a more severe limitation on our
knowledge. Measurement theories are concerned with the description
of changes in ^ during measurement but most such theories accept
that the results of measurements are correctly predicted by QM.
HUP tells us that we can only gain a limited knowledge about the
properties of physical systems no matter how we choose to describe
the process of measurement.
To be more specific, HUP claims that the values of pairs of
certain physical observables cannot both be simultaneously known
with complete precision. Pairs of observables to which this restriction
applies are known as incompatible. The product of the minimum
uncertainties of such pairs is of the order of Planck's constant, a
small but non-zero number. To quote some examples, for position and
momentum in a given direction, kp ^x <5- h
and for energy and time 3-h.
(in these equations, Ae refers to the uncertainty in the value of E,
. -3q. .
and so on; h is Planck's constant, which has the value 6 x 10 Js.)
We can discover an electron's position or momentum to as perfect
a degree of precision as we wish, but we cannot know both simul¬
taneously without introducing an uncertainty in our measured values.
This represents a serious withdrawal from the classical ideal, in
which precision is limited only by the accuracy of our instruments,
and infinite precision is a meaningful, if idealized, goal. According
to QM, this goal is only meaningful in certain cases such as single
measurements.
Heisenberg produced a thought-experiment, the gamma-ray
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microscope , which provides a good illustration of the uncertainty
principle. This microscope is used to find the position of an electron.
The resolution possible in any microscope is limited by the wave¬
length of light which is used. Gamma rays have a very small wave¬
length, and by using high-energy gammas, the wavelength can be
reduced without limit, since (according to QM) energy is inversely
proportional to wavelength. Thus the electron's position can be
obtained with arbitrary precision.
However, in order for the observer to 'see' the electron, gamma
rays must strike it and be deflected into the microscope's lens
system. On colliding with an electron, an unpredictable amount of
momentum will be transferred from the gamma ray to the electron.
The size of this discontinuous momentum change is limited by the
energy of the gamma ray. Thus, as the position of the electron is
specified more precisely (by increasing the energy of the gamma ray)
the momentum of the electron becomes more uncertain. Hence HUP is
seen to hold in this thought-experiment.
Heisenberg himself adopted an operationalist approach to
measurement. He argued that we can only discuss or describe those
things which we can actually measure; our measurements are necessarily
imprecise, hence our description of microsystems is also imprecise.
This viewpoint rejects the notion that we can describe microsystems
at times when we are not observing them. As a result, it avoids the
very difficult problems which arise if we do accept the 'realist'
notion. For a realist is forced to wonder whether the 'fuzziness'
of observables follows simply from the physical facts of any measure¬
ment process, or whether it represents a more fundamental 'fuzziness'
in nature. In other words, even if it is impossible to obtain
simultaneous precise values of the.position and momentum of an
electron, must we conclude that the electron does not simultaneously
possess a well-defined position and momentum at each moment in time?
In fact, according to QM, we are not even permitted the luxury
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of imagining that these quantities are well-defined, even if we
accepted that their values are unknowable with complete precision.
Not only do positivist supporters of QM reject this whole line of
thinking as meaningless, but the physical implications of the theory
raise serious doubts about the validity of such imaginings. The best
way to illustrate this is by reference to another thought-experiment,
the two-slit interference experiment.
The Incompleteness of QM: (2)The Two-Slit Interference Experiment.
According to classical wave theory, if a coherent set of waves
is diffracted by a pair of slits as shown in Figure 1, an interference
pattern is set up which (in the case of light waves) appears as a
set of alternating bright and dark bands on a screen. These bands
represent constructive and destructive interference
The classical explanation of this phenomenon is that a part of
each wave front passes through each slit, and the two parts recombine
at the screen. Phase differences between the two components cause
the interference pattern.
A second classical example consists of a gun firing bullets at
a pair of slits (Figure 2). The bullets which pass through the slits
are embedded in a target and their distribution is plotted as shown.
No interference pattern is seen. Each bullet which arrives at the
target has either passed through the top slit or the bottom slit.
Now consider the results of firing electrons or light at a
two-slit system, taking into account the implications of QM. According
to QM, electrons have wave-like properties and hence can exhibit
diffraction and interference. Conversely, light, which we normally
think of as a wave, is emitted and absorbed only in discrete quanta
(photons), and these photons can be thought of as particles of light.
Thus neither of the above classical models is wholly appropriate
for such microsystems.
QM predicts (and experiments confirm) that if both slits are
open an interference pattern is obtained, while if only one slit is
open a 'bullet-type' distribution is produced (Figure 3). What is
more, these predictions continue to hold even when the frequency of
'firing' is reduced to such an extent that only one electron or



































particles are detected, as single events in a detector and the inter¬
ference pattern is the summation of many such events e)
This suggests that an electron or photon can interfere with itself.
A particle model would suggest that each particle travels only
through one slit, since it cannot he in two places at the same time,
yet in the two-slit case, the presence of the other slit (through
which the particle presumably did not pass) alters the outcome so
that the interference pattern occurs. Nevertheless, the arrival
of a particle at the detector is a single event, even in the two-slit
case.
Further, if a detector is placed at each slit, then for each
electron entering the system, a detector will either register the
electron or it will not. We never get half a 'click1 from a
detector. (However, any such measurement disturbs the electron's
motion and destroys the interference pattern.)
Another major difficulty with a conventional particle model has
been pointed out by Bohm. There are certain regions on the target
where (in the two-slit case) an interference minimum occurs, so that
few or no electrons arrive at these regions. However, in the one-
slit case, some of these regions may receive a large number of
selectrons. As Bohm puts it
"How can the opening of a second slit prevent the electron from
reaching certain points that it could reach if this slit were
closed?"^7
QD provides a consistent-account of all these phenomena. The
electron's behaviour is governed by the wave function . In the
two-slit case, ^causes interference just like any other wave, so
that the amplitude of y at the screen is alternately large and small
in adjacent regions. The magnitude of v|/ at any point represents the
probability that the electron will be located at that point. Points
on the screen where vf is large will receive a large percentage of
the electrons. As we fire more electrons at the slits, the electron
distribution tends to copy the spatial variation in the amplitude
of vjI . Thus QM provides statistical information about an ensemble
of electrons, but since we need to observe a large number of events
to see what pattern actually does emerge, QM provides an adequate
description. (Similarly, in the one-slit case, QM predicts a
distribution corresponding to single-aperture diffraction, and for a
large number of electrons such a distribution is obtained.)
However, although QM accurately predicts the experimental
results, it has now become extremely difficult to talk about 'the
position' of an electron, because the electrons behave partly like
waves (being affected by both slits) and partly like particles
(arriving at specific points on the target). Thus not only are our
measurements restricted (in the way HUP describes) but our ability
to describe the behaviour of physical systems, even when no measure¬
ment is occurring, is also hampered. It goes without saying that this
does not constitute a problem for a positivist, for whom description
without observation is meaningless. Nevertheless, many physicists
have been concerned by this difficulty, and a number of solutions have
been proposed.
Bohr took this restriction very seriously, claiming that our
ordinary (classical) physical concepts were simply inadequate for
describing microsystems. He argued that any attempt to choose
between concepts like 'particle' and 'wave' would inevitably lead
to ambiguity and confusion. He introduced the term complementarity
to describe this view. The principle of complementarity implies that
wave and particle models are both applicable to a certain extent;
.they are mutually exclusive, and neither constitutes a complete
description of reality.
Bohr stressed the connection between the use of any particular
mode of description (wave or particle) and the specific experimental
procedure being employed to examine the system. Experiments which
involve detecting electrons as they pass through the slits necess¬
arily give rise to particle behaviour (no interference), while
experiments using two unobstructed slits gave rise to wavelike
properties (interference patterns).
Bohr extended his complementarity principle to other aspects of
QM, and indeed to other sciences. For example, he argued that
'causality' and 'space-time description' were a pair of complementary
modes of description in QM. Either we describe systems using the
Schrodinger equation (where the system evolves causally provided it
is not disturbed) or we interact with a system (and thus alter its
behaviour in an uncontrollable way) in order to measure its physical
state. We can have either causal evolution or quantitative measurements,
but not both at the same time' .
The extension of complementarity into other areas such as
biology, psychology and even theology will be discussed in Chapter
Three. I quote here a single example. Bohr argued that biological
experiments in vitro were complementary to experiments in vivo. For
instance, we can describe an organ either in terms of its function
for the living organism, or in terms of the organ's internal structure
Experiments which study the internal structure of an organ are,
according to Bohr, necessarily fatal to the host organism, so that
the two modes of description, and the procedures used to obtain these
descriptions, are mutually exclusive.
Critics of Bohr's 'complementarity principle' have argued
that the use of this term reifies and exaggerates the philosophical
significance of what may well be a temporary limitation on our
experimental techniques and on our knowledge. As we shall see in
Chapter Three, it certainly seems to be true that some authors have
invoked complementarity to defend vitalism in biology.
A detailed analysis of complementarity is hampered by Bohr's
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rather vague and ambiguous use of the term. As Jammer points out,
Einstein could not comprehend Bohr's usage, and even supporters of
Bohr, such as von Weizsacker, apparently did not fully appreciate
Bohr's meaning.
Having discussed the limitations which QM imposes on our descrip¬
tions of reality, let us now examine some critiques of QM which argue
that more detailed descriptions of reality are possible. I shall
discuss two such critiques, both of which have been highly influential,
and both of which will be referred to again later in this thesis.
These alternative arguments are Bohm's hidden variable theory (HVT)
and the Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen thought-experiment.
As discussed earlier, HVTs can allow a more detailed hypothetical
picture of what occurs when a measurement is made. This greater
detail can also be obtained even when measurements are not being made.
For example, in Bohm's (1952) HVT, it is possible to refer to
precise values of (say) the position and momentum of an electron at
30all times . In addition, the behaviour of the electron is completely
causal. Causal interactions take place between hidden variables at a
'sub-quantum level'. Our existing measuring instruments do not give us
w
access to this level, hut only to the 'higher' level at which QM
operates. There is no empirical difference between this HVT and QM
because the HVs 'average out' to the values predicted by QM. In
particular, the uncertainty principle is retained as a practical
limitation on our knowledge. However, there is an important
conceptual difference between the theories, namely that within Bohm's
HVT it makes good sense to refer to observables such as position
and momentum simultaneously, even if we choose not to, or are at
present unable to, measure them simultaneously.
To illustrate this difference, consider the two-slit electron
interference experiment. Within Bohm's HVT,
"this experiment is described causally and continuously, in terms of
a single precisely defined conceptual model."3^
Here, the electron is a real particle, and VjV represents a real
physical field which sets up forces which act on the electron. The
wave is diffracted by the slits and sets up an interference
pattern, while the electron, like a classical particle, passes through
one or other of the slits. Because the amplitude of ^ varies
markedly on the far side of the slits, the electron experiences
complex forces as it travels towards the target. The electron's
trajectory is therefore difficult to describe, and in practice only
statistical predictions about its final position are possible. These
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predictions turn out to be identical with those of QM. The
conceptual distinction between the theories is that in the HVT the
electron follows a definite trajectory, about which we can
meaningfully talk even if in practice it is not possible to measure it.
Einstein'-s.. response to the apparent incompleteness of QM was
quite different. As one might suppose from his well-known statements
about God not playing dice, Einstein was unhappy with the idea of
renouncing causality. Initially, he tried to show that the uncertainty
principle was not fundamental, and he produced a number of thought-
experiments which claimed to provide simultaneous arbitrarily accurate
values for apparently incompatible observables. However, in each case,
Bohr managed to show that Einstein had neglected some feature of
the experiment and that the observed system was necessarily disturbed
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by the measurement, so that uncertainty remained.
Although Einstein was apparently forced to concede that QM was
dc
consistent, he refused to accept that it was a complete description
of reality. His position was most strongly expressed in a paper
which he co-authored with Podolsky and Rosen in 1935 (hereafter
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referred to as EPR) . EPR argue that incompatible quantities could
still have precise values, although we may not know what these values
are.
This paper has exerted a great influence on later work on the
interpretation of QM; in particular, it forms the background for the
experimental tests of local hidden variables. However, EPR's discussion
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is rather difficult to follow. In a textbook written in 1951» Bohm
recast the EPR argument into a clearer form, and virtually all
subsequent references to EPR make use of Bohm's version. I shall
adopt the same procedure.
EPR first state their philosophical premises. First, every
element of physical reality must have a counterpart in any physical
theory which claims to be a complete description of reality. Second,
if, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with
certainty the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an
element of reality corresponding to this physical quantity.
Within these premises are other implicit assumptions, and it will
be useful for the argument which follows to point them out. Implicit in
the first premise is the assumption that the world can be analyzed int>
distinct, separable 'elements of reality'. Implicit in the second
premise is the assumption that a prediction of the value of a quantity
which is sure to be correct is in every way equivalent to an actual
measurement of that quantity.
EPR then describe a particular thought-experiment. Consider a
molecule for which the total spin angular momentum is zero . The
molecule consists of two atoms, each with non-zero spin, and these spins
are oppositely directed so that their vector sum is zero. We can
define spin components along any direction. Let us choose three
mutually-perpendicular directions x, y, and z, and denote the spin
components along these directions Byd^, &y.t ando^. Because the total
spin is zero, the spin components of the two atoms along any of these
three axes are equal and opposite; that is,
Oh = -C , d = - CT , and £f = - C
xl V yl V zl Z2
<{-1
An additional feature which is unique to QM and follows directly
from the uncertainty principle is that, for any particle, no two
perpendicular spin components can both be known with complete precision.
For example, /iC fiCT ^h, ffd h, and so on.
1 yl y2 Z2
If the molecule dissociates into its constituent atoms and these
atoms then fly apart, the total spin of the pair of atoms remains
constant (at zero) and the above.relationships between the spin
components continue to hold. Therefore, if we measure, say, & ,
1
we can predict the value of £) with complete certainty, since
G =-£> . *2
X2 xl
According to EPR's definition, G' is an element of reality.
X2
But we have not physically interacted with the second atom in any
way, which suggests that O' was an element of reality even before
X2
we measured O" , because this measurement could not have had any
X1
effect on the second atom. (Recall that the argument is independent
of the distance between the two atoms so that they could be millions
of miles apart.) However, we could instead have measured CT" , and
hence predicted C with certainty. Thus, according to EPR,^(j'
y2 y2
is also an element of reality. By extension, we could reorient our
measuring apparatus while the atoms were in flight, and so conclude
that all possible components of the second atom's spin are,
simultaneously, precisely defined and real. This contradicts the
uncertainty principle so that QM does not completely describe reality.
As is typical in the interpretation of QM, the thought-experiment
can be interpreted in several ways. For example, Bohr emphasised
the fact that different experimental arrangements are required to
measure different spin components, and that these arrangements are
mutually exclusive. According to Bohr, the concept of a physical
property cannot be considered in isolation from the measurement
procedures by which a value for the property is obtained. Since no two
spin components can be measured at the same time, such spin components
are not simultaneously real.
Thus, Bohr resolves the EPR problem by rejectingboth of their
premises. First, it is not the case in QM that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between elements of reality and elements of the
mathematical formalism. QM yields only statistical predictions of
outcomes, and many classical concepts, such as particle and wave,
are simply inappropriate for describing microsystems.
Secondly, whereas EPR claim that a physical quantity is real if
its value can be predicted with certainty, Bohr attributes reality
only to quantities which are actually measured experimentally. This
is quite consistent with the earlier discussion of Bohr's account of
the two-slit experiment, where the choice of model (wave or particle)
is inextricably linked with the fexperimental procedure being used.
EPR does not only raise questions about QM. Any alternative
'realist' theory should also be able to account satisfactorily for
EPR. For example, Bohm's HVT reproduces the results of QM, including
the uncertainty principle. Let us examine how this theory copes with
EPR.
Bohm suggested two alternative solutions. The first applies
if QM's predictions are actually verified by experiments, and the
second raises the possibility that QM might be empirically falsified.
Let us begin with Bohm's first possibility.
The problem is to reconcile the predictions of QM, which are
retained in Bohm's HVT, with the additional assumption that all the
spin components are real and precisely defined, as required in a
. realist HVT. Recall that if d is measured then d is known
X1 X2
precisely while C and <T are not. Thus if 6" were to be
yp y2
measured after d was measured, the value obtained for (T would
X1 y2be random. If, on the other hand, we had measured 6^ followed by
"ld
, the value obtained for d would now be fixed, and set equal
y2 y2to ~d > while the other spin components of the second atom
yl X2
and 6 7 would be random.
Z2
Because of the nature of Bohm's theory, we cannot evade the
responsibility of providing a causal explanation for the behaviour
of the second atom. In other words, we have to ask: how does the
second atom 'know' which spin components should be random and which
should not, and how can this knowledge be 'updated' instantaneously
should we decide (after the atoms are in flight) to measure a
different spin component of the first atom?
For Bohr, of course, none of these problems exist, because until
a measurement is performed, none of the spin components are
meaningful. However, Bohm's HVT can only agree with QM if the HVs
are allowed, to carry * messages' from the first to the second atom,
'telling' the second atom which spin components it should randomise.
These signals, moreover, have to be able to travel at an infinitely
fast speed in order to reproduce QM's prediction of an instantaneous
change in the second atom should we decide to measure a new component
of the first atom's spin. The necessity of such faster-than-light
signalling over arbitrarily large distances is, to many people, a
major difficulty for any HVT whidh attempts to reproduce the predictions
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of QM.
We turn now to Bohm's second possible solution. Bohm pointed
out that no existing experiment has actually tested the predictions
of QM under the extreme conditions of the EPR thought-experiment.
All the experiments which have examined correlations between pairs of
particles are static, so that (for example) spin directions are
fixed throughout the experiment. Under these circumstances, there is
no need to postulate infinitely-rapid signals passing between the atoms
because much slower signals would still have time to transmit the
information about the spin direction which was going to be measured.
This raises the possibility that if the spin measuring devices were
to be reoriented while the atoms were in flight, then the correlations
predicted by QM (and by Bohm's HVT) might not be found. Bohm's
oo
discussion of this possibility in 1957 and again in 1962
anticipates the much later attempt by Aspect to construct an experiment
to test this possibility. This experiment will be discussed below.
Bell's Theorem and Local Hidden Variables.
The EPR argument was originally constructed to support the argument
that QM does not provide the most complete possible description of
reality. However, EPR did not suggest that the predictions of QM
were empirically incorrect. Nevertheless, some thirty years later,
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EPR was revived by John Bell and used to make such a suggestion .
Bell used the same basic physical situation as EPR; that is, a
coupled system dissociates into two parts, and QM predicts that the
properties of the two parts are not independent, even if they become
widely separated. In other words, long-range correlations exist
between the properties of the subsystems. Bell constructed an
alternative hidden-variable theory in which such correlations were
S o
absent. According to this theory, the subunits behave quite independently
of one another from the moment they separate. This theory is therefore
a local hidden-variable theory (LHVT) whereas QM is clearly non-local.
Some authors have remarked that most physicists, including
many supporters of QM, intuitively think of the world in 'local'
terms. Although most physicists may recognise the existence of
coupled systems which (according to QM) can only be described in
terms of their combined properties, there is nevertheless a tendency
to drop this approach when the correlated subsystems become separated.
It is tempting to think, for example, that each member of a photon
pair (produced by electron-positron annihilation) has a well-defined
set of properties which are manifested quite independently of what
we do to the other member of the pair.
The great significance of Bell's work is that he was the first
person to point out explicitly that such local mental pictures are
quite inconsistent with the predictions of QM. This seems a rather
startling finding, and in retrospect we may be surprised at the lack
of interest in locality in earlier years. Even Bohm's attempt to
provide a realist underpinning of QM, which explicitly mentioned
the need for instantaneous nonlocal Interactions in any such attempt,
did not arouse much widespread interest in the essentially non¬
local character of QM. The later experimental tests of Bell's
postulated LHVT seem to suggest that the world is really non-local,
and (as we shall see) many of the experimenters have hailed this as
an important finding. However, in a way it is strange to find this
sort of reaction to the experiments, since they merely appear to
confirm the predictions of a theory which has been generally accepted
for over fifty years.
Certain aspects of QM's nonlocality, such as the Pauli
£j-i
exclusion principle , were recognised at a very early stage, and
even nonlocality on a macroscopic scale was not unknown. For example,
the accepted account of superconductivity assumes coherent behaviour
of electrons throughout a sample of macroscopic dimensions. Yet as
far as I can tell, Bell was the first person to introduce explicitly
the concept of locality in connection with the EPR thought-experiment.
Perhaps the reason for the surprise with which Bell's work was greeted
in some quarters was that he was the first person to construct an
£~(
explicit local formulation of a physical process like the EPR
experiment and to show that such a formulation was incompatible with
QM-. In addition, it is very easy in the context of EPR to show that
QM's nonlocal predictions can extend not only over macroscopic,
but also over astronomical distances. As one author put it,
"^Bell's theorem] shows that our ordinary ideas about the world ^
are somehow profoundly deficient even on the macroscopic level."
Let us examine the distinction between QM and LHVT in more
detail, for a particular experimental situation. The most commonly
discussed case is the correlation between the polarizations of a
pair of photons created in such a way that (according to QM) they
constitute a coupled system. Thus, according to QM, the wave function
of each photon contains elements which relate to the state of the
other photon. In contrast, LHVT claims that the state of an individual
photon is governed by a set of hidden variables and that this state
function contains no reference to the other member of the photon
pair. Thus (according to LHVT) localization occurs as soon as the
photon pair is emitted.
This distinction between QM and LHVT, although conceptually
obvious, is not at all marked at the experimental level. For example,
both theories would predict that if (say) the polarization of one
photon is found to be parallel to a certain axis, then that of the
other photon will, if measured, be found to be antiparallel to that
axis. However, the ways in which the two theories arrive at these
predictions are rather different. According to QM, the photons
remain coupled until one is measured, and this act then fixes the
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parameters of the other photon . Accoriing to LHVT, the parameters
of the photons are set, once and for all, on emission, but their
values are such that the same complementary relationship holds. The
difference is a subtle one, and it is difficult to imagine an
experiment which could discriminate between these two theories.
In his 1964 paper , Bell describes an experimental procedure
which could, in principle, provide such a test. What is more, Bell's
reasoning is remarkably general, and discriminates between QM and
all possible LHV theories, irrespective of the details of their
structure. Since 196^, a large number of modifications of 'Bell's
Theorem' have been proposed, and some of the later versions bear very
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little resemblance to the original . Nevertheless, all such theorems
conclude that although QM and LHVT are indistinguishable for single
pairs of measurements, it is possible to discriminate between the
theories by comparing the results of a series of measurements
taken at different orientations. In the case of photon polarization
correlation experiments, an empirical quantity (usually denoted by )\ )
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is defined as a sum of coincidence counting rates . Such rates
count the frequency with which bdth members of a pair successfully
pass through polarization analysers, and these rates depend upon
the orientations of the pair of analysers. Rates for different
orientations are added to give a value for ^ . 'Bell's Inequality'
states that, for any LHVT, )\ is less than zero. In contrast, according
to QM A can be a positive quantity if the analyser orientations are
chosen correctly. In this way, a series of measurements should
allow a clear distinction between QM and LHVT. The difficulty arises
in matching this theoretical prediction to the real (and therefore
imperfect) conditions found in actual experiments.
Experimental Tests of Hidden Variable Theories.
Until fairly recently (1967), discussion of the interpretation
;of QM, and of the validity of possible alternatives, was confined to
theoretical work involving philosophical or mathematical analysis and
reference to thought-experiments. Since 1967. a- number of real
experiments have been performed which attempt to discriminate in
a more clear-cut way between various alternative theories. A major
theme of this thesis is that the switch to experimental investigation
did not mean the end of theoretical and philosophical wrangling.
However, before discussing this point, it may be useful to describe
the basic features of the various experiments which have been performed.
47(l) Papaliolios' test of the Bohm-Bub theory.
Earlier, it was pointed out that Bohm and Bub added a nonlinear
term to the Schrodinger equation and so implied that reduction of
the wave function was a physical process which took a certain amount
of time to complete. In hidden-variable terms, measurements disturb
the HVs and it takes time for the equilibrium distribution (which
averages out to QM) to be restored. The time required for this process
is often referred to as the relaxation time.
o
Boriift and Bub suggested, as a tentative estimate, that the
-13relaxation time was of the order of 10 seconds. As we shall see in
Chapter Pour, this value seems to have been rather arbitrary, and
this had important consequences for the reception of Papaliolios'
experiment. Nevertheless, this value appears explicitly in their
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paper, and raised the possibility that an experiment could either
corroborate or falsify their theory. If two consecutive measurements
-13
are performed on a physical system and less than 10 seconds passes
between the first and second measurements, then the HVs will not have
had time to return to their equilibrium values and the results of
the second measurement will not be in accordance with the predictions
of QM.
Papaliolios performed polarization measurements on photons,
using polaroid filters with axes oriented as in Figure 4-. The arrows
indicate the polarization axes of the polarizers. Light which passes
through A is polarized along the direction of A's axis. Only a
fraction of this light can then pass through B; the amount depends on
the angle between the axes of A and B. Since these axes are chosen
to be almost perpendicular, very little light will emerge from B.
Thus any photons leaving B are in a precisely-defined state and
(according to Bohm and Bub's theory) the values of their HVs are also
well-defined. This makes it much easier to produce conflicting
predictions for the two theories.
In travelling from A to B, the HVs have plenty of time to return
to their equilibrium values, but this is not the case between B and
G because of the shorter distance involved. Therefore, the QM
4-9
predictions for the intensity of light emerging from G may not hold.
Figure 5 shows the conflicting predictions for the two theories. The
actual experimental results agree with QM to within 1%. Thus either
the Bohm-Bub theory is incorrect, or the relaxation time is much
smaller than the lower limit set by Papaliolios' experiment. This
-14-
lower limit was about 2 x 10 seconds, roughly one-fifth of Bohm
and Bub's original estimate. The interpretation of these findings
will be discussed in Chapter Four.
Experimental arrangement of linear polarizers A, £, and C. The heavy arrows indicate the direction of
polarization transmitted by each polarizer. The arrows labeled l&j) and Ib2) indicate the direction of polarization
for the eigenstates of polarizer £, and lct), lc2) for the eigenstates of polarizer C. Angle e = 10".
Figure 4-
The solid curve indicates transmission ver¬
sus 6 according to quantum mechanics and is propor¬
tional to cos20. The dotted curve is that predicted by
the Bohm-Bub theory for e = 10°, assuming no relaxa¬
tion of the hidden variables. The data, taken at a re¬
laxation time of 7.5x lo~14 sec, agree witL the quan¬
tum-theory curve to within 1%.
Figure 5
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(2) Experimental test of Winner's 'Consciousness' interpretation.
An ingenious test of this interpretation was performed "by
Shimony and some of his students in 1976^. This group reasoned
that if an observer is responsible for reducing a wave function by
some psychophysical interaction, then it might be possible to
discriminate, by introspecting on one's mental sensations, between
situations in which one has, or has not, reduced a wave function.
The authors concede that this possibility is not demanded by the
consciousness interpretation, and that it constitutes an additional
hypothesis. Failure to make such discriminations might then have
little to do with the basic hypothesis that conscious observers
reduce wave functions. Nevertheless, the experiment is interesting
since it represents as yet the only attempt to test the consciousness
interpretation by empirical means.
In this experiment a radioactive substance is placed near a
Geiger tube which is connected to an amplifier and a pair of counters.
The count rate was approximately one event every thirty seconds.
The counters were observed by two observers, A and B, situated in
separate rooms. By using delay lines, it was ensured that any event
(radioactive decay, tube activation and counter increment) would be
observed in A's room before the signal reached B's room. When the
event was observed, the wave function of the combined system (radio¬
active atom plus apparatus) was reduced from a superposition (a mixture
of 'atom not decayed/counter not activated' and 'atom decayed/ counter
activated') to a pure state ('atom decayed/ counter activated').
Normally, observer A, being the first to see the event, would
be responsible for the reduction, so that the wave function which
reached B would by then already be reduced. However, it was arranged
that, at random intervals, A would stop looking at his counter, so
that B (who looked all the time) would, in such cases, be the first
to observe the event and so would initiate reduction. The aim of the
experiment was to see if B's sensations as he observed an event
differed according to whether he was or was not responsible for the
reduction.
In order to help observer B to make such a judgement, he was
'trained' by observing a number of events which A had already seen
and a number which A had not seen. It is of course possible that the
training period was too short, or (as suggested earlier) that the
two types of observation do not give rise to noticeably different
sensations. The result of this experiment was that B's estimates
of whether he was responsible for reduction were correct exactly
50% of the time, a result which (with remarkable accuracy) fits the
hypothesis that B was simply guessing.
This experiment clearly has many limitations and is far from
being conclusive. Indeed, one might wonder why it was ever performed,
given the methodological objections which can be raised against it.
I shall discuss this issue at some length in Chapter Four.
(3) Experimental Tests of Local Hidden Variable Theory.
A large part of this thesis is devoted to LHV experiments, and
to the ways in which their results were obtained, received and
interpreted. Therefore, it will be necessary to refer to many detailed
aspects of the experiments in the context of this later discussion,
and there seems little point in providing a comprehensive account of
the experiments at this stage. However, some general comments on their
aims and procedures may be useful here.
The aim of all such experiments is to measure correlations
between the properties of pairs of particles which fit the basic
demands of the EPR thought-experiment. One experiment looked at the
spin correlations of protons. All the other experiments used the
polarization correlation of photons, and I shall restrict the present
discussion to the latter case.~^
Correlated photon pairs can be produced in a number of ways,
and the polarizations of the pair may (according to QM) be either
antiparallel or mutually perpendicular, depending on the mode of
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production. In either case, EPR-type correlations are predicted.
It is not possible to perform a direct measure of polarization.
Instead, the photons enter polarization analyzers (often referred to
as 'polarizers'). Ordinary sheets of polaroid could be used, though
more efficient systems are available. Analyzers have a preferred
axis of polarization, and the transmission rate (between 0 and 100$)
depends on the difference in direction between the analyzer's axis
and the photon's polarization. (Complete alignment between these
directions.gives 100$ transmission, while no light will emerge from
£ 1
one polarizer if these directions are perpendicular.) Detectors
are then used to measure the transmission rate. Figure 6 shows a
schematic diagram of the process.
There are many practical difficulties associated with such
experiments. For instance, only a small fraction of the photon pairs
will travel in the required directions and encounter the measuring
apparatus. Most of the pairs will "be emitted in different directions
and so will not be detected. The'count rates are therefore small,
and long runs (up to several hours in the early experiments) are
needed before significant amounts of data are accumulated.
A more serious difficulty is that the photons may not be emitted
in exactly opposite directions as shown in Figure 6. One method of
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photon production uses atomic cascades , and the emitting atom may
recoil, carrying off some momentum and destroying the symmetry of
the arrangement. A photon may therefore avoid detection by 'missing'
the apparatus while its partner on the other side passes straight
through the other set of apparatus and is detected. An additional
problem with the use of cascades is that the photons produced are
of low energy and cannot be detected with great efficiency.
Both of these problems are serious ones, because they distort
the results. Thus the detection of a single photon may lead us to make
incorrect inferences about the polarization of its partner, simply
because the partner flew off at an angle or failed to register when
it arrived at a detector. Both problems can be avoided by using
high-energy photons produced by electron-positron annihilation ,
but it is very difficult to measure the polarization of such photons.
In addition, there is a considerable amount of 'noise' in all
photon experiments, produced partly by the presence of stray light
from outside the system, and partly by random triggering of the
detectors even when no photon is present, due to background radiation
and thermal 'dark current'. In all the experiments, electronic
coincidence circuitry was used to minimise noise. To illustrate this,
Figure 7 shows data from an early correlation experiment in which
the polarizers' axes were set either parallel or perpendicular.We
would then expect either 100% or zero coincidence. An artificial delay
is introduced between the registration of signals from the first and
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effects, it should "be independent of the delay time. If genuine, it
should only show up when the delay time is zero. The graphs in
Figure 7 show the presence of genuine coincidences together with a
large amount of noise.
Let me summarize the results of these correlation experiments.
The proton spin experiment found that the QM predictions were accurate.
Four experiments using high-energy photons have been performed.
Three gave results in agreement with QM while the fourth was ambiguous;
its results lay on the limit of Bell's Inequality, since the quantity
"A was calculated to be approximately zero.
Four experiments using low-energy photons have also been
performed. Three gave good agreement with QM while the fourth came
out clearly in favour of LHVT. The reception of this anomalous
experiment is especially interesting and will be discussed in detail
later. At the risk of pre-empting this discussion, however, it would
be accurate to say that this experiment is not now accepted by the
LHVT group as a valid result.
Note Apart from Chapter Three, the rest of this thesis is concerned
almost exclusively with critical approaches to QM. That is, the work
to be examined is concerned with reinterpreting or modifying the theory
in order to remove perceived difficulties either with the conventional
interpretation or with the theory itself. Such work is quite different
from 'routine' or 'orthodox' extensions of QM, in which the theory is
applied in new contexts. Rather than make this distinction repeatedly
in the text, I shall adopt physicists' own usage, by referring to
such critical work as work dealing with 'Foundations of QM' (FQM).
( o
Chapter Three
Quantum Mechanics and Society
Introduction
The general theme of this thesis is the relationship between
scientific knowledge and the social context in which that knowledge
is generated, transmitted and interpreted. As pointed out in Chapter
One, the term 'social context' can be defined in a number of ways.
In the present chapter, it is employed in its widest sense, to
represent society as a whole; that is, the social, cultural and
political milieu in which the activity of physicists is embedded.
In Chapter One, I argued that the content of scientific
beliefs is not uniquely determined by the application of a single
methodology or by interaction with the natural world. It is therefore
possible to inquire whether scientific beliefs reflect the context
in which they originated or were developed. I also argued that
knowledge should be seen as a resource to be actively manipulated
and employed in the pursuit of personal or social interests, rather
than as a set of facts to be accepted at face value. This implies that
the same set of scientific beliefs can be interpreted and employed
in different ways by different groups.
Both these issues will be discussed here. In the first part
of the chapter, I shall discuss two quite different social contexts
(Weimar Germany, and the Soviet Union during and after the reign of
Stalin) and I shall examine the development of QJ4 in these contexts.
Much of the empirical data is taken from the work of Forman"'" and
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Graham , though the approach taken here, and the conclusions reached,
differ to some extent from those of the original authors.
In the second part of this chapter, I shall examine the wide
variety of inferences which have been drawn from QJVI by various groups
of physicists and non-physicists. We have already seen in Chapter
Two that QJVI can be interpreted in many different ways; here we shall
deal with the implications which QJ4 is claimed to have for other
areas of belief.
This chapter will serve several purposes. It will provide
C\
evidence in favour of the view that even modern physics is not
immune from external cultural influences. Since the remainder of the
thesis will concentrate on influences within the scientific
community, this evidence will he useful in demonstrating that there
is no sharp discontinuity between 'internal' and 'external' influences.
Second, an examination of the treatment of concepts such as
causality and complementarity by scientists in Germany and the
USSR will illustrate the negotiability, or flexibility, of meanings
within science. The second part of the chapter will demonstrate
that meanings are even more flexible outside physics, and that it
is very difficult, even in principle, to discriminate between 'valid'
and 'invalid' applications of terms such as complementarity. In
Chapter Four, I shall use this finding to criticise another case-
study, whose author makes unproblematic identifications of 'causal'
and 'dialectical' theories, and I shall go on to propose a model
of controversies which is consistent with this finding.
Third, the evidence in the present chapter will introduce us
both to the constraining effects of the cultural context (to which
physicists respond) and also to the active employment by physicists
of the resources provided by this culture. In Chapters Five and Six
I shall return to this dichotomy, dealing in detail with both these
effects in a much smaller area of scientific activity.
QM and the Weimar Republic: Forman's Case-Study.
Forman's case-study of the origins of QM in Germany in the
1920's is often cited in texts on the sociology of scientific
knowledge, though it is usually described as 'speculative' or
3
'controversial'. The reason for this is that it is possible to
read his paper as claiming that cultural factors led physicists
to alter the content of physics. If accepted, such a claim would
L\.
provide strong evidence in favour of the sociology of knowledge.
Unfortunately, Forman's arguments are often ambiguous, and at many
points in his paper he makes much weaker claims for the role of
cultural factors in the development of QM. It is therefore important
to examine his data and his arguments in some detail.
QM was developed in the 1920's mainly by German-speaking Central
European physicists. It was (and still is) represented as an acausal
theory, and was thus seen to constitute a break with the traditions
of 'classical' physics. At the same time as QM was being developed,
the dominant cultural movement in Germany was anti-scientific,
irrationalist, pessimistic and anti-determinist - the so-called
'Lebensphilosophie', characterised by Spengler's highly influential
book 'The Decline of the West'. Forman asks whether the development
of an acausal science in such a context was purely coincidental. He
concludes that it was not, but it* is difficult to decide just how
strong he thinks the connection is.
Certainly, many physicists participated in the general cultural
movement, reading Spengler and adopting a philosophical dislike
for causality. By quoting physicists' speeches before lay audiences,
Forman persuasively argues that they were eager, even before the
development of the 'new' quantum theory^, to present physics in such
a way that it did not seem to be in conflict with the general
cultural trend. For example, Reichenbach argued that complete
determinism was an unnecessary and unjustified assumption which, in
the interests of economy, should be rejected.^ Schrodinger claimed
that even in classical physics, what we actually observe are statist¬
ical laws, which do not require causal determination of individual
7
events.
Forman cites a number of similar cases, noting that the
arguments against causality were often less than rigorous:
"What is most striking is |_Nernst'sj resolve to sink the law of
causality by hook or by crook"®
and
"the most striking features of the manifesto are, on the one hand,
the quasi-moral terms in which causality....is repudiated Thy
Schrodinger^and, on the other hand, the frivolousness with which
the objections to dispensing with causality are dismissed."9
A large number of physicists made virtually simultaneous 'public
conversions' to acausality. Since, as he points out
"there were at just this moment no specific developments in physics
which could plausibly be regarded as the source of such acausal
convictions"-*-0
it seems a plausible conclusion that
"what we are dealing with is, essentially, a capitulation to....
intellectual currents in the German academic world."-'--'-
(1
However, the extent of this capitulation is not clear. Most
of Forman's evidence in favour of this apparent change in physicists'
attitudes consists of extracts from speeches made by physicists
before general bodies of academics. He concedes that such statements
may be part of a 'public relations' exercise, rather than expressions
of physicists' own convictions:
"When one recalls that the audiences for most of these renunciations
of causality were, in the first instance, the whole body of the
university assembled on a ceremonial occasion, then I think it
reasonable to construe such renunciations as attempts to alter, or
at least receive a special dispensation from, an unbearably
' "
of the theoretical physicist as a 'hard-
This claim may be uncontentious. However, Forman apparently
wishes to go further, by making the charitable assumption that such
public declarations represented a real desire among physicists to
dispense with rigorous causality;
"There was in fact a strong tendency among German physicists and
mathematicians to reshape their own ideology towards congruence with
the values and mood or their environment„"-L3
If we reject this argument, we are forced to conclude that the
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public statements were "mere image projection" and that
"physicists and mathematicians were engaged in a cynical manipulation
of their image."^-5
What evidence is there that physicists were not simply engaged in
image manipulation? The most convincing sign that physicists took
the rhetoric seriously is their attitudes to 'crises'. One of the
central tenets of Spenglerian philosophy was that the whole Western
world was experiencing a series of crises. As one would expect from
the 'image management' argument, physicists were eager
"to serve themselves with the crisis rhetoric when addressing a
general academic audience"16.
However, Forman goes further than this, arguing that physicists
were impelled to look for, and to create, crises in their own
discipline. In particular, over a very short time, a crisis was
perceived (or constructed) in the 'old' quantum theory. Forman
claims that this perception was not justified on technical grounds:
"While it is undoubtedly true that the internal developments in
atomic physics were important in precipitating the widespread sense
of.crisis..o.nevertheless it now seems evident to me that these
internal developments were not in themselves sufficient conditions.
The possibility of the crisis in the old quantum theory was, I think,
dependent on the physicists' own craving for crises, arising from
participation in, and adaptation to, the Weimar intellectual milieu
....the crisis of the old quantum theory, far from being forced
upon the German physicists, was more than welcome to them."-'-''7
This, then, is a rather stronger claim, namely that social
pressures altered physicists' perceptions of their own discipline,
and, precipitating the conviction that something was seriously
wrong with the current theory, led them to attempt to modify it.
In other words, external social pressures altered the direction of
physics.
Forman also claims that these social pressures also affected
the reception given to proposed alternatives to the old theory.
Proposals were judged not only on their technical merits, but also
on the extent to which they renounced causality. There are three
pieces of evidence to support this claim. First, Forman discusses
a paper by Bohr, Kramers and Slater, which was speculative yet also
involved what Slater called 'discarding rational causation'. Forman
writes:
"It is, I think, only by reference to the widespread acausal
sentiment that one can understand the immediate and widespread
assent which the theory received in Germany, even though it was in
fact hardly a theory at all, but rather a vague suggestion."
Secondly, there was a small number of physicists, including Einstein,
who had not publicly repudiated causality, and who felt that
"fellow physicists were rushing to embrace a failure of causality
without having made any serious attempt to explore the possibilities
of a causal solution.'"
Thirdly, Forman discusses the reception of the 'new' quantum theory.
Not only was it rapidly accepted by German physicists, but it was
also widely publicised by physicists who were eager to "carry the
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good news to the educated public" . Articles about the new theory
were published in the popular press even before the major technical
papers appeared in print.
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In a later paper, Forman examines the reception of QM in
Britain, where there was no cultural movement against causality.
His results are consistent with the claims made above, since British
physicists not only showed less interest in the 'crisis' of the old
quantum theory, but also laid far less emphasis on the acausal aspects
cy
of the new theory.
Thus, Forman is clearly arguing not only that physicists made
rhetorical statements about causality for purposes of 'image
management', but also that they actively tried to incorporate
acausal concepts into their theories, and eagerly welcomed an
acausal theory, stressing the fact that it was acausal. We should
note, however, that this account is far from being a full-blown
'externalist' or 'relativist' model of the development of QM. It
implies, for example, that QM is indisputably acausal; it also
implies that although external factors may affect the direction of
science by providing specific cultural resources, focussing attention
on specific problems, and setting specific goals, internal technical
considerations are still responsible for generating and evaluating
new theoretical developments.
In some of his writings, Forman seems to be going much further
than this, arguing that physicists chose to construct an acausal
theory, either partly or wholly as a result of social pressures.
Consider the following statements:
"If the physicist were to improve his public image, he had first
and foremost to dispense with causality....And this, of course,
turned out to be precisely what was required for the solution of
those problems in atomic physics which were then at the focus of
the physicists' interest.
and even more explicitly
"physicists were impelled to alter their ideology and even the content
of their science in order to recover a favourable public image.
The implication of this stronger argument is that acausality
might not have been a necessary requirement for the solution of
the technical problems which physicists faced. Of course, technical
considerations meant that any new theory which physicists came up
with would have to be able to account for experimental data, but
acausality might simply have been a 'gloss' which physicists chose
to place on this theory. As time passed, this acausal gloss may
have become reified, and the theory may have come to be seen as
inherently acausal.
It seems clear that the controversial status of Forman's paper
follows from the fact that it can be read in this way. However,
Forman does not clearly come out in favour of this strong account.
In his later paper, on the reception of QJYI in Britain, he describes
u
his earlier work as a study of the reception, and not the construc-
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tion, of Qjyi in Germany «, He also claims, simply as a matter of fact,
that QJM is acausal:
"the epistemic hearing of the new theory was simply overlooked"
and
"The Solvay Congress.... opened the eyes of the participating British
physicists to the inescapably acausal character of the quantum
mechanics. -5
Evidently, if QM is inescapably acausal, then neither the Weimar
context nor any other events outside the technical domain could have
affected the form which the theory took, although of course the
popularity and rhetorical usefulness of this form may indeed have
been dependent on its cultural context.
In a recent critique of Forman's study, Hendry also rejects the
'strong' account which claims that the acausality of QM was solely
a response to the milieu, although he feels that
"Forman has succeeded in demonstrating an influence of the milieu
upon physicists' attitudes to causality, and....he could even
assert quite reasonably that the attitudes were in some (weak)
sense 'caused' by the milieu."
Hendry concludes that, by underestimating the effect of purely
internal technical developments in physics, Forman has exaggerated
the role of the milieu, at least in his strongest statements.
Given the weakness of the case in favour of the 'strong'
reading of Forman, must we conclude that QM is inherently acausal,
for purely technical reasons, and that such an acausal theory would
have emerged in any cultural context? I would argue that it is
possible to reject these conclusions, provided we are careful about
what we mean by 'an acausal theory'.
It is possible that, in a different context, a completely
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different theory could have arisen. For example, Einstein claimed
that no serious attempts were made to develop a causal theory; he
clearly believed that such a theory might have been found if German
physicists had seriously looked for it.
A second possibility is that, given the actual solution to the
technical problems - namely, the formalism of QM - a causal
interpretation of this theory could have been constructed. We have
already seen that most British physicists did not emphasise the
n
supposedly acausal character of QM to anything like the same extent
as the Germans did. Moreover, 'causality' is a notoriously vague
concept, as Hendry points out:
"Two physicists might agree completely as to the definition of
causality, but differ completely as to whether it had been rejected
in a theory. In particular the same situation might be seen by one
as a rejection of causality and by the other as a temporary absence
of a causal theory, and to make matters worse these two views might
be expressed in exactly the same words."28
In 1952, David Bohm produced a 'causal' interpretation of QM^
which, although limited in its scope, seems to contain no factual
errors, and yields the same (correct) experimental predictions as
do more orthodox interpretations of QM. In a sense, then, QM 'is'
neither causal or acausal; its perceived character differs from one
interpretation to another, and individuals do not always agree as
to which interpretation is the best one.
Many factors, other than technical issues, may affect an
individual's choice of interpretation, and the reception given to
different interpretations by the physics community. This will be
discussed in detail in Chapters Four and Six. As things turned out,
Bohm's work in the 1950's was not favourably received. We can only
speculate about what might have happened if Bohm had produced his
'causal' interpretation in Weimar Germany in the 1920's.
In fact, hidden variables were discussed at that time, for
example by Born and de Broglie. de Broglie actually developed a
detailed hidden-variable theory as early as 1926, and he abandoned
it not because it was found to be in error, but because it
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"found little favourable acceptance among other physicists" .
Born also discussed "inner eigenstates", for example in a passage
quoted by Hendry:
"We have no grounds to believe that there are inner eigenstates of
the atom that stipulate a determined collision path. Should we hope
to discover such eigenstates later (such as phases of internal
atomic motion), and to determine them for the individual case? Or
should we agree that the agreement of theory and experiment on the
impossibility of giving a stipulation of the causal lapse is a
pre-established harmony, which rests on the non-existence of such
stipulations? My own inclination is that determinism is abandoned
in the atomic world. But that is a philosophical question, for the
physical arguments are not conclusive <,"31
Born later came out much more clearly in favour of an acausal,
probabilistic interpretation of QM which became incorporated in
the orthodox 'Copenhagen' view. Yet the above passage makes clear
the choice which had to be made to reject hidden variables which
would restore at least the appearance of causality. Hendry also
recognises the implications of hidden variables, when he notes,
after discussing Born's arguments in favour of acausality,
"The existence of hidden microscopic parameters could have changed
this, of course"32.
I certainly do not wish to imply that German physicists in the
1920's were foolish to ignore the possibility of hidden-variable
interpretations of QM. There were very good technical reasons for
the actual form which QM took in this context. In Chapter Four, and
more especially in Chapter Six, I will discuss other cases in which
theories and interpretations were evaluated in terms of 'internal',
technical criteria (that is, in terms of the culture of physics), yet
I will argue that the outcome of this evaluation process remained
at least partially arbitrary, conventionalised, and problematic.
The implication is that, if QM had arisen in a context in which
causality was a respected idea, alternative theories, and causal
interpretations of QM, would have been more favourably received;
if more people had tried to develop approaches like Bohm's and
de Broglie's it is possible that a more complete alternative to
'orthodox' QM would have emerged.
Obviously, this does not constitute a proof that an alternative
theory was possible in Weimar Germany. We are entitled to ask whether
Bohm, transplanted back into the 1920's, would have been able to
construct a causal interpretation without the advantage of having
an acausal version to start with. Even if we accept the possibility
of alternative outcomes to the actual one, it is by no means the
case that physicists can always come up with a technically and
philosophically respectable theory on demand. Of course, it is a
matter of individual preference whether we ascribe this to the
33limited ingenuity of physicists or to the intractability of nature.
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Quantum Mechanics in the Soviet Union
In this section, I shall examine the effects of the changing
political context in the Soviet Union, between the 1920's and the
I960's, on the sorts of interpretations of QM which were held by
Soviet physicists and philosophers. As is well-known, Soviet
science was often influenced by political developments during this
period, the most obvious example being Lysenkoism . The development
of QM in the Soviet Union has also been well documented^.
In many ways, the case of Soviet QM is quite different from
the case of Lysenkoism. As has been discussed in Chapter Two, it
is quite possible, and indeed normal, for physicists to use the
formalism of QM to solve practical problems without having to grapple
with the philosophical problems associated with the interpxe tation
of the formalism. Most Soviet physicists, from the 1920's onwards,
have followed this procedure, as have most Western physicists.
There was no organised attempt by the Soviet state to cast doubt
on the validity of the QM formalism. Indeed, physicists were actively
encouraged to apply their science to economically and militarily
important goals, most notably in the development of the atomic bomb.
Thus the influence of the state on the development of modern physics
in the USSR was, in this sense, similar to the influence exerted
in Western countries. In both cases, technical development in specific
(military) directions were encouraged, while at the same time,
individual scientists could become politically suspect.
However, there is one important difference between the Soviet
case and that of Western countries. The interpretation of QM in the
USSR became a subject of intense political concern. The vehicle by
which this concern was expressed was the relationship between the
the interpretation of QM and that of dialectical materialism
(hereafter DM), the 'official philosophy' of the Communist Party.
Prior to World War Two, there was little official criticism
of any interpretation of QM0 According to Graham:
"Before World War II the views of Soviet physicists on QM were quite
similar to those of advanced scientists everywhere. Russian physics
was in many ways an extension of central and west European physics.
The work of such men as Bohr and Heisenberg influenced scientists in
the Soviet Union as it did everywhere. Indeed, such physicists spoke
of the 'Russian branch' of the Copenhagen school."37
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The first serious critique of the Copenhagen interpretation to
OQ
be made in a Soviet physics journal was by Nikolskii in 1936 • He
called this interpretation 'idealistic' and 'Machist'. However,
this was an isolated incident, and other Soviet physicists, notably
Fock, Blokhintsev, and Omelianovskii, continued to publish views
which were very similar to those of the Copenhagen school throughout
the period up to the war.
Some Western authors have argued that there are clear
philosophical contradictions between Q4 (by which they mean the
Copenhagen interpretation of QM) and DM. (As we shall see later in
this chapter, some Western physicists have gone on to argue that
DM, and therefore Marxism, has thereby been refuted.) Such authors
find it difficult to account for the apparently peaceful coexistence
of QM and DM in the pre-war period. For example, Brush writes:
As one might have expected, the subjectivist flavour of [the Copenhagen
Interpretation^ aroused the suspicions of dogmatic Marxists; what
is surprising is not that the Copenhagen Interpretation was criticized
as being contrary to dialectical materialism but that Soviet
physicists were allowed to accept it without much political
interference in the 1930's«
In fact, there were a number of good reasons for this lack of
political interference. In the first place, just as it is possible
to disagree over the interpretation of QM, so there were also
disputes among dialectical materialists, both over the proper role
of DM within science, and also over the content of the officially-
approved version of DM. These issues were not settled until the early
kQ
1930's.
Secondly, especially in the early years after the revolution,
the Party was reluctant to exert pressure on highly-qualified
scientific and technical personnel in order to convert them to
Marxism. They were too useful in their technical capacities to be
hampered by ideological investigation. Even as late as 1931> Stalin
was counselling Party officials in these terms:
"It would be stupid and senseless now to regard just about every
specialist and engineer of the old school as an undetected criminal
wrecker. We have always considered hostility to specialists a
harmful and shameful thing and we still do„"4'-1-
Indeed, even by 1932, less than 2% of Soviet physicists (excluding
graduate students) were members of the Communist Party.
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A possible third reason for the lack of political interference
is the complete irrelevance of interpretive issues for the application
of QM to practical problems. As in the West, few physicists took
any active interest in interpretation. Even at the height of the
Gold War, relatively few physicists were attacked because of their
views on QM. In the pre-war period, most of the physicists who did
comment on the relationship between QM and DM were content to argue
that there need be no contradiction between adhering to a causal
philosophy (DM) while using an apparently acausal theory (QM),
because QM could be treated as a temporary first step towards a
causal, non-statistical theory. Comparing this argument to more
elaborate defences of QM, Joravsky notes
" This argument, a much simpler method of having the cake of QM
without paying the penny of causality, was and remains very popular
among Soviet Marxists."^2
The period after the Second World War was largely dominated
by the politics of the Gold War, which led, on both sides of the
Iron Curtain, to rigorous attempts to 'purify' intellectual activity
by making it consistent with the dominant ideology. In the Soviet
Union, this process gradually abated after the death of Stalin in
11953• It is possible to trace the effects of these internal policy
changes on Soviet physicists' interpretations of QM.
The 'ideological purge' which began in the late 19^0's is
sometimes known as the Zhdanovshchina, after A.A.Zhdanov, who was
appointed Minister of Culture by Stalin in 19^7• In a speech made
in June, 19^7, Zhdanov had this to say about QM:
"The Kantian vagaries of modern bourgeois atomic physicists lead them
to inferences about the electron's possessing 'free will', to
attempts to describe matter as only a certain conjunction of waves,
and to other devilish tricks. What nation other than ours, the
country of victorious Marxism, and our philosophers, should have
the privilege to lead the fight against the corrupt and vile
bourgeois ideology? Who else than we should deliver to it the fatal
blows?"^3
Despite this strong hint of a tightening-up of official
attitudes towards the interpretation of QM, M.A.Markov wrote a paper
in 19^8 which was strongly in favour of the Copenhagen interpretation.
The paper was published in the second issue of a new journal,
Voprosy Filosofii (Problems of Philosophy). Soon after, a polemical
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attack on Markov's position was made by A.A.Maksimov. A number of
physicists, together with B.M.Kedrov, +he editor of Voprosy Filosofii,
gave their support to Markov's position, and pointed out that
Maksimov's critique contained a number of technical errors. The
technical issues were, however, quickly overshadowed by the
dismissal of Kedrov, together with five members of Voprosy's
editorial board, at the Party's behest.
Kedrov made a public apology:
"The root of my errors is that I violated the Leninist principle
of party spirit in philosophy and deviated towards bourgeois
objectivism and apoliticism."m5
As Graham's account makes clear, the 'Markov affair' had as much
to do with a power struggle among professional philosophers as
with the interpretation of QM, but it certainly left physicists
in no doubt that certain views would not be tolerated. As Zhdanov
himself put it:
"Bohr's point of view is a product which is not viable in the least.
It is refuse which, as Lenin said, must be thrown down the drain."^6
The Markov affair constituted the most extreme case of political
interference in the interpretation of QM. It soon became clear that
the professional ideologists, such as Maksimov, were not competent
; enough in physics to produce alternative interpretations which were
officially acceptable yet also technically self-consistent. The
task of providing an approved interpretation therefore reverted back
to the physicists and philosophers of science who were now much
more aware of the demands of 'party spirit'. It may therefore come
as no surprise to find that their views after the Markov affair
were often different from their earlier positions on QM.
A common view among Western critics of the Soviet Union is that
scientists' attempts to conform to DM during the years of the
'ideological purge' were hypocritical, if understandable, moves
designed to ensure their professional survival. Scientists' 'true'
beliefs, which could only be expressed after the liberalization which
followed the death of Stalin, were claimed to be more in line with
the 'politically neutral' beliefs of Western physicists. For example,
Born said:
"I venture to presume that the opinions of leading Soviet physicists
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are quite similar to ours.... they merely make the concession to
official philosophy by describing the new ideas as a dialectical
development of materialism.""^7
and Heisenberg said:
"It can scarcely be avoided that the narrowness of the doctrines
of DM is felt by those who have really understood modem physics
and its philosophical meaning."^"
There is certainly some evidence in favour of this claim. Take,
for example, the physicist V.A.Fock. He was a member of the pre-war
'Russian branch' of the Copenhagen school, and defended Bohr's
viewpoint throughout the 1930's, arguing that complementarity was
an 'integral part of QM' and 'a firmly established objectively
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existing law of nature.' After the war, complementarity became
officially unacceptable, yet as late as 1949 Fock continued to
defend it. In that year, he came under strong attack, notably in
a book edited by Maksimov, which contained a paper by Omelianovskii
which stated:
"Unfortunately, several of our scientists„...have not yet drawn the
necessary conclusions from the criticism to which Soviet science
subjected the Copenhagen school. For example, V.A.Fock in his earlier
works did not essentially distinguish the uncertainty relationship
from Bohr's principle of complementarity."50
Following this criticism, Fock temporarily ceased to advocats
complementarity. He criticised Bohr's tendency to extend this
principle into other areas such as biology, noting that
"to the extent that the term 'principle of complementarity' has
lost its original meaning....it would be better to abandon it."51
Fock also made some substantive changes to his interpretation of QM.
For example, he changed his definition of the wave function ^ from
being a measure of our information about microsystems to being an
objective description of microsystems.
In the late 1950's» as political pressures eased, Fock began to
discuss complementarity once more. He also visited Bohr in Copenhagen
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in 1957* Fock claimed, though this is not universally accepted, that
Bohr modified his interpretation during this visit. On his return
to the Soviet Union, Fock attended a conference at which he drew a
strong distinction between the 'physically true' part of Bohr's
original ideas, and Bohr's original 'erroneous' philosophical position,
namely, positivism. Now that Bohr had adopted a more objective
philosophy, Fock claimed,
"it is therefore possible to agree completely with Bohr after this
correction of his formulation, and the term 'Copenhagen School'
should no longer be used in a pejorative sense."53
Fock's position soon became the dominant one in Soviet physics.
Bohr's 'rehabilitation' was finalised when he was invited to the
Soviet Union in I96I. Soon after his death in 1962, a commemorative
issue of a leading journal was dedicated to him. His work was
highly praised. Fock's account of Bohr's change of view was now
apparently officially accepted, since the leading article noted the
existence of a historical struggle between materialistic and idealistic
interpretations of Bohr's work, concluding that the work of Soviet
physicists like Fock had helped to make the idealistic interpretation
cK
untenable.
This account of Fock's changes in position seems to support the
view of Western critics that DM exerted a wholly negative role in
the post-war period, and that as soon as this external pressure
was removed, Soviet physicists fell back more or less into line
with the views of Western physicists. Similar changes in position
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by Omelianovskii and Blokhintsev are well documented.
However, it is by no means certain that these responses were
nothing but necessary acts of obeisance towards a stultifying
monopolistic ideology. Certainly, Soviet physicists thought it
wise to include references to DM in their work. But DM is a complex
philosophy, and different physicists were able to select different
elements of the official version of DM in order to justify different
interpretations of QM. Blokhintsev, for example, developed a
statistical interpretation during the 'purge' which differed markedly
from the views of Fock. Bentley summarizes the flexibility of DM
in the following terms:
"Adherence to the Stalinist frame of reference does not ....lead to
identical interpretations of experimental results and thus identical
new theories. In fact, the doctrines [of DM3 are not necessarily
always mutually consistent. Blokhintsev's first interpretation
neglected Stalin's law of universal connections, and his attempt to
rectify this resulted in [his neglectingj Lenin's doctrine of
objective reality. Fock's later interpretation stretched the meaning
of this doctrine, and the Terletsky school (the Soviet equivalent
of the Bohm school) neglected the concept of levels. DM in Soviet
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science is thus not a kind of 'mechanical' replacement for
creativity as a number of Western writers seem to assume."56
DM, then, as part of the cultural context, provided a range
of models, principles, and other resources which physicists could
select and adapt while constructing their interpretations. Given
the importance of DM in the cultural context, it is not surprising
to find that it is also used critically; for example, one of the
ways in which Fock criticised Blokhintsev's interpretation was to
describe it as undialectical:
"A purely statistical point of view is incorrect in a philosophic
sense. In contrast with what DM teaches us, the statistical point
of view issues not from the objects of nature but from observations
....This draws it toward the positivist view of Bohr."57
Blokhintsev's response was to criticise Fock's own definition of the
wave function by claiming it was not consistent with a realist or
materialist view
Making the claim that an opponent's views are in conflict with
the tenets of DM is not simply making a statement of fact. The
former involves a process of selection, and the active construction
of an account which is designed to be rhetorically useful. In a
sense, such claims and counter-claims are very similar to the rather
routine rhetorical exchanges found in any scientific dispute.
Western interpreters of QM engaged in similar exchanges, though here
the key terms were not 'undialectical' or 'positivist' but 'contrary
59to good scientific methodology', 'unreasonable', and so on. Of
course, in the Soviet case, the consequences of losing the battle
for the 'official' definition of reality could be more serious,
although with the exception of Kedrov physicists do not seem to
have suffered greatly for their stance on the interpretation of QM.
Thus, it may have been necessary for Soviet physicists to make
some response to DM during the 'purge'; however, since this response
was an active, and indeed a creative, process, it certainly did not
lead to uniform conformity. Yet critics might argue that all the
interpretations produced during the 'purge' were similarly tainted
and distorted by having to incorporate an alien philosophy which
was irrelevant for the proper development of science. In other
words, it could be argued that 'good methodology', and even
'reasonableness' are concepts with some heuristic value, whereas
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the concepts of DM have none. Yet some Soviet physicists have
continued to defend DM and its rolu in their work, even at times
when there was little pressure for such defences from ideologists.
For example, Blokhintsev continued to defend his statistical
interpretation as late as 1966^, at the same time retaining the
association between his interpretation of QM and his reading of DM,
quoting Engels in his support. Blokhintsev also attacked Bohr's
philosophy, which
"has been the origin of the far-reaching conclusion that the qurrent
mechanics of the atom cannot be compatible with materialism."1
Fock also produced a defence of DM, long after the time when
such statements could be considered compulsory:
"Dialectics plays an essential role in obtaining new outlooks
on the external world and the appropriate ways of description.""^
It is not only in the case of QM that we find Soviet scientists
defending the use of DM as a heuristic device. The mathematician A.D.
Aleksandrov has claimed that Marxist philosophy strongly influenced
his work in mathematics. ^
Graham argues that since the use of DM in science is now
optional, we should take seriously the arguments of those Soviet
scientists who continue to use it. He concludes:
>
"I am convinced ....that quite a few prominent Soviet scientists
believe that DM is a helpful approach to the study of nature. They
have examined many of the same problems of the interpretation of
nature that philosophers and scientists in other countries and
periods have also examined, and they have slowly developed and
refined a philosophy of nature that would almost certainly continue
to survive and evolve even if it were no longer propped up by the
Communist P&rty. It is a philosophy of nature that is tied very
closely to science itself, and it now depends much more on science
for sustenance than on Party ideology.""^
Of course, we are not obliged to accept this conclusion, since
it is possible that, even in relatively liberal periods, it can do
a Soviet scientist ho harm to continue to be seen to support DM,
s c-
and it may even be to his advantage. We should also bear in mind
the general methodological problem of interpreting actors' accounts
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of their actions. Nevertheless, since not all Soviet scientists
continue to refer to DM, there does seem to be an element of choice,
which is hard to reconcile with the view that DM was and is nothing
but a means of enforcing conformity.
It is certainly not the case that all Soviet physicists are
11
'really' in favour of the Copenhagen view, despite the claims to
this effect hy Born and Heisenberg, quoted earlier. Since the 1950's>
Soviet physicists, like those in the West, have examined a number
of alternative interpretations, including statistical interpretations,
Sty
hidden-variable theories, and unified field theories. ^ In retrospect,
it seems clear that Western supporters of the Copenhagen Interpretation
were being just as monopolistic as Soviet dialectical materialists
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in claiming that their own point*of view was uniquely valid.
Although authors such as Born were highly critical of attempts
to incorporate philosophical elements such as DM into physics, they
were not at all reluctant to draw inferences from QM and then apply
them to a critique of DM. This will be the subject of the next section.
Complementarity and Marxism.
In an essay written in 1951» Max Born concluded, from a
consideration of QM, that Marxist doctrines were incorrect. The
argument involves complementarity, which, Born implies, is an
empirically established principle:
"Science is not only the basis of technology but also the material
for a sound philosophy. And the development of modern physics has
enriched our thinking by a new principle of fundamental importance,
' the idea of complementarity."69
Born stresses the novelty of this idea, noting that
"Marxian philosophy, which is a hundred years old, knows of course
nothing of this new principle."^
Because Marxism does not contain a complementarity principle, Bohr
seems to be saying that it must be an incorrect view of reality. He
claims that one of Marxism's central predictions - the eventual
overthrow of capitalism - is false. For, by applying the principle
of complementarity to the conflict between capitalism and communism,
"one would expect a synthesis of some kind, instead of the Marxian
doctrine of the complete and permanent victory of communism."'1
This argument can be criticised in several different ways. To
some critics, the fact that Born was using a physical theory to
attack a political ideology is proof that Born's account is invalid;
this is an illegitimate use of science which simply demonstrates
Born's political bias. For example, the Soviet philosopher of science
Omelianovskii criticised
7^
"modern reactionary bourgeois physicists...^.who, invoking Bohr
and Heisenberg, 'liquidated materialism*."7^
A similar case is made by two Italian physicists, Garuccio
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and Selleri who write:
"QM could certainly not be neutral with respect to the greatest
political conflict of those (and our) times, the struggle between
Socialism and Capitalism. At least two of the main creators of QM,
Born and Heisenberg, in fact saw in their theory a powerful tool
to fight Marxism and to help the widening of the capitalist world."7^
Nevertheless, although Born's motives may be political and
therefore suspect, this does not prove that his arguments are invalid.
However, we are not forced to conclude that Marxism has been disproved;
Born's arguments can be, and have been criticised on substantive
grounds.
For example, while Born argued that complementarity is a new
principle, other supporters of the Copenhagen view have adopted a
quite different position:
"This mode of cognition....was in fact perceived thousands of years
ago by the philosophers of ancient India and China. In modern science,
Niels Bohr has given it the name of complementarity."75
In Chapter Two, we saw that not all physicists accept the
complementarity principle as an essential part of QM; instead of
seeing it as a logical consequence of the formalism, they claim it
is simply part of one interpretation of that formalism. Seen in this
way, complementarity is far less threatening to Marxism than Born
implies.
What is more, some physicists were able to accept both Marxism
and complementarity. The most notable example is Rosenfeld, who worked
in Copenhagen with Bohr. Although he was a Marxist, he felt that
complementarity was a well-established principle:
"The conception of complementarity forces itself upon us with
logical necessity. It is not some fanciful speculation which we
could at will accept or reject according to whether we find it
conformable to some philosophical criterion or other."7°
Unlike some of the Soviet physicists discussed above, Rosenfeld
claimed that the Copenhagen view was quite compatible with Marxism,
though (as we have seen with interpretations of QM and of DM) there
are different interpretations of what is meant by 'the Copenhagen
view':
"It is a pity that the creators of the conception of complementarity
have....sometimes expressed themselves in ambiguous or even frankly
T\
idealistic terms. But this ought not to disconcert us. Are we going
to lay complementarity under an interdict because Heisenberg is an
idealist? We might just as well condemn the Principia because Newton
dishes up his dialectics in the guise of Puritan theology."77
Rosenfeld points out that Bohr himself did not use complementarity
to criticise Marxism. Indeed, Rosenfeld argues that Bohr was,
albeit unconsciously, something of a dialectical materialist himself?^
"Bohr is too subtle a dialectician to fall into the same inconsis¬
tency as Heisenberg....he experiences the dialectical movement of
nature as a living reality with which he has completely identified
his thought and his feelings. Naturally enough, dialectical relations
take in his mind the shape of complementarity relations'.'79
Thus, the relationship between complementarity and Marxism,
let alone the empirical status of these two concepts, is by no means
obvious. There is disagreement over whether complementarity is an
essential feature of Qfl; if this is rejected, the empirical success
of QM says nothing about the validity of the complementarity
principle. As we saw in the previous section, there is also
disagreement over the detailed structure of Marxist philosophy.
Finally, because of the vagueness of these concepts, it is by no
means obvious that there is any necessary contradiction between the
.two. In the next few sections, I will discuss other cases where
inferences drawn from QM have been applied to fields other than
physics; in each case, a wide range of opinions can be found.
QM and Biology.
Although Bohr avoided political issues, he did try to extend
complementarity into other areas, particularly biology. For example,
he argued that in vitro and in vivo experiments were complementary:
experiments which involved killing an organism, he claimed,
necessarily neglected the special characteristics of complete,
living organisms. In particular, they neglected the concept of purpose.
In a biographical article on Bohr, Rosenfeld points out that
Bohr's father was a physiologist who had resisted Darwinian 'mechan¬
istic materialism' and had defended the use of teleological arguments
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in biology. Bohr himself also made statements in favour of teleology
and vitalism, such as the following:
"Owing to this essential feature of complementarity, the concept of
purpose, which is foreign to mechanical analysis, finds a certain
field of application in biology."®!
and elsewhere
"the existence of life must be considered as an elementary fact
that cannot be explained, but must be taken as a starting point in
biology, in a similar way as the quantum of action, which appears
as an irrational element from the point of view of classical
mechanical physics, forms the foundation of atomic physics."®2
If life is to be made exempt from causal mechanical explanation,
then, a fortiori, so is human consciousness and free will. Bohr
writes:
"the freedom of the will is to be considered as a feature of conscious
life which corresponds to functions of the organism that not only
evade a causal mechanical description but resist even a physical
analysis." ®
Born agrees with this view:
"If even in inanimate nature the physicist comes up against limits
at which strict causal connection ceases and must be replaced
by statistics, we shall be prepared, in the realm of living things,
and emphatically so in the processes connected with consciousness
and will, to meet insurmountable barriers, where mechanistic
explanation, the goal of the older natural philosophy, becomes
entirely meaningless.
These arguments have been criticised along the same lines as
those we encountered in the last section. To Marxist critics,
statements like the above are clearly ideologically motivated, and
therefore invalid:
"Born joined Bohr and Heisenberg in showing how important the quantum
mechanical philosophy could be for granting space in other sciences
to idealistic conceptions."®5
Levy-Leblond, a French Marxist physicist, makes a similar point:
"The alleged 'crisis of determinism' which quantum physics brought
about (in fact it was a modification of the forms of physical
causality) opened the gates to a flood of philosophical, ideological
and even political lucubrations....In brief, one has witnessed a
true ideological exploitation of modern physics."
In addition, we can once again find a wide variety of views
both on the interpretation of QM and on the implications of QM for
biology and psychology. Rosenfeld, for example, accepted the validity
of complementarity but felt that
"it would be premature to assert that we shall be able to fit the
dialectics of life or consciousness to such a framework."®''7
Wigner, whose 'consciousness' interpretation of QM was discussed
in Chapter Two, clearly shares the view of Bohr and Born that human
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consciousness is a unique feature in nature. However, whereas Bohr
and Born go on to argue that consciousness cannot be described in »
causal or even rational terms, Wigner claims that we should modify
the formalism of QM in order to produce a precise physical description
of the interaction between the observer's mind and the external
■M 88world.
To quote a final example, the Nobel prize-winning biologist
Monod has applied QM to biology in order to argue against vitalism.
In his book, 'Chance and Necessity', Monod points to the essentially
random nature of genetic mutation:
"Pure chance, absolutely free but blind, [lies] at the very root
of the stupendous edifice of evolution....there is no scientific
position in any of the sciences more destructive of anthropomorphism
than this one." 9
QM> according to Monod, provides a supplementary argument in favour
of this view:
"Finally, on the microscopic level, there exists a source of even
more radical uncertainty, embedded in the quantum structure of
matter. A mutation is in itself....a quantum event, to which the
principle of uncertainty consequently applies."90
Monod has a rather sophisticated attitude towards the use of
QM in such arguments. For example, he notes that there is some
: difference of opinion over the interpretation of QJd;
"The principle of uncertainty was never entirely accepted by some
of the greatest modern physicists, including Einstein....Certain
schools have....denied it the standing of an essential concept."91
Monod therefore dissociates his general arguments about randomness
from his particular use of QM:
"It must be stressed that, even were the principle of uncertainty
some day abandoned, it would remain true that fin examining genetic
mutations^ one could still see nothing but an 'absolute coincidence'."92
Thus, in Monod's case, QM is used to provide an illustration, or
a supplementary argument, rather than a 'proof' of his case. Levy-
Leblond takes a less charitable view; in a critique of Monod's
book, he writes:
"How can one admit more clearly that quantum physics has intrinsically
nothing to do QwithJ the discussion and is an authority cited merely
to buttress an argument?'^
A study of the extension of QM into biology allows us to extend
the findings of previous sections. Not only are we faced with conflicting
Interpretations of QM, but even within a single interpretation
(the Copenhagen view-discussed by Bohr. Born and Monod) we find
there are separate features which are, in a sense, 'complementary'.
Thus, the complementarity principle, as employed by Bohr and Born,
is used to point to one conclusion, while the uncertainty principle
is used by Monod to point to a diametrically opposite conclusion.
Wigner's position makes it clear that 'complementary' is an
adjective which can be bandied about rather freely to describe any
pair of concepts which seem to describe the same thing in different
ways; this is very far from a proof that the two modes of description
are mutually exclusive. Complementarity has been applied in several
gij,other contexts in this rather superficial way. However, it should
not be supposed that these differences of opinion simply reflect the
vagueness of the concept of complementarity. Other features of QM,
notably the loss of determinism, have also generated conflicting
views. The next section deals with such an example.
God and Determinism.
It can be argued that the lots of complete causality is
incompatible with the idea of an omniscient, omnipotent God. For
some authors, the great advantage of a deterministic hidden-variable
interpretation of QM is that it would restore a role for such a God.
This viewpoint has been expressed by Rietdijk:
"I feel that the only possibility that [the3 universe in general,
and human life in particular, might have a deeper sense of purpose,
consists in that the entire history of the universe, of mankind and
of every individual, is proceeding according to a great design,
however opaque it may be for us. An indispensable condition for the
possibility that such a design might exist is that, indeed, Einstein
was right in saying 'Der Herrgott wurfelt nicht' (God doesn't gamble).
If God did, if indeterminism and chance did exist as current QM
maintains, life and the world would be a lottery. Therefore, our
only hope of survival, in the deepest meaning of the word, the only
hope of the truly religious man, has to be set on determinism, on
hidden variables."95
Belinfante, on the other hand, points to the completely opposite views
"there are those who for religious reasons do not want to believe
in determinism. For them it is not a priori obvious that all
happenings in the universe should be ultimately explainable by human
reasoning. Anything happening in nature may in one way or another be
a manifestation of God acting in this world, but especially those
happenings that defy explanations can be 'understood' merely as acts
of God. Thus the indeterminacy in atomic happenings as predicted by
the quantum theory is a manifestation of the omnipresence and
omnipotence of God. The lack of determinism in quantum theory, to
these people, is not only acceptable, but is a reassurance of their
religious beliefs. If nature were fully deterministic, there would
be no place in it for a God with any freedom to act; the 'equations
of motion' would determine everything."9°
It is hardly surprising that the concepts of 'God' and 'determinism'
should be complex enough to sustain contradictory 'deductions'
about the implications of Qf4 for religion. Partly because of this
ambiguity, some authors have argued that we should refrain from
drawing any strong theological conclusions from the apparent demise
of determinism brought about by QM.
Mackay, for example, follows Monod's example, by pointing out
that some physicists do not agree that indeterminism necessarily
follows from QM:
"Although most physicists today speak of atomic events as 'indeter¬
minate'^ there have been those, including the great Einstein himself,
who refused to concede that they were anything more than unpredictable-
by-us«,"97
Mackay also points to the flexibility of the concept of
indeterminism, drawing a distinction between the apparent indeterminism
of microsystems with the deterministic behaviour of many macrosystems:
"Despite Heisenberg's revolutionary principle, we all know that
clocks keep quite good time, the sun continues to rise relatively
predictably, and other things that we depend on like boiling
kettles continue to be reliable."9°
This view is of course quite consistent with QM, as Rosenfeld points
out:
"Determinism....is perfectly adapted to the description of
phenomena on the macroscopic scale; its validity in that field is
of course not in question: there determinism reigns as supreme as
ever
For these reasons, Mackay urges Christians who wish to defend the
concept of free will
"not to waste their ammunition on physical determinism, even of the
which has come in with the Heisenberg -uncertainty
Barbour, in his comprehensive study of the relationship between
science and religion, is similarly sceptical about the implications
of QM for the concept of freedom. First, he points out the wide
variety of opinions among physicists concerning the nature of
indeterminism in QM. Next, he argues that randomness in the behaviour
of individual atoms, even in the brain, has no obvious causal links
with the consciousness of human beings. Finally, he draws a clear
distinction between 'randomness' and 'freedom'
The evidence presented in the last few sections strongly
suggests that QM does not contain a set of clear, unequivocal
implications for other areas of belief. Instead, QM provides a
set of concepts, models, and other cognitive resources, which can
be employed by an actor in support of his views on biology,
politics, and so on. Moreover, the resources provided by QM are
sufficiently rich and varied that they can be used to 'support' a
wide variety of views - indeed, diametrically opposite views.
QM is by no means unique in being used to support conflicting
views in a wider context. For example, Rosenberg found that the 19th
century theory of the hereditary nature of intelligence and morality
was used, in different contexts, to support arguments both for
environmental improvement and compulsory sterilisation of the 'unfit':
"Ostensibly scientific formulations have found quite different
social roles in different national contexts....social thinkers....
had selected those scientific plausibilities which fitted., ggst
conveniently into their social need and presuppositions."
Existing studies of the rhetorical use of science have not only
' drawn attention to the flexibility with which theories can be
interpreted, but also to the perceived high status of science
within our culture, which presumably leads to the widespread use
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of science as a rhetbrical resource. The evidence presented in
this chapter corroborates these conclusions, and may be particularly
useful in pointing out that modern physics, despite its esoteric and
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highly technical nature, is by no means immune from this process.
The Validity of Rhetoric; QM and Parapsychology.
Having examined a number of cases in which QM was applied to
other fields, what conclusions can we draw about the 'validity' of
such applications? Marxist critics, such as Levy-Leblond, Garuccio
and Selleri, argue that, because these applications are motivated by
ideological or philosophical prejudices, they are all invalid. As we
shall see in Chapter Four, scientists who study the interpretation
of QM often admit that they use philosophical or other non-empirical
criteria in their assessment of ideas. Yet they do not feel that their
tT
work is invalid, because of this.
One alternative is to adopt a symmetrical view to all
applications of QJM, describing them all as examples of the use of
cultural resources for rhetorical purposes. Later, I shall argue
in favour of this view.
There is, however, another possibility, namely that some
applications are more valid than others, and that there are criteria
of validity by which such applications can be assessed. Before
arguing in favour of the 'symmetrical' view, I shall first argue
that this third possibility is not viable.
The best way to investigate this question is to examine an
extreme case, where a particular application of QM seems especially
suspect. Parapsychology provides us with several such examples, in
which QM has been used in what seems an 'illegitimate' way.
In a series of well-known books, Carlos Castaneda has described
the beliefs of the Yaqui Indian sorcerer Don Juan."*"^ Don Juan
claims that there are many realities, and that a skilled sorcerer
can jump from one to another. In his book 'Psi and the Consciousness
Explosion', Holroyd uses the Everett 'many-worlds' interpretation
of QM to support this model of reality. Holroyd writes:
"Modern theoretical physicists are telling us that there may exist -
and they mean really, not figuratively - many worlds. Considered
in the light of the theories of....DeWitt and Graham....don Juan's
statement that 'your car was not in that world' is simply a statement
of fact."106
Holroyd may be forgiven for failing to point out that the
many-worlds view is not 'orthodox' physics. However, what is more
difficult to ignore is the fact that, according to the authors of
the many-worlds view, transitions between worlds are impossible,
so that the theory cannot account for the appearance or disappearance
of sorcerers or cars. DeWitt is very clear on this point:
"The laws of QM do not allow us to find ourselves split....We,
who inhabit only one of these worlds....have no access to the other
worlds."107
Indeed, the inaccessibility of all the other universes, and therefore
the lack of any possible empirical evidence for their existence,
is seen by many critics to be one of the main flaws of the many-
worlds theory.
Thus, Holroyd is using this theory to support a hypothesis
which the authors of this theory claim to have ruled out. Does this
not constitute an 'invalid' use of a theory? Since DeWitt has not
responded directly to Holroyd's claims, it remains a possibility
(though perhaps an unlikely one) that they might have been able to
negotiate some sort of compromise. However, even this slim chance
is absent in the next example, since the physicists concerned have
explicitly rejected any parapsychological interpretation of their
theory.
This example concerns the claims made by Jack Sarfatti, a rather
colourful character who was trained as a physicist but is now
closely involved in parapsychology organisations in California. He
draws on elements of cosmology, relativity theory and QM to justify
his viewpoint. For example, referring to the (conventional) QM
concept of zero-point motion (that is, a vibration of atoms which
persists even at absolute zero), Sarfatti writes:
"The assumption here is that the zero-point motion is not random
as now assumed but contains sacred messages of the Hidden Wisdom
that filter through to our profane limited understanding at the -^g
molecular level. Is this the mechanism of Divine Understanding?"
One of the sources for Sarfatti's speculations has been the
hidden-variable theories of David Bohm and his co-workers. Bohm
and his colleague Hiley took exception to Sarfatti's use of their
work:
"By taking these quotations out of context, he [SarfattiJ has created
the impression that our work directly relates to his own conjectures
regarding the observer-participator. The actual situation is very
different."-'-^
Another physicist, Stapp, also felt that Sarfatti had misrepresented
him, and wrote to Sarfatti:
"You have quoted passages from papers of mine in a way that suggests
that your ideas ....are in accordance with quantum theory. I think
I should set you straight ."HO
Some of the claims made by Sarfatti and his colleagues might be
charitably interpreted as rhetorical exaggeration, such as the
following comment, made by Herbert, on Bell's theorem which concerns
the non-locality of QM:
"If once-interacting objects are truly forever inseparable, then
when you get out of the bathtub, you, in some sense, never really
leave it....Bell's theorem gives precise physical content to the
motto 'we are all one' ."HI
£1
However, although Sarfatti and his colleagues could defend their
style of writing in terms of a desire for dramatic effect, there
remains the fact that they quote physicists in support of their
views, when these physicists explicitly reject the claim that their
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work is consistent with Sarfatti's.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow from this that
Sarfatti's claims about physics, as opposed to physicists, are false.
Obviously, Bohm may claim that Sarfatti falsely accuses him of
wishing to introduce consciousness into physics, and it is difficult
to refute any claim which Bohm may care to make about his own motives.
Equally, it is difficult to validate such a claim. Moreover, one
can argue, as indeed Sarfatti does, that Bohm's theory supports the
concept of consciousness in physics, even if Bohm himself dislikes
this argument:
"[Excluding consciousness] is the classical view of physics which
Bohm and Hiley seem to want to retain. It is a view that we must
respect and admire, even if we cannot subscribe to it."^-3
Presumably, Holroyd could, if he wished, argue on similar lines,
claiming that the many-worlds view is a partial account of don Juan's
abilities, but that the theory requires modification to allow for
the possibility of transitions.
There is a further example in which the apparent falsity of
parapsychologists' statements about physics seems hard to deny. In
his book 'Space-Time and Beyond', Toben discusses the implications
of the 'new physics' - QM, relativity, black holes, and so on - for
parapsychology. He writes:
"All over the world, phenomena are occurring that cannot be
explained within existing belief systems....However, if we properly
[sicj interpret some of the existing accepted £sicj scientific
theory, we find that explanations do exist."
As in the case of Holroyd, the many-worlds view is cited with no
indication of its marginal status. A more glaring error occurs in
Toben's treatment of the experimental tests of local hidden-variable
theories. He cites the experiment of "A.Holt" (actually Richard A.
Holt) and claims that Holt's result indicates
"that the quantum potential (hidden variable) interpretation of
quantum theory due to de Broglie and Bohm agrees more closely with
experiment than does the conventional interpretation, which denies
the existence of hidden variables.
Toben seems to be unaware of Freedman and Glauser's experiment,
whose results were published before Holt's experiment was completed,
and which gave completely the opposite result. More seriously, Toben
seems to have little grasp of the intricacies of hidden-variable
theories. As discussed in Chapter Two, Bohm and de Broglie produced
non-local theories, whose predictions agreed with those of QM for
these experiments. Holt's results conflicted with these predictions,
so that they support local theories and oppose Bohm's theories.
(As we shall see in Chapter Five, even some physicists misunderstood
the implications of Bell's theorem for Bohm's theories.)
In principle, Toben could argue that the apparent conflict
between Holt's results and Bohm's theory is due to an error in our
interpretation of one or both. However, this would involve a far more
comprehensive rewrite of conventional wisdom than in the example
above, in which Sarfatti presented his conflict with Bohm as a
simple difference of opinion about the role of consciousness in
physics. Certainly, drawing conclusions from experimental results
is by no means unproblematic, as we shall see in Chapter Six, but
it is difficult to see how Holt's results could be used to support
Bohm's theory.
Thus, there seems to be a minimal sense in which the concept
of 'error' is meaningful when discussing the application of physics
into other fields of inquiry. However, such errors are wholly
peripheral to the more important question with which this section
deals - namely, the assessment of the validity of such extensions
of physics. A criterion of 'validity' based on a search for factual
errors is of little use in assessing many of the applications of QM
into biology, politics and religion discussed earlier; such errors
are the exception, and not the rule. Factual errors may indeed be
a sign of incompetence, but it is a form of gross incompetence -
like claiming that '2 and 2 make 5' - which no decent rhetorician
would be guilty of.
Must we therefore conclude that any rhetorical usage of QM is
as legitimate as any other? One final alternative has been suggested
by Bedau. Referring to rhetorical uses of complementarity, Bedau
concedes that the popularity of such usages bears little relation
to the rigour of the arguments involved, nor to the extent to which
the rhetoric accurately describes complementarity as the concept
is used in QM, He argues that the term, 'complementarity' is rapidly
becoming meaningless. Wishing to avoid semantic confusion, he applies
a sort of copyright rule: a 'correct' use of the term is one which
matches Bohr's own usagej•
"Is the would-be complementarist to be allowed to mean by complemen¬
tarity whatever he pleases? Obviously not....What is left, then,
but a tacit reliance upon the concept....as employed by Bohr, minus
whatever is peculiar to its application in QM? But if tacit reliance,
why not explicit?"-'--'-"
Bedau's views are cited here not because they are particularly
well-known or interesting, but because they usefully characterise
a concept of meaning which the evidence presented in this chapter
seriously weakens. Apart from the fact that Bedau's rule would be
pointless unless everyone agreed to be bound by it, it would in
any case be virtually impossible to apply the rule. For one thing,
Bohr's concept of complementarity was developed over a number of
years, so we must first decide which version of complementarity
to use as our benchmark. More importantly, different physicists
have understood Bohr to be saying very different things. For
example, Einstein wrote:
"Despite much effort which I have expended on it, I have been unable
to achieve a sharp formulation of Bohr's principle of complementarity.
Another physicist, von Weizsacker, while writing a review paper on
the subject in 1955» re-read Bohr's early papers on complementarity
and
"came to the conclusion that for over 25 years he had misinterpreted
Bohr's notion...., the real meaning of which he now thought he had
discovered. But when he asked Bohr whether his [new] interpretation^..
accurately presented what Bohr had in mind, Bohr gave him a
definitely negative answer ."H"
Note that this ambiguity represents only doubt over what Bohr meant
by complementarity; we have already seen the wide range of opinions
held by other people about complementarity. It would seem that Bedau
has failed to give us a reliable criterion for discriminating
between valid and invalid extensions of QM.
Barbour provides a more satisfactory treatment of the problem.
Like Bedau, he refers to the use of complementarity in physics in
order to indicate how, if at all, the term should be used in other
contexts. For example, in physics the term refers to different ways
no
of analysing the same entity, such as an electron, in different
circumstances. This excludes certain extensions of the term, such
as the claim that science and religion are complementary, because
"God and the world are different modes of being, not different
modes of knowing a single being. "H9
As in the case of Bedau, such claims about what the term 'really
means' in physics are open to question, but Barbour goes further;
unlike Bedau, he does not feel that physicists' own views of what
complementarity means should have primacy. For example, he argues
that we need not accept Bohr's renunciation of ontological questions.
He also notes the existence of alternative 'principles' in science,
such as the search for unity:
"complementarity provides no justification for premature and
uncritical acceptance of dichotomies."120
Most importantly, Barbour recognises that
"use of the Complementarity Principle outside physics is analogical
not inferential. There must be independent grounds for justifying
in the new context the value of two alternative sets of constructs."121
If we view concepts such as. complementarity, determinism and
causality as flexible resources which can be applied analogically
or metaphorically in different contexts, we avoid a number of
pseudo-problems such as the difficulty of defining 'valid' and
'invalid' uses, and the problem of accounting for the very wide
variety of uses to which the concepts of QM have been put. None of
these extensions emerges 'naturally' from QM; in each case, authors
had to actively select particular features of the theory and neglect
others, and then construct an account employing the chosen features.
Certainly, for a particular observer, some such accounts seem
more persuasive than others. Accounts which contain factually
incorrect statements may seem particularly unconvincing, provided of
course that one is aware of the error. Quite often, the account is
aimed at an audience which does not have such a technical background,
and the fact that an account is 'really' incorrect is neither here
nor there if the error remains undetected. (Besides, students of
the mass media are well aware of the extent to which an audience's
prejudices are resistant to any amount of documentary evidence and
logical arguments.) Thus, although we could discriminate between
extensions of QM by means of a criterion of 'persuasiveness', this
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would not only be subjective and transitory, but would also bear
very little connection with more absolute notions such as 'validity'.
Discussion.
In the first part of this chapter, I showed how scientists in
two very different cultural contexts presented their work in such a
way as to make it acceptable to the demands of their particular
milieu. For this claim to be plausible, we must of course accept
that their work could have been presented in other ways. This is not
difficult in the case of Soviet QM, since many Western observers
explicitly stated that Soviet scientists were presenting a distorted
view of QM. In the case of Weimar physicists, there is no proof that
an alternative causal theory was possible, but it seems clear, from
the different reception of QJ4 by German and British physicists, and
from the existence of hidden-variable interpretations of QM, that
the particular way in which QM was presented - as an irrevocably
acausal theory - was only one of several options.
I also argued that the Western view of Soviet QM as deviant or
pathological is questionable. It is by no means clear that the use
of dialectical materialism as a heuristic philosophy of science is
valueless, or indeed that it is any less valuable than alternative
philosophies, such as Popper's, which are explicitly cited by many
Western scientists.
Thus, in an important sense, the development of the interpretation
of QM in these two contexts can be treated symmetrically. In both
cases, scientists perceived, and successfully responded to, external
social pressures originating in the general cultural milieu, and
presented their work in an appropriate way.
Since we are dealing here only with the interpretation of QM -
that is, whether or not the theory is acausal or dialectical - one
could argue that the substantive details of the theory (the equations
which make up the formalism) are immune from such social processes.
Despite some of Forman's more extreme claims, there is little evidence
to support the view that external cultural influences did affect QJM's
formalism. However, in Chapter Four I shall argue that socialization
processes within science do indeed play an important role in
determining the goals and methods which scientists adopt, and in
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Chapter Six I shall argue that such processes also affect the
substantive conclusions which scientists reach about the meaning of
experimental results.
One benefit of the present chapter, then, is to improve the
precision of the terms "social context" and "scientists' responses",
by specifying different sorts of contexts and different sorts of
responses.
In the second part of this chapter, we saw how QM was used to
draw inferences about many different fields of inquiry. The aim was
not to provide a comprehensive list of such usages, but to provide
a wide enough range, particularly of conflicting examples, to give
credence to the view that concepts such as complementarity,
uncertainty and indeterminism, originating within QM, have no clear,
necessary or unequivocal implications for other fields. Such usages,
as Barbour put it, are analogical and not inferential. Each such
application of QM involves creative processes of selection,
assumption, and the construction of accounts. There is no useful
criterion which can discriminate in a general way between 'valid'
and 'invalid' applications of QM.
The evidence presented here suggests that we should adopt a
symmetrical approach to all extensions of QM. However, one can go
further: it also suggests that scientists' accounts of QM (QM is
acausal, dialectical, and so on) are not qualitatively different
from rhetorical uses of QM in other areas (QM refutes Marxism,
supports vitalism, and so on).
Apart from the support it provides for the general concept of
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meaning described in Chapter One , such a model is also useful in
increasing our awareness of the problematic nature of statements
about what QM (or any other theory) is 'really' like. In Chapter
Four, we shall encounter accounts which rely on unproblematic
characterisations of Bohm's theory as 'dialectical' and of other
proposals as 'arithmomorphic'. We can now approach such accounts
with a suitable degree of scepticism.
-
Chanter Four
Social Organisation of FQM and the Conduct of Disputes
Introduction
It should already be clear from the material presented in
Chapter Two that, in cognitive terms, FQM is a rather fragmented
field. A very large number of different reformulations of QM has
been proposed. Virtually the only things held in common by FQM
workers are the past success of QM's formalism and the inadequacy
of the conventional interpretation of that formalism. There are
marked stylistic and methodological differences between the various
alternative interpretations which have been proposed; some are
highly mathematical, some employ mainly intuitive physical arguments,
and others argue on philosophical grounds.
My first aim in the present chapter is to examine the social
structure of FQM. I will try to show that, in sociological terms,
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FQM is not a typical scientific specialty , and that its social
organisation, like its cognitive structure, is fragmented.
I shall then argue that this congruence is by no means coin¬
cidental; the fragmented social structure (and low status) of FQM
is at least partly due to the absence of consensus over methodology
and goals. Because FQM workers find it difficult to communicate and
collaborate with each other, there is little opportunity for coherent
social structures to develop. Conversely, the absence of a coherent
social structure means that there is no 'official' training system
for entry into FQM, and few generally-recognised sanctions; as a
result, cognitive consensus is unlikely to be achieved.
In this analysis, I shall emphasise methodological differences
between different sorts of FQM workers, partly because it seems a
useful way to classify this field, and partly because such an
approach also provides a useful way of describing disputes in FQM.
Such an approach has been attempted by Pinch , in his analysis of
the reception of Bohm's 1952 hidden variable theory. I shall examine
Pinch's wort; showing how his findings are consistent with a method¬
ological analysis. However, I shall go on to argue that Pinch's
analysis is not entirely satisfactory. Specifically, he invokes
\
concepts such as 'arithmomorphism' and. 'the authority structure of
physics' which not only lack generality (in that they do not apply
in other disputes) hut are also, I would claim, misleading and
unnecessary. I shall try to show that a more, satisfactory account
of Pinch's data can be obtained by considering that physicists are
concerned primarily with practical issues ('doing physics'), which
inevitably involves a concern with methodology.
As a way of expanding and supporting this analysis, I shall
then examine another 'communication breakdown' in FQM. The Bohm-Bub
hidden variable theory was subjected to an experimental test. I
shall examine the reaction to this test of Bohm, Bub, the experimenter,
and a mathematician. Here again I shall argue that what seems to be
a cognitive dispute over the status of a theory and an experiment is,
fundamentally, a dispute over the choice of methodology.
The general implication of this analysis, which will be dealt with
in more detail in my final chapter, is that when we attempt to account
for the existence, conduct, or outcome of a debate in FQM (and perhaps
in other sciences as well), we must take careful note of the social
and technical context of the debate; scientists who do not share a
common methodological orientation are unlikely to perceive the theory
or experiment at the centre of the debate in quite the same way.
The status of FQM within physics
Let us begin by considering whether FQM constitutes a specialty
within physics in the way that, say, solid state and high energy
physics do. In institutional terms, the answer is clearly 'no'. FQM
does not appear as an organisational subgroup within physics; for
example, there are no FQM sub-committees on funding bodies, and no
professional bodies to regulate this activity or organise regular
conferences. In cognitive terms, FQM also lacks a clear identity;
for example, it has no separate classification within Science
Abstracts, nor are there any journals which are universally recognised
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as the appropriate forum for this work.
In a wide-ranging study of the social organisation of science,
Hagstrom makes a passing reference to FQM:
"Most of the topics I had judged to be controversial issues in
science ....were defined as 'philosophical issues' by my informants,
Is-
not scientific issues....Physicists sometimes react in this
fashion to attempts to renew interest in deterministic interpret¬
ations of quantum theory....none of the physicists interviewed
spontaneously mentioned this issue as an important unresolved
issue when asked if they could think of any such issues."--5
Also, Hanson writes:
"Physicists remain somewhat indifferent to issues of the Bohr
versus Bohm-Feyerabend variety. Such issues they regard as
ill-founded in the absence of any solid mathematical foundation
to serve as the basis for discussions of 'interpretations'."
The marginal status of FQM within physics was confirmed by many
of my interviewees:
"That was one real drawback about this field, that it isn't really
a field. It's not like high energy physics, there's a high energy
physics group in the majority of physics departments, and there's
a solid state group, and this doesn't really slot into any one
of these."
Not only is FQM not perceived as a standard cognitive
sub-division of physics, but it also lacks many of the organ¬
isational features of such sub-divisions. The absence of professional
bodies, and the scarcity of conferences, have already been mentioned.
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In addition, replies to a questionnaire suggest that FQM has no
organised recruitment pattern. Less than half the people who
work in FQM have been students of anyone who was involved in this
field, and many members of this minority claimed that their own
interest in FQM arose for other reasons and that their approach
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was very different from that of their former teacher. Most people
claimed to have become interested in FQM after reading books or
articles, rather than from talking to anyone they knew personally,
and an interest in FQM seems to be just as likely to develop
when a physicist is well-advanced in his career as it is when
he is a student. In addition, very few respondents spent a major
part of their time on FQM; for the majority of people, it seems to
be an activity which takes up less than half of the time available
for research.
Another feature of a scientific subgroup is the existence
of journals which are widely perceived as the appropriate forum
for discussion of the subgroup's content. FQM workers, when asked
to indicate the journals which they most associated with work in
FQM, listed a wide variety of journals with no clear consensus
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over which sources were central to this field. In many cases, FQM
respondents listed general physics journals such as the American
Journal of Physics, and Nuovo Gimento. 'Hard' physics journals
(that is, those specialising in well-established fields with
mainly empirical, quantitative papers), such as Physical Review,
were only cited by the group of physicists who performed exper¬
imental tests of local hidden variable theories.
The only journal of standard form which might conceivably
be regarded as a central forum of debate in FQM, and which restricts
itself to 'fundamental' questions, is Foundations of Physics.
However, many FQM workers claimed that, despite its wide scope,
this journal did not seem to them to represent FQM in its entirety.
Some informants claimed that this journal specialised in the more
speculative side of FQM, and that its contents were of dubious
quality. However, despite these reservations, Foundations of Physics
at least has the advantage of being included in Science Citation Index
publications, so that it may provide us with a further sort of
evidence about the status of FQM. Let us examine this evidence.
Citation Analysis of FQM
The limitations of citation analysis are well-known"*"^, but
if handled with care, citation data may be of some assistance
in checking conclusions about the status of a field gained by
other, less quantitative means. Here I shall restrict myself to
evidence about the status of the journal Foundations of Physics,
using the Science Citation Index publication, Journal Citation Index.
This index provides data on citations to and from any particular
journal.
The first section of the index lists the 'Impact Factor' for
various journals; this is defined as the ratio of actual citations
of a given journal in a given year, to the total number of citable
items published in that journal in that year. A large Impact
Factor for a journal means that much of its content was cited
within a year of publication, and it is assumed that this implies
that the journal's contents had a strong impact on the scientific
community. This assumption can be questioned, by arguing that
articles can be cited for all sorts of reasons, other than the
Hi
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articless quality ' . However, let us examine the Impact Factors
for a number of journals, as shown in Table 1. (Note that an
Impact Factor greater than unity means that, on average, each
article was cited more than once within a year of publication.)
The low Impact Factor of the American Journal of Physics
does not, I think, accurately reflect its status; rather, it is
a result of its rather special content. This journal publishes a
large number of relatively short*articles and letters, many of
which are not intended to be original research, but rather historical
reviews, accounts of school and college physics courses, and
suggested experiments for demonstrating the laws of physics.
Despite the obvious shortcomings of the Impact Factor as a
means of assessing journals, it is clear that Foundations of Physics
has a very low score on this 'scale. This suggests (though it by
no means proves) that this journal is of low status; its contents
are either not widely cited or are cited more than one year after
publication.
Another piece of data in the Journal Citation Index is the
'Self-citing Rate'. This measures the extent to which citations
to a given journal originate in articles which are themselves
published in that journal. The results for a number of journals
are given in Table 2.
Interpretation of these results is, again, not straightforward.
For example, is it reasonable to claim that citations to Nuclear
Physics A made in Nuclear Physics B are not self-citations? Also,
the age of the journal may be important: a journal published for
the first time in (say) 1974 would abviously have a low Self-citing
Rate for that year, since there would be no previous articles in
that journal to cite. In fact, Foundations of Physics is the
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youngest of the journals listed in Table 2 so its disproportion¬
ately large self-citing rate cannot be accounted for in this way.
There is here, therefore, some evidence for the claim that,
to a greater extent than for other journals, the only people who
are interested in the contents of Foundations of Physics are those
who themselves publish in that journal. Other data also support
this conclusion of narrow readership. For example, Foundations
of Physics was cited only 46 times in 1975» an<3- these citations
Journal Impact Factor (1975)
American Journal of Physics 0-33
Foundations of Physics 0-35
Nuovo Cimento B 0-8
Journal of Mathematical Physics 1>08
Progress in Theoretical Physics 1* 6L\
Physical Review A 2*61
Physical Review Letters 5*91
TABLE 1
Journal Self-citing Rate (1975)
Nuclear Physics A 33%
Nuclear Physics B 35%
International Journal of Theoretical Physics 35§%
American Journal of Physics 37%
Foundations of Physics 52%
TABLE 2
occurred in only 16 journals (including itself), whereas the
International Journal of Theoretical Physics received 200 citations
from 40 journals and (at the other extreme) journals like Nuclear
Physics and Physical Review receive many thousands of citations
from virtually every physics journal. Obviously, the total number
of citations depends at least partly on the number of citable
items, but the sources of citations may well reflect the extent
to which a journal's contents ar§ widely seen as relevant.
On the other hand, when we examine citations made b^ authors
writing in a particular journal, we find that (in 1975) authors
publishing in Foundations of Physics cited 3^3 different journals,
books and other sources; journals cited ranged from Physical Review
and the American Journal of Physics to Philosophy of Science and Mind.
This pattern of citation over a broad range of sources is unusual;
Nuclear Physics cites fewer sources, and is in this sense more
'introspective' than Foundations of Physics. This suggests that FQM
authors make use of work done in a wide variety of fields, an
impression also supported by more qualitative evidence such as
interviews and correspondence.
It is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from citation
evidence alone, mainly because of difficulties in deciding what,
if anything, all these numbers really mean. However, the data can be
interpreted as corroborating evidence for my earlier assessment
of FQM, provided we look at all the citation data as a whole.
For instance, the high self-citing rate of Foundations of Physics
might seem to suggest that this journal represents a subgroup which
deals with esoteric problems of little interest to most physicists
( a suggestion which seems plausible) but the citing behaviour of
this journal's authors suggests also a wide variety of viewpoints
within FQM.
In fact, citation data of this sort are of relatively little
use in trying to determine the degree of consensus or of social
organisation within FQM. For instance, the fact that, in general,
citations made in Foundations of Physics refer to a wide variety
of sources does not tell us whether each individual behaves in this
way, or whether the journal's authors each cite a small number of
sources and different authors cite very different sources. Indeed,
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one might well wish to question the whole notion of drawing
conclusions about an author's orientation from the journals which
he cites; the range of topics covered in many journals is simply
too wide for such conclusions to be very meaningful. Perhaps the
best defence of my use of citation analysis here is that the conc¬
lusions reached are in agreement with those gained from correspondence,
reading, and interviews.
'Schools of Thought' within FQM
Although FQM may have little or no organisational structure,
studies of scientific sub-groups have suggested that informal
iq.
communication networks may often permeate a field . Such networks
may originate in student-teacher relationships, and often centre
around some key individual.
As pointed out earlier, most FQM workers did not enter FQM
as a result of the influence of a teacher, and even those who did
do so claimed that their views differed in many respects from those
of their teacher. Few physicists' names crop up frequently as
teachers of FQM. The major exception is David Bohm.
Many FQM physicists claimed that Bohm's hidden-variable
; interpretation of 1952 had been a major influence in shaping their
attitudes towards FQM. However, for most people, the value of Bohm's
work was not that it was correct but that it pointed out that the
orthodox interpretation of QM need not be correct. Nevertheless,
Bohm's department at Birkbeck College in London has produced a
substantial number of PhD students who have written theses which
attempt to reinterpret QM along lines similar to Bohm's. Does this,
therefore, constitute a school of thought?
Many of Bohm's students, once their PhD research was complete,
ceased to have any involvement with FQM0 In fact, the only two
former students of Bohm who have continued to publish frequently
in FQM are Aharonov and Bub. Both, after co-authoring one or two
papers with Bohm, have now diverged considerably from Bohm's own
position,, Bub, in particular, is now highly critical of Bohm's
'hidden-variable' concept, claiming that it, like the Copenhagen
Interpretation,
"misconstrues the foundational problem of interpretation by
I
introducing extraneous considerations which are completely
unmotivated theoretically." ^
Among people -who did not study directly under him, Bohm is
well-known, hut is not a highly influential figure. The following
statement sums it up well:
"I have a great respect for him, which was horn with his 1952
paper....I sort of wish him luck, hut I don't expect that I can
help him with his programme."
To a certain extent, Bohm a*nd his Birkheck colleague Hiley
form an isolated social group. By this I do not mean that no-one
ever communicates with them, hut that they themselves limit such
interactions. Hiley explains:
"When Dave [Bohm] and I were starting off here, people did come in
from the States, ....and we used to have tremendous arguments....
and we decided that it just wasn't worth it. In other words, we
deliberately insulated ourselves, because we were getting into
these tremendous arguments about red herrjggs, which weren't
getting down to the core of the problem."
Thus it seems clear that Bohm and Hiley no longer (if they
ever did) take an active role in trying to achieve communication
and consensus among a geographically dispersed 'school of thought'.
In fact, Hiley claims~to be in favour of diversity:
"There are very many different approaches. I think this is good,
I'd like to encourage it. I don't see it as harmful. The difficulty
[with QMj is so great, we need-,very many different approaches
cross-fertilizing each other."
The only other likely candidate as a leader of a 'school of
thought' in FQM is Prince Louis de Broglie who, in the 1920's,
first developed the idea that matter might have wave-like properties.
He proposed a hidden-variable interpretation in 1926, abandoned it
soon after,, and only became' critical of orthodox QM again in the
1950's. Now in his late 80's, de Broglie lives in Paris and is
associated with a fairly coherent group of French physicists,
notable Vigier, Lochak, Andrade e Silva and Mugur-Schachter. Most
of them work in Paris, and they have all published articles either
publicising or developing de Broglie's 'double-solution' theory
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as an alternative to QM.
de Broglie's work on FQM is not well-known or understood
outside France, as he himself acknowledges when writing about 'hidden
parameters':
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"these ideas have since been developed ....in numerous papers of
de Broglie and his students. In this connection, it is a somewhat
puzzling fact that these papers remain poorly known, to those who
criticise the ideas developed in them and even to some of those , g
who are trying to emulate their particular approach to problems."
de Broglie's group of students is apparently intensely loyal to
their leader. In a publicity brochure for a book to commemorate.
de Broglie's 80th birthday, we find the following:
"A group of friends, colleagues and students of Professor de Broglie
....reveal him as the great discoverer of matter-waves, which
revolutionised man's vision of the atom and which govern the working
of the electron microscope, the transistor, and the laser. They
also show him as the eminent leader of a school, always looking to
the future, pursuing his work in collaboration with young scientists
and defending ijgnaciously the conception of the world he developed
20 years ago."
Although he no longer is actively involved in research to any
great extent, de Broglie apparently still intends to dictate the
direction of research undertaken by his group, expressing
"the hope that young researchers will devote themselves to
developing, in the direction I have indicated in these last years,
the ideas which allo^jd the birth of wave mechanics in Prance
half a century ago."
In a sense, then, de Broglie and his followers could be said to
constitute a school of thought in FQM, by which I mean that they
have a shared, distinctive viewpoint on how QM should be reinterpreted.
However, the influence of this school, even in Prance, is rather
limited. There was, for instance, no interaction between the followers
of de Broglie and the physicists who performed experimental tests
of local hidden variables. One French reviewer of the book cited
above described it as:
"totally organised around the ideas of the Master [with] excessive
repetition of a-c^g of deference and ritual formulas of quasi-
religious tone."
To this reviewer, the work of de Broglie's school exhibited
"isolationist purism", and he concluded by asking
"may not [these ideas] be nothing but the temple of a small
number of the chosen?"
Despite de Broglie's undoubted personal status in Prance, his
research group receives no government funding. Soon after govern¬
ment funds were cut off in 1972, de Broglie's group formed the
Louis de Broglie Foundation, which holds regular seminars and produces
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its own journal. The contents of this journal often go far beyond
the scope of de Broglie's own ideas, but there is little effective
dialogue between de Broglie's followers and other authors within
the pages of the journal.
To sum up the findings of this section, it may indeed be argued
that there are schools of thought in FQM, and I have discussed the
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cases of Bohm and de Broglie at Some length . However, it is
certainly not the case that such schools exert any dominant
influence on the development of FQM; nor have I been able to find
24-
many other examples of schools of thought in this field. The concept
simply does not seem useful for providing a general description
of FQM. There are of course some institutions where two or more
individuals are active in FQM. However, in many cases these individuals
told me that there were many areas in which their opinions differed,
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and that collaboration with their institutional colleague was rare .
The evidence presented so far in this chapter indicates that
the social organisation of FQM is not highly structured. In Chapter
Two, I pointed out that, in terms of its cognitive content, FQM
is rather fragmented, and that there is very little consensus.
The Is.tter point is well illustrated by two quotations:
"It can certainly be said that there is no sector of modern science
in which so little agreement has been reached about tjae correct way
of interpreting and developing the existing theory."
and
"Time after time the old malaise over QM returns.... the same issues
keep coming back....and half-forgotten 'solution^' are refurbished,
and served up as new by successive generations."
In the next section, I shall look more closely at the lack
of consensus in FQM, with a view to determining the interactions
which may exist between FQM's cognitive and social position. One
useful way of tackling this issue is to compare 'traditional' FQM
work with the local hidden variable experiments, since the latter
are quite atypical in both social and cognitive terms.
1 oq
Causes of the lack of consensus in FQM
Many of my informants were acutely aware of the rather
fragmented state of FQM, and they provided a number of explanations
to account for this state. One account claimed that the diversity
of views in FQM results from the fact that few of the issues can
be tested experimentally. Not surprisingly, this reason was given
most frequently by LHV experimentalists:
"All these wild, unphysical theories had been postulated....you can
make theories all day long....but it all boils down to 'does it agree
with experiment?'"
It is certainly true that the LHV activity, which centred
round experimental work, shows a remarkable degree of both cognitive
consensus and social cohesion not found elsewhere in FQM. For example,
Bell's original idea that LHVs would be experimentally distinguishable
from QM was developed independently (though in less general form)
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by two other physicists about the same time . When this idea was
taken up by two American theorists some years later, they quickly
set about trying to organise an experiment and made contact with
a group of experimenters, only to find (much to their surprise) that
another experimenter had come, up with a similar experimental
proposal, again independently. Three LHV experiments were completed
within three years, and during this period a number of other
physicists went at least some way towards testing Bell's theory only
to give up on discovering that experiments had already begun. By
1976, eight experiments had been completed, the implications of
these experiments had been discussed at several conferences, and
a fairly firm consensus (in favour of QM) had emerged.
These events will be discussed in much more detail later in
this thesis. For the moment, the above extremely brief description
will suffice to illustrate the fact that LHV was not typical of FQM.
As far as the experimenters were concerned, the reason for this was
that the experimental approach generates consensus, and organises
activity, in a fairly unproblematic way. I shall question this view
in later chapters. However, regardless of the validity of this view,
it does not by itself explain the lack of consensus in other areas
of FQM. The LHV experimenters extended their argument (though often
only implicitly) by claiming that an experimental approach was the
only way in which consensus could be achieved and activity could be
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'properly' organised. This argument is much more suspect. In the
first place, there are many intellectual activities, from theoretical
physics to abstract mathematics and philosophy, in which experiment¬
ation seems to play a relatively insignificant part and yet which
have not only a coherent social organisation and a marked degree
of cognitive consensus, but also (at least in the view of some
practitioners) a valid notion of progress. It would seem, therefore,
that the absence of experimentation in FQM is not a sufficient
explanation for its present state.
According to one informant, the proliferation of interpretations
in FQM had come about because no 'good' interpretation had yet
been found:
"Because no good interpretation has been proposed, anyone who's
interested proposes his own, and everybody can have his own variation."
Yet most informants felt that their own interpretation was indeed a
'good' one. It would seem that the central difficulty in this field
is an absence of shared criteria of what constitutes a 'good'
interpretation. Indeed, some authors go as far as to claim that
the choice of interpretation is purely a matter of personal taste.
The most vivid illustration of this claim came in response to an
article by DeWitt in which he described the 'Many-Worlds' inter-
29
pretation . The journal concerned published several replies in
which this interpretation was criticised in explicitly aesthetic
terms. For example, Sachs claimed that
"such a model does not appeal to my personal physical intuition"
and that it was not necessary
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"to go to such extreme lengths of straining physical sensibilities".
Ballentine criticised
"the arbitrary„/and in my,opinion silly) assumption that the world
is splitting."
Pearle is even more explicit:
"None of these interpretations can yet be decisively accepted or
rejected on the basis of an experimental test, so the question of
which interpretation to choose becomes a matter of personal taste^.„
To me [the many worlds interpretation) appears uneconomical."^
Irrespective of any philosophical and sociological critiques
of empiricism, it certainly seems to be the case that, for many
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physicists, FQM is not 'real' physics because it is not experimental. ^
This seems consistent with the views of LHV physicists, and with those
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of Hagstrom's informants. Among FQM authors, the absence of 'hard'
empirical arguments may have led to the utilisation of purely
rhetorical arguments. We have already seen one such usage, which
might be summarised (or parodied) as 'It's all a matter of taste,
and I don't happen to like this interpretation.' More subtle forms
of rhetoric are also used. For example, a common tactic in FQM
is to cite Einstein in one's support. Since Einstein never fully
accepted the orthodox interpretation of QM, he has become a major
folk-hero within FQM.
To take a specific example, DeWitt writes that the many-worlds
interpretation
"is a completely causal view, which even Einstein might have
accepted."
His critics do not let this claim go unchallenged. Ballentine argues
that Einstein actually supported the statistical interpretation. Sachs
is even more explicit;
"I take issue with DeWitt's remark about the Qnany-worldJ approach
as one that 'even Einstein might have accepted'. The features that
Einstein anticipated in a fundamental description of matter were
spelled out in his own writings....and they were not at„all
contained in the type of theory that DeWitt discusses."
DeWitt counters with the following:
"It is probably only wishful thinking, but I like to think that
Einstein....might have been surprised and pleased at Everett's
conception which^did not see the light of day, alas, until after
Einstein died."
This exchange is by no means unique. Pearle and Sachs have
clashed over whether Einstein supported a statistical interpretation






Einstein supported hidden-variable t ories . Bohr, too has been
the subject of much textual exegesis'
The presence of such rhetorical exchanges is common in science.
However, if (as some critics would claim) such arguments are the
only kind to be found in most FQM work, and if personal taste is
the only criterion used to choose an interpretation, then FQM is
clearly in difficulties. Not only would this make it very difficult
to achieve either consensus or progress in FQM, but it would make it
impossible for us to arrive at any structured account of FQM's
social organisation, because there would be none.
I do not believe this is an accurate picture of FQM. I would
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argue that we can perceive a structure of sorts within FQM, and
that this structure is based on methodological distinctions.
Methodological Choice in FQM
Many of my informants believed that progress in FQM was possible.
Individuals claimed to have set themselves certain goals, and to
have chosen a certain set of procedures to achieve these goals.
They were able to present a pictdre (one might say a rational recon¬
struction) of their activity, in which their later work followed on
from, and progressed beyond, their earlier discoveries. In the LHV
case, the completion of a series of experiments provided a rather
unequivocal measure of progress. Elsewhere in FQM, claims to have
made progress were seldom universally accepted because different
workers held different views about what constitutes progress.
To some extent, these differences may ultimately lie at the
level of 'personal taste'. However, I have found it useful to
characterise much of the disagreement as a dispute over the choice
of methodology to be used I. in FQM in the absence of empirical tests.
For example, faced with apparent logical paradoxes in QM, one point
of view is to attempt to alter QM, while another is to attempt to
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: alter the structure of logic
The sociological value of a methodological characterisation
of FQM is that an actor's committment to a particular methodology
is often not simply a matter of taste, but a reflection of that
actor's previous training and institutional position. Many of my
informants displayed clear connections between their professional
background and their attitudes to FQM.
For example, a mathematician described the source of his
dissatisfaction with QM as follows:
"The conventional formalism of....QM, von Neumann's formulation,
has got all sorts of mathematical headaches attached to it....
topological problems which are really quite irrelevant to any
practical calculation, but which it seems necessary to solve if
you want to give a mathematically rigorous theory of QM."
This informant felt that non-mathematicians approach QM in a
quite different way:
"X is a theoretical physicist, but he's definitely not a mathe¬
matician. .. .that's why he gets so far with what he does. If you work
like a true mathematician, you'd get stuck because you can't prove
the next implication, but X simply jumps on."
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In contrast, many physicists, such as Pearle, DeWitt, and
Wigner, perceive the main difficulty with von Neumann's formulation
of QM in physical terms - that is, they wish to know how the
mathematical procedure of reduction can be described in physical
terms, and they construct specific mechanisms by which reduction
may take place.
For example, the Bohm-Bub hidden-variable theory, produced in
1966, was based on an earlier HV"theory developed by Wiener and
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Siegel in the 1950's« However, whereas Bohm and Bub were interested
in the physical implications of their model, Wiener and Siegel were
led to their theory on mathematical grounds. As Siegel told me:
"We chose this .[formulation] for mathematical reasons, because of this
remarkable....dichotomic algorithm which wj|g the product of Wiener's
marvellous, intuitive, mathematical mind."
According to Siegel, they did not have high hopes for the
theory, and felt it might well be "physically vacuous". It certainly
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had little impact on physicists , far less than Bohm's early HV
theory of the same period.
"Nobody showed much interest in it. It was very much harder to
understand (than Bohm's 1952 theory]) , the maths was more complicated,
and it was not so physical.... So far as the physicists were
concerned, since it was difficult to underst^d, very few physicists
gave it the time necessary to criticise it."
Philosophers also drew explicit links between their training
and their approach to FQM:
"In my case, it's more philosophy than physics simply because my
background is mostly philosophy."
FQM contains elements of philosophy, pure mathematics,
theoretical physics, and (in the case of LHV) experimental physics.
Different individuals are drawn to take an interest in different
features of FQM, and to some extent this seems to be affected by
their training or their own self-classification as a physicist,
a philosopher, and so on. But this multiplicity of approaches has
itself had an effect on the status of FQM, simply because FQM appears,
to the outsider, to be such a mixture of disciplines.
"A lot of philosophers haven't picked it up because the kind of maths
you need to understand it is pretty esoteric, and it's hard to get
a mathematician to pay attention to it, because it's motivated by
non-mathematical considerations, so you're caught between two worlds."
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"PQM is at une intersection of physics and philosophy. .. .it studies
physical theory and uses, or should use, philosophical tools....
The philosophy departments usually mistrust people with a scientific
"background....ana it's not a recognised, established branch of physics."
and
"It's been the bane of my existence, because I publish papers in
philosophy and physicists say 'oh well, he's a philosopher', and
philosophers did have a tendency to say, 'well, he's a physicist.'"
As mentioned earlier, few people devote the majority of their
time to FQM. Many informants explained this in terms of the low
status of FQM in the eyes of their professional colleagues:
"It's been an odd experience for me, working in this field. It
didn't have at all the kind of rewards that work in mathematical
physics or other fields have....I haven't got any strokes from
mathematical physicists whom I respect for this work. It's only a.
part of my research. I think I would have done more work in this
field if I'd gotten more rewards."
At the same time, the fact that FQM is not technically well-
developed or esoteric in its content makes it possible for people
to 'dabble' in this field; it is fairly common to find mathematicians,
philosophers and physicists publishing one or two papers in FQM then
leaving this area, apparently for ever.
The lack of any coherent organisation or cognitive consensus in
. FQM may, in a way, be self-perpetuating. Since the field lacks
an organised critical system, progress, even for an individual,
may be difficult:
"I'm disappointed that so few people are working on this. I can't
handle all the mathematical problems myself without years of work...
..Also, I'm a Popperian, I believe you learn from being severely
criticised, and one of the unfortunate things about not having
enough people working on this stuff is that you never get criticised.
I'm sure I've said lots of wrong things and I'd like to know this."
Thus, there is clearly a complex relationship between the
status of FQM, its social structure, and its cognitive content.
Its low status, and its lack of an organised social system, seem to
be at least partly responsible for its failure to achieve cognitive
consensus, apart from the very few 'schools', such as de Broglie's,
where a tight, though introspective, consensus is maintained. Yet
the lack of cognitive consensus, and the plurality of views within
FQM, seem to contribute to its continuing low status. Only the LHV
activity has broken free of this impasse, largely because a group of
people focused on a specific problem and agreed on a methodology for
o
solving it.
Methodological differences seem to be one major cause of FQM's
condition. The concept of methodological divergence is therefore
worth exploring further. Before doing so, I must stress the need to
avoid over-simplistic models. For example, it would be misleading
to divide FQM into three camps - physicists, mathematicians, and
philosophers - on methodological grounds. Such a division is far too
clear-cut to be an accurate picthre. As we have seen, physicists (for
example) do not share a common attitude to FQM despite their shared
professional label. Although personal taste may play a part in
generating this diversity, there is still a place for methodological
analysis even within a single occupational group.
For example, DeWitt's support of the many-worlds interpretation
may seem a strange position for a physicist to adopt, given the
apparently strange physical implications of this theory. But if we
look more closely, we find that DeWitt's position results from a
prior commitvftwt to what he himself calls 'naive realism'. As
discussed earlier, the many-worlds view argues that since reduction
does not appear, in the basic formalism of QM, then reduction does
not occur. An infinity of splitting universes is a necessary
consequence of this conclusion, but to DeWitt this is far more
acceptable than tinkering with the formalism for 'metaphysical'
reasons:
"What becomes of reality? How can one treat so cavalierly the
objective world that exists all around us?....What if we forgot
all metaphysical ideas?....Let us try to take the mathematical-
formalism of QM as it stands without adding anything to it."
This, then, is an explicitly methodological stand:
" [This approach]] implies a return to naive realism and the old-
fashioned idea that the^g can be a direct correspondence between
formalism and reality."
This interpretation, it is claimed, therefore represents a
"straightforward....honest view of things."
Thus we should avoid any simplistic account of FQM which
claims that physicists favour experimentally-testable interpretations
while philosophers argue on philosophical grounds . Methodological
differences can be much more subtle than this. DeWitt's case
confirms this, and also reminds us that the methodology of an
interpretation, and not just the content of that interpretation,
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can have a major influence on its reception.
Having rejected a simplistic subdivision of FQM into three
methodologically-distinct areas, the snag is that we must also
reject the idea of using professional labels as an easy, foolproof
way of identifying methodological orientation. Such a method may
still be useful where the actors being studied are not members of
the same professional group (and we shall see examples of this below)
but it is of little use in characterising a dispute between, say,
two physicists. Given the many diverse activities which go under
the name of 'physics', it is not surprising that methodological
differences exist within this professional group.
Of course, one could investigate the differences in training
between two physicists to try to give a sociological account of
their different methodological preferences. However, many of these
preferences are, at root, philosophical. For example, to DeWitt,
realism means restricting oneself to the contents of the formalism,
and accepting whatever picture of reality this implies. To Pearle
(among others) realism means questioning and modifying the formalism
until it corresponds to a plausible physical model. Sociological
processes may indeed play a part in determining such philosophical
attitudes; however, other factors are undoubtedly involved, so that
the origin of methodological differences remains an open question.
Having seen how the concept of methodological orientation
may help us to characterise and account for the cognitive diversity
in FQM, let us turn now to what may be an even more interesting
application of the concept, namely, the study of conflict in FQM.
Conflict and Methodological Divergence: Pinch's case-study
In the case of the many-worlds interpretation, we saw that
DeWitt's critics recognised that no conclusive arguments could be
used against this theory. Although detailed technical criticism did
occur,many critics chose to avoid prolonged conflict by claiming
that the choice of interpretation was 'all a matter of taste',
and that they simply could not accept the view that the universe
was continually splitting.
There have been other occasions in FQM's history where conflict
has been more prolonged and overt, and in the remainder of this
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chapter I shall concentrate on these. Despite the fact that these
disputes were conducted in terms of 'what is true' rather than
'which methodology is best', I shall argue that methodological
differences did lie at the heart of these disagreements.
I begin with a discussion of Pinch's study of the reception of
Bohm's 1952 hidden-variable theory"^". This is an important paper,
and in many respects Pinch's conclusions are consistent with my
own. However, there are a number*of areas of disagreement, and I
will argue that in such areas Pinch's analysis is unsatisfactory.
The case-study examines the relationship between Bohm's HVT
and a mathematical 'proof', advanced by von Neumann in 1932, which
claimed to show that no HV interpretation of QM was possible. Pinch
asks two questions: first, why did the creation of a supposedly
impossible theory not lead to a detailed examination of the proof,
instead of a rejection of the theory? Second, why did it take until
the 1960's before the relationship between the theory and the proof
was properly understood?
Pinch argues that Bohm and the supporters of von Neumann failed
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to communicate . The clash was not simply due to the fact that these
groups supported different philosophical positions, such as realism
- (Bohm) or instrumentalism (von Neumann), nor because Bohm was trying
to reintroduce causality:
"Causality....has, in this dispute, been treated as 'window dressing'
....physicists seem to produce cognitive objects which they then
call causal or acausal rather than basing their work on any committment
to a particular notion of causality."
According to Pinch, the reason why the conflict existed was
that von Neumann had not anticipated the particular type of HVT
which Bohm would later produce, and the reason why Bohm was unable
to resolve the conflict was that he did not fully understand the
axiomatic mathematical techniques used by von Neumann in constructing
his proof:
"The failure of Bohm and von Neumann to communicate....can be
explained in terms of their differing research techniques. Von
Neumann was a mathematician committed to....using the research
technique of axiomatisation. Bohm was ^theoretical physicist
committed to developing new theories."
The lack of communication between (supporters of) von Neumann
and Bohm seems, then, to be rooted in differences in methodology
and competence between the two sides. This conclusion is quite
i iv
consistent with my own analysis.
However, when Pinch goes on to examine the reception of Bohm's
theory by other physicists, he constructs an account which seems
less satisfactory. He argues that although commitment: to a
philosophical viewpoint, such as acausality, was not a powerful
determinant, nevertheless there was a strong commitment among
physicists to the 'metaphysical' principle of 'arithmomorphism'.
This concept is taken from the wbrk of Georgescu-Roegen; according
to the latter, arithmomorphic concepts are those which can be
analysed logically, in contrast to 'dialectic' concepts which are
qualitative and often contain contradictions. When applied to
mathematicians like von Neumann who constructed logical proofs, this
nomenclature makes a certain amount of sense; logical proofs
involved the manipulation of arithmomorphic concepts. Pinch goes on
to argue, less convincingly, that the reason why Bohm's theory was
not covered by the proof was that the theory was dialectical. A less
elaborate explanation is that the theory did not meet all the axioms
on which von Neumann's proof is based. Von Neumann may therefore
have been guilty of limited imagination when he constructed his
proof (one might forgive him for this since the proof was written
20 years before Bohm constructed his theory) but it is not the case
that theories such as Bohm's are not amenable to mathematical or
logical analysis^.
When the concept of arithmomorphism is applied not to
mathematicians but to physicists, its validity is even more suspect;
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since (as Pinch himself points out^ ) physicists do not often use
axiomatic methods of logical analysis in their own work. Despite
this, Pinch argues that physicists are differential towards logical
'proofs', although the only example of such deference to be cited
is the treatment of the von Neumann proof itself . He claims that
logical proofs are the epitome of the 'arithmetic ideal' which is
assumed to be incorporated in the 'authority structure' of physics. "
Thus, the reason why physicists defended the proof and attacked
Bohm had very little to do with the content of either of these
things, and much to do with their form:
"Bohm was not only producing a rival interpretation of QM but was,
by his emphasis on qualitative and physical considerations, also
challenging the authority structure of physics.„..The failure of
uv
Bohm to achieve a social and. cognitive redefinition is not
surprising when so much was at stake and considering that he was
fighting against the embodiment of the arithmetic ideal, the much ^
worshipped and revered, but little understood, von Neumann proof."
There are several flaws in this account. First, apart from
the evidence of this particular case, Pinch does not establish
as a fact the existence of the 'arithmetic ideal' as part of the
'authority structure' of physics. The argument, therefore, appears
circular: physicists defended the proof because it was part of
the authority structure, and we know it was part of the authority
structure because they defended it'.
Secondly, if physicists are opposed to 'dialectical' concepts,
it is difficult to understand the high status of Niels Bohr's
concept of complementarity, which explicitly sets limits on
logical analysis and claims that contradictions are essential in
our models of reality. Pinch himself describes Bohr's views as
dialectical, and quotes members of the physics elite defending
such views. Indeed, it could be argued that Bohm was trying to make
complementarity less dialectical and more arithmomorphic by incorp¬
orating it into
"a precisely definable conceptual model.
Third, as Pinch points out, the fact that von Neumann's proof
is no longer accepted as a conclusive rejection of all HVTs
(because of its restrictive axioms) has not improved the climate
for such theories:
"The realisation that 'HV impossibility proofs' do not rule out
HVs has not led to gjie success of Bohm's interpretation or any
other such theory."
Also, the demise of this "embodiment of the arithmetic ideal' does
not seem to have had any effect on the authority structure of physics
either.
Let me suggest an alternative account for the rejection of
Bohm's theory, and for the role of the proof in this rejection.
When we examine the comments made by physicists on Bohm's theory,
it is clear that it seemed to them to be a very retrograde step,
and a return to a position which had only recently been abandoned
after a long struggle. Pauli claimed it was 'old stuff, dealt with
long ago', it was 'arbitrary', and it introduced an asymmetry for
its
which there was no justification. Ileisenberg claimed it was merely
'an exact replication of the Copenhagen Interpretation but in a
different language', and Rosenfeld felt Bohm was inadvisedly
'attempting to restore determinism*. Bohm himself openly admitted
that his interpretation was experimentally indistinguishable from
orthodox QM and that there was no evidence in favour of his view.
Without wishing to substitute an 'empiricist ideal' in place
of Pinch's 'arithmetic ideal' as.a central element in the authority
structure of physics, I would suggest that it is fairly easy to
see, from the above comments, why Bohm's theory was unattractive
to practising physicists. To an experimental physicist, Bohm's
theory offers no guide to any practical steps which might be
taken to test its validity. (When testable HVTs are proposed, as we
have seen, experimenters do take an interest.) To a theoretical
physicist, Bohm's theory offers only a more complicated, and rather
alien, way of saying the same thing.
In other words, Bohm's theory was irrelevant for the aims
and practices of most physicists; it was of no use as a resource.
Most physicists therefore ignored his work. The fact that members
of the elite chose to actively criticise, rather than ignore, Bohm
can also be explained without reference to an arithmetic ideal.
Until Bohm produced his HVT, his work had been both respectable
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and respected . Insofar as it is the task of the elite to set
goals and specify methods for their discipline, and to monitor and
reward progress, it was clearly incumbent upon them to point out the
error of Bohm's ways, and to dissuade anyone else from following
what seemed to them a sterile path.
What role did von Neumann's proof play in this? Rather than
acting as the main motive for Bohm's rejection, the proof merely
constituted a useful rhetorical resource to legitimise the rejection,
just as other rhetorical attacks on Bohm accused his theory of
being retrograde, artificial, asymmetric, metaphysical, and so on.
It may well be true, as Pinch claims, that physicists did not
examine either the proof or the theory to a sufficient extent to
explain the contradiction. This again, though, was a rather sensible
practical strategy. As Pinch points out, most physicists lacked the
mathematical competence necessary for a proper analysis of the proof;
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equally, they lacked any strong incentive to take time off from
their own research in order to develop these esoteric skills. It is
possible that some physicists rejected Bohm, not on methodological
grounds, but because they erroneously believed that the proof was
conclusive. Yet it seems more likely that the proof was an excuse,
and hot the cause, of Bohm's rejection.
There are further arguments in favour of this conclusion. There
is, first of all, a general argument that it is inadvisable to give
a major role to 'the power of logic' as a determinant of action.^
Secondly, Bohm himself managed to reject the spell cast by von
Neumann's proof, yet his critique of the proof in his 1952 paper,
to quote Bell,
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"seems to lack clarity, or else accuracy."
Since Bohm was able to construct a refutation (however shaky)
against the proof, one can presume that other people in the 1950's
would also have been able to do. Yet few did.
Third, as already mentioned, Bell's later (and more rigorous)
refutation of the proof has not led to an upsurge of interest in
HVTs of the type produced by Bohm. The reason, I would suggest, is
that such theories seem no more attractive to physicists now than
they did in 1952. No doubt von Neumann was held in high esteem in
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the 1950"s, even though physicists might not understand his work,
but it would be easy to exaggerate his authority in determining
physicists' actions - after all, most physicists were quite aware of
the fact that the great Einstein had strong reservations about QM,
yet few people accepted Einstein's ideas.
If these arguments are accepted, then the fact that the proof
was not 'really' a proof was quite irrelevant, as long as this fact
was not glaringly obvious, and as long as it was convenient for
physicists to think of and refer to the proof as a proof. Thus,
although both Pinch and I would agree with Belinfante's claim that
"for decades, nobody spoke up against von Neumann's arguments,
and....his conclusions were quoted by some as the gospel""",
I would not accept Belinfante's other claim that
"the authority of von Neumann's overgeneralised claim for nearly
two decades stifled any progress in the search for HVTs."69
Bohm was able to work on his HVT despite the proof, and I do not think
in
the proof deterred, many people who would otherwise have joined him.
Belinfante is a physicist, not a historian, and he tends to rewrite
history from a present-day perspective with the advantage of
hindsight. For example, he writes:
"I have always been puzzled how people could ever have been
convinced by von Neumann's arguments.... the lack of validity
of [his postulates] in any^decent HVT should have been obvious
to anybody by inspection."
It is true that for someone"who now sees the proof as obviously
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and trivially wrong1 , there is indeed a problem in accounting
for its acceptance, or at least its citation, over so many years,
whether we attribute this to 'magic', as Belinfante does, or to
'arithmomorphic commit, as Pinch does. I hope I have
convinced the reader that neither of these viewpoints is correct.
In this section, I have introduced the argument that disputes
and communication breakdowns in FQM can be the result of differences
in scientists' practices, aims or methodologies. However, the
argument would be unconvincing if it applied only to a single episode.
Fortunately, this is not the case.
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Wynne's study of the rejection of Barkla's work in the 1920's
provides many interesting parallels with Bohm's rejection in the
1950' s« Like Bohm, Barkla was rejected not because he had been
shown unequivocally to be mistaken, but because he was out of step
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with the concepts, goals, and methods of 'orthodox' physics' . Like
Bohm, Barkla (a Nobel prizewinner) was too prestigious to be
simply ignored, so that the rejection of his work had to be overt,
and the (practical) reasons for this rejection had to be supplemented
by rationalizations and rhetoric.
In the next section, I shall examine another such episode, in
which the opposing sides are theorists and experimenters. Since no
mathematicians or proofs are involved> there is little scope for
arithmomorphic and dialectical commitinenrfc^. as explanatory devices.
However, I hope to show that methodological differences are central
to the dispute.
\
Papaliolios' Experiment and the Bohm-Bub Theory
The technical details of the Bohm-Buh theory and the
Papaliolios experiment have been given in Chapter Two. For
convenience, I will summarize the main points here.
Bohm and Bub postulated the existence of a set of hidden
variables whose values normally 'averaged out' to give the same
predictions as QM. The process of measurement is considered to
disturb the HVs and change their*values. After a very short delay
(the 'relaxation time') the values resume their equilibrium
distribution and once more correspond to the QM predictions.
Bapaliolios set up an experiment in which a measurement is performed,
followed by a second measurement very soon after the first; the
time interval between the two was shorter than Bohm and Bub's
estimate for the relaxation time,T. No deviation from QM predictions
was detected. Thus either QM is correct or the relaxation time is
too small to be detected by Papaliolios' method.
Some additional technical details will be required for the
discussion which follows. In their original paper, Bohm and Bub
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provide a numerical estimate for u of approximately 10 seconds,
based on the tentative equation
1 ^ -ifT
where \ is Planck's constant divided by 2x7', k is Boltzmann's
constant, and T is the temperature (in Kelvin) of the system.^
(in fact, taking T as 300°K, i.e. approximate room temperature,
t = 2*5 x 10 seconds.)
When Papaliolios published his result, he quoted Bohm and Bub's
rf -13estimate for T as approximately 10 seconds, but quoted the
equation incorrectly as ihn_
that is, without the factor of 2tT J-* (Taking T as 300°K, this
—13
equation gives T = 1-6 x 10 -'seconds.)
In his experiment, Papaliolios was able to use times as short
, -1^ !>—
as 2-4- x 10 seconds, which is well below Kl but comparable
with . Later work allowed him to reduce this limit even
further, to t < 1*9 x 10 seconds.' Thus the incorrect citation
of instead of \t was, in the long run, irrelevant since
Papaliolios managed to rule out both these estimates. However, since
Papaiioiios' lower estimate was not published until seven years after
his initial result, one might have expected Bohm and Bub, during the
intervening period, to have defended their prediction by referring
to Papaiioiios' error. They did not do so; indeed, they both told
me that they were not at all surprised to find their prediction
refuted, and that they saw no point in trying to defend their
prediction. In fact, what did surprise them was that anyone went
to the bother of testing their prediction in the first place. Clearly,
the attitudes of Papaiioiios and of Bohm and Bub towards the prediction
and the experiment were very different.
Papaiioiios' interest in the theory was almost entirely due
to the fact that an experimental test could be performed. In an
interview, I asked him if he had been interested in FQM prior to
his experiment:
"No. I have an interest in doing interesting experiments. Especially
if they're easy experiments."
The fact that Bohm and Bub had produced a numerical prediction
was very important to him:
"I wrote to Bohm, saying I was grateful that he'd given a value
for the time, because without such a value the theory is meaning¬
less, because you could always say that the time is sufficiently
short that things look like the usual quantum state,... .And without
such a value for the time there is no experiment."
Erom Papaliolios' point of view as an experimentalist, not only
must a 'meaningful' theory make specific predictions, but the
predictions must be testable in a practical way. This is clear in
the next extract from the interview. I asked him what he would have
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felt if Bohm and Bub had suggested a value for X of 10 seconds,
a far shorter time than could be measured with Papaiioiios'
apparatus. He replied:
"Giving an unattainable number is no better than giving no number
....[the theoryj would be nonsense, just an unnecessary complication
to quantum theory. As long as it's intestable, and has no experimental
consequences, you shouldn't even clutter up your mind with it."''
In his experiment, Papaiioiios found that there was no deviation
from QM's prediction; however, as he was well aware, this result
does not refute the Bohm-Bub theory. It simply suggests that their
estimate for the relaxation time was too large. Indeed, Bub did
point out that this conclusion could be drawn:
"An experimental comparison between the statistical predictions of
I 7_o
th'e quantum theory and this HVT has been carried out recently.
On the basis of a photon polarisation experiment, it has been q„
shown that if the HV hypothesis is true, thenX < 2'^ x 10~--'sec."
Once his original experiment was completed, Papaliolios had
to decide what further steps, if any, ought to be taken to test
the theory. He refined his apparatus to reduce the upper limit of
rL even further, though this was a relatively trivial extension of
his original experiment and was not published until Papaliolios was
* O-i
asked to describe his work in a review paper some years later.
Clearly, a supporter of the Bohm-Bub theory could reply to such
lower figures in exactly the same way as before, namely that they
simply set an upper limit on X .
Another possible line of action, which Papaliolios considered
seriously, was to use Bohm and Bub's claim that X varied inversely
with temperature. According to this suggestion, cooling the apparatus
to 100°K (the temperature of liquid oxygen) would increase X. by
a factor of three compared with its value at room temperature. Thus
—lij,
an experiment which could measure times as short as 1-9 x 10 seconds
would be a much more crucial test of the theory if the predicted
-1^
value of X was raised to (say) 7'5 x 10 seconds. In his original
paper, Papaliolios discusses this possible approach:
"It is also possible, to perform a more definitive test of Bohm
and Bub's choice of -fit Csicj as the relaxation time, by repeating
the experiment at lower temperatures. The lack of a theoretical
understanding of this choice of X f however, does not at this time g^
justify cooling the apparatus to liquid air (or lower) temperatures. "
Neither Papaliolios, nor anyone else, has ever performed
such an experiment. In Papaliolios' case, the reason for this was
largely to do with external events; his main research interest
was astrophysics, and
"then the pulsars came up and I just comgletely dropped these
experiments and never returned to them."
Why has no other experimentalist carried out a low-temperature
test of the theory? The reason, I suggest, is that from an experi¬
mentalist's point of view such an experiment would serve no useful
purpose. The experimental upper limit for X could be lowered
indefinitely without crucially affecting the theory. Similarly, the
Q£i
temperature-dependence of X had 'no theoretical justification'.
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In addition, since it was clear that % was less than 1*9 x 10
seconds, a very short time, the possibility that X might really
be even smaller did not seem at all plausible, given the absence
of any justification for such small values:
"As the upper limit is reduced it becomes more difficult to inven^
a believable physical process that might be responsible for it."
In interview, Bapaliolios was more forthright:
jf.
"Bohm didn't give me any justification for . So if the guy who
writes the theory essentially admits that it's a number he pulled
out of the air then why should I waste ^gme testing it....There
has to be some theoretical foundation."
At this point, the reader may be wondering why, given the
arbitrary and unsatisfactory status of the prediction, any
experimental tests were performed. In the first place, the experiment
was both easy and cheap:
"I constructed the apparatus and did the experiment all within
a period of two weeks®,-, .the apparatus was trivial.... it was done
without any funding."
Secondly, the experiment offered the chance of a publication,
and in fact was published in the prestigious journal Physical Review
Letters. Thirdly, although it seemed highly unlikely that QM would
be refuted, the possibility was there. For the first time, an
alternative to QM had produced a specific prediction for experi¬
mentalists to look at:
"My feeling was that QM was probably right. One has a feeling as
to what's probably going to happen, bg^ if you really believe
that you wouldn't do the experiment."
Clearly, Bapaliolios thought that the experiment was an attractive
one. He told me that he worked very quickly, because his experiment
seemed 'obvious', and he thought that lots of people might be
planning such experiments in the first few weeks after Bohm and Bub
published their theory. In fact, only one experimental proposal
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other than his own appeared in print . This involved relaxation
effects in nuclear physics - very different from Bapaliolios'
photon polarisation study - and no such experiment was performed.
One reason why Bapaliolios might have seen his experiment as
obvious was that he had been using polarisers in his undergraduate
teaching, and, as he put it:
"It was just a coincidence that my thoughts were running along
these lines when I happened to see the Bohm-Bub paper by chance."''
)
Let us now examine Bohm and Bub's attitude towards an
experimental test of their theory. We shall see that such a test
was not at all what they had in mind when they wrote their paper.
In their introduction, Bohm and Bub state that
"It is definitely not propose^, that the theory developed here is
likely to be a 'right' one."
Instead,
"the main ajm of the theory is to provide a language and a set of
concepts." .
They argue that the Copenhagen interpretation is unnecessarily
restrictive, since it maintains that we cannot talk about what is
'really' happening in microsystems; instead, QM provides us with
a set of predictions which apply in specific experimental contexts.
Bohm and Bub argue that
"science is surely more than merely a set of algorithms for an
engineer's handbook. Science also aims at an understanding of the
overall stincture and order of movement of matter from the atom
to the galaxies." ^
To enlarge the scope of QM, they argue, requires.a new descriptive
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language , and their theory attempts to do this. Despite its
imperfections, such an attempt is worthwhile, firstly because it
shows that an alternative language is possible, and secondly
because it may lead, in time, to better theories.
"The theory, in its present form, suffers from a number of
inadequacies, but i<t does provide a new conceptual structure in
which certain questions can be considered, which cannot even be
formulated within the framework of QM....In some cases, a new
language opens up a different structure of thinking and thus leads
to new kinds of actions in relationship to nature. What is needed
now is a hypothetical tentative approach..."
Clearly, this is rather distant from the concerns of experi¬
mentalists. Bohm and Bub do discuss the experimental implications
of their theory, though this section occupies less than a page of
their 17-page paper, and it is rather speculative. Discussing the
value of the relaxation time, they write
"This is, of course, unknown, but some plausible suggestions
can be made at this stage."
Two mechanisms for relaxation - thermal and quantum mechanical - are
suggested, though only in the former case is a specific prediction
(k-r) made. In an interview, Bohm confirmed Papaliolios' suggestion
that had little theoretical justification:
"The value of 'T was just a suggestion, the number was almost
pulled out of a hat^... was nearly a guess.... X could he
immensely shorter."
The mechanism used by Papaliolios (altering the polarisation
of photons) was not mentioned by Bohm and Bub. Papaliolios gained
the clear impression that they did not expect either this or any
other experimental test of their theory:
"I wrote to Bohm describing the experiment and the result, and
I think I caught him by surprise:"
Bub confirms this impression:
"I was utterly astounded when I learned Papaliolios was doing an
actual experiment....For me, Cthe theory) was only a didactic
model....it never occurred to me that these thoughts would be
taken seriously....it wasn't that we'd proposed a rival theory to
QM, but rather we had investigated, by means of the model, the
possible structure of a class of rival theories."
The experiment does not seem to have had much impact on the
development of Bohm's or Bub's ideas. In later papers, they
continued to argue that the real significance of a HV theory is
that it introduces new concepts and a new mode of description. In a
review of HVTs published in 19^9> Bub makes no reference to
Papaliolios' experiment.Although, as stated earlier, Bub now
rejects Bohm's HVT approach, this change seems to have been the
result of the influence of the philosopher Putnam, and does not
seem to have had anything to do with Papaliolios.
Papaliolios, and Bohm and Bub, clearly held very different
attitudes towards both the theory and the experiment. To Papaliolios,
the presence of a specific numerical prediction was the theory's
saving grace; it gave him a way to evaluate the theory in terms that
were meaningful to him. Once the most direct test had been performed,
the looseness of the theory's predictions made it uninteresting to
experimental physicists, partly because no experiment could conclus¬
ively refute the theory, and partly because there was no 'believable
physical process' to account for such short times.
To Bohm and Bub, the main value of their theory was its new
conceptual structure, not its empirical validity. Bohm's attitude
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to his earlier (1952) theory was quite similar.
It is of course possible that Bohm and Bub deliberately
included a specific prediction to gain attention for their work,
'H-
and deliberately chose a value for t which would be experimentally
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accessible, in a way that 10 seconds would not. However, there is
no evidence to support such a cynical view. Instead, all the evidence
suggests that Bohm and Bub simply do not equate 'meaningfulness'
with 'immediate testability' in the way Papaliolios does.
This case-study strongly suggests that methodological
differences can play a central part in disputes. Both Pinch and I
would agree on this point. However, this example can also discriminate
between Pinch and myself, by providing further evidence against
Pinch's use of the terms 'dialectical' and 'arithmomorphic'.
According to Pinch, certain concepts in Bohm's 1952 theory
are inherently dialectical, and are therefore in conflict with the
'arithmetic ideal' of physics. Pinch is therefore arguing that the
structure of the theory led to its rejection. In contrast, my
analysis focussed on Bohm's aims, and on the way he chose to present
and develop his theory. In other words, I argued that any analysis
of what Pinch calls 'cognitive objects' must take account of the
ways in which these objects are manipulated. Only in this way can
we explain other features of FQM, such as the fact that an avowed
realist like DeWitt finds the many-worlds theory attractive.
Applied to the Bohm-Bub theory, a methodological analysis
would suggest that the two attitudes to this theory which we have
already encountered were not the only possible ones. Scientists
who held neither 'experimental' nor 'philosophical' methodologies
would have attitudes to the theory quite different from those of
Bohm and Papaliolios. Let us now examine the attitudes to the
theory of a mathematician, Jerald Tutsch.
Tutsch published three papers on the Bohm-Bub theory, and in
these papers he not only defends the theory but also argues in
favour of more experimental tests as soon as possible. Clearly,
his views are not identical with any we have yet encountered.
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In his first paper , Tutsch points out the lack of theor-
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etical justification for the figure of 10 seconds as the time
interval over which QM might cease to be valid. He derives a
new time of 10 "^seconds, based on a different mechanism. Although
such short times are attainable in principle, this new estimate
I -L S
saves the theory from Papalxolios' original experiments.
In his second paper, Tutsch makes it clear that he does not
share Bohm and Bub's concern with developing new conceptual structures
at the expense of experimentations
"Whether or not the new variables must remain hidden will be
settled by mathematics and experimental physics, and not by
philosophy."
However, Tutsch also claims that Fapaliolios' experiment has
not settled the issue, because the measured time interval was too
long. In fact, the experiment
"showed the randomisation time to be smaller than that conjectured
by Bohm and Bub."
In his final paper, Tutsch derives a new hidden-variable
theory from
"a combination of very general and reasonable requirements
concerning QM, physical measurement, and mathematical simplicity."
He shows that this theory leads to the same equations as those
used by Bohm and Bub, and again he stresses that Papaliolios'
experiment does not constitute a proper test of either theory.
Tutsch's views seem to lie somewhere between Bohm and Bub's
speculations about conceptual frameworks, and Papaliolios' concern
solely with empirical testing. Tutsch's training, and his method¬
ological orientation, are equally distinct. He was trained as a
mathematician, and his work on HVT was performed for a PhD in the
maths department at the University of Wisconsin. In a letter,
he explained his viewpoint:
"My main interest in mathematics has been in nonlinear systems of
differential equations, and I found the Bohm-Bub equations interesting
from that standpoint....1 always felt that HVTs were simply another
interesting mathematical model of the world....[Bohm-BubJ is an
interesting model of a HVT, but that is about all....It was my
feeling that the Papaliolios experiment did not really test the ,
Bohm-Bub theory, and that experiments of that kind never could."
Tutsch's case supports the view that there is no simple
dichotomy between 'arithmetic' and 'dialectical' concepts, or even
between another possible pair of categories such as 'empirical' and
'theoretical' concepts. A single 'cognitive object', such as the
108
Bohm-Bub theory, can be interpreted in many different ways. The
particular interpretation which an actor constructs is heavily
dependent on his general methodological orientation.
Discussion
In this chapter, I have been concerned with two interrelated
issues; the social organisation of FQM, and the lack of consensus
in this field. I argued that the diversity of views in FQM, as
detailed in Chapter Two, is reflected in the rather fragmented
(if not anarchic) social organisation of this field. It seems clear
that there is an interaction between the social structure and the
cognitive content of FQM; however, this interaction is complex
and two-way. The lack of a clearly-structured training, communication
and reward system in FQM militates against the emergence of consensus
by removing the most obvious means by which deviance could be
sanctioned and agreement rewarded. Equally, the lack of any shared
body of knowledge, or of a communal perception of progress,
encourages scientists, mathematicians and philosophers with a wide
range of different perspectives to 'dabble' in this field; that is,
to invest a short period of time in FQM while retaining a more
lasting committment to the aims and methods of their 'home'
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disciplines. Even the relatively few individuals who spend the
majority of their time in FQM seem to feel isolated, though this
is often by choice; recognising the fundamental differences in
outlook which separate many FQM workers, individuals often felt
that discourse with groups who did not share their views was pointless.
The concept of methodological divergence can also be used to
account for the conduct of disputes in FQM. This analysis began with
an examination of Pinch's case-study. Despite our differences in
terminology, Pinch and I are largely in agreement over the causes
of the 'communication breakdown' between Bohm and the constructors
of 'impossibility proofs'. However, I argued that concepts such as
arithmomorphism and the dialectical/arithmetic dichotomy are
unnecessary and misleading. This is not only because concepts such
as 'dialectical' can be defined in many different ways (as we saw
in Chapter Three) but also because this usage ignores many
features of Bohm's particular case. Theories and ideas cannot be
unproblematically identified as arithmetic or dialectical, and it is
therefore unsatisfactory to argue that the physics elite opposed
Bohm simply because he threatened the arithmetic ideal. The
limitations of such a normative account, in which deviance is
1
recognised automatically, and sanctions applied in an unproblematic
way, have already been discussed in Chapter One. I presented an
alternative account in which Bohm's work was depicted as a
retrograde proposal which was perceived to be out of step with the
aims and methods of the rest of the physics community.
Turning now to the reception of the Bohm-Bub theory, we saw
that Bohm, Papaliolios and Tutsch disagreed over the theory's
status and value because they each wanted to use the theory in
different ways. One might even make a stronger claim, drawing on
Wittgenstein's dictum that 'the meaning is the use': in a very real
sense, their differing methodologies led these actors to perceive the
theory in different ways. To Bohm, the theory was an example of
an alternative conceptual structure; the attempt was so tentative
that it might better be called a metaphor rather than a serious
attempt to accurately describe reality. To Papaliolios, the theory
was a source of empirical predictions, and the low 'quality' of
its predictions meant that it was not a good theory. To Tutsch,
the theory was a set of nonlinear differential equations which
happened to contain terms which referred to physical observables.
Since these actors held such different views about the meaning and
purpose of the theory, it is hardly surprising that they failed to
reach agreement. The different perceptions of the theory were firmly
embedded in these scientists' practice. It would be very difficult
for the participants to achieve consensus about the status of this
theory without resolving these more fundamental differences in
practice.
In conclusion, I have argued that a satisfactory account of
the existence, conduct, and outcome of disputes in FQM must take
into account the social and technical context of the dispute. This
context includes the peculiarly fragmented social and cognitive
structure of FQM, which has important effects on the manner in which
FQM develops. In this field, actors with very different method¬
ological orientations often converge on a single cognitive object,
but they may fail to engage in constructive discussion about that
object. Because of their methodological differences, they may, simply,
fail to perceive the disputed cognitive object in the same way.
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Chapter Five
Social Context and the Process of Scientific Investigation
Introduction
In previous chapters, I have examined the interaction between
FQM and its 'social context' at a number of levels. In Chapter
Three, I dealt with the general cultural and political context in
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which interpretations of QM were developed and transmitted. In
Chapter Four I dealt with the interaction between the internal
social organisation of FQM and its lack of cognitive consensus.
In Chapters Five and Six I will look in more'detail at a single
episode of FQM - the experimental tests of local hidden variables
(LHV) - and I will discuss the influences which the local social
context exerted on the conduct of the physicists involved.
A study of LHV is particularly interesting for several reasons.
First, as stated earlier, the LHV group was much more cohesive
than much of FQM. The group had a clearly-stated purpose (namely,
to test the validity of LHV) and they agreed on the methodology
to be used in this task. As we shall see, not everyone agreed with
the idea of experimental tests. This is a second reason why LHV
is interesting. Unlike the cases discussed in Chapter Four,
methodological issues were openly discussed in LHV.
Perhaps the most important reason for looking closely at LHV
is the fact that it was an experimental activity. Thus, at least
according to the traditional view of science, the outcome of this
activity might be expected to be relatively immune from social
influences in a way which more theoretical FQM might not. In
Chapters Five and Six I will investigate the validity of these
expectations. In the present chapter, I shall concentrate on the
behaviour and attitudes of the LHV physicists, and in the next
chapter I will examine the content of their knowledge-claims.
In Chapter One, I argued against normative accounts of scientists'
behaviour, and in favour of an approach which can be labelled
interactionist or contextualistic. This approach is based on the
view that scientists are actively engaged in processes of interp¬
retation and negotiation. Behaviour is not determined by passive
obedience to a set of rules. Instead, courses of action are undertaken
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for a variety of practical, idiosyncratic reasons (that is,
reasons which make sense for the individual within his particular
context) and such actions may be retrospectively depicted as rule-
governed .
According to this view, highly specific details of the local
context in which behaviour occurs may be vital for a complete or
consistent account of that behaviour. There are two reasons for this.
First, although behaviour may always be goal-directed, the specific
goal of a particular actor depends crucially on the context. Second,
the choice of behaviour which is most likely to fulfil a particular
goal will also depend on the context.
The general aim of this chapter is to examine and demonstrate
the ways in which individuals come to terms with their local social
context, how they adapt their behaviour to meet the demands of that
context, and how the products of their behaviour become data in
the deliberations of other individuals.
The first part of the chapter deals with a number of features
of the development of the LHV activity. I will examine the formation
of communication networks, the reasons why individuals chose to
perform experiments, the ways in which they presented their work,
and their response to anomalous results. In each case I will show
that individual physicists were concerned with solving practical
problems, and that their actions were tailored to fit the
particular conditions under which they operated, and the particular
goals which they were trying to fulfil. The second part of the
chapter looks at how the LHV activity has become a fact to which
other physicists must now respond. LHV, in other words, has altered
the social context in which FQM activity takes place.
The Social Context of LHV.
Before discussing the effects of social context, it is obviously
important to describe the relevant features of that context.
This raises methodological problems, since what is seen to be
'relevant' may depend on the sort of account which is put forward.
For example, one could argue that the fact that the LHV experiments
were performed during the Vietnam war is a relevant feature of the
social context of these experiments. There is little evidence in
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favour of this particular argument"'". However, it use. fully demon¬
strates that any account which links behaviour to social context
is open to accusations of bias and selection. There is no complete
defence against this argument; ultimately, the reader must judge
the plausibility of my account for himself.
The context of the LHV experiments can be subdivided into a
number of areas. In historical terms, the empirical success of QM,
and the absence of any successful alternative theory, or alternative
interpretation of QM, are very relevant. The historical context
meant that any proposed alternative to QM would, a priori, be
seen to be implausible. I do not wish to imply that all such
alternatives would be rejected out of hand - evidently, this did
not occur with LHV. However, there is little doubt that QM and LHV
did not compete on equal terms, and it would be very surprising
if this had no influence on the conduct of the LHV experimenters.
In social terms, most of these experiments took place in the
USA, within university physics departments, and many of them were
performed by fairly junior physicists at either doctoral or post¬
doctoral level. These physicists were therefore not entirely secure
in their positions, and were heavily dependent on the support, or
at least tolerance, of their superiors. At the most obvious level,
some degree of acceptance of LHV experiments as 'valid physics' was
required if a PhD was to be awarded.
In addition, the skills required for the LHV activity were
largely experimental. There is a fairly well-established division
of labour in science, particularly physics, between theorists and
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experimenters , at least to the extent that the kind of person who
had been involved with theoretical FQM prior to LHV (such as Bohm)
could not readily perform a LHV experiment, either because such a
person would lack the necessary skills, or because he would be
unable to gain access to the necessary apparatus.
Thus, the sort of person who becarwt involved in LHV was
necessarily different, in skills and methodological approach if
not in temperament, from the 'typical' FQM worker. This might well
be expected to play an important part in shaping the relationship
between LHV and the rest of FQM.
The above elements are some of the features of the social context
of LHV which are particularly relevant. Obviously, there are many
features which were not unique to LHV and yet which influenced the
conduct of the experimenters. Such features include the contemp¬
orary communication system in physics, journal refereeing procedures,
the different status of various universities, and so on. There is
little point in trying to list all such features.
Having presented an admittedly sketchy picture of the social
context of LHV, let us now examirfe some aspects of the experimenters'
behaviour to see if we can identify any features which seem to be
causally related to this social context. I shall begin by examining
the early history of LHV and the ways in which the members of the L^V
group initially came into contact with each other.
Formation of Communication Networks in LHV
In the early history of LHV, there are many instances where
two or more individuals independently put forward very similar
proposals, both theoretical and experimental, and where each was
unaware of the existence of the others. Of course, such examples
3
of near-simultaneity are by no means restricted to LHV ; however,
these episodes had an important bearing on the development of LHV,
and are therefore worth examining in detail.
The general idea that it might be possible to distinguish
experimentally between QM and local theories seems to have originated
independently with three peoples Bell, at CERN in Geneva, and T.D.Lee
and Richard Friedberg, both at Columbia University in New York. The
approaches of the three authors were not identical. Bell's LHV paper
was a development of an earlier paper in which he had criticised
'proofs', such as von Neumann's, which claimed to show the impossib-
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ility of HVTs . Lee had developed his ideas with specific reference
to the behaviour of high-energy particles called K-mesons. He did
not publish a paper referring specifically to tests of locality,
although two authors, Inglis and Day^, did discuss K-meson experiments
of the sort Lee had described. However, partly due to technical
difficulties with the production and rapid decay of K-mesons,
neither Inglis, Day nor Lee himself developed these ideas further.
Friedberg's analysis^, though stylistically very different from
Bell's, arrived at the same conclusions by a similar route, namely,
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by examining the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen thought-experiment.
It is significant that none of these ideas made much of an impact;
in fact, Rriedberg and Lee did not even publish their conclusions
on locality, and Bell's paper was published in the first volume of
a new journal (Physics) rather than in an existing high-status
journal.
It would be easy, in retrospect, to exaggerate the impact of
these theoretical developments. After all, we have now reached the
point where nine separate LHV experiments have been performed.
Many papers on LHV have been published, and the conclusions drawn
from the experiments have been widely circulated in the 'popular'
7scientific press', and even in less 'respectable' circles such as
g
parapsychology and mysticism . Indeed, one physicist, Henry Stapp,
has gone as far as to claim that
9"Bell's theorem is the most profound discovery of science."
It is therefore tempting to portray the development of the
LHV activity as a 'natural' progression from Bell's early paper
through the experiments to the present day. In fact, Bell's paper
was not at all well-known; although published in 1964, the first
recorded reference to it did not appear until 1968, and this citing
paper contains factual errors about the implications of Bell's
ideas
The first experimental test of locality did not use Bell's
ideas at all, at least initially. Leonard Kasday, who performed
an experiment for a PhD at Columbia with Jack Ullman and C.S.Wu,
originally developed his theoretical model in terms of Rriedberg's
unpublished results. He only learned of Bell's work when another
physicist, Clauser, visited Kasday at Columbia in 1968 to find out
some details about their experiment. In 1972, when Kasday completed
his PhD thesis, he cited Bell as the source of his theoretical
model, adding
"Professor..Eriedberg greatly clarified the significance of Bell's
Theorem."
Kasday's 'accidental' discovery of Bell's proposals was not
unique . Clauser, who later performed several LHV experiments, also
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came across Bell's 1964 paper by accident , and Shimony, who was
instrumental in organising another LHV experiment, only read Bell's
paper because a mutual acquaintance told Bell that Shimony might
13find it interesting, whereupon Bell sent him a copy. With the
exception of Kasday's test of Friedberg's proposal, no LHV experiments
were proposed until 19&9» five years after Bell's original paper
was published.
The explanation for this haphazard diffusion of Bell's ideas,
and of the delay in producing experimental proposals, must take
account of the underdeveloped social and technical context in which
Bell's paper appeared. First, there was no existing network of
experimental FQM workers, and no journal which could serve as the
appropriate medium for such papers. Second, there was much uncertainty
over the technical details of an experiment; both Shimony and Clauser
initially felt that an experiment of the type proposed by Bell had
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in fact already been done. Even when they realised that existing
experiments were not sufficient to rule out LHV, they were still
faced with the difficult task of designing a new experiment which
could test LHV. Third, there was no organised communication
between theorists and experimenters, so that even when Clauser and
Shimony had (independently) decided on the form that such an experi¬
ment might take, neither of them knew how to go about getting
access to the necessary equipment. In each case, accidental encounters
were again important, as the following anecdotes illustrate.
Clauser had just completed a PhD in radio astronomy at Columbia
University. He discussed the possibility of an experiment with Kasday,
and decided, for reasons I shall describe later, that a different
sort of experiment was required. He was also at this time looking
for a job, and he gave several papers at seminars at different
universities. At MIT, he met a postdoctoral student, Kocher, whose
PhD experiment at the University of California at Berkeley, had
involved measurement of photon polarization correlations. Clauser
already knew that measurements of this sort could be used to test
Bell's proposals, and he examined Kocher's work in some detail. He
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realised that it did not meet the requirements of a LHV test , but
that a modified form of this experiment would be suitable. He
contacted Kocher's ex-supervisor, Commins, at Berkeley, but found that
there were no vacancies for postdoctoral students in this department.
However, Clauser obtained a postdoctoral appointment elsewhere in
Berkeley, and once there he gradually 'worked his way into' the
appropriate research group and performed a LHV test.
Around the same time, Shimony and his PhD student Home were
also trying to find someone who had access to the necessary apparatus.
The chain of events in this case was even more tortuous. As Shimony
put it:
"We went around asking everybody'we had access to who had experimental
knowledge of optics., 'where can we^-get photon pairs which we can use
for the purpose of testing LHV?'"
Early in 19^9 > Shimony gave a talk on FQM in Cleveland, Ohio, where
he met Pearle, a doctoral physics student. Pearle suggested that
Shimony should talk to Snyder at Harvard. Snyder recalled Kocher's
experiment with Commins, and on checking the reference Shimony realised
it was indeed suitable. Shimony also decided to ask Papaliolios,
whom he did not know but whose paper on the Bohm-Bub theory he had
read. Papaliolios was also at Harvard, and when Shimony showed
him the Kocher-Commins paper,
"Papaliolios said, we have an apparatus at Harvard very much like
this....Pipkin had a student, Holt, who was just beginning his
doctoral work, intending to use this apparatus to look at the
lifetime of an intermediate state. Papaliolios arranged a meeting
....We explained what was going on, why their apparatus was useful
for testing Bell's inequality. We had to do a lot of explaining of
the motivation of our experiment....This type of thing was very
far from the concerns of Holt and Pipkin so we had to discuss
the matter for about an hour or so before they became^fairly convinced
that we were on the track of something interesting."
These episodes, and particularly Shimony's, illustrate quite
clearly the lack of any organised communication system at the start
of the LHV activity. In addition (and the relevance of this point will
become clear later) Holt's involvement with LHV was pure coincidence;
he happened to have access to the necessary apparatus. He had no
prior involvement, or even much interest, in the philosophical
aspects of FQM. Holt's own recollections of his early feelings
confirm this view:
"I thought, sure, I'll^ghip that off in six months then get back
to some real physics."
As a final illustration of the effects of the poor communication
system in LHV, we should note that Clauser, and Shimony and Home,
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came up with virtually identical proposals while" being completely
unaware of each other's existence. Shimony later recalled his feeling
that there was no great urgency in publishing a preliminary paper
to establish priority, and that he and Home could take the time
to complete their detailed calculations first.
"We felt, it doesn't matter, no-one else is doing this anyway... that
was an illusion."
They discovered an abstract of a. paper by Glauser on LHV in the
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Bulletin of the American Physical Society. They contacted Glauser,
and agreed that they should all collaborate in completing their
theoretical calculations, and that they should keep in touch, once
Clauser left for California, so that they could all monitor the
progress of the experiments at Harvard and Berkeley.
In this section, I have traced the early history of LHV, in an
effort to show that the outcome - nine completed experiments - did
not follow naturally, or unproblematically, from Bell's initial
paper. Events such as the five year delay before Bell's work was
taken up, Kasday's switch from Friedberg to Bell, Glauser's move to
Berkeley, and Holt's involvement in LHV, were all contingent
events which depended on some highly particular feature of the
social context in which LHV took place.
Deciding to Perform a LHV Experiment.
Individual physicists had to make a conscious decision to
perform a LHV experiment instead of spending their time doing
other things. Yet, as we shall see, there were some drawbacks to
LHV compared to other possible experiments. It is therefore
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inters ting to ask why these people chose to do LHV experiments.
As pointed out earlier, FQM work was generally held to be of
low status. This perception might well be expected to be most strong
among experimenters, bearing in mind the non-empirical character of
most FQM work prior to LHV. Yet the LHV group had to work alongside
experimental physicists. Many LHV workers felt that this led to
problems s
"I had considerable problems....with finding a place to do this
experiment. The comments you get....for doing this hidden-variable
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thing, ihey think it's a waste of time because they already know
the result....X was very upset that I was spending too much time
working on what was obviously of no importance, the results were
already known, and it was crazy that I didn't believe the existing
theory."
PhD students involved in these experiments made similar comments
about their supervisory committees:
"I encountered difficulties because of what the topic was, because
I had to justify to the people on my committee what was going on.
They had very strong biases about the subject matter....whereas with
other types of thesis experiments it's taken for granted that, well,
lots of people are doing this, you're measuring the coefficient of
such-and-such, and you're okay."
We must be careful to keep these 'difficulties' in their
proper perspective. There was no grand conspiracy to suppress LHV
experiments, or to harass LHV experimenters. The experiments
themselves were, after all, technically respectable, and Bell was
a respectable theorist based at CERH, a high-status institution.
The following quotation from an experimenter may help to clarify the
position:
"B. said that my experiment was interesting, but he asked if I had
a permanent position, because I would have difficulties, many people
would say that my experiment wasn't interesting and that I was
wasting my time. Well, I have seen people who could have said this,
but if I explain the problem as I see it....many people finally say
okay....T. said to me,'I would never give such an experiment to
one of my students, but if one came and saw me with the same enthus¬
iasm as you have, I would let him do it.' You see, experiments like
this are a kind of a luxury. You can accept them from time to time."
It would seem that the LHV physicists deliberately chose to
enter a field which was of relatively low prestige, and that they
performed experiments which most people thought were very unlikely
to produce either surprising or even particularly informative
results. Evidently, some factors must have overridden these
disincentives. What were they?
A rather facile way of accounting for these physicists' decision
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would be to say that they simply found the topic interjsting. Certainly,
one would be surprised to find physicists voluntarily working on
a topic which they did not find interesting. In interviews, I did
find that most people cited interest or curiosity as one of the
reasons for their involvement. Apparently, people who were in favour
of QM found just as much interest as those who were less convinced:
\
"I went into this "business with the idea of disproving hidden
variables once and for all."
"I got into the business with the idea that....hidden variables
might really be there."
"I was very interested originally in the foundations of QM, simply
because I couldn't understand it, and I wanted to understand it."
However, to leave the explanation at this point would be
inadequate. For one thing, I found several people who expressed
interest in LHV experiments yet Who claimed that they would not have
wished to perform such an experiment themselves, nor would they have
advised other people to do so. For example, Nussbaum had completed
a FhD under Pipkin at Harvard shortly before Shimony approached
Pipkin and Holt. Nussbaum later went to the University of Tennessee;
he considered the possibility of doing a LHV experiment there, but
decided against it, partly because there were then two other experiments
in progress, and partly because, as he put it,
"Given my other responsibilities and research commitrtviuivVs, my
, entry into the 'hidden variable sweepstake' seemed neither necessary
nor wise."
Another experimenter, Scarl, who had already done some 'fundam¬
ental' optics experiments, told me that although he found the topic
interesting, he was reluctant to allow any of his students to perform
such an experiment:
"You can't really put a graduate student on that kind of problem,
because when he gets out there is no employment. That is, if you go
out and say,'hey, I did my thesis in hidden variables', and you try
to impress, say, Lockheed Aircraft, I don't think they're going to
be too interested."
Whether or not such assessments of the 'risks' of LHV were
accurate, these statements serve to remind us that intellectual
curiosity is only one of many factors which may influence a scientist's
decision about where to invest his time. Let us try to identify some
other factors which were important in the LHV case.
Nearly all the people who performed the experiments were PhD
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or postdoctoral students. I wish to suggest that, given the social
context of LHV, such people were particularly suited for these
experiments, and that in this (rather weak) sense the social context
determined the sort of person who would get involved with LHV.
To some extent, the topic studied by a doctoral or post¬
doctoral student is a means to an end: namely, being awarded a PhD
or producing acceptable reports at the end of a postdoctoral
fellowship. None of my interviewees felt that their LHV work had
'typecast' them. They have:now gone on to work in fields as diverse
as atomic physics, laser fusion, and the psychology of perception.
This 'flexibility' among physics students has also been found in
25other studies . This may have helped to overcome any fears about
getting involved in what was undoubtedly a rather unorthodox
activity.
There are other relevant factors. For instance, a PhD student
requires a topic which is not beyond his technical competence, yet
which allows him to develop and extend his range of technical skills,
and so enhance his future employment prospects. He requires a topic
which will yield worthwhile results within two or three years, yet
which is something more than a routine application of well-known
procedures, differing only in detail from what has gone before.
Seen in this light, the LHV experiments begin to look more
attractive. The work is technically feasible, yet can be presented
as a fundamental test of one of the most important theories in
physics. At the same time, it avoids the necessity for very expensive
hardware or large-scale collaboration, involving twenty or thirty
people, in sharp contrast to fields such as high-energy physics.
All these factors seem to have been important for the LHV
experimenters. In their comments, quoted below, they come across
as an opportunistic group, for whom an interest in FQM may have been
a necessary, but by no means a sufficient condition, for their
involvement, (in the interview extracts which follow, all emphases
have been added to support the arguments made above.)
"I was in nuclear physics....! was looking for a thesis project. I
always wanted to do experiments which sat on a table-top but
nevertheless had some reasonable significance, and I'd always been
concerned about the basis of QM....this seemed like a good thesis
experiment."
"I didn't like the idea of a high-energy experiment as part of a
big team, with all the politics and bureaucracy....the LHV experiment
was technically difficult....I'd always been interested in QM....
The experiment was graduate standard. It was .just luck that I was
free at the time. Otherwise I'd have done a weak interaction
experiment."
"I was looking for a postdoc position, or someplace to go when I
finished my thesis on astrophysics, and I wanted to do something
in FQM, although I didn't really have anything in mind until I read
about LHV."
Another physicist, speaking before his experiment was completed, said
"JLrom the experimental point of view it's very interesting, because
I'll learn many things, I'll use some techniques that I don't know.
This is very interesting for an experimentalist."
There is still another feature of the social context which may
have been relevant. The high status of QM may have led many people
to feel that the outcome of the LHV experiments was a foregone
conclusion. Equally, however, the high status of QM meant that if
the experiments were to conclusively support LHV, they would have had.
a very great impact. As one experimenter put it
"There's a tremendous pay-off if QM is wrong. This would be phenom¬
enal, very exciting....I don't regard it as a big possibility,
though."
Here we should be cautious. It is one thing to speak wistfully,
after the experimental results were known, of what the consequences
might have been if QM had been falsified. (Some interviewees
mentioned Nobel Prizes.) It is quite another thing to claim that
this possibility was given widespread credence prior to the experi¬
ments. In principle, of course, any new experiment could lead to
the downfall of an established theory. This Popperian claim was
often used to defend the whole idea of doing LHV experiments, as
we shall see. However, LHV was considered to be rather implausible,
and. (at least in retrospect) few of my interviewees claimed to have
taken the possibility of refuting QM very seriously. Of course, given
what they now know, my interviewees may have been rewriting history.
We have no way of knowing what their expectations prior to 1972
really were. Nevertheless, we can at least say that, given the
other features of the experiments listed above, physicists did not
need to believe that they were heading for a Nobel Prize in order
to have good reasons for doing LHV experiments. The small chance of
a large pay-off may have been one influence, but there is no reason
to suppose it was a necessary, or even a strong, influence.
In this section, I have discussed a number of features of the
LHV context which seem to have played a part in selecting the personnel
involved. The decision to perform a LHV experiment did not emerge
naturally as a result of intellectual curiosity alone. Instead, it
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was the result of a complex evaluation process, in which physicists
assessed the experiment in terms of its relevance for their particular
needs. The outcome of this evaluation process was that certain people
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ended up doing LHV experiments , while other likely candidates
^ + 28did not.
Social Context and the Presentation of LHV.
In this section, I will examine the way in which the LHV group
presented their work to the physics community, through published
papers and theses. My aim will be to show that their presentation
was not simply consistent with the general conventions which govern
the structure and style of physics papers (such as a subdivision
into introduction, data and conclusions; use of the passive voice;
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and citation of other relevant work. ) I will show that LHV papers
also reflect the special context in which these papers were written;
that is, the style and structure of these papers were strongly
influenced by the low status of FQM in the eyes of most experimental
physicists.
It is important to note that the LHV experimenters considered
themselves to be 'respectable' physicists who just happened to be
performing experiments in FQM, rather than FQM workers who just
happened to be using experimental methods. Their training was in
conventional physics; their colleagues in the departments where they
worked were 'conventional' physicists; and they submitted their
results for publication, not in FQM journals such as Foundations of
Physics, nor even to 'general' physics journals such as the American
Journal of Physics, but to high-status, highly technical journals
such as Physical Review and fhysical Review Letters. Clearly, the LHV
group considered that the proper audience for their work was the
mainstream body of physicists rather than simply FQM workers. It is
therefore not surprising that they took active steps to counteract
the fairly low opinion of FQM held by much of this audience.
One very common tactic used in many of the LHV group's reports
was to lay great stress on the qualitative differences between
their work and all previous FQM work. Previous work had largely been
characterised by philosophical criticism or mathematical manipulation
of axioms. The LHV work, they pointed out, was the first major piece
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of experimental FQM, apart from Papaliolios' experiment. Further¬
more, and unlike Papaliolios' experiment, the LHV work offered the
hope of a decisive result either for or against QM, unlike previous
FQM work where (they claimed) the reader's own philosophical
preference was the ultimate arbiter. Let me give some examples of
these arguments.
"While some theorists were attempting to demonstrate the impossib¬
ility of hidden variables in general , others were trying to show
by example that such theories could be constructed....The dramatic
change in the state of affairs came about when^Bell derived a
general restriction on a wide class of HVTs."^
"At the very time when the axiomatic approach seemed to have reached
a dead end^,possibilities of experimental verification became
apparent."
"For forty years, physicists have wrestled with the implications of
QM; the result is a vast inconclusive body of literature on the
subject....the experiment proposed provides a decisive test....
the first conclusive test of the entire family of LHV theories."
"In the absence of an experiment capable of discriminating between
the different interpretations, the discussion of the foundations
of QM was more the concern of philosophy of science than of actual
physics.
"Bell's theorem has profound implications in that it points to
a decisive experimental test cf the entire family of LHV theories."
Apart from attempting to 'distance' the LHV activity from
prior work on FQM on methodological grounds, and claiming that the
LHV work would be decisive, the above quotations contain a third
feature which seems to have been at least partly rhetorical. This
is the claim of generality: the experiments would not simply test
one LHV theory; they would test a 'whole class' or indeed 'the
entire^family' of LHV theories. In a sense, this is quite true, since
Bell's analysis (which shows that QM and LHV make quite different
predictions) is not restricted to any particular LHV theory. Bell's
analysis depends mainly on the necessary consequences of any LHV
theory.
The generality of Bell's analysis would have been very useful
if there had been, say, five different LHV theories in existence in
the 1960's, each of which differed in its detailed structure; all
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such theories could be eliminated by one experiment. However,
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no-one had proposed, let alone defended, any particular LHV;
indeed, as far as I can tell, Bell was the first person to use
the term 'local hidden variable'. Thus although the experiments
might indeed test 'the entire family of LHV theories', the fact
that no member of that family had yet been born suggests that this
usage was at least partly rhetorical.
Even the claim of decisiveness had a large rhetorical content.
Because of limitations of the efficiency of their apparatus, and on
the choice of experimental design, certain assumptions had to be
made before the experimental data could be validly used to discrim¬
inate between QM and LHV. This will be discussed in some detail in
Chapter Six.
The LHV physicists were well aware of the need for assumptions,
and the justifications for these assumptions were discussed in
detail within experimental reports and reviews of the LHV activity.
Although they did their best to argue that the assumptions were
justifiable and did not detract from the value of the experiments,
there is clearly some contradiction between claims of decisiveness
and the need for assumptions. The best way to account for this,
I would argue, is to interpret the 'decisiveness' claims as partly
rhetorical, although, as we shall see, the LHV group felt there were
very good reasons for accepting the validity of the assumptions.
The fact that the assumptions were publicly analysed in such
detail is also consistent with the claim that the LHV physicists were
concerned with presenting a good public image; the best way to do
this was to be as rigorous as possible in pointing out all their
assumptions. This, after all, is a central feature of 'good empiricist
methodology.'
I do not wish to imply that there was a cynical or hypocritical
concern with the presentation of a particular public image. The
LHV group were not pretending to be good empiricists; as far as I
can tell, they genuinely believed in the value of a rigorous,'
careful approach, and strove to follow this methodology as well as
possible. In interviews,, they pointed out that there were good
technical reasons for this approach:
"You can't be cavalier here, because you're trying to rule out
certain clearly stated ideas, and if, in the course of bringing
these ideas into contradiction with QM at the real experimental
level, you have to make some assumptions, then you've got to expose
those assumptions."
In addition, they were also well aware of the low status of FQM
and the benefits to be gained by clearly pointing out their
rigorous apprach:
"In this field, publication should be done with higher standards
than you would impose on a normal physics experiment. We've got to
redeem ourselves from a generation of quacks."
Similar opinions were expressed in response to my questionnaire.
More than half of the physicists involved in LHV felt that such an
involvement could, in principle, hamper a young physicist's career.
However, most of them added that this had not happened in their own
case, and they attributed this to the fact that their work had
been rigorous, and had been seen to be rigorouss
"Your career won't be hampered if you do your work well."
"Work in this area won't harm anyone if he does good work."
"I did encounter difficulties because of the subject-matter, but
basically you show that you've done a competent experimental job
and that's sufficient."
In this section, I have shown that the LHV group adopted a
particular style of presentation, including rhetorical attacks
on non-empirical FQM and an emphasis on 'good methodology'. Such
behaviour was a deliberate response to the special context in which
the LHV activity took place.
Social Context and the Response to Anomaly.
In Chapter Two, I pointed out that one and only one LHV
experiment produced results which were both contrary to the pred¬
ictions of QM and in clear agreement with Bell's prediction for LHV
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theories . In the next chapter, I will discuss the processes by
which this experiment came to be classed as an erroneous result by
the LHV community„ For the purposes of the present section, I shall
simply take this result as a fact, and examine the response of the
person who produced that fact, Richard Holt. In the next section, I
shall examine the response of other physicists to Holt's result.
oO
Holt's experiment was similar in design to another experiment,
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performed b3^ Freedman and Glauser , which was completed a few
months before Holt's. Rreedman and Clauser found that their results
I Vif
agreed completely with the predictions of QM. Initially, Clauser
seems to have been fairly enthusiastic about LHV and, according to
his own and others' accounts, he had entertained the hope of falsif¬
ying QM. In an interview, Glauser described his feelings about his
own results:
"I was really disappointed....1 wanted to find the fatal flaw in
QM.... there's not much you can do to deny the result. You do the
experiment yourself and that's what comes out of it. What can you
say?"
Holt did not respond to his own results in this straightforward
empiricist manner. Apparently, he had strong reservations about
the validity of his results as soon as they began to appear, and
these were reflected in the way he treated his results. For example,
Glauser and Freedman published their results, whereas Holt did not,
nor did he even submit them to a journal. Holt, and his PhD super¬
visor Pipkin, took a long time to reach this decision:
"We kept flip-flopping. One of us favoured publishing, the other
didn't, then we both changed our minds...^Jn the end, we decided
not to publish, nor to keep it a secret."
Their final decision was to produce an unpublished manuscript
describing the experiment and the results. It is also relevant that
although Holt's results started to appear in 1971» he did not submit
his PhD thesis until 1973* The intervening period was spent in a
(fruitless) attempt to isolate a source of error in the experiment.
Although both the thesis and the later unpublished paper describe
an exhaustive series of error-tracing tests, they are written in
rather different styles. Holt claimed that these stylistic differences
reflect the different aims and audiences of these two accounts:
"The thesis was written very strongly....the mood I was in at that
time was, if I'm going to present this, then whether I fully believe
it in my own heart of hearts or not, I'm going to give it a fair
presentation and not just, out of the side of my mouth, happen to
mention that the consequences of this experiment could be very
startling. I was going to make the presentation as strong as could
be justified by the results....In the paper, the presentation is
less strong, because this was for publication, where you really
want to say nothing which is going to be speculative, you want to
put in the minimum which you can justify. In particular, I felt
one should take the attitude, 'Look, here are our results, we are
very cautious about them, we don't accept them, but we think you
ought to know about them'....A thesis is just a completely different
thing from a refereed publication. What's appropriate for one isn't
appropriate for the other."
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Why did Holt spend nearly two years checking his apparatus,
rather than simply stating his results, then dropping the matter?
He now describes this investment of time as a virtual necessity,
in order to safeguard both his doctorate and his reputation:
"I was very disappointed with my results....I don't believe QM
has yet reached its outer limits....and also, as a practical matter,
it meant that I had to spend an extra two years looking for system¬
atic errors to make sure that anybody would believe me....When it
came time for my final oral, I was expecting a hard time, and a lot
of suggestions on what could have gone wrong....but during those
two years I had inputs from so many different quarters that just
about everything had already been thought of....I know a lot of
people have had the attitude before they knew about what I did that
it was obviously just a sloppy experiment. Then they've come and
looked at my apparatus and read my thesis and talked to my supervisor
or me, and they almost invariably say, 'I'm really impressed that
you looked at all these possible systematic errors, and I can't
think of anything else. Not that I believe your results^ but I do
believe that it was a very carefully done experiment.'"
Holt also stressed the fact that he had performed two other
experiments during his PhD research which had absolutely nothing to
do with LHV:
"I took the precaution of naming the thesis 'Atomic Cascade Experi¬
ments' and emphasising the fact that I'd done two other experiments
as well that I wanted people to notice....one of these was I think
a fairly important contribution, I was fairly pleased with that
result, though, everyone keeps looking at the hidden variable part
of the work."
At one time, while holding a very temporary post, Holt considered
the possibility of repeating his experiment, and negotiations
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concerning this issue took place at three different locations.
However, at this time he was offered a more secure long-term post
elsewhere, involving more 'orthodox' experiments. As he put it:
"If you're looking for a career in physics you can't just keep
doing way-out experiments. You want to do some mainstream experi¬
ments too. People kept telling Clauser to go out and measure a few
numbers instead of doing more of these crazy experiments. It was
even wor^e for me, since I was doing them and getting the wrong
answer."
Let me summarise the alternatives available to Holt. He could
have publicly disowned his result, claiming that it was due to an
unknown error - but this would not have reflected well on his
competence, at a stage in his career when he was looking for employ¬
ment as an experimental physicist.
He could simply have presented his results as he found them,
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with no comments on whether he believed, them, and moved on to
another field - but given the surprising nature of his findings,
disbelief would have been inevitable. Gould this PhD student really
have found a flaw in QM when another group, with a very similar
experiment, claimed to have found none? Such behaviour on Holt's part
would, almost certainly have led other people, including his ihD
committee, to assume that Holt had made a simple error.
A third option would have been* to publish his result, claiming
or implying that it was a valid result. Undoubtedly, this would have
generated a lot of publicity, and if Holt's claim was later vindicated
his prestige would have been greatly enhanced. But this is a very
big 'if'. The central role of QM in contemporary physics, the margin-
ality of LHV, Freedman and Glauser's result - all these factors
strongly suggested that Holt's results were not likely to be corrob¬
orated by subsequent experiments. In addition, Holt now claims that
he intuitively doubted his results all along.
There was yet another argument against claiming that the results
were valid. Holt's own supervisor, Pipkin, had been involved in a
similar situation in the early 1960's, when another of his students
obtained results which apparently disproved quantum electrodynamics,
another highly successful physical theory. This claim, which was
lV7
published, was later shown to be spurious. Although Holt stresses
that no pressure was exerted on him to 'cover-up' his results, this
embarrassing episode, so close to home, must surely have served as a
cautionary tale. What would be gained by a public fanfare? Provided
that his result was made known to the small group of physicists
actively involved with LHV, there was little to be gained by sensation¬
alism. Why risk having to make a retraction at a later date of a
result which he doubted anyway?
None of the above courses of action seemed likely to produce a
particularly favourable outcome. Seen in this light, Holt's actual
response to his result was clearly a sensible one, given the context
in which he found himself. Faced with a result which he did not believe,
his actions seemed to him to be the best way of minimising any
damage which might be done, and of optimising the outcome of what
could have been a very embarrassing episode. By showing that the error
was persistent, non-routine, and apparently deeply-rooted in the
apparatus, and by permitting other physicists to examine his apparatus,
without isolating the error, he attempted, as it were, to 'defuse'
the error so that it did not reflect seriously on his own competence
48
as an experimenter. My impression from talking to nearly all the
LHV physicists is that Holt has successfully presented himself as a
good experimenter who had. a hit of had luck, obtained an incorrect
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result, yet treated that result in the correct sceptical manner .
The Response of Other Physicists'To Holt's Result.
As stated earlier, I am not concerned in this chapter with
cognitive aspects of LHV; that is, I shall not at this stage discuss
the conclusions which the LHV physicists reached, either ahout the
validity of Holt's experiment or the status of LHV in general. In the
present section, I shall simply examine physicists' behavioural
response to Holt - what they did, rather than what they thought.
Obviously, such a subdivision is an artificial one. The behaviour
of the LHV group was clearly influenced by what they knew about the
cognitive status of LHV. In addition, as we shall see in the next
chapter, Holt's own behaviour had an important influence on the
cognitive evaluation of his results„
Nevertheless, I hope to show in this section that many aspects
of the response of other physicists to Holt's results owed little
to their cognitive assessments of the validity, or otherwise, of these
results. To a large extent, they were motivated by quite different
concerns.
When we remember Holt's own response to his experiment, we
might expect that this experiment would be totally ignored by
other physicists, and classed as an obvious error. This is not in
fact what happened. A number of physicists took an interest in Holt's
work. Some of them visited his laboratory to inspect his apparatus,
50and two physicists, Glauser and Pry, performed separate experiments
which set out to resolve the disagreement between the experiments
of Holt and of Rreedman and Glauser
At first sight, this may seem slightly odd. It is certainly true
that the two early experiments gave different results, but why were
other people prepared to take Holt's result seriously enough to
do further research on it, when Holt himself was apparently convinced
that his result was simply wrong?
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There is more than one possible answer to this question. One
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answer would he to invoke Merton's norm of 'organised scepticism' ;
that is, scientists are not only supposed to be sceptical about
novel results, but they are also considered to be sceptical about any
attempt to dismiss such results, even if the dismissal is made by
the person who actually obtained them.
There are several difficulties with this sort of account. I
have already discussed some general criticisms of the normative
approach in Chapter Cme. To quote a single pertinent criticism, if
such a norm of 'scepticism about dismissals' were to be applied
universally, it is difficult to see how scientists would ever find
the time to generate new results, since all apparently erroneous
experiments would have to be checked by independent observers. The
existence of categories such as 'gremlins' and 'transients' in
scientists' vocabularies, which serve to account for unexplained,
often temporary deviations from expected results, suggests that in
practice there are limitations on scepticism.
A more specific criticism of the 'scepticism' argument in the
case of Holt is that many interviewees were able to produce a large
number of reasons why they 'never believed Holt's result'. Although
such statements may involve some retrospective rewriting of history,
it cannot be denied that there were many good reasons for disbelieving
Holt's result, even as early as 1973• This issue will be discussed
in more detail in the next chapter.
I wish to put forward an alternative to the normative account,
by arguing that belief or disbelief in H°lt's result was by no means
a crucial factor in the decision to perform further experimental
tests. All that mattered was that Holt's result was, or could be
presented as, an anomaly or a puzzle which had not been explained.
Superficially, this seems very similar to the normative account;
both accounts rely on the premise that science is a puzzle-solving
activity, and that anomaly generates practice. The important point,
though, is that not all anomalies give rise to practice - hence the
existence of categories such as 'gremlins'. A great many anomalies
are routinely abandoned without any prolonged investigation into
their causes„ The decision as to whether a particular anomaly should
be followed up or dismissed is a complex one, and such a decision is
not made solely on technical grounds.
As we have seen, Holt's particular position ensured that he
did have to investigate his result in some depth. Had he not searched
diligently for a source of error, and had he not been seen to have
done so, he felt that his RiD might not have been awarded and his
competence as a physicist might have been questioned. But why did
other physicists choose to devote their time to this problem?
At the very least, they had nothing to lose; they were not
responsible for Holt's result, so that if they did discover a trivial
error in Holt's procedures, they themselves would not be embarrassed.
More importantly, further experimentation could serve several
functions which would not be served by simply ignoring Holt's result.
The first such function is perhaps the most obvious: namely, that the
disagreement between the two existing experiments might be resolved.
However, it would be easy to exaggerate the importance of further
experiments in this regard. Although more evidence in favour of QM
would be more satisfying, it seems fairly clear that, even if no
further experiments had been done, QM would have been vindicated in
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any case . Further experiments could be presented as important for
settling a 'live' cognitive conflict, but there were other factors
which were probably more important in encouraging this work.
One such factor was the credibility of the whole LHV enterprise.
As stated earlier, some rather extravagant claims were made for this
activity; for the first time, a decisive answer to a problem in
PQM would be available. Holt's results were obviously incompatible
with such claims. Clauser, at least, was apparently acutely aware
of this. He performed a further experiment which he described as an
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"experimental investigation of„...\jan] anomaly."
Glauser's results were in full agreement with QM. He later expalined
his rationale in the following terms:
"In the work which I and others did, we really ought to have put a
great effort into getting very clean experiments to avoid criticism,
and I think to some extent we were quite successful....the people
I've been working with who have studied this have really made this
thing respectable experimental physics, which it was not when we
started."
Another advantage of further experiments was that, like any other
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challenging piece of work, they offered the chance to develop skills
and techniques which could then he applied to any number of other
topics. Recall that many LHVphysicists cited this as one of their
reasons for becoming involved in LHV in the first place. This factor
seems to have been a strong motive for Fry, the second person to
investigate Holt's experiment.
Pry first took an interst in LHV as early as 1970, soon after
he read the first published experimental proposal. Together with
another physicist, he applied for a number of grants in 1970 and
1971 in order to purchase the necessary equipment. Although they
did manage to obtain some equipment, they found that they could not
overcome certain technical problems, connected with the hyperfine
structure of the mercury atom. Also, Preedman and Glauser's result
appeared at about this time, and Pry decided to abandon his
experiment.
However, Holt's result completely altered the situation. As
Pry put its
"I didn't have the money to get around the [hyperfine] problem and
so I abandoned the experiment in 1972. Then when the Holt-Pipkin
result came out, that provided enough impetug for me to get more
money to buy a laser and do my experiment."-5
In fact, when Pry reapplied for funds in 197^» he was given
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money by an organisation which had rejected his application in 1970 .
Admittedly, his second application included substantial technical
C-O
improvements, but Pry at least has no doubts that the change in
the granting body's attitude was the result of Holt's findings:
"The reason they gave for their first rejection was that there were
already two other experiments in existence.... of course, when they
disagreed, the higher^Jdata collection! rate of my experiment
became more crucial."-5^
Holt's result, regardless of whether Pry believed it to be valid,
thus gave him an opportunity to negotiate for funds:
"Holt's experiment prggided a basis from which I could argue to
get some more money."
I certainly do not wish to imply that Pry had no interest
in the LHV issue other than as a way of getting money. He himself
notes that:
"aside from the question of getting funds, someone had to resolve ^
the disagreement....there had to be another independent experiment."
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Nevertheless, I think there is some reason for claiming that
Holt's result was not a crucial part of Fry's motivation, hut rather
it provided a resource by means of which he could fulfil some
wider aims in his work. For example, in 1973 Fry published a paper
on general applications of two-photon correlation experiments,
in which he noted tfyeir usefulness in testing LHV theories as well
as other uses such as finding the efficiency of photon detectors,
and studying resonance fluorascehce.
There are two further pieces of evidence. First, after publishing
his LHV results, which were
"in excellent agreement with the QM prediction....and in clear
violation of the LHV restriction" ,
Fry made a further application for funds to improve his apparatus,
in order to gain more data on the LHV question, and also to perform
several quite different experiments involving two-photon correlations,
along lines similar to those discussed in his 1973 paper. There is
no suggestion that this application was motivated by doubts over
the validity of Fry's existing LHV results. As he himself said:
"This [proposed experiment] doesn't really tell you anything new
in a direct sense.... in the original LHV experiment I took data
for about an hour and a half. If I took data for 300 hours, I would
be able to have really small error bars, and get a really beautiful
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curve, and just to have that begytiful result it should be done.
That alone is enough argument."
Thus, Fry's improved experiment would be more satisfying from the
point of view of experimental design, although it would not tell
us anything we don't already know about the status of LHV.
The second piece of evidence is that, shortly after completing
the LHV experiment, Fry moved temporarily to another university^ in
order to take part in another 'fundamental' experiment, this time
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to study parity violation. Like many of the LHV physicists, Fry
expressed a general preference for such fundamental experiments,
rather than for more 'routine' work:
"Many people just go out and measure things....but I think it's
much more exciting to do things like the hidden-variable experiment
and the parity experiment."
It seems clear from the evidence presented here that Fry was
largely concerned with developing experimental techniques per se, and
applying such techniques to a number of different 'interesting'
1ST
empirical problems. The LHV experiment was simply one of these
problems.
We should remember that the LHV group considered themselves
primarily as experimental physicists, not FQM workers. None of them
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planned to spend their entire professional life doing LHV experiments
Many of them claimed that, once it became clear that existing
experiments favoured QM, it was difficult to see any point in
further LHV experiments. In addition, none of the numerous alternatives
to the Copenhagen interpretation of QM had led to realisable
experimental predictions which could provide conclusive tests of
these alternatives. Most of the experimenters therefore described
their LHV work as 'a one-off job'.
Earlier, we saw how Holt was led to treat his result with
suspicion because of the context in which it appeared. In this section
I have argued that, for similar reasons, we ought to be surprised
that other physicists apparently took it seriously enough to want
to check it. At the very least, the decision to perform further
experiments should be seen as problematic rather than inevitable.
It is difficult to disprove the view that scientists are primarily
motivated by a desire to search for truth and to resolve puzzles
> and anomalies. But such a view merely explains the existence of
scientific practice; it says nothing about why some anomalies are
explored and others are not. I have advanced other motivations
(a concern with the reputation of this field, and an interest in
acquiring apparatus and skills) which may account for the later
experiments.
The LHV Experimenters and Methodological Differentiation.
We have already seen that the LHV experimenters were highly
critical of non-empirical FQM work. They were careful to 'distance'
themselves from such work in published comments, by contrasting
its inconclusiveness with the 'decisive' nature of experiments.
Such criticisms were partly rhetorical; however, they also reflect
what seems to be a genuine distaste of 'traditional' PQM on
methodological grounds. This attitude, I suggested, originated in
the different background a*id training of the LHV group.
Although some of the LHV group simply performed their
experiments then left this field, others, notably Glauser and
Shimony, applied an experimental methodology to other aspects of
FQM. Both these physicists seemed to feel very strongly that this
approach was the best, if not the only way to properly tackle
all issues in FQM. Not surprisingly, some non-empirical FQM workers
took exception to this intrusion into 'their' field. Equally,
however, other people were apparently inspired by the LHV activity
to investigate other experimental approaches in FQM. There is even
some evidence to suggest that the field of FQM may be becoming more
clearly differentiated into different subgroups, each of which
adheres to a particular methodology. The purpose of the present
section will be to describe the above events, and to present them
as a final example of the way in which the process of scientific
investigation is affected by the social context in which this process
occurs.
I begin by examining Shimony's viewpoint. Although he did not
himself perform a LHV experiment, Shimony was central in bringing
together many of the people who became most deeply involved in
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LHV . He was also extremely vocal in his advocacy of empirical
methods in FQM. For example, at a conference in 1970 (a"t which Bohm
also gave a paper), Shimony commented on non-local hidden-variable
theories, such as Bohm's, which do not disagree empirically with QM.
"There are nonlocal HVTs; certainly, no empirical evidence refutes
this family of theories....There are, however, methodological
objections against [such^ theories at present....This family is
too large, and some members of it seem compatible with any experi¬
mental data whatsoever. Before it can be taken seriously, some
heuristic principles must be exhibited for restricting attention
to a subfamily7which is small enough to have definite empirical
consequences."
(DeWitt made a similar point about HVTs when he said that we should
not 'change the rules' by postulating new entities because
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"there are presently no rules about changing the rules."
However, DeWitt uses this argument to support an interpretation
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which Shimony has explicitly rejected . Thus, as we saw in Chapter
Four, the fact that two authors reject one particular methodological
approach does not necessarily mean that they both accept the same
alternative approach.)
Shimony's most explicit defence or; the e~xperimental method
occurs in a paper which he coauthored with some of his students in
1977 • To set this paper in its proper context, we should note that
in I963 Shimony published a review of several interpretations of
QM. One of these was Wigner's 'consciousness' interpretation, in
which it is proposed that the wave function is reduced during measure¬
ment by means of an interaction with the observer's consciousness.
(See Chapter Two for details.) In 1963, Shimony rejected this interp¬
retation on the following grounds:
"This is counter-intuitive in the extreme, though without apparent
inconsistency. However, there is no empirical evidence that the
mind is endowed with this power....and furthermore there is no
obvious way of explaining the agreement among different observers
who independently observe physical systems. Thus, Qthis^ interp¬
retation of QM rests upon psychological assumptions which are almost
certainly false."
The 1977 paper, written after most of the LHV experiments
were completed, describes an experimental test of the 'consciousness'
interpretation, and cites another (unpublished) experiment carried
out by another of Shimony's students. The results of both experiments
were negative, showing no evidence of any effect of consciousness.
Given that Shimony had already dismissed this interpretation
in 1963> one might wonder why he chose to test it some years later.
In the 1977 paper, two reasons are given. The first is that
difficult problems, such as the interpretation of QM, often require
radical solution. The second reason is very illuminating and is
worth quoting in full:
"A second reason is methodological. We feel that there is value in
exhibiting concretely how a radical hypothesis can be subjected to
careful experimental scrutiny. The thesis that the scientific method
combines openness to theoretical innovation with a critical
insistence upon experimental test, is generally accepted, but 7
exemplifications of this thesis are uncommon and instructive." ^
Clearly, Shimony is largely, if not predominantly, concerned
with making this general methodological point, and the consciousness
interpretation simply provides a useful exemplar. Shimony's earlier
(1963) comments suggest that the results of this experiment came
as no surprise to him, and (as discussed in Chapter Two) the design
of this experiment is not without shortcomings.
If it is true that this paper is at least partly a challenge
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to non-empirical i'QM then the fact that it was published in
Foundations of Physics is particularly appropriate. rf1his journal
provides a forum for many non-empirical theories and speculations;
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de Broglie contributed to its first issue , and much of Bohm's
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recent work has appeared there . This journal has an explicit
editorial policy of giving a favourable reception to speculative
work; in the first issue, the editors noted that:
"very few scientific journals today encourage speculation not tied
to hard and demonstrable facts. One wonders whether brilliant ideas
are not lost by this restrictive attitude. Foundations of Physics
will publish with suitable frequency disciplined speculations
suggestive of new approaches in physics."
Shimony was not alone in his belief that an experimental
approach was very important for FQM. I have already quoted Glauser's
statements that
"[we} have really made this thing respectable experimental physics,
which it was not when we started"
and that this field required a very high standard of work because
"we've got to redeem ourselves from a generation of quacks."
Like Shimony, Glauser actively extended the experimental methodology
into other areas of FQM.
Neoclassical Radiation Theory (NCRT) had been developed by
Jaynes and other theorists in a number of papers published during
the I960*s and early 1970's.^ It is well known that QM and its
extensions (such as quantum electrodynamics) require quantization
of the electromagnetic field. A number of phenomena, such as the
photoelectric effect and the black-body radiation spectrum, are
routinely cited in physics textbooks as 'proof' of the need for
quantization. Jaynes and his colleagues developed a new theory which
did not invoke quantization (hence the term * neo-classical'),
yet which could account satisfactorily for the above, and many other,
physical phenomena which apparently require quantization. They
did not perform experimental tests of NGRT; they simply showed that
this theory generated the same prediction as QM and quantum electro¬
dynamics, arguing that we should not be too complacent in our acceptance
of the evidence for quantization.
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In 1972, Glauser published a paper in which he argued that NGRT
did not agree with QM's prediction for polarization correlations in
i s> G
LKV-type experiments, and tnat experimental data, such as Kocher
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and Commins' experiment , and Glauser's own experiment with
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Rreedman , supported the QM predictions.
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In a later paper, Glauser again discussed NGRT, noting that
it disagreed with QM in its description of the physical processes
which occur when light strikes a semi-silvered mirror, or any similar
beam splitter. According to QM, light is quantized into discrete
photons, and individual photons cannot be split, whereas a classical
wave, no matter how weak, can always be split into two components
of non-zero intensity.
Rather than take the attitude that 'QM must be correct*, Glauser
claims that alternative theories such as NGRT emphasise:
"the importance of experimentally demonstrating phenog^na which
require a quantization of the electromagnetic field."
Although the half-silvered mirror is a classic textbook
thought-experiment, Glauser points out that QM's prediction for
single photons hitting such a mirror had never been rigorously
tested experimentally,and he claims that this is unsatisfactory:
"That a photon is not split in two by a beam splitter is certainly
'old hat', and it may seem surprising that we have gone to the
effort to test this prediction experimentally. What is in fact
much more surprising is that evidently no such experimental test
has heretofore been performed, and such tests are clearly of great
importance."
Glauser then shows that a LHV-type experiment can test this
prediction and that NGRT is falsified. The statements above strongly
suggest that Glauser, like Shimony, felt that an experimental
approach was relevant not only to LHV but also to other aspects of
FQM.
Only Glauser and Shimony have actively applied an experimental
methodology to other FQM topics, but it seems clear that virtually
all the LHV physicists shared their preference for experimental
approaches to fundamental questions. Now that the experimental
evidence is clearly in favour of QM, further experiments appear,
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to most people , rather unattractive:
"We all came away feeling that the theorists had to think up a new
idea that would give experimentalists something to work on, other
than just pushing the same idea into better and better experiments."
Some interviewees made the even stronger suggestion that the
LHV group had primarily been interested in the experiment, and that
w i
many of them had. had very little liking for the particular theory
being tested.
"In many ways, the activity of the last ten years over Bell's
inequality has been a tempest in a teapot. It's just that people
have been so happy at finding something they can actually do and
think about that is more concrete and more in line with what other
physicists do that there was anogver-reaction to it....I don't think
[LHVjwas likely from the start."
and
"I never those [lhv] theories.... they were ugly, tentative,
and clumsy."
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Many interviewees suggested that if a 'good idea'^ came along,
which could be experimentally tested, many of the LHV group would
be willing to perform such a test. For example, Papaliolios,
who was personally acquainted with most of the LHV group, said:
"Most of the people who've done these experiments are now in other
areas....you can't be an experimentalist in hidden variable theories
because there aren't that many experiments....If someone were to
think of a new class of experiments to do, I think you'd find all
of these people would immediately jump into the^field. The interest
is there, it's just the opportunities aren't."^
Impact of LHV on Other FQM Activity.
What impact has the LHV activity, and its challenge to non-
empirical methodologies, had on other FQM workers? It would certainly
be difficult for them to ignore this work completely, since it has
been discussed not only in high-prestige physics journals such as
Physical Review and Physical Review Letters, but also in review
journals such as Reports on Progress in Physics, and Comments on
Atomic and Molecular Physics, and in 'popular' scientific journals
such as Scientific American and New Scientist, and in virtually all
recent books on the interpretation of QM. The experimenters' claim
to have made this work 'respectable' seems to be justified.
In looking at the behaviour of other FQM workers after LHV,
it is difficult to prove that LHV exerted a causal influence.
However, in the years since LHV began, a number of other FQM workers
have tried to get their ideas experimentally tested, and in many
cases these workers seem to have been directly influenced by LHV.
For example, Fitchard, who was formerly a student at Texas
A & M University while Fry was performing his LHV experiment there,
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developed an experimental proposal to test the Heisenberg Uncertainty
Principle. His publishing strategy was as follows:
"I'm sending my proposal to Phys Rev Letters first....the original
LHV proposals were in Phys Rev Letters, so why not?....Since I'm
proposing an experiment, I'd like to have lots of experimenters
see it....The vast majority of physicists don't study foundations,
and the only thing that's going to convince them is an experiment.
That's why these experiments like Pry's are so important."
Pearle, who had helped to put Shimony in touch with Holt and
Pipkin, and who had published a paper on the interpretation of the
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LHV results^ , felt that the LHV experiments would have an important
social influence on the field.
"I don't think LHV theory was likely from the start, but the experi¬
ments might be historically important, in the sense that they get
people to think that this can be done, that you can question QM,
and come up with a do-ablg experiment which can check it, and it
was important to do it."
Pearle published another paper on his own proposed modification
to QM. This theory was similar to the Bohm-Bub theory, in that it
proposed to solve the 'reduction' problem by adding a non-linear
term to the Schrodinger equation. Unlike Bohm and Bub, though, Pearle
was very keen to make his theory empirically testable:
"I have to make the theory more concrete. I've got to find a
physical basis and an experimental test....I have some ideas, but
I'm not an experimentalist. I'd like to talk to Glauser or someone
else who does way-out experiments, that's the kind of guy I need
to tell me whether it's feasible."
To quote a third example, Mugur-Schachter, a theorist who
was a former student of de Broglie, has published a number of papers
in FQM. In 1977, for the first time, she included an experimental
proposal to test one of her ideas. In the acknowledgements section
of this paper, she notes
"I am grateful to Dr J,. S. Bell for impgrtant remarks on the
possibility of an experimental study."
These three examples provide fairly clear evidence of theorists
who had direct contact with LHV workers, and who were thus led to
look at experimental tests more closely. Not all recent experimental
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proposals can be linked with LHV in such an obvious way^'. As a
possible 'intermediate' case, consider Matthys' PhD thesis, in which
he investigates the feasibility of an experimental test of the
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Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle . Matthys cites the work of Bell
and others on LHV, and writes:
"The importance of performing potential experimental tests of these
matters whenever they become technically feasible, hardly needs to
be emphasised....Perhaps the main reason why the debate over the
meaning of the uncertainty principle.... sejms to perdure £sicj
endlessly, is that it may appear to be more a philosophical than a
physical question....While Gedankenexperimente may be useful in
criticising a theory or developing its implications, they are
■unsatisfying as a proof. The desire remains to find a specific
physical measurement that can be used as arbiter between interpreta¬
tions of the theory."
The connection between this thesis and LHV is slim but perhaps
non-negligible. Matthys' PhD supervisor was Jaynes, who three years
earlier had seen his NCRT theory (and LHV) criticised by Glauser's
experiment. This episode certainly impressed Jaynes at the time.
Speaking at a conference in 1973> he said
"A perfectly harmless-looking experimental fact....can, at a single
stroke, throw out a whole infinite class of alternative theories..
..The mind boggles at the thought that any such thing could be
possible....if the [argument^ survives scrutiny, and if the exper¬
imental result is confirmed by others, then this will surely go
down as one of the most incredible intellectual achievementjQjn
the history of science, and my own work will lie in ruins."
It is not possible to prove a causal relationship between LHV
and all subsequent experimental proposals. However, the evidence
presented here does indicate that LHV has had an important
influence on many FQM theorists. Yet it is by no means the case
that every FQM theorist is now adopting an empirical approach.
There are a number of other responses.
Some FQM authors stress the need for assumptions in the LHV
experiments. (A detailed discussion of these assumptions and their
justifications will be presented in the next chapter.) Such authors
concluded that experimental approaches, by themselves, are insuff¬
icient to solve the problems of FQM:
"These experiments do not represent really direct tests, the
fundamental process being always mediated by other phenomena
(....which introduce extra elements and 'distort' the initial
phenomena), so that one can wonder to what extent this type of
experiment is really convincing. Therefore, it seems to me, that
one is brought back after all....to the 'epistemological' discussion,
as old as QM, on its interpretation, the significance of its
concepts^„and the possible insufficiency of those we have at the
moment."
Other theorists are even more critical of LHV. For example,
Uo
Bub argues that the theoretical basis of the experiments is erroneous
and he claims:
"The Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt experimenj^^sig116^ to "test the
Bell inequality, is therefore pointless."
(Bub's arguments have themselves been strongly criticised by LHV
workers
A number of FQM theorists told me in interviews that there
seemed little point in testing a.theory which conflicted with QM
in existing domains. Although they were sympathetic to critiques
of QM, they accepted the view (criticised by LHV workers) that QM
was unlikely to be falsified quite so easily. They felt it was
better to construct alternatives to QM which did not diverge from
QM in existing domains. This attitude is most clearly expressed by
Flato:
"One can of course check experimentally if it is the quantum
prediction which is correct, or the £localJ hidden variable
prediction. This point of view.... taken by some people quite
seriously....seems naive to me. QM was proved up till now to be
very successful (whenever applicable). Hidden variables (if they
exist) should be physically meaningful, able to reproduce all
predictions of QM, and have predictions in domains in which
QM cannot solve 'everything'."
This passage is taken from a book which contains theoretical
and experimental papers on FQM. The clash of viewpoints contained
in it was noted by a reviewer, Maiocchi. On the one hand, he quotes
the claim by LHV experimenters that
"the problem of the validity of LHVs rests with the experimentalists.
Maiocchi notes
"the eighteenth-century view of the function of crucial experiijiggts
which is at the bottom of (such} highly debatable statements."
On the other hand, he characterises the dJLternative view as one in
which
"the new theory appears as a 'research programme' still in its
early stages, and it does not seem fair to ask it to be prematurely
confronted with the experimental results which the 'older' QM
has already faced and assimilated. Only a myopic empiricism can
claim that a theory still being elaborated should be capable of
explaining the totality (or near totality) of the available
empirical evidence."
As a result of the LHV experiments, the contrast between the
experimental methodology and the methodology of 'traditional' FQM
has been made more explicit. Not surprisingly, perhaps, not all
the LHV experimenters are impressed by this defence of a non-
experimental approach. As one of them put it:
"Obviously, there's what I call the lunatic fringe, that no matter
what you do they say 'Oh sure, but all we have to do is go to a
nonlocal theory, and all your results mean nothing'."
This is a rather uncharitable view of FQM, which ignores the
historical fact that all hidden-variable theories which were the
subject of serious theoretical analysis prior to LHV were non-local
theories. Bohm's work is an obvious example of this. In a sense,
then, the LHV activity was genuinely irrelevant for many FQM theorists.
However, the social impact of LHV made it difficult for theorists
to ignore it. As one theorist put it:
"The experimenters were extremely able and active propagandists,
which helps their point of view but not ours. They've drawn
everyone's attention away from work like ours."
While some theorists criticised the experimental methodology
as 'naive' , others produced more positive defens.es of non-empirical
methods. For example, one interviewee, describing his own philos¬
ophical analysis of QM, told me
"Of course, this isn't empirically testable, but a study of the
interpretation of QM cleanses the theory and avoids a lot of
wasted time..Not all mistakes are empirical, many are formal....
A study of the interpretation doesn't lead to better testable
predictions, it leads to clearer statemjg^s....it's useful because
it can prevent people making mistakes."
Other interviewees mentioned additional criteria, such as
simplicity, objectivity, and coherence, which they believed were
as helpful as empirical results when it came to assessing and
developing interpretations of QM. One of the fullest defences of
a non-empirical methodology to appear since the LHV experiments
was written by Bohm, in the book which was reviewed by Maiocchi.
Bohm writes
"In my view, the essence of what the theorist does is in the
creative act of insight, and not in the detailed hypotheses that
may follow."
He points out, for example, that the theory of the luminiferous
ether was never definitively disproved by experiment, but that it
was abandoned by Einstein, in favour of a 'new insight', because it
was leading to a "serious lack of clarity.""'""'"^
Discussing his current theory, Bohm notes that
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"a great deal of work remains to be done before our insight will
reach a point at which it will be fruitful, to make well-defined
and experimentally testable hypotheses." x "
Of course, Bohm had been defending his approach in similar
terms as far back as 1952 (see Chapter Four). It would therefore
be an exaggeration to claim that such a defence in 1976 was prompted
solely by the LHV experiments. However, at least one feature of
Bohm's argument in 1976 is novel.. Discussing the results of the
LHV experiments, which support the idea of non-locality, he points
out that his own 1952 theory was also non-local, so that the
experimental results "definitely fit in with" his ideas. He concludes
"the need for new forms of insight into this qpgstion is made
even sharper and clearer than it was before."
Bohm was not the only author to use this tactic. Other
theorists were apparently well aware of the rhetorical or persuasive
force of experiments, and have used the experiments to support
theories other than QM. Logically, after all, any experimental
falsification of one theory is also a corroboration, not only of
QM, but also of a large, possibly infinite, set of other theories
whose predictions happen to agree with those of QM for the experiment
in question.
As an example of this tactic, the Mexican physicist de la Pena,
together with his colleagues, postulated that the values of hidden
variables might be affected by the act of measurement. This sort of
LHV theory, they argued, was not falsified by existing LHV experi¬
ments. Indeed, they claim that
"the correct conclusion to draw Qfrom the experiments) ....is that
QM is not reducible to LHV theories in which the measuring process
cannot affect the measured system. The experiments only serve to
confirm the existence of these effects."
An even more extreme example of the use of the LHV experiments
to support unorthodox theories is provided by Reuven Opher in his
'dybbuk theory' proposal. Opher changedhis name from Raymond Fox
in the early 1970*s- Under the name of Fox, he had published
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several proposals for LHV experiments. In 1975> Opher published
a paper"^^ in which he postulated that quantum-mechanical wave
functions were reduced under the influence of cosmic particles
called dybbuks. (The term comes from the Hebrew word for a wandering
\u
spirit.) Dybbuks, if they exisu, possess imaginary energy, imaginary
momentum and imaginary mass. Discussing Freedman and Glauser's
LHV experiment, Opher notes that
"The [dybbuk] theory predicts that an EER paradox experiment
which has a space-time interval between the analysers >> CSt )
should obtain the results of conventional QM. This was th^gesult
of the experiment....in agreement with the above theory."
Thus an experiment which seemed to its originators to support
QM is being cited in such a way as to seem to lend support to Opher's
rather unorthodox theory. This was not what the LHV group had in
mind when they described the experimental method as decisive.
Evidently, the rhetorical force of an appeal to experiment can be
applied in more than one way.
In this section, I argued that the LHV activity altered the
social context in which FQM operated, by presenting a paradigm
case of experimental FQM. Some theorists were encouraged to follow
this example, either because they felt that this methodology 'works',
or because they felt it was a way of gaining respectability and
recognition. Other theorists perceived LHV as a direct challenge
to their own methodology, and their response was to openly criticise
the methodology, not the content, of the LHV work.
As we saw in Chapter Four, such methodological differences
underlie many disputes in FQM. What makes the LHV case special is
the impact which LHV had, and the way in which both sides in the
dispute (theorists and experimenters) dealt explicitly with methodo¬
logical issues, rather than (as in previous examples) leaving such
issues implicit. Because of these features of LHV, theorists were
virtually obliged to respond to it. This does not mean that they
were compelled to adopt experimental methods, as we have seen. By
introducing a new factor into the social context of FQM, LHV opened
up a whole range of new strategies.
Changes in Editorial Policy Towards FQM.
I have suggested that the social context of FQM - specifically,
attitudes to non-experimental methods - has been strongly influenced
by LHV. Now that the LHV activity is nearly complete, will these
attitudes persist? One way in which such attitudes might become
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entrenched is by being incorporated into the editorial policy of
FQM journals.
I have already quoted the editorial in the first issue of
Foundations of Physics, in which it was claimed that speculative
work would be favourably received by this journal (see Chapter
Four). Other 'non-empirical' journals have also appeared in recent
years. For example, the International Journal of Theoretical Physics,
first published in 1968, has an Explicitly tolerant policy towards
'philosophical' approaches. To quote from the first editorial,
"It is the intention to publish papers that carefully examine ....
problems from the standpoint of either the physicist or the
philosopher, and the inclusion of such philosophical detail as is
necessary for elucidatory purposes will be accepted for publication."
More recently, the Journal of Philosophical Logic first appeared
in 1972. Its first editorial stresses the connection between physics
and philosophy which operates through the intermediate subject of
'quantum logic':
"In my opinion, the virtual schism that has existed between the
practise [sicJ of quantum logic and what everyone understands to
be part of philosophical logic is about to disappear. The interaction
of logic with the foundations of physics will^gssibly be as fruitful
as that with the foundations of mathematics."
While these new avenues were being opened up for non-empirical
FQM, some existing avenues were being closed down. In 1972, an
editorial entitled 'Regarding Papers about Fundamental Theories'
appeared in Physical Review. The concluding paragraphs begin as
follows:
"We shall no longer accept papers of this type for the Physical
Review. There will, of course, always be borderline cases, and we
shall therefore give a very rough outline of the criteria and ,
characteristics such a paper must have so that we may consider it."
Several conditions are set which require that any assumptions used
must be justified by their explanatory or heuristic power. The
editor continues:
"Moreover, the author must show that the new assumptions do not
contradict existing experimental facts. He must also investigate
possible new consequences of his assumptions, and whether these could
be tested by new experiments. It should not be overlooked that
physics is an experimental science. In spite of the temporary
hegemony of theorists, no physical thgsqgy is significant unless it
can be related to experimental data."
In 1970, Reviews of Modern Rrysics made another interesting
ur
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editorial comment, when it published Ballentine's paper on the
statistical interpretation of QM. In a preface to this paper, the
editor pointed out that his referees were unable to agree about
its value. He claims that
"The subject of the following paper lies iijL^ijhe border area between
physics, semantics, and other humanities."
Unlike the editor of Physical Review, quoted above, the editor of
Reviews of Modern Physics
"does not feel called upon to draw the border of physics firmly
or restrietively, the more so as the subject seems to maintain a
broad appeal after ^+5 years of QM." ^
However, the Editorial Comment ends with what might appear to be
a warning:
"The Editor is experimenting with this note, trying to convey the
flavour of controversy surrounding an unusual p^-g^r. He might
take a different attitude on future occasions."
I do not wish to imply that this apparent tightening of
methodological boundaries in FQM was caused solely by LHV. The
chronology of events is sufficient to render such a claim implausible.
Neither would it be true to say that these shifts in editorial
policies were a major cause of the explicit methodological focus
in FQM in recent years. The statements by FQM workers about
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methodology often refer specifically to LHV, whether as an inspiring
example of how to do FQM or as an example of how not to do FQM.
Editorial policies of journals were seldom mentioned by interviewees
as an influence on their behaviour, and such references are completely
absent from published comments about the choice of methodology.
Nevertheless, statements of editorial policy may provide
useful rhetoric, and actual editorial policies may exert important
influences on the development of FQM. At the very least, journals
may serve a labelling function. For example, when Glauser speaks
of making LHV into 'respectable experimental physics', he may be
referring to the use of a particular methodology, but the 'respect¬
ability' of this methodology, in his eyes, follows from his social
location, and his personal history, in the physics community. At
another level, respectability might be measured by the ability to
have one's work accepted for publication in the Physical Review,
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though as we have seen, this acceptance is explicitly based on
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specific methodological criteria.
It is too early to say for sure what effects these changing
editorial policies, and the emergence of new journals, will have
on FQfl. They may contribute towards a differentiation of FQM into
mutually exclusive subgroups with different methodologies.
Alternatively, they may simply help FQM workers to identify the most
appropriate location for work of Various sorts, and so aid the
3.2>&
flow of information throughout FQfl. Irrespective of the details,
it is clear that the emergence of new journals, and policy changes
in old ones, illustrate other ways in which the social context of
FQfl is changing.
Discussion.
Throughout this chapter, I have been concerned with demonstrating
the ways in which individual scientists come to terms with their
local social context, and how they adapt their behaviour to meet
the demands of that context.
The examples provided also clarify the distinction between
'local' and 'global' context. There is not a dichotomy between micro
and macro contexts; indeed, these two terms are better described as
sections of a continuum which ranges from the individual through his
workplace, his professional subgroup, and his status as a scientist,
to his country and his cultural milieu.
Nevertheless, there is at least an intuitive distinction
between general features of science, and features which are specific
to a particular piece of scientific activity such as LHV. Early
studies in the sociology of science mainly dealt with general
features, such as the reward system, the communication system,
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disciplinary boundaries, and other structural features
The central argument of this chapter is that, by ignoring the
detailed microsociology of science, such studies provide an inadequate
picture of the process of scientific investigation. For example, the
style and content of LHV papers reflects not only general conventions
of scientific writing, but also specific local features of the LHV
activity, such as its historical association with FQJ14, the status of
FQM, and the perceived audience for LHV papers.
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Since there is no sharp dividing line between local and global
contexts, we find that actors cite a whole range of motivations
and reasons for their actions, some dealing with very particularistic
features of their context (Holt's reference to Pipkin's earlier
mistake; Glauser happening to meet Kocher), some related to more
general aspects of LHV (Fry appealing for money to resolve an
apparent conflict), and others referring to the wider context in
which LHV occurred (Shimony and Glauser urging wider use of
experimental methods to improve the reputation of the field;
experimenters' claims that this work was misunderstood by their
colleagues; theorists' recognition of the rhetorical power of
experiments).
Nevertheless, all the factors listed above, together with the
others discussed in this -chapter, are clearly connected in a very
direct way to the actual piece of scientific practice being studied,
and these factors must be given their proper role in any satisfactory
account of this practice.
Two other important findings emerge from this chapter. The
first is the active nature of the individual's interaction with his
context. In Chapter Three, we saw how Qjyi could be used to generate
a whole range of accounts, corresponding to the different aims of
the people constructing these accounts. Even when physicists were
responding to direct political pressures, as in the Soviet Union,
the products of their activity illustrate the active, selective, and
creative features of this response. In the present chapter, we have
seen many examples of negotiation and manipulation of the environment,
such as Glauser's entry into Gommins' laboratory, Shimony's recruitment
of Holt, Holt's extended study of his apparatus, the presentation of
LHV as 'decisive', and so on.
The second finding is that the products of scientists' activities
themselves became part of the environment with which other groups
had then to come to terms. This point may be uncontentious when
applied to knowledge-claims: yesterday's discoveries are incorporated
into today's practice and tomorrow's textbooks. Yet the same
conclusion applies to non-cognitive elements of the context.
For example, LHV did not alter the cognitive structure of
us
theoretical FQJY1, since no FQM theorist believed in LHV anyway. At
the end of the day (so the theorists claimed) we knew nothing;
more than we had done originally. Yet LEV did drastically alter the
social context of FQM. As an exemplar of "how to do 'good' FQM", LHV
could not be ignored, though of course different people were able
to cope with it in different ways.
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Chapter Six
The Evaluation of Knowledge
Introduction
In Chapter Five, I concluded that many aspects of the LHV
physicists' behaviour could only be satisfactorily accounted for
by referring in some detail to particular features of the social
context in which this behaviour occurred. In the present chapter,
I shall extend this claim to cognitive aspects of the LHV activity.
That is, I shall argue that a satisfactory account of the way in
which physicists draw substantive conclusions about the validity
of hypotheses, the implications of experiments, and so on, cannot
rely on a generalized model of 'scientific method'; instead, such
an account must relate these conclusions to the specific context
in which they were formed.
The first section of the argument examines the assumptions
which physicists were forced to make because of limitations of
their apparatus. Such assumptions had to be justifiable if the
experiments were to have any validity as genuine tests of LHV.
By examining such justifications, I shall show that the evaluation
of the assumptions was strongly influenced by the cultural background
shared by the LHV group. This culture provided a set of criteria
by which the assumptions were assessed. Although physicists were
unable to fully articulate their reasoning, it seems clear that
this reasoning was given meaning and validity by (mostly tacit)
references to 'what everyone knows'.
I shall then examine physicists' evaluation of Holt's experiment.
In keeping with the analysis of Chapter Five, I will argue that
physicists had very good reasons for rejecting Holt even in the
absence of further experimental results, though such reasons can
only be seen as 'good' from within the particular culture of these
physicists. Extending the argument, even the accumulation of new
results (in favour of QM) does not necessarily (in strictly logical
terms) invalidate Holt's result. However, the rejection of Holt's
experiment, while perhaps not inevitable, is both meaningful and
predictable given the context in which these experiments occurred.
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An analysis of Holt's reception is made much easier by
examining the reception of the other 'anomalous' experiment,
performed by Faraci and his colleagues. Unlike Holt, Faraci's
group defended their result, and the reception of this result
differs in some interesting ways from that of Holt. This episode
raises the important question of competence. As we have seen, Holt's
concern with defending his reputation as a competent experimenter
was an important influence on his behaviour. The different reception
of these two experiments strongly suggests not only that an exper¬
imenter's reputation can be affected by the evaluation of his
knowledge-claims (as Holt realised) but also that the evaluation
of knowledge-claims can be affected by prior, or simultaneous,
evaluation of the competence of the persons making the claim.
Throughout this chapter, I will be concerned with the way in
which culture can affect the evaluation of knowledge. I shall
introduce the concept of plausibility as a useful way of concept¬
ualising this interaction. Referring to an idea as 'plausible'
rather than as 'true' has a number of advantages. In the first
place, it is more in keeping with a relativist or naturalistic
methodology. It avoids any absolutist connotations while preserving
the possibility that certain ideas may be accepted unanimously
by a certain social group at a certain time. Even if some ideas
are indeed true, such ideas are presumably also considered to
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be plausible by someone who holds them to be true. Plausibility,
then, should not alienate realists, yet it allows relativists to
discuss concepts such as consensus and psychological certainty
without having to introduce the concept of 'truth'.
My argument will be that in evaluating knowledge-claims,
irrespective of whether conflicting claims are present, physicists
approach the problem with a pre-existing culture which not only
provides them with an observation language, a methodology, and so
on, but also with a set of expectations of what is likely to be
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'true' and what is unlikely to be 'true'. In other words, culture
provides a plausibility structure which actors use, at least in an
informal, qualitative sense, to assign probabilities to different
accounts. In the LHV activity, I shall try to show the operation of
ni
this plausibility structure in the evaluation of knowledge-claims.
Simply because culture seems to limit action, we should not
suppose that actors simply respond passively to such constraints.
In the previous chapter, we saw how Holt, Clauser and Fry actively
manipulated features of their environment in order to achieve their
aims. Such resourceful activity is also possible in the cognitive
domain. I shall examine one physicist, Aspect, who seems to have
altered the plausibility structure of this area of physics, not
by discovering a novel result, but simply by behaving in a partic¬
ular way. This episode will allow us to develop a fuller picture
of the operation of culture in the evaluation of knowledge.
Obviously, it is rather simplistic to speak of the plausibility
structure as if every physicist received the same training and
held the same set of expectations. We have already seen that the
LHV group did hold many attitudes in common, and that they shared
a commitme-nt to experimental methods. However, it would be surprising
if there were no points on which they disagreed. I shall therefore
go on to examine some aspects of LHV in which consensus was not
obtained; I shall use this evidence to show the limitations of
the plausibility structure as a determining factor, but also to
. demonstrate that where there is no shared plausibility structure,
we should not expect to find consensus.
Finally, I shall introduce some purely speculative ideas
concerning alternatives to the actual outcome of the LHV activity.
If things could have turned out differently from the way they did,
then it may be useful to examine such alternatives, comparing them
with the actual outcome, as yet another way of investigating the
factors which actually did cause the outcome we observe.
The Plausibility of Assumptions
Technical details of the LHV experiments were provided in
Chapter Two; for the reader's convenience, the relevant aspects of
that discussion are reproduced here. In addition, in order to fully
develop the argument, some additional technical information is
required.
Bell's work showed that LHVT and QM gave slightly different
predictions for the strength of correlations between the properties
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of certain pairs of particles. However, any experiment designed to
discriminate between the theories had to use existing, imperfect
apparatus. For example, one way of testing the theories would be
to measure the correlations between the polarizations of two photons.
Ideally, any such experiment would consist of a source of photon
pairs, produced in such a way that, at least according to the QM
predictions, there would be a strong degree of correlation between
their properties. The photons must then enter polarization analyzers,
which would allow photons in certain polarization states to pass
through unaffected with no losses, while absorbing or deflecting
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all the photons which are in certain other polarization states.
Photons emerging from the analyzers must then be detected with
perfect efficiency. In addition, all other optical components
(for example collimators and filters) must not absorb or depolarize
any photons. Figure 1 provides a simplified picture of the experim¬
ental design and illustrates the fate of two photons with different
polarizations.
In fact, it was impossible to attain this idealized procedure
using existing equipment. Although a number of different experimental
designs were available, each of them fell short of this ideal in
at least one of the above respects. These, imperfections made it
impossible to discriminate between LHVT and QM in the way Bell
described. However, it proved possible to modify Bell's results so
that the two theories still gave measurably different predictions
even in realistic experimental conditions: but the validity of
such modifications could not be proved. It was necessary to assume
various things about the apparatus. (As we shall see, the exact
nature of the required assumptions depended on the details of the
particular experimental design in question.)
Every scientific experiment depends upon certain assumptions,
many of which, in most cases, remain implicit. For example, experi¬
menters who periodically check that their apparatus is functioning
correctly must assume that this continues to be the case between
one check and the next. During data analysis, experimenters may
draw lines joining points on a graph, with the implicit assumption
that the areas between or beyond their actual data points are
correctly described by their lines. The need for assumptions per se




"Any argument whose scope is strictly limited to a discussion of
ideal systems is of little value to working physicists,-who endeavour
to describe systems that can and do occur in practice.
Nevertheless, the assumptions required in the LHV case are
not trivial. There is more than simply extrapolation to be considered.
A better analogy might be with the user of an electron microscope,
who has to make not only 'routine' assumptions about accuracy and
the proper functioning of his equipment, but also more important
assumptions about whether a particular image represents a real object
or an artefact of the preparation and viewing process.^ The LHV
physicists were dealing with postulated entities (the 'hidden
variables') about which, by definition, very little was known.
One had therefore to be very careful when making assumptions about
pieces of apparatus whose behaviour might, after all, be governed
by unknown entities.
Before we examine the details of the required assumptions, we
should note that the LHV physicists were quite explicit in admitting
that the assumptions could not be proven; the best that could be
hoped for was to make them as plausible as possible:
"These [experiments] , of course, need auxiliary assumptions to
be valid. As a result, their value depends on how reasonable the
assumptions are."
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"There seems to be no recourse but to make a plausible assumption."
Physicists were now faced with a gap between what they wanted to
say - namely that the experiments would constitute a decisive test
of LHVT - and what they could justifiably argue on logical grounds.
How did they evaluate the plausibility of their assumptions in
order to make this gap as small as possible?
Choosing an Assumption
The evaluation of plausibility in this case can be described
as a two-stage process. The first stage was to examine the range
of possible assumptions, each corresponding to a different experi¬
mental design, and choose the most plausible. The second stage was
the construction of arguments which would maximize the plausibility
of the chosen assumption. This distinction is both historically and
logically useful. After all, it is one thing to produce a rank-
ordering of candidates, and quite another to decide whether the
top-ranking candidate is good enough to pass'.
I 7S
Let us consider two methods of testing LHV which were studied
"by the experimenters. Both involved measurements of the correlations
between the polarizations of photon pairs, and thus both required
methods of photon detection and polarization analysis.
One design used high-energy photons (produced by electron-
positron annihilation) which could be detected with great efficiency
but for which no simple method of polarization analysis existed.
However, the way in which photons'are scattered after hitting a
target was known to depend on their polarization, so that a study
of scattering behaviour could provide an indirect means of inferring
the polarization of the photons. Unfortunately, a detailed description
of the relationship between scattering and polarization could only
be derived from QM, and since QM was one of the theories being tested
the validity of this description was open to question. Clearly, there
is some circularity involved in the use of QM to analyze data
which are then used to check the accuracy of QM. In order to perform
the experiment, one had to assume that this circularity was not
vicious; that is, one assumed that whatever else might be wrong
with QM, its numerical predictions for the scattering - polarization
relationship were correct.
The alternative experimental design used low-energy photons
(produced by atomic cascades) for which efficient polarization
analyzers existed, but for which existing detectors had low efficiency.
Only a small fraction of the photons which arrived at a detector
would be counted. One therefore had to assume that the photons which
were detected did not constitute a biased sample of the photons
arriving at the detector. A more precise way of stating this, which
was used in an experimental paper, is that one must assume that when
a pair of photons successfully passes through the polarizers, the
probability of their joint detection is independent of the polarizer
settings
Nearly all observers felt that the high-energy assumption was
the less reliable. However, it is difficult to find in print any
rigorous arguments in favour of one assumption rather than the other.
Both are in agreement with past experience, and in both cases it is
possible to construct counter-examples - that is, LHV theories which
would not be experimentally distinguishable from QM because of the
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imperfections in the apparatus. The comparisons between assumptions
which do appear contain many explicit references to 'reasonableness'.
Here is one example:
" For[high-energy experiments] a simple counterexample suffices to
show that rather strong additional assumptions are needed here....
counterexamples for [low-energy] experiments are also possible, but
they are much more difficult to produce. Correspondingly, the required
additional assumptions are considerably weaker and more reasonable
and the experiments more conclusive. This .judgement is of course
subjective, but it is reasonable I
The underlined words in this statement are clearly evaluative, yet
no basis for this evaluation is given, other than appeals to
reasonableness. When tackled on this point in interviews, physicists
invariably replied that this was indeed a subjective judgement, but
one which was not difficult to make.
In a sense, this was not an important judgement, since both
types of experiment were in fact performed. But why would anyone
choose to perform a high-energy experiment if it was thought to
be more open to question? The answer of course is that these delib¬
erations did not take place in a vacuum. One group had already begun
a high-energy experiment before its members knew of Bell's work,
and the experiment was then adapted to the task of testing Bell's
pp. 131-33
proposal. (See Chapter Five^for further details of this 'switch
of allegiance' by Kasday and his colleagues from Friedberg to Bell.)
As a result, this group was already committed to using high-energy
photons.
Despite the apparent agreement that low-energy experiments
used weaker assumptions, Kasday and the other members of the high-
energy group were reluctant to concede that their results were not
both valuable and reliable. For example, Kasday pointed out that
even if LHV was correct, its predictions agree with those of QM
in most areas, so that most of QM's predictions would still be
trustworthy. In addition, Kasday devotes seven pages of his thesis
to a review of independent experiments which support the QM predictions
for the scattering-polarization relationship, concluding that
"these experiments taken together provide strong evidence"
in favour of his assumption.
Other high-energy experimenters argued that the two types of
experiment were complementary, and that testing QM in two energy
m
ranges was better than testing it in one, even if the assumptions
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required in the higher energy range were somewhat stronger.
Another member of Easday's group, Ullman, stressed that all
the experiments required assumptionst
"Some of the low-energy experimenters have said things like 'our
experiment tests LHV and yours doesn't.' We weren't convinced by
this. They had to use assumptions too, though different ones....
Probably ours are a little more shaky, but no-one's succeeded in
even proposing an experiment that doesn't have some kind of a
loophole which you can invent some hidden variable explanation for."
Choosing one or other assumption meant choosing one or other
set of apparatus, and in the case of Kasday's group the latter
preceded the former. This was an exception; the low-energy experi¬
menters were in a position to choose between assumptions before they
began to plan their experiments. Even here, though, we must not
neglect the realities of life. Few scientists are in a position to
purchase whatever equipment they wish. As discussed in Chapter Five,
what actually happened was that Holt was recruited by Shimony and
Home simply because Holt had access to the necessary equipment,
and Clauser moved from New York to California in order to gain
access to similar apparatus. In a sense, then, the evaluation of
rival assumptions was peripheral to the real negotiations over
gaining access to equipment and funds. Had these 'real' negotiations
produced different results, so that only Kasday's experiment was
completed, it seems likely that his results, which were after all
in good agreement with the predictions of QJY, would have satisfied
most people's curiosity about LHV.
Justifying the Chosen Assumption
Having decided which assumption to adopt, the LHV physicists
then had to convince themselves and others that even this weak
assumption was not sufficiently strong to invalidate any experiment.
Shimony described the low-energy assumption as 'plausible' and
defended it as follows. Part of the procedure in such an experiment
is to measure the polarization correlations at a number of polarizer
settings and to combine these measurements to give a certain number.
LHV predicts this number will be less than zero, though it does not
predict a specific value. QM, on the other hand, predicts a specific
positive value for this quantity. Shimony argued that:
"If the experimental value turns out to be positive, a determined
advocate of LHVTs could attribute the result to the falsity of
the assumption. This special pleading would not be entirely
unreasonable. However, if the experimental value is not only
positive, but in very close agreement with the QM prediction, then
the advocate of LHVTs would appear to be obsessive.
In other words, it would not be 'entirely unreasonable' to claim
that the sample of photons registered by the detectors is not
completely unrepresentative of the total photon population, but it
would be 'obsessive' to claim that the sample is so biased as to
give a result which was completely contrary to the true state of
affairs.
In another paper, Shimony and his colleagues concede that we
cannot be sure that the apparatus is not behaving in a biased
manner, since any experiment designed specifically to test this
possibility would 'almost certainly' have a different set of values
for its hidden variables compared with the values found in the
correlation experiments. Thus any conclusions found in the former
experiment need not necessarily be valid in the latter. Despite
this lack of certainty, however, these authors feel that the
assumption is reasonable, arguing that 'highly pathological
l^f
detectors' would be required to render this assumption false.
In interviews, physicists were asked to explain in more detail
what was meant by a 'pathological detector':
"It's pathological because it would mean a detector behaving in a
very unphysical, unreasonable fashion, something that one would
not normally expect a detector to do."
"Pathological just means you can't really believe that such a
mechanism is part of the world."
These statements exhibit the same sort of subjective, rather vague
expressions as those found in published papers. It is highly
unlikely that .these physicists had other, more rigorous reasons for
accepting their assumption which they neglected to state in print
or in interviews. What seems more likely is that they simply found
it unbelievable that apparatus could operate in such a selective
manner, but they could provide no logically compelling justification
for their views. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that for practising
physicists, the assumption is indeed highly plausible. Because of
their knowledge and experience, because of their immersion in the
culture of physics, they felt strongly (even if they could not fully
n°\
articulate this feeling) that the assumption was an unobjectionable
one, and that experiments based on this assumption were not thereby
devalued.
It would be wrong to imply that the LHV group were cavalier
about the assumption. Several attempts were made to produce even
weaker versions, with some success. However, this effort was
tempered by practical considerations. As one theorist said of his
improved version:
"We haven't proved that's the weakest assumption you could make,
but there's a point where it doesn't seem worthwhile to spend
more time."
And to quote another theorist
"It's always difficult to get clean experiments. But there's a
trade-off between important philosophical things and things we can
do."
The predicament of the physicists is clear. Some sort of assumption
was going to be necessary, and no matter how intuitively plausible
it seemed, they felt obliged to provide as strong a justification
as possible. What ensued were rhetorical references to the 'unreason¬
able ', 'pathological', and 'obsessive' nature of any argument
which attacked the assumption. This predicament, and the chosen
solution, were clearly recognized by the experimenters:
"Whenever you see words like 'pathological' in physics, there's a
reason for them, and the reason is you can't do anything about them!'
"You use clever phraseology. You can really beat people down with
the right words and impress the hell out of them."
Only in this way could the experimenters get down to the business
of actually doing experiments, which was after all why they were
involved. As long as the assumptions were weak enough for all
practical purposes, as long as they seemed plausible, the experi¬
menters were content to get on with the job.
The way in which the assumptions were evaluated illustrates
a very important point. Physicists were convinced that certain
beliefs were highly plausible, even though they could not articulate
their reasons for this belief. Their conviction stemmed from their
immersion in a shared scientific culture, a culture which
"legitimates and limits the parameters requiring control in the
experimental situation, without necessarily formulating, enumerating,
or understanding them."-'-"
1 To
Later in this chapter I will discuss areas in which this shared
culture either did not exist, or was not sufficient to enforce
consensus. For the moment, note that Kasday, who performed a
high-energy experiment and had to use a supposedly less reliable
assumption, was able to draw on different elements of his culture
(such as previous experiments) in order to justify his choice. This
did not provoke a serious disagreement because Kasday's results
were quite consistent with the ldw-energy results.
The Plausibility of Experiments.
In 1972, the first low-energy photon experiment (performed
by Freedman and Clauser) produced results in good agreement with
17
the predictions of QM . Early in 1973» Holt's (low-energy)
experiment gave results in complete disagreement with QM^. No
other low-energy results were available until 1976, when Glauser,
and Fry and Thomson, both found results in agreement with QM"^.
20
High-energy experiments were completed in 1971,197^, 1976 and 1977
Apart from the 197^ experiment, all of these agreed with QM, and
even the 197^ experiment, performed in Sicily by Faraci and his
colleagues, was ambiguous rather than clearly in favour of LHV.
Finally, another experiment completed in 1976 used protons rather
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than photons, and also gave good agreement with QM.
Thus, by 1977, when I performed my interviews, it is perhaps
not surprising that physicists were able to conclude that, despite
Holt, QM had been confirmed. While it may be rather simplistic to
imagine physicists simply adding up the score for and against QM, the
sheer weight of numbers in favour of QM was obviously very
influential, as the following quotation from a review paper makes clear:
"In order to maintain that a local realistic theory f)i.e. LHVT3
governs nature, one must invoke experimental errors not only to
explain a violation of the inequalities fi.e. a violation of the
LHV predictions^ in seven out of nine experiments, but also to
explain a very close quantitative agreement with the quantum-mechan¬
ical predictions in these seven."^
The situation becomes slightly less one-sided when we recall the
general agreement that high-energy experiments require stronger
assumptions, so that their results are less decisive. (The proton
experiment, it was agreed, needed even stronger assumptions.)
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However, even if we concentrate on the low-energy experiments,
the score still favours QM by tliree to one. This was perceived,
to be conclusive, as is illustrated by the PhD thesis of Lamehi-
Rachti, who performed the proton experiment. The main body of the
thesis was written before the 1976 low-energy results were known,
and Lamehi-Rachti discusses the low-energy situation in the follow¬
ing terms:
"We see that in this type of experiment.... the experimental situation
is far from being clear, with two experiments giving contradictory
results, and it is difficult to draw a conclusion in the absence
of other experimental results of the same type which would confirm
or deny the results of one of these two experiments."
In an appendix of the thesis, the results of the 1976 experiments are
noted:
"Holt's experiment has been repeated by Glauser....It therefore
seems that Holt's experiment has been marred by an experimental
error. Another experiment....by Fry....has allowed a distinct
improvement in the experiment..„ „We can therefore conclude that
the results of experiments of photon correlation in atomic cascades
jji-.e. low-energy photonsl are in favour of
Statements such as these would suggest that the choice between Holt's
experiment and that of Freedman and Glauser was not resolved until
further relevant empirical evidence became available in 1976, and
that the validity of Holt's result was an open question until that
time. In many ways, this suggestion is misleading. The status of
the two experiments was far from symmetrical prior to 1976. For
example, many discussions of the experiments during this time
relegate Holt's result to parentheses:
"Freedman's results showed that the quantum mechanical prediction
held to sufficient accuracy to exclude hidden variable theories
satisfying the localizability condition (although Holt's experiment
seems in disagreement with this)."^-5
and
"the existing experimental evidence is generally against such an
assumption (although there are two reports [(i.e. Holt and Faracif
in its favour)."
Other papers simply make no mention of Holt's experiment:
"Tests....of quantum theory have exhibited no contradictory evidence
....in the domain of atomic physics."^7
We must be careful in interpreting thss^ data, because of an even
greater asymmetry between the two experiments. As pointed out in the
I ^ !L
previous chapter, Holt did not publish his results in a standard
physics journal, unlike Freedman and Glauser. It is therefore
possible that some authors had simply never heard of Holt's result.
However, an unpublished account of Holt's experiment was widely
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circulated, and the experiment was discussed in published reviews.
It is certain that at least some authors who knew of Holt's result
did not give it equal prominence with that of Freedman and Glauser.
In addition, many interviewees claimed that they knew of Holt's
result but that they 'never believed it'. A wide variety of reasons
for this opinion were given, and many of these reasons make no
reference to the later empirical data. These reasons can be grouped
under several headings.
Inductive Arguments.
Many interviewees stressed the power and accuracy of QM, and claimed
that they found it almost inconceivable that QM could have been
refuted by such a relatively simple experiment:
"There's something very powerful about induction. QM has always
been right and it's very hard to expect it not to be right."
"I could hardly believe that QM, which had explained so much so
well, would be overthrown„"
These views are of course reasonable, but they are far from conclusive.
In fact, they are in conflict with the type of rhetoric used to
justify the LHV experiments in the first place. In the early days,
experimenters were eager to show that no-one could be sure that
QM would be confirmed. They claimed that the past success of QM was
irrelevant because LHVs would only show up in the special circum¬
stances of these experiments:
"The history of science shows how little obligation Nature has
to conform to our a priori conceptions."29
Ad Hominem Arguments.
Interviewees often referred to the reputation of the various
experimenters, and to their competence and past record. Almost every¬
one had both good and bad things said about him, and opinions (not
surprisingly) differed widely on these issues. One aspect which was
frequently mentioned (and which was discussed in Chapter Five) was
the involvement of Holt's supervisor, Pipkin, in an earlier experiment
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which claimed to have found a discrepancy in quantum electrodynamics.
Here again, two interpretations could "be placed on this episode.
Some respondents cited this c,s a reason for suspecting that Pipkin
'had made another mistake'; others argued that, because of his
earlier mistake, Pipkin would he doubly cautious and would have
checked Holt's experiment very carefully to avoid a repetition
of such an incident. Seen in this light, Pipkin's background supports
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Holt's results rather than weakens them.
Expertise Arguments.
Interviewees on the periphery of the LHV activity were willing to
defer to the judgement of the physicists who were most closely
involved with the work.
"These people no doubt specialize in hidden variables and they
probably had pretty good reasons for believing in QM."
Others carried this further, claiming that the only people who
can really know everything about an experiment are the people who
actually built and worked with that particular set of apparatus:
"The only people who could know for sure what went wrong are Holt
and Pipkin because you've got to get down there and use that
apparatus again to find out."
In areas of controversy where rival experimenters produce differing
results, this deference to expertise can perpetuate disagreement,
because each party can insist that he alone is competent to judge
his experiment. This is not very relevant for the present case; as
we have seen, Holt and Pipkin did not strongly defend their result,
nor have they argued in favour of LHV. They did not even publish
the result in the normal way. This seems to have left a strong
impression on a number of people:
"The people who did the experiment didn't believe it. I'm certainly
not going to believe it if they didn't."
Although they do not claim that their result is valid, Holt
and Pipkin insist that neither they nor anyone else has ever success¬
fully identified an error in their experiment. A number of suggested
sources of error were proposed, but in each case, often after
further tests of their apparatus, Holt and Pipkin claimed that the
suggestion was false. As Pipkin put it, 'we still don't know what
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went wrong'.
Holt himself could not fully explain why he rejected his result,
except by references to intuitive feelings:
"An experimentalist gets a feeling for what systematic errors could
do....and you develop a certain, almost intuition, I think, about
whether you believe an experiment."33
Technical Arguments.
According to some respondents, the data of Freedman and Glauser
was 'more forceful' than that of Holt, because the former favoured
QM by six standard deviations, while the latter favoured LHVT by
only four standard deviations. Yet both results are statistically
significant according to the normal conventions of atomic physics.
Thus, at the very least, Holt's experiment gave a definite result
which cannot be attributed to random fluctuations.
A second criticism refers to the data collection procedures
used in the two experiments. Holt took data for two orientations
of the polarizers (at relative angles of 22-|° and 67-§-°). Freedman
and Glauser took data at eleven orientations between 0 and 90°•
However, all the experimenters had agreed on a theoretical analysis
before the experiments which predicted that the maximum divergence
between LHV and QM would occur at 22-|° and 67^°. Although data at
other positions are useful, Holt's procedure cannot be considered
incorrect.
These technical arguments have been summarized by Freedman:
"It wasn't as convincing as [ourJ experiment, just because they only
measured it at two points....and with less signal-to-noise, so it
seemed much more susceptible to systematic error, though they did
a very good job of tracking [the errors]] down, and they came to
the right conclusion, [namely]] that they couldn't find any."^
The 'Errors' Argument.
We have seen that many of the reasons given for rejecting Holt's
result could be called 'nonscientific', or at least 'nonempirical'.
Even the technical arguments so far presented are less than conclusive.
However, when presented with a list of reasons, such as those above,
some interviewees claimed that none of these was the 'real reason'
for rejecting Holt. A similar point was made in a review article
written by Shimony and Glauser:
"The probability is extremely high, in our opinion, that the results
contradicting the predictions of QM were due to systematic error.
This opinion is not based on a conservative acknowledgement of
the great success of QM in the atomic domain. Rather, it is based
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upon the consideration that QM predicts strong correlations,
whereas Bell's theorem sets a limit upon such correlations.
Virtually any conceivable systematic error will 'wash out a strong
correlation so as to produce results in accordance with Bell's
theorem, rather than speciously strengthen a weak correlation."35
In other words, since errors usually reduce the degree of order in
a system, they may reduce the 'correct' QM correlation so that
the experiment appeared to yield the LHV value. In fact, Glauser,
who later performed an experiment to check Holt's results, initially
obtained results in agreement with LHVT. These results were eventu¬
ally attributed to stress effects in an optical component, and when
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this fault was corrected, the LHV-type results disappeared. Holt
and Pipkin found that one of their optical components was also
being stressed. This discovery was made after Holt's thesis and the
Holt-Pipkin preprint were written, but in interviews, both Holt
and Pipkin claimed that the stress effects were not large enough
to invalidate the results.
Now, although errors could (and on at least one occasion
apparently did) reduce a QM correlation to give a pseudo-LHV result,
it is difficult to see how, if LHVT were correct, an error could
artificially boost the correlation by just the amount required
- to yield the QM prediction. Thus the 'errors' argument allows
us to dismiss results which favour LHV, but provides support for
results which favour QM.
This is a powerful argument, and it was expressed in even
more emphatic form in interviews:
"Nearly all errors, or maybe even all errors, although it's difficult
to say that..,.but essentially an infinite number, all the ones you
can think of, would tend to reduce the correlation."
"If anything goes wrong, you get the hidden variable result.
Anything that goes wrong is going to give a weaker correlation. You
can't get a stronger correlation than QM predicts."
But is it really the case that there are no errors whatsoever
which could increase the correlations? When pressed on this point,
interviewees tended to qualify their earlier statements:
"Oh, you can mock up a very perverse or psychotic type of mechanism]'
"There are a lot of errors that could do it, but they're all sort
of wierd."
"There could be such errors, but they have to be screwy, nutty
things„"
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"(The errors argument] explains my prejudices, if you like.
Obviously, someone could come up with a systematic error which
goes the other way."
"That's a good point, but I can't think of an example....I haven't
ever dreamed one up....I haven't really thought about it, though."
When pressed, interviewees did manage to dream up possible correlation-
increasing errors, and they did indeed sound somewhat 'screwy',
given what they (and i) knew about physics. Nevertheless, the above
quotations indicate that the 'errors' argument depends for its
strength on the fact that the LHV physicists shared tacit knowledge
of what does and what does not constitute a 'screwy' or implausible
hypothesis. Because of this agreement, it was not necessary to justify
statements about the effects of errors on correlations; everybody
knew that (effectively) all errors reduce correlations.
Nevertheless, this piece of tacit knowledge is by no-means a
watertight fact. For example, if the argument is taken seriously
in its most emphatic forms, then a single experimental result
in favour of QM would be proof of the validity of QM, since there is
thought to be no 'non-psychotic' error which could falsely produce
such a result. Now that further experiments have been performed,
it is fairly safe to make such a claim, as one physicist did in 1977s
> "There are many ways of washing out the correlation. But you cannot
see any way of increasing the correlation. So one experiment that
gives a good correlation for QM is enough....you can have ten
experiments against QM because there are hundreds of reasons for
washing out a good correlation....but nothing else except QM can
explain....Freedman and Glauser's result."
If the errors argument was really as strong as is now claimed,
we would expect to find it being used quite openly to reject Holt's
result as soon as this result appeared. Yet Holt's thesis makes no
mention of this argument, and in their unpublished manuscript, Holt
and Pipkin simply state that
"in view of the results of the Freedman and Glauser and experiment,
it is premature to claim that all systematic errors have been
eliminated, and that the quantum-mechanical predictions are incorrect."
Clauser and Home, in their 197^ theoretical analysis of LHV,
also fail to use the error argument. They simply note the existence
of conflict between the two results.
When the error argument was used for the first time, in 1975.
it was used more tentatively than in later comments. In 1975. it
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was claimed that 'there are many more systematic errors that reduce
the correlation than increase it', while in 1976 'nearly all
possible systematic errors' would reduce the correlation, and in
1977 'an infinite number, all the ones you can think of' would do
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so. Since Freedman co-authored the first two statements , and made
the third in an interview, the statements as a whole are comparable,
and seem to suggest that the error argument has been 'firmed up'
as time passed.
Thus, although the error argument has been described as the
'real reason' for rejecting Holt's result, it does not appear to
be different in kind from any of the other arguments used to justify
this rejection. None of these arguments, taken in isolation, proves
conclusively that Holt was wrong. When taken together, and placed
in their social context, they make a very persuasive case, not
only for ranking Holt as less plausible than Freedman and Clauser,
but also for rejecting Holt's result completely. Since none of the
arguments we have seen so far relies for its strength on further
experiments, there is a great deal of justification for the claim
made in Chapter Five, namely, that further experiments were not
solely, or even primarily, motivated by a desire to resolve a genuine
impasse between two equally plausible results. As I suggested in
Chapter Five, it seems very likely that the above arguments would
have been quite sufficient to justify Holt's rejection if, for some
reason, no further experiments had been done.
Even in the absence of other results, the case against Holt is
a strong one; but it is a case based on likelihood and plausibility,
and not certainty. Despite the emphatic statements made by LHV
physicists, some were willing to concede this point:
"Experiments, really, to a large extent, are plausibility arguments.
The result of the experiment presumably means something. Something
caused this. Then the plausibility comes in, and you try to convince
people or yourself that what caused it is what you thought you
measured, and that, unfortunately, involves arguments that you and
I can understand, it's not purely objective. What we try to do is
to make it as objective as we can."
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The Existence of Other Results.
My argument so far has ignored a very important feature of
the context in which interviewees responded to my questions.
At the time they were interviewed, they knew that there were
several experiments agreeing with QM, while only Holt's experiment
agrees with LHV. Thus, although the case against Holt was a matter
of plausibility, the body of experimental evidence made it a matter
of virtual certainty. One interviewee expressed it like this:
"It depends on the number of experiments. If everybody gets
correlations that are too high then you have to say that a screwy
accident is happening to everybody. That I can't believe. One
experiment, yes....but you're not going to get the same thing happen
when another group does the whole experiment over again with a
different apparatus. If several groups do it and they get the same
thing, then the probability of something like that becomes
vanishingly small."
The 'additivity' of results is well illustrated by Lamehi-Rachti's
thesis (quoted earlier) in which he found it .'difficult to draw a
conclusion in the absence of other experiments' when faced with
only two conflicting results, while (in the appendix) he noted the
later results, and thereupon dismissed Holt's experiment.,
I have already argued that this apparent conversion is not an
accurate picture of the response to Holt before, and after, other
results appeared. Holt's result had effectively been dismissed
long before other results were known, and most of the arguments
used to justify this rejection made no reference to other experiments.
Nevertheless, it is certainly true that the errors argument
becomes more persuasive when a large number of results in favour of
QM are available. The fact that this argument is now used retro¬
spectively to explain why Holt was 'obviously wrong' is interesting
if fairly predictable, though it annoys fapaliolios:
"It's a phony reason. I'm an experimentalist, and I believe that
if you have to reach a conclusion on the basis of error analysis
then your experiment is lousy and it should be re-done....Holt's
experiment gave a definite answer, and the obvious thing is to do
it again, with perhaps a slightly different set-up."
Anyone who wished to defend Holt's result would obviously
have to deal with the other, conflicting, results. One tactic would
be to claim that all the other experiments were wrong; clearly,
this would be an extremely unconvincing argument. However, this
is not the only option. Instead, it could be claimed that Holt's
result is not comparable with the other experiments because the
physical conditions under which they were performed were not the
same.
To some extent, this point was recognized: Clauser went to
great lengths to make his second experiment as similar to Holt's
as possible. For example, Glauser's first experiment (with Freedman)
had used photons from an atomic "cascade in an isotope of calcium,
whereas Holt had used mercury. In his second experiment, Glauser
switched to mercury. Had he not done so, it could still be argued
that LHVs only manifest themselves in mercury and not in calcium.
Now we know this is not so:
"Holt's experiment has been repeated....by Glauser, with the same
atomic cascade as Holt but with somewhat different equipment....
so whatever the fault is, it's not in the mercury atom."
But this point-by-point comparison could, in principle, be extended
to a near-infinite number of features of Holt's apparatus, many of
which were not duplicated by Glauser„ Glauser himself describes
his experiment as
"attempting to repeat, at least in part, the conditions of Holt's
experiment."39 .
Glauser lists several 'possibly significant' differences between
the two experiments. The fact that Glauser's experiment gives a
different result from Holt's could be taken to mean that one of these
differences was enough to prevent Glauser's experiment from being
a functioning LHV detector. But of course this was not what
happened. Instead, Glauser's experiment was seen as correct, and
the differences between the two were seen as pointers to the likely
location of Holt's error. For example, the error probably did not
lie in Holt's excitation method, since Glauser used the same method
and still got the 'right' answer; the error was more likely to lie
in an area which Glauser did not duplicate.
Apart from their use in error-tracing, the differences listed
by Glauser are seen as trivial. Thus, although Glauser himself was
careful to qualify his statements about replication, his experiment
is, for all practical purposes, seen as a straightforward complete
replication of Holt's experiment.
ko
"Holt's experiment has been repeated by Glauser."
no
Holt himself agrees:
"Now that Glauser has done the experiment with the exact same
cascade in mercury, with trie same sort of lamp, I have to believe
that it's got to have been the apparatus which caused the result.
It couldn't have been the physics because everything is the same
there.
It would of course be possible to construct a lcuig list of differences
between the experiments. These would range from the technical
(different lens coatings, different photocathode characteristics,
different levels of isotopic purity) through the strange (different
locations, different times of the year) to the apparently ludicrous
(different colours of paint on the lab walls, different number of
letters in the experimenters' surnames). Given what physicists 'know'
about atoms, and the behaviour of their apparatus, none of these
differences is at all relevant. This knowledge is of course
theory-dependent and rests on 'bold conjecture' rather than on
if3unassailable truth . The reader, however, will surely feel that some
of these conjectures are not particularly bold ones. This feeling,
I would suggest, simply reflects the extent to which the reader
shares the same cultural background as the LHV physicists.
Although I have tried to cast doubt on the conclusive nature
of the reasons advanced for rejecting Holt, and have tried to
render them problematic, I certainly do not wish to imply that the
LHV physicists were foolish, irrational or necessarily wrong in
coming to the conclusions they did. The important point, though,
is that the LHV physicists were by no means logically compelled
to reach these conclusions.
Not all the reasons produced by physicists could be classed
as 'good scientific reasons'. Indeed, they cover a wide spectrum
of 'hardness' or 'scientificity', ranging from gossip to deta^ed
technical arguments and experimental evidence. My aim in this section
has been to show that as we move through these arguments, we find
no epistemological discontinuity. There is no point at which the
arguments cease to be appeals to reasonableness and plausibility,
and start to derive from something firmer. All that happens is that
as the arguments begin to accumulate, and begin to be phrased in
more conventional scientific form, the case in favour of LHV (or Holt)
begins to look less and less plausible. In other words, the
counter-arguments needed to defend LHV, or the validity of Holt's
result, begin to seem increasingly 'obsessive' or 'pathological'.
Ultimately, physicists vote with their feet. If each individual
feels that the issue of LHVT has been settled to his satisfaction
and leaves the field, then in a very real sense the issue of LHVT
has been settled. Small loopholes may still exist,such as the need
for assumptions, but most people*do not see this as a serious reason
for continuing to work in this field.
"It's perfectly possible [to improve on the experiments^] but nobody
is willing to spend the time, money or effort to actually perform
it....I've got other things to do now."
"We all came away....feeling that the theorists had to think up
a new idea that would give experimentalists something to work on,
other than just pushing the same idea into better and better
experiments."
"I don't really see any more experiments in hidden variables that
I find really interesting, whereas I've got lots of other experiments
that I've been putting off."
In their published statements, these physicists were usually
careful to point out the loopholes and qualifications which applied
to their conclusions. Nevertheless, the evidence against LHV, and
the implausibility of this hypothesis, did lead to some small
liberties being taken. For example, shortly before he left Berkeley
and moved to a quite different job, Glauser performed another LHV
L\L\.
experiment, this time using circularly-polarized photons. He
admitted (in an interview) that this experiment was done in a hurry,
on a low budget, and that the results were not very precise. (This
seems to have been the reason why this paper was published in
Nuovo Gimento rather than the more prestigious Physical Review
Letters, where Glauser's other experiments appeared.)
In this experiment, as in the others, correlation rates were
combined into a single quantity, which Glauser called & . (See
Chapter Two for details.) QM predicted S = 0*002 for Glauser's
arrangement, while Bell's inequality demanded that S 4- 0 for all
LHV theories. The experimental result was that cD =-0-015 -0*025.
(The size of the error reflects the poor quality of this result.)
In his paper, Glauser admits that:
A-5
"No actual violation of the inequality can be sought here."
nz
However, Glauser seems to ignore the. fact that his measured value
of ^ is negative (and is certainly not equal to 0-002), when he
concludes
"None the less, the predictions of .\QM\ for this case appear at
least to be approximately valid.
Thus, although this result could conceivably be used to defend LHV,
the case against LHV had by this time been 'firmed up' to such an
extent that such a usage was quite implausible; indeed, Glauser
seems to be using this result in the opposite way, as a defence
4-7
of QM. '
In interviews, as we have seen, LHV physicists were much more
emphatic, and less cautious, than in their published statements.
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This is hardly surprising. What is perhaps more significant is
that, as we move out from the small 'insider' group who actually
worked in LHV, and examine the views of other observers, we find
that conclusions become more and more emphatic, and qualifications
tend to disappear. For example, authors such as Zukav and Stapp,
who have written about the philosophical implications of non-
locality, ignore the evidence in favour of LHV and do not mention
L\qthe assumptions required in existing experiments. 7 During my
fieldwork, I encountered a number of physicists who had heard of
the LHV activity but had not heard of Holt. Several people who had
heard of Holt claimed (incorrectly) that the source of Holt's
error had now been agreed. Finally, I found that apart from those
who had been actively involved in LHV, few people knew much about
50the assumptions involved in the experiments.
The Reception of Faraci's Experiment
In 197^t Faraci and his colleagues at the University of Catania,
in Sicily, published the results of a high-energy photon correlation
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experiment. These results disagreed quite sharply with the predic¬
tions of QM, and provided limited evidence in favour of LHV,
although the evidence was not as strong as Holt's experiment.
Unlike Holt, Faraci and his colleagues did not concede that
they had made a mistake. However, they have received no support
from other experimenters. The most detailed published criticism of
m
their experiment was made, as one might expect, by the group which
had already performed a high-energy experiment, Kasday, Ullman and
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Wu. In a postscript to their 1975 report of their own experiment,
Kasday and his colleagues discuss several shortcomings in the Italian
experiment, most of which involved subsidiary effects which might
have taken place inside the apparatus and might have caused the
anomalous results. Unlike the US group, the Italians had made no
empirical checks to see if their 'results had been distorted in
this way; instead, they had performed a theoretical calculation to
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estimate, and correct for, such effects. ^
Kasday's group also pointed out a much more glaring error in
Faraci's paper. Faraci had claimed that the two sets of results
were in agreement. As Kasday put it
"This is not correct. Our results are in formal disagreement with
theirs."55
Faraci's group continued to defend their result, largely by ignoring
rather than refuting such criticisms. In 1976, they published a
second paper in Nuovo Gimento,^ This paper was submitted after
Kasday's paper was published, also in 'Nuovo Gimento. It therefore
seems likely that Faraci's group were aware of Kasday's criticisms,
yet they make no reply to these criticisms. In addition., there is no
doubt that Faraci's group were aware of the results of Kasday's
experiment, and of ]Treedman and Glauser's experiment, since these
experiments were cited in Faraci's earlier (197^) paper. Yet in their
1976 paper, Faraci and his colleagues make no mention of either of
these experiments. Of their own experiment, they say:
" £the result} shows an anisotropy ratio lower than that predicted
by QM but in agreement with Bell's limit for the existence of
local HVs."-5°
This sounds rather as if agreement with 'Bell's limit' is
something rather definite and significant, rather than being very
ambiguous, neither in favour of nor against LHV. (Recall that QM
predicts A to be a specific positive number, LHV predicts A 4 0, and
Faraci found 0.) Bell himself claims that the term 'Bell's
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limit' is 'entirely unauthorized'„
Faraci's group cite only one other experiment - Holt's. They
write:
"Recently, some experiments (Holt and Faraci) seem to put in doubt
the general validity of [quantum] theory."58
Since they neglect the other experiments in favour of QM, their
paper appears to give undue support to LHV.
Also in 1978, a conference on the LHV experiments was held
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in Sicily. Farad's group was represented by Notarrigo; he defended
their use of a theoretical analysis rather than an empirical check
of the effects discussed by Kasday. He did not suggest any possible
error in Kasday's experiment, but claimed that
"the question... .is still open."^
I attended this conference as an observer, and I gained a very
clear (though of course subjective) impression that Farad's result,
and Notarrigo's defence of that result, were treated rather sceptic¬
ally, despite the apparent 'one against one' situation among the
high-energy photon experiments at that time. A significant factor,
at least in the formal sessions and the debate between Notarrigo
and Ullman (the representative of Kasday's group) was the fact that
Notarrigo had. to defend his result in a language (English) in which
he was not fluent. Nevertheless, I do not feel that this was a
crucial point in determining the verdict reached by the audience of
. LHV experimenters. Although I have no documentary evidence on this
point, I gained the clear impression that most of the audience had
made up their minds before they heard Notarrigo's defence.
Faraci's experiment provides a very useful comparison with
Holt and Pipkin's experiment, in a number of respects. Both disagreed
with QM; in both cases, previous (and apparently similar) experiments
had agreed with QM; both were eventually rejected by most physicists;
and in both cases, further experiments were performed to check these
'discrepancies'. However, Faraci's group defended their result,
whereas Holt and Pipkin did not. (As discussed earlier, Pipkin said
at the conference 'we still don't know what went wrong with this
experiment'.)
A further difference between the two experiments was that Holt's
care in checking his apparatus and searching for errors seems to
have led most people to conclude that Holt himself was a competent
experimenter, and that he had simply been unfortunate. The informal
verdict on Faraci's experiment was somewhat less charitable. This
is clearly a sensitive issue, so the following comments are quoted
anonymously:
"Kasday, Ullman and Wu just had a vastly more sophisticated
experiment."
"There was no big fundamental fight between Faraci's and Kasday's
experiments. Faraci's group simply weren't careful enough about
taking some corrections into account. Their experiment would be
more interesting if there weren't such an obvious flaw."
One informant said of the Sicilian conference:
"I think it was pretty much the consensus, although nobody
really wanted to come out and say it in public, that it was just
a second-rate shoddy experiment."
When asked to explain in detail why he preferred Kasday's
experiment, this informant replied:
The amount of care being taken, the number of checks against
systematic errors, the overall understanding of all the physical
processes that were going on....Faraci et al [sicD left a number
of things unexplained in their write-ups which turned out to be
quite crucial....the thinking was quite muddled, the attempts at
shielding and eliminating secondary scatter were very sloppy.
Kasday had made really great efforts to eliminate a large number
of systematic asymmetries which Faraci hadn't done. Faraci's
statistics were quite poor in comparison, their electronics were
pretty sloppy. It was just not professionally done."
These statements strongly contrast with the informal comments
made by the same group of people about Holt's experiment. Although
no-one thought Holt's result was correct, neither did any of my
informants claim that Holt was incompetent. At most, they said that
if they had been in Holt's position, they would have acted differently;
for example, some said they would have published the results, and
others said they would have used different error-tracing techniques.
Thus it would seem that the LHV physicists' judgement of
Faraci was somewhat harsher than their judgement of Holt. This is
an important point, to which I shall return later. However, there
are also many similarities in the treatment of both pairs of
conflicting results, namely, Holt-Pipkin v Freedman-Glauser, and
Faraci v Kasday. It should already be clear that in each case,
physicists were able to produce reasons for preferring the result
which agreed with QM, and that many of these reasons had little to
do with subsequent experiments. In the case of H°lt, I argued in
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Chapter Five that the resolution of apparent discrepancies was
not the only, and perhaps not even the most important motivation
for performing further experiments. I have yet to establish a
similar point for the response to Faraci's experiment. I will now
attempt to do so.
If the statements quoted earlier are truly indicative of
physicists' assessment of Faraci, there would seem to be little
point in performing further experiments. Yet two further high-
energy photon experiments were performed after Faraci's experiment;
one group, in Birkbeck College, London, was led by Wilson, and the
other, in Bologna, Italy, was led by Maroni.^ Why were these
experiments performed?
I was unable to interview any of these experimenters. However,
I did interview Bohm and Hiley, who were also in the physics depart¬
ment at Birkbeck College.^ Hiley told me that he and Bohm had
suggested the experiment to Wilson as early as 1970> long before
Faraci's result was known. The experiment was originally intended
to test a theoretical proposal, advanced by Bohm and others, which
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was quite distinct from LHV. As things turned out, the experiment
took much longer than expected, mainly because the apparatus had
to be moved to another building for administrative reasons partway
through the construction stage. Thus it was only by accident that
Wilson's results appeared after Faraci's. It is not surprising that
Wilson and his colleagues cite Faraci, because Wilson's results are
certainly relevant for any discussion of Faraci's experiment, but
it seems fairly clear that Wilson's experiment was not prompted by
any concern over an 'anomalous result'; indeed, it was not a response
to Faraci at all.
Despite this fact, Wilson's experiment has been presented by
other physicists as if it were a direct response to Faraci. For
example, Clauser and Shimony discuss Faraci's result, then write
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"Wilson et al repeated the experiment."
Pipkin, in a comprehensive review of the LHV experiments, writes:
"Stimulated by the discardent [sic] results obtained by Faraci et
al, Wilson, Lowe and Butt used an arrangement....'
These descriptions of Wilson's experiments are probably a result
of ignorance about the true origins of the experiment rather than
m
deliberate misrepresentations, since no-one from Birkbeck College
attended the experimenters' conference in Sicily, and (as discussed
in Chapter Four) there is little communication between Bohm's
group and the LHV group. However, this episode usefully illustrates
how a sequence of events can be (inaccurately) presented in such a
way as to conform to a stereotyped notion of 'scientific method', in
which anomalies ^problematically generate further investigation.
The second experiment, by Maroni's group, does seem to have
been a direct response to Faraci's experiment, though here, too,
this statement requires qualification. Firstly, Maroni and his
colleagues were not previously involved with FQM; like Wilson's
group, Maroni was not motivated by strong doubts about the validity
of QM. Instead, the experiment was suggested by colleagues who
were interested in theoretical FQM. As Maroni told me:
"I am not a specialist in the problems concerning the foundations
of QM....by our work we had it in mind to give a small contribution
to the discussion of an important cultural subject without any
professional implication.
Secondly, Maroni did not learn of Wilson's experiment until
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after his own had been completed. It is impossible to say whether
Maroni would have become involved if he had known that another
independent test of Faraci's results was taking place.
Finally, it would seem that Maroni's group did not have a high
opinion of Faraci's experiment; having discussed the LHV experiments,
including Kasday's and Faraci's, they write
"It turns out that all these results seem to support QM rather than
LHV theories""^,
although, to be fair, they do go on to justify their own experiment
in terms of the need to resolve the existing discrepancies.
Unlike Holt and Pipkin, Faraci and his colleagues did not reject
their own result. For this reason alone, Maroni's experiment is
understandable. However, despite the fact that both Maroni's and
Wilson's groups found results in agreement with QM, Faraci's group
has continued to defend the validity of its results. For example,
in April 1978 Faraci and Pennisi published a paper in which they
derived further inequalities which would allow new experimental
tests of QM and LHV. In this paper, they made only a passing reference
to the existing LHV experiments:
"At present, much theoretical and experimental work is in progress
to check QM."70
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The reader is then referred without comment to the published
abstracts of the 197^ conference papers. Faraci's own experiment
is also cited, but with no indication of its findings.
Another paper, written in June 1978 by the same authors
although not published until 1980, discusses yet more inequalities
which, it is proposed, could be used to study triplets, not pairs,
of photons and hence provide further tests of QM. Again, the existing
experiments are cited but the results of these experiments are not
discussed.
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In a letter, also written in June 1978, Faraci told me
"Notwithstanding results of many groups which agree with QM, I
believe that this problem is not at all concluded. As far as our
results are concerned we are checking very carefully any possible
source of systematic errors which could have modified the experi¬
mental conclusions."72
Faraci went on to make criticisms of Wilson's and Maroni's
experiments, but he did not criticise Kasdays
"Wilson's experiment gives serious reasons of doubt about his
results because of the geometry used (mainly the size of detectors).
On the other hand, Maroni's data are less accurate than Kasday's."73
A group of Sicilian theoretical physicists, based at Palermo,
have also adopted a sympathetic approach to Faraci's results.
This group's response is particularly interesting because they adopt
the same tactics as I did in my 'devil's advocate' defence of Holt's
result in the face of mounting evidence in favour of QM. Their
argument is worth quoting at length:
"The quoted results do not agree with each other, but most of them
agree with QM....while QHolt and Faraci^ do not. Being faced with
this situation, our point of view is that all results obtained so
far should be considered right, until a mistake is found that
proves some result to be wrong, so that the problem is not to find
which or who is right or wrong, but why different results are found,
i.e. to find which relevant conditions are different in the two
classes of experiments....Thus it seems necessary to put under control
some parameter not yet considered."?^
What conclusions can we draw from the reception of Faraci's
experiment? Some aspects of this episode simply serve to support
the conclusions derived earlier from a consideration of Holt's
experiment. For example, most physicists seemed to find little
difficulty in choosing between conflicting experiments (Kasday v
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Faraci .and Freedman and Glauser v Holt). It would be too facile to
claim that they simply chose the results which agreed with QM.
Equally, however, it would be inaccurate to claim that they kept
a completely open mind until further experiments were performed.
Instead, they evaluated the rival experiments by invoking a whole
range of criteria, drawing on a variety of elements from their
cultural context. This evaluation was far from being an example
of straightforward deductive reasoning.
In the case of Holt, I pointed out that each of the reasons for
rejection can, individually, be criticised. Rejection is a matter
of plausibility, not of proof. However, given the context of Holt's
result, the outcome was hardly surprising. Farac!'s case provides
further support for these arguments. The major difference between
Faraci and Holt is, of course, that Faraci and his colleagues
have continued to claim that their result is valid. Regardless of
the persuasiveness of such claims, or their effect on the professional
future of this group, the fact remains that such a defence is
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clearly possible. Admittedly, the defence is a rather minimal one;
Faraci's group has never criticised in detail the experiments which
disagree with their findings, particularly Kasday's experiment.
Nor have they tried to explain why their experiment alone displays
the effects which they found. Yet it is clear that if they wish to
pursue a search for 'relevant differences' between their experiment
and all others, such a course of action is, in principle, open to
them. The fact that, in their most recent papers, they seem to be
adopting such an approach, is further evidence in favour of my
arguments, concerning both their experiment and Holt's.
There is another important difference between Holt and Faraci,
to which I alluded earlier. Holt's experiment, at least in one
sense, was a success: the other LHV physicists did not conclude
that Holt himself was an incompetent experimenter. Instead, they
concluded that he reacted properly to a puzzling experimental
anomaly. Faraci's group was judged more harshly: many LHV physicists
claimed that Faraci's experiment was done in an unprofessional
manner, with an unacceptable lack of careful checks on whether the
apparatus was functioning properly. In other words, the experiment
was taken as a reflection on the personal competence of Faraci and
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his colleagues, which was not the case with Holt. Holt's case
indicates that the production of an anomalous result is not, by
itself, sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the experimenter
is incompetent. How, then, can we account for the different reactions
to similarly anomalous results?
One possibility is to stress the fact that Holt 'recanted' by
denying the validity of his results and declining to publish them
in isolation. Faraci's group did*publish. Yet it does not seem
likely that this alone could account for Faraci's hostile reaction.
After all, some LHV physicists felt that Holt should have published
his results.
What seems more likely is that the quality of Faraci's work
seemed inadequate. The published report of their results was brief,
containing few details of their experiment; the paper contained
factual errors, and introducing the misleading 'Bell limit'. It
later became clear that their experiment was much simpler than
Kasday's, omitting many important experimental checks. Their defence
of their result was weak; they provided no account of the different
results obtained by other groups.
In other words, I am suggesting that the hostile reception
given to Faraci's group was not because they obtained the 'wrong'
result, nor even because they did not admit that their result was
wrong. Instead, other physicists concluded that the work was simply
badly done. The cultural context shared by the other LHV physicists
included a set of expectations of how one should go about performing
and presenting a physics experiment, and Faraci's group did not
fulfil these expectations. It may be true that one aspect of these
expectations is that a 'good' experiment should produce the 'correct'
result - in this case, agreement with QM. But this is by no means
the whole story.
The Social Construction of Plausibility.
In previous sections of this chapter, I have discussed the
effects of the existing plausibility structure on the evaluation
of new knowledge-claims. That is, I have been concerned with the
constraints imposed by the cultural context in which these claims
appear. However, it is clear that physicists are not merely passive
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respondents in this process. We have already seen how Holt success¬
fully coped with his anomalous and unwelcome result. His actions
did not make his result any more plausible, but they safeguarded
his professional reputation. In this section, I shall deal with a
case in which a physicist did succeed in increasing the plausibility
of an idea by choosing a specific course of action. The discussion
will centre around the different fates of two LHV 'loopholes',
both of which claim that LHVT may have some validity despite the
existing experimental evidence.
One of these loopholes, which I shall call the 'selective
apparatus' proposal, has already been mentioned. It suggests that
polarizers and detectors, which themselves may be governed by LHVs,
may select a biased sample of the total photon population so that QM
appears to be valid even when it is not. Although much of the early
discussion of this proposal refers to the behaviour of detectors,
it should be stressed that the behaviour of polarizers is also
questioned, as this quotation from a letter written by a LHV
physicist in 1970 reveals:
"It seems to us that the polarizer may profoundly affect the hidden
variables carried by the photon....if polarizers were either ideal
or identical then this could be ignored. But it is not clear to us
that the polarizers are either ideal or identical....it is easy
to conceive that the polarizer could randomly mix a well-ordered
set of hidden variables to change a LHVT result into a quantum
result."77
The possibility of selective polarizers has also been mentioned in
ryO
several papers. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the LHV
physicist decided that this possibility was not at all plausible,
and they made the assumption that this proposal was false.
The other loophole which I shall discuss has become known as
the 'timing proposal'. It first appeared in Bell's original paper
on LHV, published in 196^:
"Conceivably, Cthe QM predictions^ might only apply to experiments
in which the settings of the instruments are made sufficiently in
advance to allow them to reach some mutual rapport by exchange of
signals with velocity less than or equal to that of light. In that
connection, experiments....in which the settings of the instruments
are changed during the flight of the particles, are crucial."79
Expressed in rather loose terms, the timing proposal suggests the
following. If an experimenter sets up his apparatus, and then goes
for a coffee break, the photon source might, in some unknown way,
'learn' the settings of the polarizers. Knowing this, the source
could then adjust the polarizations of the each photon pair which
it emits, in such a way that the results would appear to show that
QM was correct. Even if the experimenter takes a very short coffee
break, the source would still have plenty of time, since this
information might be transmitted at the speed of the light. To
avoid this, the experimenter would have to wait until the photon
source had 'read' the polarizer settings, and had sent out a pair
of photons with suitable properties; then, while the photons are
in flight (but before they arrive at the polarizers) he would alter
the polarizer settings so that the photons would no longer be
specially prepared for what they would meet. This alteration would
have to be done extremely rapidly, since it must take place in
less time than it takes light to travel a few centimetres. Since
none of the existing experiments incorporated this 'timing' element,
physicists had to assume that the timing proposal was false if their
experiments were to be considered conclusive tests of LHV.
Let us compare the plausibility of the selective apparatus
and timing proposals at an early stage in the LHV activity. At first
sight, the timing proposal might seem to be more important, since
it was mentioned in the very first LHV paper. The selective apparatus
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proposal did not appear in print until 1969» five years later.
However, it would be wrong to give much weight to this argument,
since the 1969 paper in question was essentially the first to take
up Bell's work. In terms of the historical development of LHV,
the two papers represent the first and second stages of the work.
It is also significant that the timing proposal is not mentioned
in this 1969 paper.
Another paper, published in 1971» discusses both proposals,
describing them as
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"manoeuvres available to the advocate of LHV theories."
The selective apparatus proposal is dealt with in 3^ lines, and the
timing proposal in 9 lines. Both are effectively dismissed, without
being shown to be invalid. In each case, possible future tests of
the proposal are briefly mentioned.
In 197^> 311 important review paper discussed both these proposals,
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and again both were given similar treatment. That is, the existence
of these criticisms was acknowledged, as was the possibility, in
principle, of more definitive tests at some later date, though no
details of such tests were given. The authors concluded that in the
absence of such ideal tests, assumptions were necessary in the existing
experiments, but in view of the rather extreme nature of these two
criticisms, such assumptions were* plausible.
It would therefore seem that neither proposal was taken very
seriously at this stage, and certainly neither was believed to make
existing experiments pointless. As we have seen, most experimenters
began to feel that LHV had been given a fair trial, and had been
found wanting. Although improved experiments were possible, most
people did not themselves wish to invest the time and effort
needed to perform them:
"Certainly, questions on the polarizers and on the nonlocality,
those sorts of things are details that one can take a look at. My
feeling is that those experiments aren't going to be particularly
productive. We've looked for the obvious conflict in the obvious way,
and we've resolved that."
Despite the apparent symmetry in the early attitudes to the two
proposals, circumstances have now changed. An experiment is being
planned which will test the timing proposal, whereas no-one is
planning to test the selective apparatus proposal. What effect has
this had on physicists' attitudes to the two proposals? What effect,
if any, have the existing results had?
I shall begin with the selective apparatus proposal. Since it
argues that pieces of apparatus, such as polarizers, may be governed
by LHVs which can ^\ter the behaviour of photons, it is possible that
different types of polarizers might have different sorts of hidden
variables and hence might have different effects on the photons.
After all, our notions of sameness and difference are closely
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related to our theoretical ideas about the way apparatus behaves .
It is interesting to note that in the low-energy photon experiments,
two different types of polarizers were used. Most groups used a
pile of eleven to fifteen glass plates, all aligned at a special
angle, while one group used calcite prisms - that is, crystalline
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blocks. What is even more interesting is that the experiment which
used calcites was Holt's experiment'. This was listed by Clauser as
one of the 'possibly significant* differences betweex. Holt's
experiment and Clauser's later 'partial replication'.
However, when interviewees were asked why no-one had tested
the possibility that calcite polarizers are somehow special (a
possibility which is perfectly consistent with the 'selective
apparatus' proposal) I was told that this idea was completely
implausible:
"It is intriguing why the calcite experiment doesn't agree with
QM, but I don't think it directs you to wondering if there's some
significant difference between calcite crystals and piles of plates"
It is important for the argument which follows to note that the most
common reason for rejecting this possibility was that we know of
no mechanism which would permit this special property of calcite
polarizers to appear:
"Essentially, we know how polarizers work."
"It's hard to see how the type of polarizer can affect it."
"Every physicist believes that polarizers work in the way they're
supposed to work."
Thus it is clear that the plausibility of the selective apparatus
proposal has not increased in recent years. Holt's experiment could
be interpreted as providing some empirical support for the proposal,
O
but the LHV physicists have chosen not to interpret it in this way. ■
Let us now turn to the timing proposal. Aspect, a French
physicist, proposed a polarization correlation experiment in 1976
which would incorporate a rapid switching device, allowing a test of
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the timing proposal. When we consider the earlier comments about
the implausibility of timing, it should come as no surprise to
find that Aspect's proposed experiment did not revolutionize the
field. Most people felt that LHV had effectively been ruled out
already, and did not think it likely that Aspect would find a
violation of QM:
"Aspect's chance of success is pretty small. The LHV issue is
pretty well settled now."
"If Aspect did get a hidden variable result, no-one will believe
him, until it's done again, independently, by several people."
Published comments, though more restrained, generally managed to
combine an acknowledgement of the existence of assumptions with a
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fairly emphatic claim that LHV was already ruled out. For example,
Clauser and Shimony discuss Aspect's experiment, and conclude:
"Despite our caution concerning the assumptions, we regard the
experimental refutation which relies upon them to he compelling....
Although further experimental investigations are desirable, _we are
tentatively convinced that no theory of this kind ^i.e. LHVT] can
correctly describe the physical world."®''7
Aspect's proposed experiment did not lead other physicists to
persist with LHV work. Interviewe'es spoke of the need to decide how
best to invest their time; to them, other areas were more likely
to be fruitful than testing timing. Nevertheless, their attitude
to Aspect himself was one of tolerance. After all, to many outsiders
the entire LHV activity was pointless since QM was 'bound to be
correct'. Many LHV experimenters had encountered such attitudes, and
they themselves, perhaps because of this, were more charitable
towards Aspect.
"The only inevitable decision for a scientist is what to do next
....where to invest your time. And if you invest your time in one
place it doesn't mean that you condemn anything else as not worthy
of investigation. It just means that's where you think your talents
will be fruitful."
"I'd be very surprised if the timing experiment gave a different
result, but I suppose it's worth doing, just to close one small
loophole."
"Aspect's is the only remaining significant step that seems feasible."
Aspect himself does not claim that his experiment is likely to
produce startling results, but by filling a logical loophole it may
serve a useful purpose. In his published proposal, he says:
"Such a feature has been considered a crucial one by quite a few
workers in the field, and therefore such experiments are worth
doing."®®
While this proposed experiment has not led physicists to expect
timing to be correct, it seems clear that it has made physicists
willing to tolerate such an experiment. In a sense, the fact that a
competent physicist is willing to test the timing proposal has led
to a general acknowledgment that the proposal is at least plausible
enough to be worth testing. Aspect certainly feels that attitudes to
timing have been changed by his efforts:
"In Bell's first paper, he says that [a timing experiment] would be
a crucial [test3 ....When I began to think about these things, people
had written about timing, but they'd written very little....I very
quickly realized that the next step in these experiments was timing.
Then I reread earlier papers more carefully, and I found sometimes
one sentence, or perhaps nothing, or a footnote, where people said,
'Ah, perhaps there is a problem here; perhaps one could think about
timing.' Today, everyone says 'now the next step is the experiment
with timing.'"°9
It must be conceded that, in their published comments, physicists
have always encouraged further experiments. Without wishing to
classify such comments as mere lip-service, I would still maintain
that Aspect's efforts have altered attitudes. For example,
published comments have continued to mention the existence of the
'selective apparatus' proposal, yet interviewees were strongly
critical of the notion of experimentally comparing two different
types of polarizers on the ground that there was no known mechanism
which could lead to different behaviour in the two types.
Equally, however, no-one has ever explained how. apparatus could
achieve the 'mutual rapport' hypothesized in the timing proposal,
and no mechanism has ever been produced which could explain how
signals could be sent from one piece of apparatus to another.
When I pointed this out in interviews, I was chastized for being
intolerant:
"That's not the way you play this game. You're allowed to invent
any mechanism which would make the thing go, so you're really not
playing by the ground rules if you make that objection."
"You're not required to give a mechanism until you can see an
effect Ci.e. a violation of QM~]. Then people would get busy trying
to find out some way to explain it. But if the experiment is not
outrageously difficult, it seems worth doing it whether you have
a mechanism or not."
Aspect has not yet completed his timing experiment, though he
has very recently completed a 'conventional' LHV experiment, with
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results 'in excellent agreement' with the QM predictions. If
his timing experiment were to disagree with QM, I would suggest that
his result will not be believed. Whether or not Aspect's competence
would be called into question would depend on the details of his
experimental procedure and the manner in which he presents his results.
As we have seen with H°lt and Faraci, such factors (which are largely
under the experimenter's own control) can markedly affect the outcome.
Regardless of his presentation, timing is unlikely to be accepted.
In other words, Aspect may have made timing plausible enough to
be testable, but not plausible enough to be considered true on the
lo7
basis of one new experimental result.
On the other hand, if Aspect's timing experiment were to agree
with QM, its reception would present no difficulties. Indeed, I
would suggest that if this outcome occurs, then in future retrospective
reviews, Aspect's experiment will be placed in its 'proper' order,
in what will seem a logical sequence starting with Bell's original
paper in 196^, and tracing the 'development' of the timing proposal
through the various footnotes and. single sentences which Aspect
mentioned. In other words, in line with the normal rhetorical style
of scientific papers, it will be made to seem that the timing proposal
was always plausible; that until it was tested no-one could be sure
whether LHV was correct or not; and that it was conclusively
falsified by Aspect's experiment. It is in this way that the
plausibility structure of physics is continually reinforced and
redefined.
Consensus and Cultural Context.
In this chapter, I have examined the role of culture in
defining plausibility, and so influencing the reception of new
knowledge claims. Yet it is clear from previous chapters that not
all scientists who work on FQM share the same culture. There are,
for example, methodological differences between specialties, which
lead to different evaluations of interpretations of QM.
In my treatment of LHV, I have talked in general terms about
the attitudes of 'the LHV group' towards Holt, Faraci, and Aspect.
This rather monolithic approach is, I feel, justifiable, since I
can find no major cases of disagreement over the reception of the
work of these three people. However, it is important to stress that
this consensus was not inevitable, but is a contingent empirical
finding. In this section, I shall point out the limits of this
consensus, and shall consider the implications of a breakdown in
consensus.
When we examined the LHV physicists' analysis of the assumptions
underlying the experiments, we found that terms such as 'reasonable'
(and antonyms such as 'bizarre' and 'pathological') featured
prominently in both published statements and interviews. We also saw
that physicists found it difficult to articulate more fully what
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they meant by these terms. Such terms seem to operate as references
to a shared culture, to 'what everyone knows'. Since many specific
cultural elements are utilized in evaluating a specific proposal
as 'reasonable' or 'unreasonable', it is difficult to explain
clearly what these terms mean. Fortunately, in this particular
case, the LHV group were able to agree on what was reasonable.
Obviously, not all physicists would agree in all cases about
the reasonableness of a particular proposal, and this applied even
within the LHV group. I shall quote an example. Many attempts were
made to produce the weakest possible assumption in order to strengthen
the force of the empirical data against possible LHV counter -
examples. In 197^, Bell produced an analysis which required, as its
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basic assumption, that experimenters have free will. This analysis
was criticised by Shimony, Home and Glauser on the grounds that:
"it would not be legitimate....£fco relyO on a metaphysics which
has not been proved and which may well be false."92
These authors then propose another assumption, and claim:
"our contention is that (our assumption] is more reasonable,
though we do not pretend to offer a definitive proof nor do we
think that one can be given."99
Although they concede that their claim cannot be proved, they
provide a number of reasons in support of it. They argue that their
assumption is more reasonable because it is specific rather than
general; it makes weaker demands; and it postulates no unknown
mechanisms. All that they assume is the absence of 'conspiracies',
94.
of the type best exemplified by 'Maxwell's Demon'. They justify
this assumption on the grounds that to deny its validity is to make
science impossible. All scientific activity is based on the assumption
that the natural world is passive and is not actively trying to
deceive us.
Here we see the major difficulty involved in using a term like
'reasonableness' . Shimony, Home and Glauser's supporting arguments
are no more independent than their use of reasonableness. For just
as individuals may disagree over what is reasonable, so they may
also disagree over what constitutes a 'weak' assumption, and over
the value of particular criteria such as specificity and generality.
In other words, it is not possible to enforce consensus by appeals
to reasonableness. Shimony and his colleagues seem to realise this,
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since their assumption is justified not on ontological grounds
(appealing to what the world must be like) but on explicitly
methodological grounds (appealing to what scientific investigation
must be like).
Bell was not convinced by their arguments. In a reply, he wrote
"I do not agree that l!myj assumption... .is an unreasonable one."^
He rejected the methodological argument:
"A theory may appear in which....conspiracies may occur....I wiling
not refuse to listen, either on methodological or other grounds,"
although he adds
97
"but I will not myself try to make such a theory."
This disagreement was not a violent one, nor did it have any
important bearing on the interpretation of the LHV experiments.
As Home put it:
"We'll never revive Cthis argument! because we don't really disagree
about anything..... it' s not worth pursuing....we might have some
differing opinions on whether this assumption or that assumption
is more plausible, but I think we agree essentially."98
This was not the only case in which consensus among LHV
physicists broke down. Consider Aspect's 'timing' experiment.
Although most physicists felt that the experiment was worth doing,
roughly two-thirds of those involved in my questionnaire survey
felt that it was possible 'to draw definite conclusions about LHVT'
in the absence of such further experiments; one-third disagreed.
When asked about the sort of experiments which would be required
before a completely conclusive case could be made against LHV (a
question which invited a rather precise, if not pedantic, reply)
only two-thirds of the LHV physicists felt that Aspect's experiment,
together with the use of more efficient detectors (to rule out
biased selection) would definitively settle the issue. I do not
think this implies that existing experiments are not persuasive;
it simply indicates that loopholes remain and opinions differ about
these loopholes. As one respondent put it:
"These [further! experiments would probably convince everyone but
the most 'far out' people. The existing experiments have already
convinced the sensible people."
It is interesting to note that even these rather limited cases
of disagreement among LHV physicists did not occur until after most
experiments were complete, and most people had ceased to be actively
involved with LHV. This suggests that a distinction can be drawn
between disagreements over major and minor issues. Today, further
debate about the weakest possible assumption, or the sort of experi¬
ment required for a watertight case against LHV, is really rather
trivial and unimportant. In contrast, disagreement in earlier years
over the plausibility of all assumptions, or the validity of Holt's
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result, would have had much more serious effects on the LHV activity.
Perhaps the most important feature of LHV, as far as these physicists
were concerned, was that experimental tests seemed possible. There
would have been little point in delaying such tests until complete
agreement had been reached about the nature of ideal tests. Thus, the
LHV group's common goal - doing experiments - and their shared
cultural background in physics allowed and encouraged them to avoid
dissension until the important experimental work had been done.
There was plenty of time afterwards for individual philosophical
preferences to be expressed.
If the above account is correct, we would expect to find that
other FQM workers, who did not share the orientation of the LHV
group, would not come to the same conclusions about the experiments.
This is indeed what we find.
In Chapter Four, I pointed out that many theorists disagreed
with the whole idea of doing experimental FQM in this way; to them,
itseemed naive and pointless. But this is only one alternative to
the LHV group's own attitude: there are many others, each drawing
different conclusions from the same experiments.
Many authors have argued that the experiments have important
and very general philosophical implications,: the world is apparently
non-local. However, Bohm feels that this result vindicates his own
non-local HVT, a conclusion which the LHV group would certainly not
relish; to Sarfatti this result offers the possibility of faster -
than - light communication, though Bell disagrees with this; Ballentine
claims that, like the Michelson-Morley experiment, this result is
likely to lead to a full-scale conceptual revolution, with an outcome
as yet unknown, while Stapp is much more sure about the outcome,
arguing that we need a Whiteheadian 'process' view of reality.
Augelli claims that an acceptance of QM means a rejection of realism
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and rationalism, while Brody and de la Pena argue that the experiments
have no philosophical implications because their theoretical basis
99is not sound.
Other authors have concentrated on the derivation of the
inequalities which allow discrimination between LHV and QM. Several
theorists have suggested that the role of the apparatus in altering
HV values has been neglected, though these authors do not agree
on what the role of the apparatus actually is."'"(~)<"> Some people have
tried to develop new inequalities which they can then apply to the
existing data, while others see this as a waste of time."^"'" The
experimenters themselves do not agree about the implications of
their results for the status of QM. For example, Fry and Holt told
me that, as far as they were concerned, the results confirm their
belief that QJM is a good theory. More philosophically-oriented
LHV physicists, such as Bell and Glauser, feel that there are still
many problems with QM, although LHV is clearly not the solution
to these problems.
The Possibility of Alternative Outcomes.
Throughout the analysis of the LHV activity presented in this
and the preceding chapter, I have questioned the idea that these
events followed an inevitable, unproblematic or 'natural' sequence;
instead, I argued that the actual outcome which we observe was
highly dependent on the context in which that outcome was shaped.
It may be useful to supplement these arguments by discussing
hypothetical situations in which, given a slightly different
context, the outcome of events might be quite different. Obviously,
any discussion of how things might have turned out in different
circumstances must be speculative, and the reader must judge the
plausibility of any particular speculation for himself. Nevertheless,
this approach may be useful in helping to indicate the problematic,
and often rather fragile, nature of actual outcomes.
As an example, consider the assumptions required for the experi¬
ments. We have already seen that the assumptions cannot be justified
in absolute terms, but because the LHV group happened to share common
goals and a common cultural background, the assumptions remained
relatively uncontentious. Nevertheless, if there had been a thriving
XIX
group of LHV theorists who had wished to challenge the assumptions,
at the risk of being labelled 'obsessive', it is difficult to see
how appeals to 'reasonableness' would have quelled them, since by-
definition they would not have held the same views as the LHV
group about what was or was not reasonable. We may also speculate
about what might have happened if the high-energy experiment carried
out by Kasday's group had disagreed with Freedman and Glauser's
low-energy experiment. These experiments required quite different
assumptions, and earlier in this chapter I pointed out that the
high-energy group did not readily concede that their assumption was
markedly stronger. Since the results agreed, there was no dissension,
but if the results had disagreed I would suggest that the relative
plausibility of the high and low energy assumptions would have
become a matter of much debate.
Let us turn now to Holt's experiment. As I pointed out in
Chapter Five, Holt could have chosen to publish his results and
even to have defended them. In the present chapter, I have indicated
a number of ways in which the hypothetical 'determined advocate
of LHV' could have attacked the arguments used to reject Holt's
result. It is not inconceivable that Holt, or someone else in his
position, might have employed such tactics to defend a result in
favour of LHV. For example, it is interesting to speculate about
what would have happened if Clauser (who initially hoped to disprove
QM) had obtained Holt's results, and vice versa. Clauser himself
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suggested that they might then have been 'at each other's throats'.
If Holt's experiment had been performed by someone who
5~
aggreSively defended its validity, this might well have led to a
quite different style of debate and a different sequence of events.
Of course, it is difficult to argue that such a change would affect
the results obtained in (say) Fry's experiment. But it might easily
have prolonged the debate over LHV, and prompted different experiments,
such as an examination of the difference (if any) between calcite
and piles-of-plates polarizers.
The differences between these hypothetical outcomes and the actual
outcome are not altogether trivial. A defender of Holt's result
might well have put forward a whole range of hypotheses, 'ad hoc' or
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otherwise, to explain the apparent clash between the rival experi¬
ments, and these hypotheses might have led to further experiments
and, possibly, surprising results.
To quote an example which has some basis in actual events, Holt
was contacted by Nick Herbert, who runs an 'alternative science'
institution in California. Herbert's group, like Sarfatti's, is
closely involved in the parapsychology movement, and he expressed
an interest in Holt's result and its implications. Holt chose not
to follow up this contact; indeed, Pipkin told me that one reason
why they were reluctant to publish their results was because they
did not wish to encourage such unorthodox groups, who might
exaggerate the significance of Holt's results. If Holt had been
willing to invoke parapsychological factors to account for his
anomalous results, the involvement of such groups would be classed
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by some observers as anything but trivial. ^
Faraci's group, and their reaction to their own result,
provides us with a real example of the defence of an unorthodox
resulto Admittedly, the defence is rather weak (though, again,
other arguments than those actually used are possible) and the
hostile reception of this work may suggest that Holt was sensible in
following his chosen course of action. Here, too, though, other
possible outcomes exist. Faraci's group could have obtained a more
favourable reception for their results. Many of the reasons
suggested by interviewees for calling Faraci incompetent involve
factors which could have been altered, such as Faraci's incorrect
claim that his result agreed with Kasday's, and the lack of detail
in the published account of Faraci's experiment. The fact that the
Italian group relied on theoretical analysis rather than empirical
checks for some of their conclusions is not itself a sign of
incompetence. Holt similarly checked some possible sources of
systematic error by theoretical analysis whereas Clauser, in his
'replication', checked them empirically. Yet Holt managed to emerge
with his professional reputation intact. One reason for this, as
Holt himself said, was that he not only checked many possible sources
of error, but made it very clear, in his written reports, that he
had done so. In Faraci's case, many details about their experiment
were first explained, in a foreign language, at the 1976 conference.
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Putting it crudely, their techniques of image management could
have been better.
Thus I do not think it was inevitable that Faraci and his
colleagues would be judged to be incompetent. Holt's own case
refutes the argument that a result in favour of LHV is an unequivocal
sign that the experimenter is incompetent.
Let us turn now to the different fates of the 'timing' and
'selective apparatus' proposals. 'The evidence presented earlier
suggests that the different status of these proposals at the present
time results not so much from differences in their inherent quality
as hypotheses (if such a thing could be defined) as from the
contingent fact that a physicist has chosen to test one of them and
no physicist has chosen to test the other. I would therefore suggest
that if some apparently sane and competent physicist were to postulate
that different types of polarizers may contain different hidden
variables, and sets out to test this proposal, then he will get the
same sort of subdued but tolerant reception which Aspect received.
Physicists would not say publicly that he was crazy, since they
themselves drew attention to the assumption which has to be made
if we wish to neglect the possibility of selective apparatus.
Undoubtedly, though, they would wonder about his professional
judgement, because there seem to be much more profitable ways to
spend one's time than testing this rather strange idea. Needless
to say, although they might tolerate such an experiment, they would
not think it likely that any surprising results would emerge.
This, then, is another possible alternative to the actual outcome.
Irrespective of whether the results of such an experiment agree
with the QM prediction, there is an important difference between
neglecting a hypothesis (or rejecting it tacitly or explicitly on
grounds of plausibility) and actually testing that hypothesis
experimentally. If my argument is correct, then the fact that one
outcome rather than another actually occurred is a result of
purely contingent sociological features of this activity.
Extending the above arguments to their limit, we arrive at
the claim that a 'determined advocate of LHV' could continue to
defend his viewpoint even today. As far as I can see, there is nothing
in the rules of logic, or in the operation of human psychological
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processes, which would prevent anyone from claiming either that
all the results in favour of QM are wrong, or (a weaker and more
defensible claim) that Holt's experiment is, in some important
sense, different from all the others. If these experiments had been
performed in a context in which LHV was the dominant theory, such
a defence would be more likely to occur and, with sufficient
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ingenuity, LHV might have been defended indefinitely.
Given the actual context in which these experiments took place,
it is not at all surprising that the defence of the hypothetical
advocate of LHV is not taken seriously. I certainly do not wish to
claim that it should be taken seriously. Within the existing culture
of physics, into which the LHV group (as well as myself) had been
socialized, LHV now seems totally implausible. The important point
is that the assessment of plausibility and the evaluation of
knowledge-claims has relatively little to do with logical axioms and
deductive reasoning; it is a complex judgemental process which
cannot be isolated from the cultural context in which it occurs.
Conclusions.
In this rather lengthy chapter, I have presented a great deal
of evidence which provides strong support for a number of general
conclusions.
In the first place, I have examined a number of beliefs held
by the LHV group, concerning the acceptability of the assumptions,
the invalidity of Holt's and Faraci's experiments, the invalidity
of LHV and the status of the 'timing' and 'selective apparatus'
proposals. Although such beliefs seem well-founded, I have tried
to show that they were not arrived at by a process of logical
deduction, but by reference to the general culture of physics and
the local culture of the LHV activity. The grounds on which their
apparent certainty is based are ultimately conventional. In making
this claim, part of my argument was to show that it is possible to
render such beliefs problematic, and to propose defensible alternative
beliefs. This argument, therefore, provides evidence in favour of
relativism. However, I do not believe that a full-blooded defence
of relativism, on ontological or epistemological grounds, is either
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necessary or helpful. The methodological utility of a relativist
approach to the sociology of science is, I world argue, its main
value.
In other words, having established in principle that the actual
outcome of the LHV activity was not predetermined by the constraints
of the natural world, it is then possible to ask meaningful, and
rather important, questions about the features of this activity
which did cause the actual outcome. One approach to such questions
is speculation about other possible outcomes; by considering the
factors which might lead to such alternative outcomes, we can begin
to identify some of the crucial elements which helped to determine
the actual outcome. Another approach is to examine 'deviant'
subgroups who drew different conclusions from the LHV activity, and
to investigate the differences (in sociological terms) between such
subgroups and the 'mainstream' LHV group. A third possibility is
to present LHV physicists with a deviant proposal, and to examine
the accounts which they give to justify their rejection of such a
view.
By using all these methods, we can gain a great deal of
information about the determinants of the LHV outcome. It seems
clear, for instance, that the acceptability of the assumptions
underlying the experiments depended crucially on the fact that the
LHV group shared common goals and a common culture, which allowed
them to distinguish between 'relevant' and 'irrelevant' features
of the experiments, and 'plausible' and 'implausible' counter-
objections, in a manner which they found hard to articulate.
However, agreement over the allocation of reasonableness cannot be
enforced, and other observers, who held different methodological
preferences and who did not share the cultural background of
experimental physics, did not always agree about the status of the
assumptions. It is perhaps fortunate that the LHV activity, being
almost wholly experimental, offered little scope for active
involvement on the part of anyone who did not adhere to the
experimental methodology.
When we turn to the assessment of Holt's and Faraci's experi¬
ments, we again see that the rejection of these results was framed
in terms of a cultural context which, among other things, provided
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a set of expectations about 'proper' behaviour, and provided a
plausibility structure in terms of which novel ideas were evaluated.
However, this shared cultural background did not wholly predetermine
the outcome. Individual physicists, such as Holt, were free to
choose whether to accept or challenge the conventional plausibility
structure.But rejecting convention is risky, as Holt was well
aware and as Faraci's case demonstrates. Holt's decision to reject
his own result was itself a serious blow to the plausibility of any
heterodox conclusion - indeed, one might argue that Holt's rejection
of his result was as much a cause of the implausibility of LHV
as it was an effect of the implausibility of LHV.
Aspect's case suggests that, by their choice of actions,
individual physicists can actively modify the plausibility structure.
It is certainly not true that individuals simply respond passively
to the constraints imposed on them by their culture. Another
(complementary) conclusion which can be drawn from this case-study
is that although the natural world does not limit us to one unique
set of conclusions to be drawn from empirical evidence, the social
world (culture) effectively imposes rather tight boundaries on the
range of conclusions which will be seen as plausible. In the abstract,
socially-defined conventions may seem much weaker constraints
on beliefs than the claim that reality constrains belief. However,
the social world is very real and very 'hard' when seen from a
member's viewpoint, so that we are very far from the position of




In this chapter, I will draw together the main conclusions
which can be drawn from the data presented in this thesis. I
shall also relate these conclusions to the findings of other
empirical studies, and I shall discuss the relationship of these
empirical results to the theoretical framework on which this thesis
is based. Finally, I shall examine a general model of scientists'
response to experiments; after criticising this model, I shall adapt
it to bring it into conformity with my empirical findings.
Science and the Wider Cultural Context.
In Chapter Three, I examined the development of QM within two
different cultural contexts. I was unable to confirm the claim that
QM's formalism was affected by the cultural context of Weimar Germany;
however, I concluded that the direction pursued by physicists, their
willingness to entertain acausal notions, and their presentation
of QM as an acausal theory, may well have been influenced by their
cultural milieu. Similarly, Soviet physicists' interpretations of QM
(again, not the formalism itself) were adapted to meet the constraints
of their social context.
The similarities between these two contexts seem to me to be
more important than the differences. Although the nature of the
external influences were different, I do not think it is reasonable
to conclude, as Born and Heisenberg did, that Weimar physicists
were doing 'good' science while Soviet physicists were doing 'bad'
science. Such conclusions say at least as much about the observer's
own political position as they do about QM. Thus, a clear-cut
distinction between external and internal influences on scientific
activity is neither a sound basis for evaluating the products of
that activity, nor a useful element of historical methodology.
Turning now to the use of scientific concepts in other
subcultures, we have seen how elements of QM, such as complementarity
and indeterminism, are employed in contexts outside science, as
rhetorical resources used to support a particular position. The
same element of QM can be used to support diametrically opposite
views. Persons who adopt such tactics seem to hold the view that
scientific knowledge can be extended unproblomatica]ly into other
areas almost by a process of simple extrapolation.
However, the evidence suggests that such extensions involve
not only careful choice of the 'relevant' aspects of QM from the
totality of the theory (including all its possible interpretations)
but also an active shaping of that aspect in order to present it as
relevant. This creative model of such extensions raises the question
of discriminating between 'valid' and 'invalid' extensions of QM. I
argued that this distinction is meaningless.
This conclusion can of course be interpreted in at least two
ways. Either all extensions are valid (where 'validity' is used
weakly to signify the possibility of constructing many accounts;'
the social utility of such extensions would depend on the context) or
all extensions are invalid (that is, there is no logically necessary
connection between physical theories and theological beliefs). Both
readings are correct, though each may appeal to different readers.
Thus, a study of QM in its cultural context demonstrates not
only how cultural influences may operate on the development of a
physical theory, but also how elements of a physical theory may
be applied to contexts outside physics. I have also suggested that
evaluative concepts such as 'validity' cannot be applied unequivocally
to either sort of interaction.
Other studies of the relationship between science and culture
are in broad agreement with these findings , and therefore provide
support for the theoretical framework described in Chapter One.
As well as providing support for these general ideas, QM also has
three important advantages as a case-study. First, this single theory
provides evidence concerning cultural effects on science and
cultural utilisation of science. Second, the theory has been used
to support, not just one or two, but a very wide range of (conflicting)
views, so that the role of the theory (as a resource, not as a
source of logical deductions) is made manifest. Third, and perhaps
most important, the case of QM may help us to clarify the precise
nature of the interaction between science and culture. It is very
easy to claim that 'science is part of the cultural context*,
without specifying in any way the means by which culture, as it were,
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'gets into' apparently esoteric activities like physics, which
seem to he motivated by internal technical criteria. Similarly, we
may inquire how it is that a scientific theory which, in its own
area of application, may yield precise unequivocal predictions,
can be used to support a variety of often conflicting views about
non-scientific issues.
In QM, largely for contingent historical reasons, interpretation
has remained distinct from formalism; indeed, interpretation has
continued to be a focus of debate long after the formalism was
agreed. Chapter Two illustrated the many ways in which the physical
implications of the formalism could be interpreted. It should not
surprise us to find that an even greater range of conclusions can
be drawn concerning QM's implications for other fields.
Thus, the suggestion is that, although QM may be atypical in
its overt differentiation between formalism and interpretation, other
scientific theories can, in principle, be analyzed in the same way.
The 'interpretation' component is negotiable in rather obvious ways.
Here, then, is an aspect of scientific theories which allows culture
to 'get in', and which admits of exploitation outside science in
a multitude of ways. I do not wish to imply that other parts of
scientific theories - the formalism, or the 'core' - are immune
from external cultural influences. In Chapter Two, we saw that some
critics of QM feel that the formalism itself should be modified. In
Chapter Three, I even argued that an entire alternative theory to
QM might be possible. Nevertheless, it seems to be the case that
scientists routinely try to construct and maintain boundaries
between those aspects of science which are 'properly' the subject of
public debate, and those aspects which are considered to be internally
determined. Further studies of this boundary maintenance, and the
2
social processes which underlie it, would be very welcome.
Social and Cognitive Structure of FQjyi.
In Chapter Four, it was found that FQM is a rather fragmented
field, in both sociological and cognitive terms. These two aspects
seem to be interrelated. The absence of an organised system of
training, communication and rewards makes it difficult for cognitive
consensus to emerge; at the same time, the absence of a common
theoretical and methodological framework hampers the formation of
such a social system. The contrast with the development of LHV,
discussed in Chapter Five, helps to emphasise these points. LHV
seems to have followed a fairly typical pattern of growth, as
described by other students of scientific specialties. The rest of
FQM does not seem to have progressed beyond the initial stage, with
a variety of often-conflicting"perspectives and little communication.
l\
Indeed, it may betest;to describe FQM as a 'failed field' rather
than as a field which is 'stuck' at the first stage of development.
Mulkay, for example, admits that the "early stages of growth can only
be recognized retrospectively".-^ Since areas such as FQM are, by
definition, nebulous and therefore difficult for sociologists to
£
study (or detect ), such areas may be more common in science than
7
we at present realize.
In Chapter Four, I also discussed the role of methodology in
disputes in FQM. Methodological differences between FQjM workers
reflect the variety of origins of such workers, and seem to be one
of the main causes of the lack of communication between disputants.
To this extent, my findings agree with those of Pinch. However, I
criticised Pinch's use of 'arithmomorphism' and related concepts.
This usage, like those of complementarity cited earlier, seems to
imply that conflict was somehow inevitable. It ignores the negotia¬
bility of descriptive terms which we have encountered in this thesis.
My alternative account of disputes in FQM rests on two general
principles. One is that actors, who may fundamentally differ on matters
such as methods and goals, may choose to frame their attacks on
their opponents in terms of other issues, as a way of legitimising
their position. This seems to have been the role of von Neumann's
proof in the rejection of Bohm's theory.
The second principle is that meanings are constructed by
practice. The disputed 'cognitive object', such as the Bohm-Bub
theory, has a different epistemological status for each participant
in the dispute. This status reflects the participants' views about
what one ought to do with the cognitive object.
Of course, the existence of fundamental differences in method¬
ology or perception does not imply that disputes in FQM can never
be resolved. 'Incommensurability' should not be taken to mean that
opponents are wholly unable to communicate because of psychological
blocks. Bell, for instance, managed to explain why Bohm's theory was
unaffected by von Neumann's theorem, and Bell's account is perfectly
meaningful to both Bohm and contemporary axiomatists. However, the
existence of different methodologies means that it is often difficult
in practice for opponents to appreciate each other's point of view,
and these differences are unlikely to be resolved simply by polite
discourse. More fundamental shifts in goals or methods would
normally be required.
Social Context and Scientific Practice.
It should not be thought that sociological accounts of science
are only relevant for a study of controversies. One of the aims
of Chapter Five was to indicate the socially-regulated nature of
routine scientific activity. In a sense, this point is obvious: the
existence of regulatory mechanisms (such as the refereeing system)
and stylistic conventions (for example, in writing scientific papers)
are well-known. The normative view of science presents a picture of
a social activity which is governed by ethical as well as behavioural
e-
rules. Viewed from within this persepctive, some of my findings are
not unexpected. For example, the LHV workers were clearly aware of
the conventions of scientific writing, and they presented accounts
of their actions which referred to general procedures, such as the
'proper' response to an anomalous experiment.
However, I went on to argue that the normative perspective
does not in fact provide a fully satisfactory account of FQM. For
example, it does not adequately deal with the element of choice which
I believe was present at many points in the LHV activity. Physicists
chose to become involved in LHV because they judged it to be advan¬
tageous, given their particular social location. Similarly, their
style of presentation, with a strong contrast drawn between LHV
and all other FQM, cannot be completely justified by the 'facts';
LHV was not devoid of theoretical assumptions, despite the rhetoric
about 'decisiveness'. However, such behaviour is perfectly understand¬
able given the particular historical and social context of FQM,
and the sociological reasons for the desire to differentiate
between LHV and other FQM.
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When we examine the response to Holt's experiment, a similar
picture emerges. In the case of Holt's own response, there was a
clear concern with 'making out' - that is, behaving in a way which
seemed, to offer the best possible outcome from Holt's personal viewpoint.
Holt was also keenly aware of the constraints and opportunities
presented to him by his local social context. We could if we wished
describe his response in terms of general 'rules' dealing with
'how one should respond to anomalous results'. But this would
certainly miss a great deal of the detail of Holt's behaviour; it
would also lead us to neglect the existaice of choice. Faraci's
case demonstrates clearly that, in a similar position, other options
existed.
An account of Fry's and Glauser's response in terms of rules
governing the reaction to anomaly again seems to miss the point. Not
all anomalous results generate practice. These physicists had to
choose to classify Holt's result as the sort of anomaly for which
further investigation was appropriate before it made sense for
them to describe their response in terms of empiricist norms. These
norms, then, were a way of characterising their actions for
rhetorical purposes, to help Fry to get a grant and. to help Glauser
g
fulfil his aim of raising the status of this field. The norms
did not govern their actions, except in a very weak sense - namely,
having chosen to portray their actions as an experimental investigation
of an anomaly, Glauser and Fry had to follow the normal convention¬
alised procedures of experimentation and presentation of results.
In Chapter Six, I also examined the methodological prescriptions
made by some LHV physicists, and I argued that these prescriptions,
together with the 'success' of the LHV activity, altered the social
context in which non-empirical FQM workers operated. Here, too, we
saw a range of responses, with some people proposing experiments
and others attacking the experimental methodology as 'naive'.
This seems to be another example of scientists altering their
public statements, and to some extent their practice, in response
to a changing social context. We can also see here the other side of
the interaction between science and its social context: not only does
the social context set limits on actions, it can also be affected
by actions - in this case, those of the LHV group.
Plausibility and the Evaluation of Knowledge.
In Chapter Six, I examined, the content of science, and the
ways in which scientific knowledge is evaluated. This might he
considered to he the most important part of this study. After all,
if the content of science is immune from social processes, and is
generated and evaluated according to wholly impartial criteria, then
social processes are, in an important sense, quite trivial - 'truth
will out'.
I examined a number of cognitive issues in the LHV activity, and
argued that the validity or invalidity of theories, assumptions, and
experiments, is evaluated by drawing on elements of the culture of
physics. I used the term 'plausibility structure' to refer to the
evaluative framework which is part of each physicist's culture, and
which helps him to classify hypotheses as 'reasonable', 'likely',
'pathological', and so on.
By examining situations in which consensus broke down, I
concluded that labelling a hypothesis as 'unreasonable' does not
enforce consensus; it simply demonstrates the labeller's own
preconceptions, assumptions and preferences - in short, his own
plausibility structure. Non-experimental Fcp workers have a different
plausibility structure, so it is not surprising that they disagree
about the cognitive status, as well as the methodological utility,
of the LHV activity.
As with scientists' behaviour, so with their beliefs; we should
not conclude that any belief is acceptable just because social,
rather than purely empirical, factors, are involved in evaluation.
At any given time, certain theories are judged to be more plausible
than others, just as QM was seen to be more plausible than LHV. We
should therefore not be unduly surprised that QM 'won' the encounter.
However, the fact that social factors are involved makes it possible
for the basis of evaluation to change over time. I argued that Aspect
succeeded in increasing the plausibility of the timing hypothesis,
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at least temporarily.
Moreover, we now have a mechanism to back up the relativist
claim that all knowledge is negotiable <, Relativism does not mean that
all beliefs are negotiable here and now. One of the advantages of
the term 'plausibility' is that it allows us to reconcile the apparent
solidity of our current beliefs with the negotiability of belief
revealed to us in microsociological studies,
Microstudies illustrate the tactics used by scientists to
gain plausibility for their beliefs."^ It can be argued that, if
traced back far enough, all our present beliefs arose from such
processes of negotiation sometime in the past, and that our current
beliefs only seem certain and unshakeable because they are supported
by contemporary social institutions, which act as sources of
credibility and legitimation. Putting it crudely, the plausibility
of a belief, here and now, is a manifestation of the distribution
of power within our knowledge-related institutions at some tine in
the past.
Since the social context is dynamic, accepted beliefs very
quickly cease to be easily comparable with rejected beliefs, because
the former become the basis for future practice, generating new
areas of cognitive development which in turn may modify or support
the accepted beliefs. One form of empirical support for this view
would require two (or more) studies of a particular set of beliefs
at different points in time. Collins has performed such studies, and
his findings provide strong support for this view.^"*" He found that
the existence of high fluxes of gravity waves was never accepted, but
was initially taken seriously enough to be worth discussing and
testing. On the other hand, a few years later,
"The existence of high fluxes of gravity waves is now literally
incredible. My claim is not that sociology can bring them back, but
that their demise was a social (and political) process."12
Although there is already a great deal of evidence in favour of
13the relativist view , many people seem to find it objectionable
1h.
on an intuitive level. I believe that the concept of plausibility
can help to defuse such objections, by allowing us to acknowledge
the seeming 'hardness' of our current beliefs, while providing a
sociological explanation of this 'hardness'. Social conventions,
after all can be just as hard to break as 'natural laws'. Territorial
boundaries, and the grammatical structure of languages, are two
examples of conventions which, for different reasons, are hard to
change„
Another important advantage of plausibility is that it allows
us to classify different sorts of 'negotiations' in science, and to
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pin down our intuitive feeling that, in a given context, some things
are more negotiable than others. To clarify these issues, it may be
useful to discuss models of negotiation in more detail.
Models of Negotiation.
In his studies of the construction of a laser, the construction
of gravity wave detectors, and the replication of parapsychology
experiments, Collins has developed the concept of negotiation over
15the competence of an experiment. To illustrate this concept, he
l8
constructed a classification grid to describe the attitudes of
scientists to particular experiments (Figure l).
The argument underlying this grid is that actors can in principle
deflect the force of any critical experimental finding by arguing
that the experiment in question is not really measuring the effect
it is supposed to be measuring. Such arguments were in fact found in
both the gravity wave and parapsychology case-studies. These findings
support the view that 'reality', or our interactions with the natural
world, is never, by itself, capable of settling such disputes. A
further conclusion is that sociologists should not use the 'laws
of nature', or empirical evidence, as a way of unproblematically
accounting for the fact that most disputes are eventually settled.
As Collins puts it:
"the originator can argue indefinitely that experiments which claim
to be disconfirmations of his results, are not good replications."^
Nevertheless, there are many areas in science where experimental
results are not treated in this way. These areas are those in which
the phenomenon being tested is universally accepted,, In such areas,
everyone knows what a competent experiment looks like: a competent
experiment produces the 'correct' result. Collins has suggested that
18
in such cases, boxes 2 and ^f- disappear . An example of such a
context is the construction of a laser (Figure 2). Here, instead of
the phenomenon being defined by the outcome of a dispute over the
competence of experiments, we find that the phenomenon, accepted
by everyone, serves as a benchmark against which the competence of
individual experiments (that is, whether or not they 'work') is
assessed.
Such restrictions on negotiation do not weaken the relativist
case; anyone who fails to construct a working laser is always at
Believe in Phenomena under Investigation
YES NO
Find results YES 1. Competent 2. Not competent
consonant with
this belief NO 3. Not competent 4. Competent







Figure 2: Attitudes to Laser Construction (Collins' Model)
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liberty to argue that what he has built is indeed, a working instrument,
but one which is demonstrating a new effect.
Nevertheless, the contrast between figures 1 and 2 is so
striking that we should make an effort to subsume them both within
a more general model of negotiation. Any symbolic representation
which fits on a piece of paper will inevitably be a gross simplifi¬
cation of the real social world. Yet such models may serve useful
heuristic and explanatory functions. We should therefore try to
extend and improve our models whenever possible.
It is clear that figures 1 and 2 do not represent all possible
situations; to some extent, the situations which they depict can be
19considered to lie at opposite ends of a spectrum. This portrayal
is valid regardless of whether we accept a relativist account. For
an empiricist, there are occasions when we are sure of the facts,
occasions when we have no idea who is correct, and other occasions
when at best we have preferences for one side rather than the other.
For a relativist, the variable factor is not truth, or our knowledge
of the natural world, but the degree to which certain beliefs and
practices have become reified and institutionalised. We can describe
this variable factor as 'plausibility'.
The fact that rival theories in a controversy often do not start
off with equal plausibility has the effect of setting practical
limits to the amount of negotiation which is likely to occur. In
my own case-study, I could not help feeling that QM would inevitably
'win', despite my recognition of the relativist argument that:
"there is nothing outside of 'courses of linguistic, conceptual,
and social behaviour' which can affect the outcome of these
arguments."20
The point is, of course, that controversies do not take place
in a vacuum; they are embedded in a wider social and cultural context
with a pre-existing plausibility structure which, despite its
conventional, relative character, is a factor - perhaps a determining
one - in shaping the conduct, duration and outcome of controversies.
It is perhaps understandable that early relativist studies of
science chose to emphasis the negotiability of scientific beliefs,
and to play down factors which restrict these negotiations. It is
an encouraging sign that such limiting factors are now being recognised.
For example, in an introduction to a collection of empirical
papers, Collins writes:
"This interpretative flexibility was the main message of the 'first
stage' of the relativist empirical programme. At the same time the
papers go on to begin what might be called 'the second stage of the
programme' by describing mechanisms which limit interpretative
flexibility and thus allow controversies to come to an end."^
Let us now consider specific proposals for modifying Collins'
graphical representation of controversies, in order to take these
limiting factors into account.
There are at least three factors involved in scientists'
evaluation of an experiment, or of the hypothesis which the experiment
is testing. One is, clearly, the results themselves. It can be
argued that an experimental result is not a truly independent
variable, since the meaning of the result, and its implications
for the hypothesis being tested, require interpretation; theoretical
and other cultural factors are involved in this process. Nevertheless,
there is, I would argue, a sense in which results are fundamental
data in controversies, provided we are careful to discriminate
between 'results' and 'interpretation of results'.
For example, I would not wish to claim that Holt's experiment
proved that QM was wrong, nor that it proved that Holt had made an
error. However, it would be difficult to deny the claim that Holt's
results showed a level of polarization correlation much lower than
that predicted by QM. The distinction, and the point at which we
draw the line between 'raw data' and 'interpretation of data' is a
hazy one, but within any particular context the distinction is not
hard to make. As a methodological rule-of-thumb, we are effectively
dealing with raw data when we reach a description of the results with
22
which all the participants in a dispute would agree
The second factor is what Collins has described as the actors'
belief, or lack of belief in the phenomenon being tested. However,
reference to 'belief' seems rather unhelpful, on several grounds.
The first is the general methodological problem, discussed in
Chapter One, that actors may produce different accounts of their
beliefs in different contexts. Alternative terms such as 'allegiance'
or 'commit«,riirit-' can be more easily defined in behavioural terms.
The second problem is that, in Collins' grid, different actors
hold diametrically opposite committ^n-P;. This yes/no dichotomy is
not only simplistic, in tha+- it does not allow for a range of
opinions, hut it also implies that scientists are deeply committed
to a particular view. While this may he true in full-hlown controversy,
it does not seem to he true for the many uncontroversial areas in
23
science which fit Kuhn's description of 'normal science' . Scientists
may have mild preferences for particular hypotheses, hut when faced
with critical experimental results they may reject that hypothesis,
not because it had heen conclusively disproved, hut because their
commitment to it was not strong. If, on the other hand, the hypothesis
had heen more important to them, they may then have adopted the
strategy of rejecting the experiments which generated the conflicting
results.
Figure 3 illustrates the above arguments in the case of LHV.
Both Holt's experiment, and Freedman and Glauser's, gave clear results,
one in favour of LHV and one in favour of Qjyi. As. described in Chapter
Five, Holt, like Freedman, favoured QM while Clauser held at least
a mild hope that LHV would he confirmed. However, Clauser rejected
his favoured theory when he obtained his results, while Holt
retained his commitmc-n-t to qjv[ and rejected his results. The lack of
symmetry between boxes 2 and 3 might he thought to reflect the
different levels of personal (psychological) commitmami- to the
chosen theory. However, this assymmetry seems more likely to he an
effect of the great difference in plausibility between QM and LHV.
Plausibility, the third factor in my account, is a sociological
variable, referring to the status of a belief within the community
as a whole. Provided the individuals involved have been socialized
into the professional community, we do not need to worry too much
about their individual psychology. Indeed, I would argue that a strong
personal commit me/n't to a hypothesis which exceeds, or conflicts
with, the general cultural commitiperft to that hypothesis (the
plausibility of the hypothesis) is relatively rare in science.
I would therefore wish to replace Collins' grid with a diagram such
as that shown in Figure 4-.
The shaded region represents the vast bulk of scientific
activity in which actors have not personally committed themselves
























Figure Attitudes to experiments
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as one of 'good science' or 'empiricism', with one very important
proviso. The general cultural plausibility of the hypotheses
being tested has still to be taken into account. This may indeed be
a region of 'normal science', but it is not a region in which
scientific activity is immune from social processes. Theory-laden
observation terms are still employed, conventional practices are
still followed, and knowledge is still evaluated in terms of a
culturally-generated plausibility structure.
Thus, a general model of scientists' attitudes to experiments
would have as its axes 'results' and 'plausibility', with the
possibility of a third axis, to represent 'allegiance' or 'commitnrewt' ;
most science, however, would have a co-ordinate near zero on this
third axis. Figure 5 is a tentative attempt to describe science in
this way. Let us consider a few of its main features.
The first point to note is that the diagram is roughly
symmetrical. Experiments which confirm plausible theories and refute
implausible ones are both likely to feature in science textbooks.
Only theories on the extreme left of the diagram will normally be
tested by science students, and the student's competence will be
judged by the extent to which his results agree with expectations.
However, it is also permissible for students in liberal institutions
to test implausible theories such as Aristotelian mechanics and
phlogiston theory, though again one must find the 'correct' answer.
Theories which are less central to the plausibility structure are
routinely tested, though the conclusions drawn from the results
depend not only on the plausibility of the hypothesis but also on
the 'strength' of the results. Thus, when results conflict with
predictions, controversy may, but need not, develop. In any
particular case, the outcome depends on microsociological factors
such as whether the individuals involved wish to, or are allowed to,
24
publicise anomalous results
The diagram allows for hypotheses which range continuously
from 'very plausible' (the tacit knowledge which is seldom treated
as anything other than fact), through a middle range (in which
hypotheses are seen as tentative and are readily rejected if experi¬
mental results appear to refute them) to 'very implausible' (the




























































































Figure 5' Attitudes to Experimental Tests of Hypotheses
"Lllf
Experimental results (bearing in mind the distinction between raw
data and interpretation discussed earlier) also range continuously
from results which strongly support the hypothesis in question (an
example from QM being Fry's experiment) through 'non-committal'
results (such as Clauser's circular-polarization experiment) to
results which are in strong conflict with the hypothesis (such as
Holt's experiment).
Within this continuous two-dimensional range, I have indicated
the likely reactions to experiments at a number of points. The
selection and precise location of such points may well be idiosyncratic.
However, I believe the reactions described would be broadly typical
for the locations shown.
The fact that the interpretation of results is not wholly
independent of the theoretical framework may seem to weaken the
validity of this model. It may seem impossible to assess the 'strength'
of a result in an independent way. After all, we have already seen
how apparently damaging results can become redefined as incompetent
experiments.
The solution to the problem lies in the fact that science is a
historical process. Just as there is a logical and chronological
distinction between raw data (such as a correlation rate) and
interpretation (such as the implication of Holt's experiment for QJYl),
so there is a possibility of identifying the initial 'strength'
of an experiment before the social processes of negotiation have
been completed. Within a single workplace, such redefinition can
25
be extremely rapid ; however, when the community as a whole is
2^
examined, changes over a period of years can often be discerned
In any case, there are many contexts in which the interpretation
of a result is relatively unproblematic and stable over time. For
example, in the construction of a laser, or the assessment of an
undergraduate lab experiment, the status of the results (right or
wrong) is not in practice open to negotiation. Thus it is only in
areas of controversy that the 'strength' of results will be
renegotiated over time a^ the controversy is resolved. This will
involve a shift on the graph of Figure 5; for example, 'results in
conflict with a plausible hypothesis' will eventually be resolved
either as 'incompetent experiment' or 'hypothesis modified'. The
particular outcome will of course depend on many microsociological
factors.
A diagram such as Figure 5 has, I believe, several advantages.
In the first place, it provides a simple picture of scientific
development which is recognisable to both the empiricist and the
relativist. Of course, such observers would totally disagree about
the role of the two factors shown. The empiricist would argue that
shifts in plausibility are a result of experimental data, while the
relativist would argue that the meaning of experimental results is
negotiated to conform with the dominant plausibility structure.
Nevertheless, the diagram usefully points to some of the many
features of scientific development which are common to both relativist
and empiricist models.
Another advantage is that such a diagram may help to make
relativism, whether methodological or epistemological, more appealing,
because it explicitly allows a role for empirical data as one (though
only one) factor in shaping events. Science, as a social system,
attributes a rather special institutionalised role to empirical data.
It is possible to acknowledge the sociological implications of this
special role while denying any epistemological justification for
this distinction.2^
A final advantage of this model is that it could, in principle,
be predictive. I have already discussed how a particular conjunction
of results and plausibility may shift its position over time. It
should be possible to detect and monitor such shifts over a long
period of time , and to investigate the features of social processes
in science which cause either the meaning of results or the
plausibility of hypotheses to be redefined. In Chapter Six I drew
some tentative links between Aspect's actions and changes in the
29
plausibility of the timing hypothesis y. Collins has taken two
'snapshots' of gravity wave experiments, and has claimed that the
status of these experiments has also changed, and can be attributed
to a number of social processes. Similar studies, with intensive
continuous interaction with scientists over long time periods, might
be highly revealing.
Footnotes to Chapter Che
Ij^or more detailed accounts of this theoretical framework and
its relevance for empirical studies, see B.Barnes, Scientific
Knowledge and Sociological Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 197^); D.Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976); and M.Mulkay, Science and the
Sociology of Knowledge (London: Allen and Unwin, I98O).
2)H.M.Collins, 'Stages in the Empirical Programme of Relativism',
Social Studies of Science Vol ll (1981), 3-10, quote at 3>
emphasis in original.
3)Qne of the test illustrations of Popper's conception of
knowledge is provided ty the following■striking metaphor:
"The empirical tasis of objective science has thus nothing
'absolute' about it. Science does not rest upon solid bedrock.
The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a
swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are
driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any
natural or 'given' base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper,
it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop
when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry
the structure, at least for the time being."
K.Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson,
I968), quote at 111.
^•)See, for example, I.Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1976).
5)l.Lakatos, 'History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions',
in Buck and Cohen (eds), Boston Studies Vol 8 (Dordrecht:
Reidel, 1971).
6)M.Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1958); T.S.Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); M.Hesse, The
Structure of Scientific Inference (London: MacMillan, 197^)•
For a clear, readable introduction to these philosophical
issues, see A.F.Chalmers, What is this thing called science?
(Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1978).
7)See, for example, L.Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations
(Qxford: Blackwe11, 1953)•
8)P.Berger and T.Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971)•
9)See, for example, H.Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967); and R.Turner (ed)
Ethnomethodology (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975).
10)Garfinkel, op.cit. note 9» 79_9^«
11)B.Latour and S.Woolgar, Laboratory Life (Beverley Hills: Sage,
1979) and S.Woolgar, 'Writing an Intellectual History of
Scientific Development: The Use of Discovery Accounts', Social
Studies of Science Vol 6 (1976), 395-^22.
12)See, for example, Barnes, op.cit. note 1; B.Barnes, Interests
and the Growth of Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
131
1977); a-ncl D.Bioor, op.cit. note 1.
13)0ollins' most explicit defence of relativism appears in
H.M.Collins and G.Gox, -Recovering Relativity: Did Prophecy
Fail?' Social Studies of Science Vol 6 (1976), 4-23-44-. See
also the exchange of views between these authors and John Law,
ibid., Vol 7 (1977), 367-72 and 372-80.
14)For a thorough discussion of the internal/external dichotomy,
and reasons for its rejection, see Barnes, op.cit. note 1,
Chapter 5-
15)S.Shapin, 'The politics of observation: cerebral anatomy and
social interests in the Edinburgh phrenology disputes', in
R.Wallis (ed) On the Margins of Science: the Social Construction
of Rejected Knowledge, Sociological Review Monograph 27 (Keele:
University of Keele, 1979)» 139-78.
16)A concise critique of the normative view is provided by M.Mulkay,
'Sociology of Science in the West', Current Sociology Vol 28 (I98O)
I-I83, especially pp 43-64. For a more sympathetic treatment of
Merton's view of science, see J.Gaston, 'Sociology of Science
and Technology' in P.T.Durbin (ed) A Guide to the Culture of
Science, Technology and Medicine (London: MacMillan, I98O),
465-526.
17)H.Becker, Outsiders (New York: Free Press, 1963).
18)M.Pollner, 'Sociological and Common-Sense Models of the Labelling
Process' , in Turner, op.cit. note 9> 27-4-0.
19)Mulkay, op.cit. note 1 and op.cit. note 16.
20)See, for example, J.Harwood, 'Heredity, Environment and the
Legitimation of Social Policy' in Barnes and Shapin (eds)
Natural Order (Beverley Hills: Sage, 1979); P.Forman, 'Weimar
Culture, Causality and Quantum Theory 1918-27', Historical Studies
in the Physical Sciences Vol 3 (1971), 1-115; D.A.Mackenzie,
Statistics in Britain 1865-1930: The Social Construction of
Scientific Knowledge (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981).
21)See, for example, D.O.Edge and M.J.Mulkay, Astronomy Transformed
(New York: Wiley, 1976); D.Crane, Invisible Colleges (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1972).
22)See, for example, H.M.Collins, 'The Seven Sexes: A Study in the
Sociology of a Phenomenon, or the Replication of Experiments
in Physics', Sociology Vol 9 (1975), 205-24-; B.Wynne, 'C.G.Barkla
and the J Phenomenon: A Case Study of the Treatment of Deviance
in Physics', Social Studies of Science Vol 6 (1976), 307-47;
Latour and Woolgar, op.cit. note 11; G.D.L.Travis 'Replicating
Replication? Aspects of the Social Construction of Learning in
Planarian Worms', Social Studies of Science Vol 11 (I98I), 11-32;
H.M.Collins, 'Son of Seven Sexes; The Social Destruction of a
Physical Phenomenon', ibid., 33-62; Andrew Pickering, 'Constraints
on Controversy: The Case of the Magnetic ffonopole', ibid., 63—94;
T.J.Pinch, 'The Sun-Set: The Presentation of Certainty in
Scientific Life', ibid., 131-58. Other useful collections which
contain empirical case-studies include Barnes and Shapin, op.cit.
note 20; Wallis, op.cit. note 15; and K.D.Knorr, R.Krohn and
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^-0)Collins has argued (op.cit. note 39. especially footnote
p. 17) that there is still a role in a relativist analysis for
a concept of 'incorrect scientific method'. He suggests two such
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always a social term, not an absolute label. It is with the hope
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plausibility structure are not as threatening. Nevertheless,
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determining the outcome of scientific investigations.
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Measurement and Time Reversal in Objective Quantum Theory (Oxford:
Pergamon, 1976).
2)lt is true that some classical quantities, such as the velocity
of single gas atoms within a large volume of gas, may be practic¬
ally impossible to measure in some situations. However, within
classical physics it is always considered possible to improve
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dx o ^ 6 ~z.
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and Fall of the Schrodinger Interpretation' and L.Wessels, 'The
Intellectual Sources of Schrodinger's Interpretations', in
P. Suppes (ed), Studies in the Foundations of Q.uantum Mechanics
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as an interesting venture in self-education gradually degenerates
into a dreary routine. The major issues are so few and the words
are so many that by the time one has covered the same old
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B.S.DeWitt and N.R.Graham, 'Resource Letter IQM-1 on the Interp¬
retation of Quantum Mechanics', American Journal of Physics,
Vol. 39 (1971)> 72^P-38> quote at 726. However, other authors
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particular axis (through the wheel's centre) and a radius of
the wheel which we have painted white. Ideally, if we know the
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no idea of the value of Qb . Thus it is not true, even in classical
physics, that infinitesimal errors are always negligible. ,
8)Schrodinger's cat appears frequently in the literature on the.
interpretation of QM. It is interesting to note, however, that
a wide range of different methods of killing the cat have been
described. Whether this reflects authors' lack of German (the
language in which Schrodinger's original discussion was written),
or their desire to improve the technical sophistication of the
device, or some other more Freudian motive, is unclear.
For example, Jammer (op. cit. note l) opts for electro¬
cution of the cat; D'Espagnat (ibid.) uses a 2-slit diffraction
system instead of a radioactive substance, and uses 'poison'
to kill the cat; J.M.Jauch, in his book Are Quanta Real
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1973)uses
'prussic acid' instead of cyanide, and H.S.Green, in his book
Matrix Mechanics (Groningen: Noordhoff, 1965) uses a half-
silvered mirror and a photon. Detection of the photon operates
a relay which fires a loaded gun at the cat. Evidently, the
unfortunate cat has entered the folklore of physics, and
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9)Jammer, op. cit. note 1, 474.
10)ln AG theory, J"-1 is usually denoted by j.
11)See, for example, L.E.Ballentine, 'The Statistical Interpretation
of Quantum Mechanics', Reviews of Modern Physics Vol. 42 (1970)>
358-81.
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critique of the 'many-worlds' interpretation and a review of
Belinfante's 1973 book on hidden variables.
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in the Festschrift Albert Einstein;Philosopher-Scientist, edited
by P.A.Schilpp (New York: Harper and Row, 1959)> 663-88.
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Nuovo Cimento Vol. 44B (1966), 119-28.
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involved in debates over the interpretation of QJYI.
13)J.M.Jauch, E.P.Wigner and M.M.Yanase, 'Some Comments Concerning
Measurements in Quantum Mechanics', Nuovo Cimento Vol. 48B
(1967) 144-51.
14)Daneri et al., (1966) op. cit. note 12, 127.
15)Quoted by Jammer, op. cit. note 1, 493 •
Bub studied in London in Bohm's department, and completed
a PhD, supervised by Bohm, in 1966. His thesis topic was the
measurement theory now known as the Bohm-Bub theory. Bub later
published several other papers on hidden variables, but early
in the 1970's he abandoned this approach in favour of 'quantum
logic'. He is now highly critical of hidden-variable theories.
Bub continues to publish frequently on the interpretation of QM.
16)D.Bohm and J.Bub, 'A Proposed Solution of the Measurement
Problem in Quantum Mechanics by a Hidden Variable Theory',
Reviews of Modern Physics, Vol.38 (1966), ^53-69•
Bohm is one of the few 'grand old men' in this field. His
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Now a professor at Birkbeck College, London, Bohm has continued
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the Bohm-Bub theory.
P.Pearle,'Reduction of the State Vector by a Nonlinear Schrodinger
Equation', Physical Review Vol. 13D (1976) 857-68.
Pearle began to write about nonlinear amendments to the
Schrodinger equation in the late 1960's, when he was a student
at Harvard. Although not a major figure on this field, he has
published several papers, developing his non-linear theory and
commenting on local HVTs.
17)Jammer, op.cit. note 1, ^7^86.
Wigner, a Nobel Prizewinner, was deeply involved, in the
development of QM and nuclear physics from the 1930's onwards.
His interest in interpretations of QM dates from the early
1960'S.
18)Quoted by Jammer, op.cit. note 1, ^f84.
19)A.A.Ross-Bonney, 'Does God Play Dice?', Nuovo Gimento Vol 30B
(1975), 55-79, quote at 68.
20)For a compilation of most of the major papers on this topic, see
B.S.DeWitt and N.Graham (eds), The Many-Worlds Interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).
DeWitt normally refers to this theory as 'EWG' (Everett-Wheeler-
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that he had no involvement in the 'resurgence' of his theory,
nor did he play any part in compiling the book cited above.
He told me:
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all".
(Letter from Hugh Everett III to the author, 20th June, 1977-)
21)0ne difficulty with MWI is that when we measure a continuous
variable (such as position), a literally infinite number of
outcomes are possible, which, according to MWI, leads to an
infinity of universes.
22)B.S.DeWitt, 'Quantum Mechanics and Reality', Physics Today
Vol 23 (September 1970) 30-35, quote at 33•
23)Jammer, op.cit. note 1, 521.
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24)A more accurate, though less well-known title, is the
Indeterminacy Principle.
25)Such an experiment is at present quite impracticsA because,
unlike glass (for visible light) and electric and magnetic
fields (for charged particles like electrons) there is no way
to refract a beam of gamma rays to any great extent.
26)The diagram is simplified, in that the intensity of the bright
bands is shown to be constant across the screen. In fact,
because of diffraction effects, the central bands are brighter
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27)D.Bohm, 'A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in
terms of "Hidden Variables", Part 1', Physical Review Vol 85
(1952), 166-79, quote at 173-
28)A1though this statement is generally true, there are some
measurements which do not disturb a system and thus do not
interfere with the causal evolution of . For example, if a
second observation of some particle is carried out soon after
a first observation, and the value of the relevant observable
has not changed during the intervening time, then the second
measurement need not disturb Uj. As a second example,
information can be gained from negative results, in which, say,
a particle is found not to be in a certain location, without
the particle being disturbed„ Clearly, these examples are
special cases.
29)Jammer, op.cit. note 1, 89-90*
30)See note 27 and D.Bohm, 'A Suggested Interpretation of the
Quantum Theory in terms of "Hidden Variables", Part II' ,
Physical Review Vol 85 (1952), 180-93*
31)D.Bohm, op.cit. note 27, 17^*
32)This was no coincidence: Bohm set out deliberately to show that
a HVT could reproduce all the predictions of QM.
33)For details of these fascinating debates, see Schilpp (ed),
op.cit. note 11; for a summarised account, see Jammer, op.cit.
note 1, 127-36.
3^-)A.Einstein, B.Podolsky and N.Rosen, 'Can Quantum-Mechanical
Description of Physical Reality be Considered Complete?'
Physical Review Vol 47 (1935), 777-80.
35)B*Bohm, Quantum Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1951).
36)In QM, as in classical physics, spin refers to a particles's
angular momentum which is not due to orbital motion. However,
in QM spin is quantised so that, for example, an electron can
have one of only two possible values, +■§■ and —§-.
37)One apparently obvious objection to this theory is that it seems
to clash with relativity theory by invoking speeds greater than
the velocity of light. This need not mean that HVT is wrong,
merely that it is not consistent with relativity. Since the
process involved is novel, such a conclusion is defensible. See
B.D'Espagnet, op.cit. note 1, pp 90 and 238.
38)D.Bohm and Y.Aharonov, 'Discussion of Experimental Proof for
the Paradox of Einstein, Rosen and Podolsky', Physical Review
Vol 108 (1957)> 1070-6$ D.Bohm, 'Ridden Variables in the Quantum
Theory' in D.R.Bates (ed) Quantum Theory Vol. 3 (London:
Academic Press, 1962).
39)John Bell, a theorist based at CERN in Geneva, has had a major
impact on this field, mainly through two papers written in
1964. One dealt with 'proofs' that HVTs could not be consistent
with QM, and the other raised the issue of local HVTs which would
satisfy EPR's demands. Bell has also published a number of other
papers in this field.
40)See, for example, J.F.Clauser and A.Shimony, 'Bell's Theorem:
Experimental Tests and Implications', Reports on Progress in
Physics Vol 41 (1978), I88I-927, especially p 1922.
41)The exclusion principle states that in any system containing
certain particles such as electrons, no two particles can be
in the same quantum state. However, such particles can be
spatially separated, so that one particle 'knows' the state of
another, distant, particle and alters its behaviour accordingly.
42)H.P.Stapp, 'S-Matrix Interpretation of Quantum Theory' , Physical
Review Vol D3, (1971)» 1303-20, quote at 1316.
43)This does not mean that measurement of one photon causes a
physical change in the second photon. Rather, the choice of
apparatus used to observe the first photon determines the
particular equation which is relevant for describing the pair
of photons and therefore for describing the second photon.
44)j.S.Bell, 'On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox', Hiysics
Vol 1(1964), 195-200.
45)For details, see Jammer, op.cit. note 1, 306-12, and Glauser
and Shimony, op.cit. note 40, 1892^1900.
46)For example, in the derivation used by Glauser and Home
(see Glauser and Shimony, op.cit. note 40, 1896),
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and)\5r Q for LHV.
Here a, a' and b, b' represent different pairs of polarization
analyser settings, R(a,b) is the coincidence rate at settings
a and b for the pair of polarizers, and r(a') is the rate of
single particle detections of polarizer 1 at setting a'.
47)Papaliolios is an experimental physicist at Harvard University.
He had no active involvement in this field before he did his
test of the Bohm-Bub theory. As we shall see in Chapter Four,
this test did not require a great deal of time or expense.
Since performing his experiment, Papaliolios has taken an
active interest in other experimental tests of Qf4.
48)Bohm and Bub, op.cit. note 16, 466.
49)QM predicts that the intensity of the transmitted light varies
with the square of the cosine of the angle between the axes of
B and G.
50)j.Hall, G.Kim, B.McElroy and A.Shimony, 'Wave-Packet Reduction -
as a Medium of Communication', Foundations of Physics, Vol 7
(1977), 759-67.
Shimony, who holds a joint professorship of physics and
philosophy at Boston University, was deeply involved in
organising the experimental tests of LHVT. He has written
widely in the philosophy of science as well as on the interpretation
of QM.
51)For details of the individual experiments, see Glauser and
Shimony, op.cit. note ^0. Biographical information on the
individuals involved will be provided, as required, later in
this thesis.
52)For example, if we consider the linear polarization of two
photons emitted simultaneously in the annihilation of positronium
(an electron-positron pair) in its singlet state, the coincidence
rate is proportional to 1 - (cos6 )*" , where 0 represents the
angle between the axes of the polarization analysers. These photons
are emitted with perpendicular polarizations. Photon pairs
emitted in some optical cascades have parallel polarizations,
so here the correlation rate varies with (cos£>)'"".
53)An atom is excited either thermally, or by laser, or by collision
with ions in a gas discharge tube. One of the atom's electrons
jumps to a higher energy level, and soon returns to its original
level either directly or via one or more intermediate levels.
Each transition to a lower level is accompanied by the emission
of a photon carrying off the excess energy. When several photons
are emitted (as when the electron travels via intermediate
levels), a 'cascade' is said to occur.
5^-)The positron is the anti-particle of the electron. When a
particle meets its anti-particle, mutual annihilation occurs,
that is, the mass of both particles is converted to energy
according to the famous equation E = me2'. To conserve
momentum, spin, and so on, the energy is emitted as two high-
energy photons (gamma rays) travelling in opposite directions.
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For other examples, see Jammer, op.cit. note JO, 88.
85)Garuccio and Selleri, op.cit. note 73. 25.
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Footnotes to Chapter Four
1)As discussed, in Chapter Two, I shall use the term "Foundations
of QM' (FQM) to refer to the various attempts to reinterpret
or modify QM, as distinct from more conventional study of QM,
such as applying the accepted formalism of QM in new contexts.
2)The concept of a specialty has been widely discussed in the
sociology of science, and detailed references to the appropriate
literature are provided in Chapter One. Obviously, the claim
that FQM is atypical requires at least an implicit definition
of what constitutes a typical specialty. Rather than attempt a
detailed critique of the literature, I shall confine myself to
a few features which, according to nearly all authors, are
characteristic of scientific specialties. These include:
a strong degree of cognitive consensus, an organised social
structure, with a well-developed communication system (formal
and informal), and a training system for introducing neophytes
into the specialty. By showing that FQM has none of these
features, I hope to avoid the need for specifying any particular
definition of a specialty. ,
3)T.J.Pinch, 'What Does a Proof Do if it Does Not Prove? A Study
of the Social Conditions and Metaphysical Divisions Leading to
David Bohm and John von Neumann Failing to Communicate in
Quantum Physics' in E.Mendelsohn, P.Weingart and R.Whitley (eds)
The Social Production of Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of the
Sciences Yearbook, Vol. 1 (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977 )> 171-215*
^•)There are some journals which regularly publish papers on
aspects of FQM, notably Foundations of Physics. However, such
journals also publish papers on other aspects of 'fundamental'
physics, such as cosmology. In addition, for each journal
publishing FQM papers, there was a substantial number of FQM
workers who told me that this particular journal was not
appropriate for their work and was unrepresentative of FQM as
a whole.
5)W.O.Hagstrom, The Scientific Community (Carbondale, 111.:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1975)> 277.
6)N.R.Hanson, The Concept of the Positron (London:Cambridge
University Press, 1963), 99.
7)As discussed in Chapter One, excerpts from interview transcripts
will not normally be attributed to any particular individual.
8)See Chapter One for details of the questionnaire.
9)For example, Shimony was a student of Wigner, yet Shimony has
publicly criticised Wigner's 'consciousness interpretation' .
Although the 'many-worlds' interpretation of QM is sometimes
referred to as the 'Everett-Wheeler' interpretation, Everett
developed this model independently of his supervisor Wheeler.
These examples are typical. One reason for the lack of
continuity between 'generations' in FQM is that there are
virtually no institutions which regularly offer undergraduate
courses in FQM, and few institutions which have a long-term
research programme in FQM» Thus although a student's supervisor
may be actively involved in FQM, this is not likely to be the
area in which the student is being trained, nor is it likely to
be the supervisor's main professional activity. Many people
spoke of being introduced to FQM by their former supervisor,
but the absence of organised collaboration or- agreement between
students and supervisors is quite understandable. Typically, once
a student has been introduced to the main issues, he then
develops his own approach.
10)There are also a number of journals or regular newsletters
which have a restricted readership or are less 'public' than
Foundations of Physics, For example, the Annals of the Louis de
Broglie Foundation is sent to a wide range of locations but
was seldom cited by respondents as a useful source of papers on
their own area of FQM. The Epistemological Letters of the Institut
de la Methode, in Switzerland, is issued free of charge to
a fairly small group of people and is largely concerned with
locality and the LHV experiments. Neither of these journals is
listed in Science Abstracts or the Science Citation Index.
11)D.O.Edge, 'Quantitative Measures of Communication in Science:
A Critical Review', History of Science Vol 17 (1979)» 102-3^.
12)See, for example, M.J.Moravcsik and P.Murugesan, 'Some Results
on the Function and Quality of Citations', Social Studes of
Science Vol 5(1975)» 86-92; and G.N.Gilbert, 'Referencing as
Persuasion', ibid. Vol 7 (1977), 113-22.
13 foundations of Physics was first published in 1971•
lA-)See, for example, D.Crane, Invisible Colleges (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1972).
15)J.Bub, The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (Dordrecht:
Reidel, 197^), quote at ix.
16)lnterview with Basil Hiley, Birkbeck College, University of
London, 5th July, 1977-
17 fee note 16. y
18)The 'double-solution' theory, dating back to 1921, argues that
there are two solutions to the wave equation: a continuous wave
( f) and a singularity (particle).
19)L.de Broglie, G.Lochak, J.A.Beswick and J.Vassalo-Pereira,
'Present, Predicted and Hidden Probabilities', Foundations of
Physics Vol 6 (1976), 3-if quote at k.
20)Publicity brochure for A.George et al. (eds), Louis de Broglie;
Sa Conception du Monde Physique (Paris: Gauthiers-Villars, 1973)*
21)L.de Broglie, 'Basic Principles of Wave Mechanics', Comptes
Rendus Vol B277 (l6th July 1973) 71-3, quote at 73.
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unable to locate it more precisely. (My translation)
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"The Annales are a review of theoretical physics designed, in
particular, for the publication of studies put forward in the
Foundation's Seminar and devoted, more generally, to the diffusion
of work on wave mechanics within the perspective of the de
Broglie school ^JL*ecoie broglienne "j , as well as research
carried out in other directions which contribute to the advancement
of fundamental knowledge of microphysics."
(This policy statement is printed on the inside back cover of
each issue of the Annates.) (My translation.)
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a degree of overlap. See, for example, D.Bohm, 'On the Creation
of a Deeper Insight into What^ May Underlie Quantum Physical Law',
in M.Flato et al. (eds) Q.uanturn Mechanics, Determinism, Causality
and Particles (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976), 1-10. *
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for a number of years. These groups were headed by von Weizsacker
and by Ludwig; both are in Germany, and publish mainly in German.
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respondents outside Germany claimed to be a member of either of
these groups.
25)For example, Bub and Demopoulos at the University of Western
Ontario, Komar and Finkelstein at Yeshiva University, New York,
and Erugovecki and van Fraassen at Toronto University.
26)V.Augelli, A.Garuccio and F.Selleri, 'La Mecanique Quantique et
la Realite', Annales de la Fondation Louis de Broglie Vol 1 (1976),
154-73» quote at 154- (my translation).
27)B.S.DeWitt and N.R.Graham, 'Resource Letter IQM-1 on the Interp¬
retation of Quantum Mechanics', American Journal of Physics
Vol 39 (1971), 724-38, quote at J2J\.
28)A detailed account of the early history of LHV will be provided
in Chapter Five.
29)B.S.DeWitt, 'Quantum Mechanics and Reality', Physics Today Vol 23
(September 1970), 30-35-
30)M.Sachs, 'An Alternative to Quantum Mechanics', Physics Today
Vol 24 (April 1971), 39-4-1, quote at 4-0.
31)L.E.Ballentine, 'The Formalism is not the Intepretation', ibid.,
36-38, quote at 38.
32)P.Pearle, 'Quantum Theory Fails the Single System*, ibid., 38.
33)As we shall see in Chapter Five, the LHV activity has played an
important part in highlighting this shortcoming of 'traditional'
FQM-
34-)DeWitt, op.cit. note 29, 35-
35)Sachs, op.cit. note 30, 4-1.
36)B.S.DeWitt, 'Replies to Critics', Physics Today Vol 24 (April
1971)» 41-44-, quote at 4-2.
37)See P.Pearle, 'Alternative to the Orthodox Interpretation of
Quantum Theory', American Journal of Physics Vol 35 (1967)> 742-53
and M.Sachs 'Comment on "Alternative to the Orthodox Interpretation
of Quantum Theory', ibid., Vol 36 (1968) 463-4-.
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385m.Jammer, in The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics (New York:
Wiley, 197^) p 25^- criticises Bell for "erroneously" describing
Einstien as a supporter of hidden variables. Bell continues to
hold this view - J.S.Bell, 'Einstein Podolsky Rosen Experiments'
(unpublished mimeo, CERN, Geneva, 1976).
39)For example, as pointed out in Chapter Three, there is a wide
variety of opinions on what exactly Bohr meant by complementarity.
See Jammer, op.cit. note 38» 86-92.
40)For example, compare the approaches in Chapter Seven with those
of Chapter Eight of Jammer, ©p.cit. note 38.
^4-1 )N.Wiener and A.Siegel, 'A New Form of the Statistical Postulate
of Quantum Mechancis', Physical Review Vol 91 (1953)1 1551-80.
1+2)Interview with A.Siegel, Boston University, 1^-th October, 1977•
43)0ne indication of this is the fact that the Wiener-Siegel theory
is never mentioned in Jammer's comprehensive review of FQM (op.
cit. note 38).
44)See note !+Z.
^5)DeWitt, op.cit. note 29, 33•
46)B.S.DeWitt, 'The Many-Universes Interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics' in Societa Italiana di Fisica (B.D'Espagnat, ed.)
Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Proceedings of the Enrico
Fermi International Summer School, Course ^9 (New York: Academic
Press, 1971)t 211-5k, quote at 212.
47)ibid., 211 and 222.
48)Allen, a physicist and a supporter of the 'many-worlds' interp¬
retation, explicitly claims that experiments are irrelevant:
"Whereas the test of a physical theory is experiment, the test
of an interpretation of QM is logical consistency....of the
distinct interpretations known to the author.... only the Everett
interpretation is free from inconsistency." R.E.Allen,
'Consistency of Language and Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics',
(College Station, Texas: unpublished mimeo, Physics Department,
Texas A&M University, 1977)> quoted at 1 and 4.
49)0f course, a flair for public relations can also affect the
reception given to a proposal. By his papers in technical and
popular science journals, DeWitt proved interest in Everett's
ideas after they had lain virtually ignored for ten years.
Citation data confirm DeWitt's role:
Year 1964 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76
Citations of
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Thus DeWitt's publicising of Everett around 1970 was clearly
effective, although it would seem that, once well-known, the
original work is then cited independently of the popularising
articles. (See also footnote 20, Chapter Two.)
50)See, for example, L.E.Ballentine, 'Can the Statistical Postulate
of Quantum Theory Be Derived?- a Critique of the Many-Universes
Interpretation', Foundations of Physics Vol 3 (1973) > 229-4-0;
and J.S.Bell, 'The Measurement Theory of Everett and De Broglie's
Pilot Wave', in Flato et al., op.cit. note 23, 11-17.
51)Pinch, op.cit. note 3*
52)The lack of communication between Bohm and von Neumann himself
is much more easily understood. Bohm produced his HV theory in
1952 and shortly afterwards left the US after difficulties
with McCarthyites. He went to Brazil and was based there for
a number of years. Von Neumann's proof was written in 1932,
and he died in 1957*
53)Pinch, op.cit. note 3> 202. We have already seen in Chapter
Three how a number of different glosses can be given to concepts
such as 'causality' and 'dialectic'.
54)Pinch, op.cit. note 3> 205.
55)N.Oeorgescu-Roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic Process
(Cambridge; Mass.: Harvard University Press, I97I).
56)Bohm's theory is in fact highly mathematical. In addition,
Bell was able to show, in a clear and unequivocal way, that
Bohm's theory was incompatible with von Neumann's proof
because it did not conform to von Neumann's axioms, which
characterised von Neumann's conception of what a HV theory must
look like.
57)Pinch, op.cit. note 3, 205-6.
58)Pinch (on p 207) cites Lakatos' findings that mathematicians
are deferential towards abstract logical proofs, but then he
extrapolates this finding to physicists with no empirical
evidence other than the von Neumann - Bohm case itself. In
addition, Lakatos' claim about mathematicians is by no means
universally accepted. For example, Hagstrom (op.cit. note 5,
189) writes:"Mathematicians assert that logic is not important
to them", and that logic's low prestige in mathematics
derives from the fact that it is not generally helpful to
mathematicians.
59)Pinch, op.cit. note 3> 208.
60)D.Bohm, 'A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in
Terms of "Hidden Variables","Part I', Physical Review Vol 85
(1952), 166-79, quote at 174.
61)Pinch, op.cit. note 3> 193°
62)These criticisms are all quoted by Pinch, op.cit. note 3, 182.
63)Bohm, op.cit. note 60, 171 and 179.
64)The journal Nature (Vol 190 (1961), 308) published a short
biography of Bohm when he was made a professor at Birkbeck
College. Bohm's reputation as a physicist was acknowledged, but
was distinguished from his work on FQM, as the following extract
shows:
" [he is3 well-known among physicists as the originator of the
Bohm-Pines theory of collective motion in a plasma.... and
well-known to the public for his views on the philosophy of
science and his criticisms of the Copenhagen Interpretation."
65)This general argument is part of the theoretical framework
described in detail in Chapter One of this thesis.
66)J.S.Bell, 'On the Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum
Mechanics', Reviews of Modern Physics Vol 38 (1966) 447-52,
quote at 447.
67)An illustration of the physics elite's attitude to von Neumann's
work (of which this proof was only a very small part) is provided
in a letter written by Sir Edward Appleton to Professor W. Wilson
of Bedford College, London, on 24th September 1945:
"I bought a copy of von Neumann, as you advised years ago, but
have had no time to get beyond the first few pages. But it is
all very elegant. That I can see„"
(Wilson correspondence, Bedford College Library.)
68)F.J.Belinfante, A Survey of Hidden Variable Theories (Oxford:
Pergamon Press, 1973)» 34. ~
69)ibid., 24»
70)ibid., 34.
71)Despite the "obviousness" of the error in von Neumann's proof,
physicists who are not wholly familiar with recent FQM literature
still cite the proof as if it were accepted knowledge. For
example, J.Mehra, in his book The Q,uantum Principle: Its
Interpretation and Epistemology (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974), uses
the proof to exclude Bohm's (1952) HV theory. Then in a footnote
(on p 64) he includes a letter written to him by Bell, pointing
out that "this conclusion may be incorrect". We can of course
conclude from this that Mehra is loyally defending the 'arithmetic
ideal', but it seems more reasonable to explain this as a result
of his lack of familiarity with the literature of a difficult
and esoteric subject.
72)B.Wynne, 'C.G.Barkla and the J Phenomenon: A Case-Study in the
Treatment of Deviance in Physics', Social Studies of Science
Vol 6 (1976), 307-47.
73)Wynne accounts for these different approaches by referring to
a more general cultural differentiation which took place in
British physics after 1900. My analysis of Bohm's rejection has
not invoked such general cultural changes, although an interesting
historical treatment of FQM along these lines has been attempted
by Brush. See S.G.Brush, 'The Chimerical Cat: Philosophy of
Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective', Social Studies of
Science, Vol 10 (1980) 393-447.
74)D.Bohm and J.Bub, 'A Proposed Solution of the Measurement
Problem in Quantum Mechanics by a Hidden Variable Theory',
Review of Modern Physics Vol 38 (1966), 453-69- This estimate
"K D
is given on p 466.
75)C.Papaliolios, 'Experimental Test of a Hidden-Variable Quantum
Theory', Physical Review Letters Vol 13 (1967), 622-5. The
equation is quoted on p 622.
76)S.J.Freedman, R.A.Holt and G.Papaliolios, 'Experimental
Status of Hidden Variable Theories', in M.Flato et al (eds),
op.cit. note 23, 43-59-
77)lnterview with G.Papaliolios, University of Arizona, Tucson,
7th November, 1977- (Papaliolios normally works at Harvard but




80)J.Bub, 'Hidden Variables and the Copenhagen Interpretation: A
Reconciliation', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,
Vol 19 (1968), 185-210, quote at 205.
81)Rreedman et al., op.cit. note 76.
82)Papaliolios, op.cit. note 75» 624.
83)See note 77.
84)Freedman et al., op.cit note 76, 47.
85)ibid., 47.
86)See note 77- Since Bohm agrees with Papaliolios* description of
the origin of this equation, there seems no objection to quoting
such apparently critical statements.
87)See note 77*
88)See note 77-
89)R.Wangsness, 'Hidden Variables and Magnetic Relaxation', Physical
Review Vol 160 (1967), 1190-2. In a note added in proofs,
Wangsness draws attention to Papaliolios' results.
90)See note 77.
91)Bohm and Bub, op.cit. note 74, 4-54.
92)ibid., 454.
93)ibid., 457. emphasis in original.
94)References to language crop up repeatedly in their paper.
See, for example, pages 452, 457> 458, 468 and 469.
95)Bohm and Bub, op.cit. note 74, 469. This view of the role of
language in structuring thought is remarkably similar to the
'Sapir-Whorf' hypothesis, which has recently come under strong
criticism from p^holinguists. See, for example, I.D.Currie,
'The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis', in J.E.Curtis and J.W.Petras (eds)
The Sociology of Knowledge (London: Duckworth, 1970)> 403-21.
96)Bohm and Bub, op.cit. note 74, 466.
Id
97)lnterview with David Bohm, Birkbeck College, London, 5th July
1977.
98)See note 77-
99)lnterview with Jeffrey Bub, University of Western Ontario,
London, Ontario, 29th September 1977-
100)j.Bub, 'What is a Hidden Variable Theory of Quantum Phenomena?',
International Journal of Theoretical Physics Vol 2 (1969), 101-23.
101)See note 99.
102)For example, in his 1952 paper (op.cit. note 60, 166-7) Bohm
tentatively suggests that QM might become invalid over very
small distances but no details of possible experiments are given.
Similarly, in their I966 paper (op.cit. note 74) Bohm and Bub
describe possible violations of QM in a tentative, speculative
manner. However, in both papers, there is a great deal of
discussion about conceptual frameworks. This theme was also
stressed by Bohm in his book Causality and Chance in Modern Physics
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957 )> especially in Chapter
Four, and also in much of Bohm's later work.
103)J.H.Tutsch, 'Collapse-Time for the Bohm-Bub Hidden Variable
Theory', Reviews of Modern Physics Vol 40 (1968), 232-4-.
104)J.H.Tutsch, 'Simultaneous Measurement in the Bohm-Bub Hidden-
Variable Theory', Physical Review Vol I83 (1969)* 1116-31,
quote at 1116.
105)ibid., 1117.
106)J.H.Tutsch, 'Mathematics of the Measurement Problem in Quantum
Mechanics', Journal of Mathematical Physics Vol 12 (l97l)>
1711-18, quote at 1711.
107)Personal correspondence from Jerald Tutsch to the author,
6th September, 1978.
108)It should be emphasised that Tutsch's attitude to the Bohm-Bub
theory seemed as alien to Bohm and Bub as did Papaliolios'. In
our interview, Bub told me that whereas he and Bohm treated the
theory as a way of exploring alternative conceptual structures,
so that the details of this particular theory were insignificant
and "almost ad hoc", Tutsch, on the other hand,
"took it too seriously....he felt it might be roughly the correct
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Emitted in an Atomic Cascade', Physical Review Letters Vol 18
(1967), 575-7» This experiment was performed without knowledge




18)lnterview with Richard Holt, University of Western Ontario,
London, Ontario, 28th September 1977.
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Barkla. Barkla originally claimed to have discovered a 'J-series'
of radiation, but later withdrew this claim, while continuing to
argue in favour of the (quite separate)j-phenomenon. However,
studying the published comments on Barkla's later work, Wynne
notes that "all the papers refer to Barkla's previous mistake
as if this were evidence of his being mistaken again". See
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B.Wynne, 'G.G.Barkla and the J Phenomenon: A Case Study in the
Treatment of Deviance in Physics', Social Studies of Science Vol 6
(1976) 307-^7> quote at 327* In Pipkin's case, no mention of
his earlier mistake ever appeared in the LHV literature. Pipkin's
more lenient treatment is probably due to two factors: first,
the small number of people involved in LHV made it possible
for knowledge of his mistake to be circulated quite effectively
by informal means. Second, since Pipkin himself rejected Holt's
result, there was no need to discredit Pipkin in order to reject
Holt's experiment.
32)This comment is taken from my personal notes taken during
a conference of LHV experimenters, at which Pipkin gave a talk.
Not surprisingly, this comment does net appear either in Holt
and Pipkin's unpublished manuscript, or in the published abstract
of Pipkin's conference paper.
The lack of agreement on any specific cause of Holt's
error is virtually irrelevant, given that there is agreement
on the important point, namely that Holt did make an error. A
similar situation existed with D.G.Miller's 'ether-drift'
experiments, which disagreed with the results of Michelson and
Morley. Despite the fact that over 20 years elapsed before the
cause of Miller's error was agreed, his results were not accepted.
See L.S.Swenson, 'The Michelson-Morley-Miller Experiments Before
and After 1905'» Journal for the History of Astronomy Vol 1 (1970)
56-78.
33)lnterview with Holt, University of Western Ontario, 28th September
1977-
3^-)lnterview with Rreedman, Stanford University, 1st November 1977*
35)Clauser and Shimony, op.cit. note 5» 1919•
36)ibid., 1910.
37)Holt and Pipkin, op.cit., note 28, 26.
38)Ereedman et al., (1975). op.cit. note 28, 6l; Rreedman et al.,
(1976), op.cit. note 28, 57-
39)Clauser, op.cit. note 19, 1223.
40)Lamehi-Rachti, op.cit. note 21, 122.
41)See note 33 (emphasis added).
^2)See Clauser, op.cit. note 19 for details of technical differences
between the experiments. Since Rry, unlike Glauser, did not
attempt even a partial replication of Holt's experiment, Fry's
apparatus is very different from Holt's.
^•3)ln other disciplines, such as psychology and medicine, the
effects of conscious or unconscious experimenter bias are well
known, and techniques such as 'double-blind' trials have been
developed in an attempt to cope with such phenomena. Parapsychol-
ogists often make similar claims, for instance, concerning the
effects of sceptical observers. One consequence if this is that
the concepts of replication, and of similar/dissimilar experiments,
are often at the root of disputes in parapsychology. See
J
■^7<r
H.M.Collins, 'Upon the Replication of Scientific Findings:
A Discussion Illuminated by the Experiences of Researchers into
Parapsychology', Proceedings of the 4s/ISA Conference on Social
Studies of Scisice, Cornell University, November 1976 (School
of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Bath,
unpublished mimeo). Wynne has also noted how Dunbar's
"replication" of Barkla's work was by no means a replication
from Barkla's point of view, because it ignored certain
features which, to Barkla, were crucial. Yet Dunbar's experiment
was portrayed as a replication, suggesting to Wynne that
"it was merely 'rubber stamping' attitudes that were by then
already deeply ingrained". Wynne, op.cit. note 31> quote at 330.
44)J.F.Clauser, 'Measurement of the Circular-Polarization Correlation




47 jDespite the fact that Clauser presents this result as being in
favour of QM, no other author, to the best of my knowledge,
has quoted this result as evidence against LHV. However, it is
also true that no-one has criticised Clauser's presentation, let
alone used this result to support LHV.
48)It is fairly well established that scientific papers are written
in a conventionalised style, which bears little relation to the
details of the research process. However, my findings may appear
to conflict with those of Pinch. See T.J.Pinch, 'The Sun-Set:
The Presentation of Certainty in Scientific Life', Social
Studies of Science Vol 11 (1981), 131-58• Pinch found that his
interviewees maintained a rather formal posture, and were mostly
unwilling to make the sort of frank confessions of uncertainty,
hunch and bias which one might expect in an informal context.
However, as Pinch points out, his interviewees were aware that
there was substantial public interest in their field, and he
feels that they perceived him as a representative of this wider
public audience. In addition, there remains genuine controversy
in Pinch's field of study.
In LHV, on the other hand, many interviewees seemed
surprised and flattered that an outsider would be interested in
thsi.r work. The issues involved were also much more clear-cut,
providing a solid base of 'certainty' to underpin informal,
seemingly exaggerated statements. Other factors, such as the
demeanour of the interviewer, may presumably also affect the
sort of statements produced.
49)G.Zukav, The Dancing Wu Li Masters (London: Fontana, 1980);
H.P.Stapp, 'Bell's Theorem and World Process', Nuovo Cimento
Vol 29B (1975)> 270-6. The only exception is that Aspect's
experiment, and the hypothesis he proposes to test, is usually
discussed by such authors. This is quite consistent with the
argument I will develop below, namely that Aspect has altered the
plausibility of the hypothesis he is testing.
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50)According to Collins, this is fairly typical; he argues that
only the 'Core-Set' of scientists who are actively involved in
a controversy are aware of the inconclusive nature of much
experimental data. Scientists further from the actual research
process, he claims, are more likely to perceive this process
as unproblematic. See H.M.Collins, 'The Role of the Core-Set
in Modern Science: Social Contingency with Methodological
Propriety in Discovery', History of Science Vol 19 (1981), 6-19.
51)G.Faraci, S.Gutkowski,.S.Notarrigo and A.R.Pennisi, 'An
Experimental Test of the ERR.Paradox', Nuovo Cimento Letters
Vol 9 (197*0» 607-11.
52)L.Kasday, J.D.Ullman and C.S.Wu, 'Angular Correlation of
Compton-Scattered Annihilation Photons and Hidden Variables'
Nuovo Cimento Vol 25B (1975), 633-61.
53)Although the effects concerned were very different from those
in Holt's experiment, it will be recalled that Holt had also
been criticised on the grounds that stress effects might be
distorting his results.
54)Kasday et al., op.cit. note 52 , 659°
55)G.Faraci and A.R.Pennisi, 'Polarization of the Annihilation
Photons of Triplet Positronium', Nuovo Cimento Vol 31B (1976)
289-95.
56)ibid., 289.
57)J.S.Bell, 'The Theory of Local Beables', Epistemological Letters
Vol 9 (1976) 11-24, quote at 21.
58)Faraci and Pennisi, op.cit. note 55- 293.
59)First Session of the Thinkshops on Physics: Experimental Quantum
Mechanics, organised by J.S.Bell and B.D'Espagnat, held at the
Ettore Majorana Centre for Scientific Culture, Erice, Sicily,
l8th-23rd April, 1976. Abstracts of contributions published in
Progress in Scientific Culture Vol 1 (1976) 439-60.
60)S.Notarrigo, 'Polarization Correlation of Annihilation Radiation'
op.cit. note 59, 452-3, quote at 453-
61)A.R.Wilson, J.Lowe and D.K.Butt, 'Measurement of the Relative
Planes of Polarization of Annihilation Quanta as a Function of
Separation Distance', Journal of Physics Vol G2 (1976), 613-24;
M.Bruno, M.D'Agostino and C.Maroni, 'Measurement of Linear
Polarization of Positron-Annihilation Photons', Nuovo Cimento
Vol 40B (1977), 142-52.
62)l was unable to travel to Bologna. As for the Birkbeck group,
Dr. Wilson died shortly after completing his experiment, and
Mrs Lowe and Dr. Butt did not agree to cooperate with my research.
Neither of these groups was represented at the experimenters'
conference in Sicily.
63)lnterviews with B.Hiley and D.Bohm, Birkbeck College, University
of London, 5"th July 1977*
64)This proposal, the so-called 'Furry hypothesis', suggests that
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when correlated pairs of photons become separated by a large
enough distance, 'spontaneous localization' - a breakdown of
the correlation - may occur. As well as providing support for
LHV, Faraci's results seem to support this hypothesis. However,
neither Wilson nor Maroni found any evidence for spontaneous
localization. For further details of this hypothesis, see Glauser
and Shimony, op.cit. note 5» 1922 and Baracca et al., op.cit.
note 26.
65)Clauser and Shimony, op.cit. note 5> 1917*
66)F.M.Pipkin, 'Atomic Physics Tests of the Basic Concepts of
Quantum Mechanics' in D.R.Bates and B.Bederson (eds) Advances
in Atomic and Molecular Physics Vol 1^ (New York: Academic Press,
1978) 281-340, quote at 316.
67)Personal correspondence from Maroni to the author, JOth March 1977.
68)See note 67.
69)Bruno et al., op.cit. note 6l, 1^6.
70)G.Faraci and a.R.Pennisi, 'Polarization Correlation of a Photon
Pair', Physics Letters Vol 66a (1978), 15-16, quote at 15.
71)G.baraci and A.Pennisi, 'Polarization of Triplet P Photons in
Assymmetrical Decay', Nuovo Cimento Vol 55B (I98O),257-63-
72)Personal correspondence from Faraci to the author, 26th June 1977•
73)See note 72.
7^)D.Gutkowski, G.Masotto, and M.V.Valdes, 'On the Sufficiency of
Bell's Conditions' Nuovo Cimento Vol 5® (1979)» 323~^3» quote
at 32br.
75)Again, Wynne's study of Barkla (op.cit. note 31) provides a
similar case of a scientist who is able to construct a self-
consistent defence of his views yet who is judged to be wrong
by the cultural conventions of the physics community of the time.
76)0ther non-technical factors may also have been involved in this
assessment of quality. These may have included the prestige of
Columbia University compared with a Sicilian university, and
the personal reputation of Professor Wu, the leader of Kasday's
group. Also, in informal conversation, some US physicists
displayed a certain degree of anti-Italian bias. It is certainly
true that Italian physicists generally hold more favourable views
of Faraci's work.
77)letter from J.H.McGuire to J.F.Clauser. The copy I obtained was
undated, but a reference to a 'recently published' paper
indicates that it was written in 1970-
78)j.S.Bell, 'Introduction to the Hidden-Variable Question', in
Societa Italiana di Fisica, op.cit. note 8, 171-81; Clauser
and Home, op.cit. note 15; Clauser and Shimony, op.cit. note 5»
79)Bell, op.cit.note 199•
80)Clauser et al., op.cit. note 9«
81)Shimony, op.cit. note 8, 191.
hj-
82)Clauser and Home, op.cit. note 15.
83)This point has been discussed by Cl^user (cp.cit. note l). To
give an example, morphologically dissimilar objects such as
thermocouples and mercury thermometers are perceived as doing
roughly the 'same' thing because of our adherence to certain
theoretical ideas about heat and thermometry.
84)when unpolarized light is reflected from glass, it is partially
polarized, and the same is true for transmitted light. The
effect varies with the angle of incidence and is a maximum at
an angle known as the Brewster angle. When oriented at this
. angle, a glass plate behaves like a sheet of polaroid, and the
effect is enhanced by having a whole series of parallel plates.
Galcite crystals are birefringent, which means that unpolarized
light entering a crystal splits up into two differently polarized
components. If already-polarized light enters either of these
two devices, its transmission coefficient can be varied by
rotating the device. In this way, the polarization of the light
can be measured.
85)This is a generalisation. Recall that Gutkowski et al (op.cit.
note 7^0 did argue in favour of some unknown parameter to
account for Holt's anomalous results. However, this is the only
occasion on which such views have been expressed in print, and
in my fieldwork I found no support for such a proposal.
86)A.Aspect, 'Proposed Experiment to Test the Nonseparability of
Quantum Mechanics', Physical Review Vol Dl^ (1976), 19^4-51-
87)Clauser and Shimony, op.cit. note 5, 1914 and 1921.
88)Aspect, op.cit. note 86, 19^+9•
89)lnterview with Aspect, Erice, Sicily, 22nd April, 1976.
90)A.Aspect, P.Grangier and G.Roger, 'Experimental Tests of
Realistic Local Theories Via Bell's Theorem' (institut d'Optique
Theorique et Appliquee, Universite de Paris-Sud, Orsay: March
1981, unpublished mimeo.)
91)Bell, op.cit. note 57•
92)A.Shimony, M.A.Horne and J.F.Clauser, 'Comment on "The Theory
of Local Beables"', Epistemologlcal Letters Vol 13 (1976), 1-8,
quote at 4.
93)itid., 5.
94)This is a well-known thought-experiment, discussed by James
Clerk Maxwell, which apparently violates the Second Law of
Thermodynamics by presenting an isolated physical system in which
entropy decreases as time passes. See M.W.Zemansky, Heat and
Thermodynamics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 271 for a good
account of this paradox.
95)J-S.Bell, 'Free Variables and Local Causality', Epistemological




98)lnterview with Michael Home, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., 13th
October, 1977.
99)This list is not intended to be a comprehensive review of
the wide variety of conclusions which have been drawn about LHV.
For further details of the views quoted, see D.Bohm and B.J.Hiley,
'On the Intuitive Understanding of Nonlocality as Implied by
Quantum Theory', Foundations of Physics Vol 5 (197*0» 93-109;
J.Sarfatti, 'Towards a Quantum Theory of Consciousness, the
Miraculous and God' (l977) and various other unpublished mimeos
from the Physics/Consciousness Research Group, San Francisco;
L.E.Ballentine, 'A Survey of Hidden Variable Theories' (Book
Review) Physics Today (October 197*0> 53-5; V.Augelli, A.Garuccio
andF.Selleri, 'La Mecanique Quantique et la Realite', Annales
de la Fondation Louis de Broglie Vol 1 (1976), 15*+-73; H.P.Stapp,
op.cit. note 49; and T.A.Brody and L. de la Pena-Auerbach,
'Real and Imagined Nonlocalities in Quantum Mechanics', Nuovo
Cimento Vol 5^B (1979), *+55-62.
100)See for example L.de la Pena, A.M.Cetto and T.A.Brody, 'On
Hidden Variable Theories and Bell's Inequality', Nuovo Cimento
Letters Vol 5 (1972), 177-8*+; D.Kershaw, 'Is There an Experimental
Reality to Hidden Variables?' (College Park, Maryland: Univesity
of Maryland, unpublished mimeo, 1973, Technical Report 7*+-03*+);
G.Lochak, 'Has Bell's Inequality a General Meaning for Hidden-
Variable Theories?*, Foundations of Physics Vol 6 (1976),
173-8*+; L.de Broglie, G.Lochak, L.A.Beswick and J.Vassalo-Pereira,
' Present, Predicted and Hidden Probabilities', Foundations of
Physics Vol 6 (1976), 3-1*+•
101)Italian theorists in particular have been involved in this
activity. See, for example, D.Gutkowski and G.Masotto, 'An
Inequality Stronger than Bell's Inequality', Nuovo Cimento
Vol 22B (197*+), 121-30; D.Gutkowski et al, op.cit. note 7*+;
L.Schiavulli and F.Selleri, 'Further Consequences of Einstein
Locality', Foundations of Rrysics Vol 9 (1979), 339-52; R.Livi,
'New Tests of Quantum Mechanics for Multi-Valued Observables',
Nuovo Cimento Letters Vol 19 (1977), 189-92.
102)Interview with John Clauser, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory,
Livermore, California, 31st October 1977*
103)Ironically, parapsychologists have become involved in the LHV
activity, but they now argue that the results in favour of QM
provide evidence to support their views. See, for example,
J.Sarfatti, op.cit. note 99•
10+f)This is of course a very general argument, discussed by Duhem,
Quine, Feyerabend, Lakatos and others. See Chapter One for a
fuller treatment of this argument.
105)Apart from differences in terminology, this conclusion seems
quite consistent with those reached by Collins (op.cit. note l),
Pickering (op.cit. note 3), and many other authors. Naturally,
not all who share this view would agree on whether to stress the
constraining influence exerted by culture, or the manner in which
physicists freely choose to employ those conceptual categories
which their cultural background makes available as resources, in
1.E o
order to account for experimental data. In the next chapter,
I shall expand on this point, and I shall also indicate the
particular advantages of my own terminology.
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Footnotes to Chapter Seven
1)For examples of historical studies of the role of science in
social debates, see R.M.Young, 'Evolutionary Biology and Ideology:
Then and Now', Science Studies Vol 1 (1971), 177-206; G.E.
Rosenberg, 'Scientific Theories and Social Thought', in S.B.
Barnes (ed) Sociology of Science (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972)
and D.A.MacKenzie, Statistics in Britain 1865-1930 (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, I98I). Other references to empirical
studies were provided in Chapter One.
2)0ne important feature of this* public/private subdivision of
science is the distinction between expert knowledge (facts)
and internal disagreements between scientists. In many cases,
this distinction has broken down, leading to a quite different
public conception of the expert. See, for example, A.Mazur,
'Disputes between experts', Minerva Vol 11 (1973) > 2^-62;
S.J.Reiser, 'Smoking and Health: The Congress and Causality',
in S.Lakoff (ed) Knowledge and Power (London: Collier-Macmillan,
1966), 293-3115 and D.Nelkin, 'The political impact of technical
expertise', Social Studies of Science Vol 5 (1975). 35~5^-
3)For a useful summary and synthesis of empirical studies of the
growth of specialties, see M.Mulkay, 'Sociology of Science in
the West', Current Sociology Vol 28 (I98O), 1-168, especially
pp 18-22. For a more detailed critical review of such studies,
see D.O.Edge and M.Mulkay, Astronomy Transformed, (New York:
Wiley, 1976), especially Chapter Ten.
^)lt is important not to confuse 'failed fields' with 'dead fields'.
For example, Fisher has studied Invariant Theory in mathematics,
which 'died' early this century. See C.S.Fisher, 'The Death of
a Mathematical Theory: a Study in the Sociology of Knowledge',
Archives for the History of the Exact Sciences Vol 3 (1966),
137~59» Invariant theory was at one time a central part of
mathematics. The mechanism of its decline is therefore not
directly relevant for FQM, which has never 'taken off''. However,
Fisher's account of the reasons for decline, such as the breakdown
of teacher-pupil links, does seem in agreement with my own
findings. Edge and Mulkay (op.cit. note 3) have criticised Fisher
for underemphasising intellectual factors, such as the feeling
that the main problems in Invariant Theory had been solved. Such
factors are indeed important in FQM: to its critics, the problems
which it deals with are merely pseudo-problems.
5)Mulkay (1980), op.cit. note 3> 19'
6)See Chapter One for a discussion of the methodological problems
posed by the peculiar social and cognitive structure of FQM.
7)As pointed out in Chapter Four, Edge and Mulkay have suggested
that 'transient networks', which do not fit the typical
description of scientific specialties, may be more common, and
more important, than we realise at present. See Edge and Mulkay,
op.cit. note 3> especially p 127.
8)Thus, norms are used to provide ex post facto rationalisations
of conduct. Garfinkel has suggested that jurors use 'official'
concepts of evidence, proof, and guilt to account for their
verdict:
"jurors did not actually have an understanding of the conditions
that defined a correct decision until after the decision had
been made. Only in retrospect did they decide what they did
that made their decisions correct ones. When the outcome was
in hand they went back to find the 'why', the things that led
up to the outcome....in order to give their decisions some
order, which namely, is the 'officialness' of the decision."
H.Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs, NJ;
Prentice-Hall, 1967), quote at 14.
I have also argued that we should view the use of von
Neumann's proof against Bohm's theory in just the same way.
9)0f course, Aspect's results will also have an important effect
on the plausibility of the timing hypothesis.
10)Detailed references to studies by Collins, Pickering, Pinch,
Travis, Wynne and other authors can be found in Chapter One.
11)H.M.Collins, 'The Seven Sexes; A Study in the Sociology of a
Phenomenon, or the Replication of Experiments in Physics',
Sociology Vol 9 (1975) > 205-2^-; and H.M.Collins, 'Son of Seven
Sexes; The Social Destruction of a Physical Phenomenon', Social
Studies of Science Vol 11 (1981), 33-62.
12)Collins (1981), op.cit. note 11, quote at emphasis in original.
13)This includes not only philosophical critiques of the concept
of falsifiability, but also historical studies of 'rejected
knowledge' which indicate that there is nothing inherent in
such knowledge which necessitates its rejection or otherwise
distinguishes it from 'good' science. See Chapter One for a more
detailed discussion of these points.
14)For example, Michalos writes;
"In the worst of all possible worlds, every term, and therefore
every report, would be theory-laden. So it would be impossible
to administer an unbiased test of any theory."
A.C .Michalos, 'Philosophy of Science; Historical, Social and
Value Aspects', in P.T.Durbin (ed) A Guide to the Culture of
Science, Technology and Medicine (London; MacMillan, I98O),
197-281, quote at 231.
Historically, the existence of mutually exclusive, incommensurable
theories in science is by no means unknown. Michalos seems to
feel that it is possible to break out of this theory-laden
universe by referring to 'facts', a term which he employs
unproblematically;
"When psychologists test alternative theories about the behaviour
of rats....there is typically no question about the observable
facts... .The whole point of the exercise is to try to provide
a satisfactory account of the facts. If the facts changed to
suit every theory, the exercise would effectively lose its
point. Similarly, demographers, epidemiologists, criminologists
and geographers typically have to dip into the very same pool
of.statistical time series - i.e. facts - in order to test,
confirm, or disconfirm their theories." (ibid., 231)
Not only does this account neglect empirical evidence about the
multiplicity of ways in which 'raw data' can he interpreted,
hut hy listing a number of disciplines which use the 'same'
facts in very different ways, it points very clearly to the
ways in which facts are mediated by social processes. In his
next sentence, Michalos virtually completes the case in favour
of relativism:
"Moreover, becoming a demographer, et cetera, implies learning
to interpret such common pools of facts in the proper ways."
(ibid., 231.)
15)H.M.Collins and R.G.Harrison, 'Building a TEA Laser: The Caprices
of Communication', Social Studies of Science Vol 5 (1975).
441-50; H.M.Collins, 'The TEA Set: Tacit Knowledge and Scientific
Networks', Science Studies Vol ^ (197^)» 165-85; Collins (1975)
op.cit. note 11; Collins (1981) op.cit. note 11; H.M.Collins,
'Upon the Replication of Scientific Findings: A Discussion
Illuminated by the Experiences of Researchers into Parapsychology'
Proceddings of the ^S/BSA Conference on Social Studies of
Science, Cornell University, November 1976 (unpublished mimeo,
University of Bath).
16)Figure 1 is taken from Collins (1976) , op.cit. note 15.
17)Collins (1975) op.cit. note 11, quote at 220.
18)Collins (1976), op.cit. note 15.
19)Although Figure 1 represents the extreme case of open-ended
controversy, it should be stressed that this is an idealized
case. Most controversies are much less symmetrical than this
figure would suggest. In particular, it should be noted that
the high-flux gravity wave case study, discussed by Collins,
does not really fit Figure 1 because, according to contemporary
theory-based expectations, gravity waves (in the great quantities
implied by Weber's claims) were not plausible.
20)Collins (1975), op.cit. note 11, quote at 220.
21)H.M.Collins, 'Stages in the Empirical Programme of Relativism',
Social Studies of Science Vol 11 (1981) 3-10, quote at
emphasis in original.
22)This rule should always be applied tentatively, and should not
be used to draw epistemological conclusions. In a footnote in
Chapter One, I criticised Collins for claiming that we could
use the concept of 'incorrect method' if all actors agreed that
the method was incorrect. I argued that consensus has no special
epistemological status within a relativist analysis, so that we
should avoid evaluative terms such as 'incorrect' in these
contexts.
I may seem to be falling into the same trap here. However,
I would stress that the identification of 'raw data' is always
tentative and contingent on the actual course of the debate.
There is, in principle, no aspect of the data which could not
be made into a point of dispute. Thus, 'raw data' may not always
be raw. Nevertheless, at any point in time, some aspects of the
data will be uncontentious. These aspects, while they remain
uncontentious, act as boundaries within which negotiation takes
place. As we have seen in Holt's case, this still leaves plenty
1-•?(«_
of scope for manoujivra for the 'determined advocate of hidden
variables'.
23)T.S.Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, I97O).
24)Wynne has suggested that Barkla's 'deviant' theories were
tolerated by the physics community, rather than made the focus
of controversybecause of Barkla's prestige. Like myself,
Wynne emphasises the existence of a range of reactions to
deviance, from simple admission of error to full-scale controversy.
He argues that our accounts of disputes must be flexible enough
to encompass all such possibilities:
"It is important to treat the patterns of social control in
science as flexible from situation to situation, and to be
sensitive to wider contextual factors which influence social
control as a process of interaction between groups or individuals."
B.Wynne, 'Between Orthodoxy and Oblivion: The Normalisation of
Deviance in Science', in R.Wallis (ed),On the Margins of Science:
The Social Construction of Rejected Knowledge, Sociological
Review Monograph No. 27 (keele: University of Keele, 1979)> 67-84,
quote at 69.
25)In their 'anthropological/ethnomethodological' study of
biochemists, Latour and Woolgar present a very chaotic, rapidly-
changing picture of science. See B.Latour and S.Woolgar,
Laboratory Life (Beverley Hills: Sage, 1979)* Latour has written
specifically on the issue in question here. See B.Latour, 'Is it
Possible to Reconstruct the Research Process?: Sociology of a
Brain Peptide', in K.D.Knorr, R.Krohn and R.Whitley (eds),
The Social Process of Scientific Investigation, Sociology of the
Sciences Yearbook, Vol 4 (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980), 53-73■
However, the particular scientific activity under study here seems
atypically open: experimenters in principle could choose to
produce any of 2-6 x 10^ substances, and their choice was,
to a considerable extent, arbitrary. Each new substance led
them to redefine their strategy in order to give their choice,
and their past choices, a gloss of rationality. Areas such as
LHV, where experiments take over a year to complete, seem almost
static by comparison.
26)Compare Collins (1975)» op.cit. note 11, and Collins (1981), ibid.
27)The undeniably special sociological status of science (as a
professionalized body and as our society's major arbiter of
valid knowledge) has often been associated with epistemological
demarcation criteria such as falsiflability and rationality. One
does not have to be a relativist to question such associations.
For an intermediate view of the relationship between science and
other forms of belief, see Robin Horton, 'African Traditional
Thought and Western Science' , in M.F.D.Young (ed) Knowledge and
Control: New Directions for the Sociology of Education (London:
Collier-MacMillan, 1971). 208-66.
28)A1though in this thesis I have discussed plausibility only in
qualitative terms, it should be possible in principle to carry
out a meaningful quantitative (or at least systematic)
assessment of plausibility by sociometric means.
29)As this thesis was being typed, Aspect's experimental report,
cited as a preprint in Chapter Six, appeared in print. See
A.Aspect, P.Grangier and G.Roger, 'Experimental Tests of Realistic
Local Theories via Bell's Theorem', Physical Review Letters
Vol 4? (1981), 460-3.
This experiment, which agreed with QM but which did not include
a test of the 'timing hypothesis', was reported in The Times
(28th August 1981, p 2) under the heading 'Random events
overrun Einstein'. (i am grateful to David Edge for this
reference). This article, attributed to 'the Staff of Nature',
makes the fairly common mistake of failing to distinguish
between local and non-local hidden variables. Thus, the authors
imply that a refutation of LHV means that "there can be no
hidden variables to account for the randomness of QJVT. In
addition, the authors misunderstand the implications of this
experiment for the timing hypothesis; they claim that this
result rules out all HVTs which obey the theory of relativity.
Certainly, non-local HVTs seem to conflict with relativity, but
until the timing hypothesis is tested, it remains possible that
signals are transmitted at speeds less than that of light,
causing no conflict with relativity.
An article in The Times cannot be considered to represent
the reaction of the physics community as a whole. It is too
early to judge the reaction to Aspect's result among more
informed physicists. Nevertheless, it would be quite in keeping
with my own account to find that Aspect will be credited with





NOTE: Throughout this questionnaire, all work dealing with criticism of
the 'orthodox interpretation' of quantum mechanics, counter-proposals,
and objections to such counter-proposals, is for convenience defined
as 'work on the interpretation of QM'.
It would be very useful for us to knew details of the careers of
physicists who have worked on the interpretation cf QM. Accordingly, we
would greatly appreciate it if you could send a curriculum vitae and a
bibliography of your published work when you return this questionnaire.
•
To make our survey more comprehensive, we wish to learn of as many
of the people in this field as possible. Also, one cf the aspects we
are studying is the communication between people working in chis area.
For both these reasons, we would be very grateful if you could also send
a list cf people tc whom you send preprints or offprints, and, if possible,
a list of those - fr.cn whom ycu''receive .such'.material.
SECTION ONE: Biographical Details
l) How did you first become interested in the problems of the
interpretation cf QM?
(Please tick one or mc.ro of the options)
Talking to colleagues
Influence of a supervisor or teacher
Reading popular scientific books and journals
Reading lass specialist books or journals
Reading papers in specialist journals □
□
□
Reading books or journals in the philosophy of science j J
Attending a conference □
Other (Please specify)
If ycu can recall a single person or event as giving an important




At what stage in your career did you first take an interest in wcrl
on the interpretation of QM?
(Tick one)
Before university/college j j
As an undergraduate [3
As a graduate sundent ; i
As a professional scientist. ' j._J
Other (specify)
At any. stage of your career, have you been a student (undergraduat




If yes, please give details:
It any stage in your postgraduate career, have you worked in the
seme department, or in close proximity, with such physicists?
Yes P
No Q
[f yes, pleo.se give details:
In which areas have you worked? (Please tick one or more.)











What is your main interest in this field?
Ub -(
3.
How much of your professional time is taken up with work on the
interpretation of QM?
(Tick one only)
All of it, i.e. full-tine i !
A major part (more than 50$) '•—!
A miner part (less than 50$) i—1
Only an occasional paper, tut keeping up-to-date in reading [_]
A paper or two some tine ago, and since then have ■ | j
neglected the field.
Is this proportion changing as time goes on?
Yes Lj
No Lj
If no, go on to Question 10.
Hcv is this proportion changing?
Increasing t j
Decreasing j_J
Please explain why this is so (e.g. change of interest, other
commitments, completion of an experiment, etc.)
Apart from the interpretation of QM, what are your professional interests?
Have you ever taught an undergraduate pr postgraduate class in
quantum mechanics?
No LJ
If yes, go on to Question 13.
k.
If no, how would you deal with prchlens of interpretation if you
were to teach such a class?
Ignore then
Mention them in passing
Stress their importance
Offer a separate course cn them
Do you have any other comments about the teaching of QM?
Now go cn to Question 15.




Are there any textbooks which you dislike and would definitely net use
What do you object to in these textbooks?
In your teaching, how do you deal with
Ignore them
Mention them in passing
Stress their importance
Offer a separate course cn them
Do you have any other comments about tl
problems of interpretation of Q
□
a
2 teaching of QM?
i— <. \
5.
15) Have you ever supervised graduate students whose research has been
on the interpretation cf Qi-I?
Yes □
no G
If yes, nay we contact you for further details?
Yes i_J
No □
SECTION TUO: Your impression of the work done in this
field, and of the people who do it.
16) It has been suggested that !ia growing number of p>hysicists today
declare themselves to be dissatisfied with the interpretation
of the Copenhagen School". (Recherche, jj., p. 653, 197^)
Do you personally feel that the number of physicists interested




Please give c brief explanation for this phenomenon.
Do you know of any evidence, numerical or otherwise, of this trend?
Yes D
No □





In "your opinion, what does the physics community in general think of
this field? (e.g. 'a vaste of tine', or 'interesting but irrelevant'
or 'very important', etc .)




If so, may we contact ycu for further details?
Yes □
No P
Do you think that the physics community.in general is more, or less,
interested in problems of interpretation, than it was 15 years ago?
More interested j__|
Less interested D
Interest unchanged j j
Why do ycu think this is so?
We would like tc investigate the factors which notivate people to work
in this field. How important are the following ideas as motivating
factors in your work?







The need for a homogeneous account of the
world (i.e. classical/quantum barrier removed)
The 'paradoxes' in quantum measurement
theory (e.g. Scbrcdinger's Cat)
The 'incompleteness' of QM. as discussed
by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen
The loss of determinism in QM
The loss of locality in QM
The existence of dogmatism among some
quantum theorists
The possibility of doing interesting
experimental work
The possibility of doing interesting
theoretical work
The possibility of working with a certain
persqn (viz: )
The chance of gaining recognition by
doing good work •
Others (specify)
Please list t papers which you would recommend, as the best way of
introducing a newcomer to the main ideas in this field.
Please list the 5
greatest interest
papers which, in your
in this field.
opinion, have stimulated the
-VI v
Please list the 5 men who, in ycur opinion, have contributed, most tc
vers on the interpretation of QM.
Do you feel that your opinions have changed since you first became
interested in the interpretation *cf QM?
Yes ■
No
If yes, please explain the way in which tney have changed, and the
reasons for the change.




If yes, may we.contact, ycu for further details?
Yes □
No U
Have you any knowledge of the experiments performed since 1971 to




If no, go on to question 2b.
How/
25) Hcv'nuch do you knew about the experiments of:



















Kasday, Ullrian & ¥u
Aspect
Others (specify)
Were you surprised by any of the results actually obtained?
1To IJ
If sc, which and why?
Holt and. Faraci et al disagree with the other results. Please comment
on the following statements:




| Holt's result is less likely to be true than
1 Clauser, Freednan, Fry and Thornscon's
Faraci et al's result is less likely to be
true than Kasday et al's.
On the whole, the results refute the
existence of LHV's
On the whole, the results prove the
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The results lead to no definite conclusion
and further experiments are required
Aspect's experiment with timing will finally
settle the issue
Experiments with timing and ideal
detectors would settle the issue
Our task new is to develop new concepts
and a new language to describe the world
in non-local terms
The non-local correlations violate relativity
theory by suggesting instantaneous reduction
of the wave packet
There is no clash with relativity because
nothing physically real is transmitted
instantaneously <
| At larger separations, the correlations
[
may give the LKV result
[ QM has more problems now than before these
1 experiments were done |
Other comments:-




If no, go on to Question 27.
Vtl
26. (ccntd.)






This experiment disproves the Bchm-Bub
model
This experiment sets a limit on theJ. *
relaxation time
This experiment is irrelevant because
the relaxation time value is not
crucial to the model
This experiment is irrelevant because
of problems with identity of photons .
Other coimnents on thib experiment:-




If yes, please give details:
28) Are there any people with whom you frequently communicate or used to
communicate on this subject e.g. by letter or telephone, or in person?
Yes G
No i__|
If so, please give details:
Is/was this communication:
To exchange information on experimental techniques < ."1
Involved with writing a joint paper I }
Other (specify)
23* 12
SECTION THREE: Funding and Publishing, and difficulties
encountered.
29) Have you ever applied for a grant or ether finance specifically
to do work in these areas?
Yes G
No Q
If so, may we contact you for further details?
Yes Q
No □
30) Do you agree with one physicist's claim that "it's nc more difficult to




If ycu disagree, do ycu have any evidence for this, from your own
experience-, or the experience of others?
Yes □
No □
If so, may we contact you for further details?
Yes LJ
Nc Q




If yes, why do you think this is sc?
Larger proportion of 'crank' papers ) |
The need to keep standards high to improve the i~1
reputation of this field





31} Have ycu yourself, c.r anyone you knew, had such a paper rejected
(contd.) ' for what you feel are poor reasons?
1 i
No CI
If so, nay we contact ycu for further details?
Yes Q
No Ll
32) If ycu were locking for recent papers in this field putlished in
physics journals, which journals would ycu consult? Please list







33) In 19o2 David Bchm expressed the view that "some consideration
of theories involving hidden variables is at present needed to
help us to avoid dogmatic preconceptions". Other people have
claimed that the "orthodoxy" of physics is intolerant of criticism
and that unorthodox work is unwelcome and discouraged. Do ycu feel
that physicists who hold unorthodox views about QM have any great
difficulties in carrying out their work?
(Tick one only.)
No more than usual j j
Some more, but nothing drastic j I
Exceptional difficulties LJ
3*0 In your opinion, if a young physicist begins his professional life




Do ycu have any evidence of dogmatism or other difficulties faced "by
physicists who are critical of "orthodox" quantum mechanics?
Yes Q
No p
If so, may we contact you fcr further details?
Yes O
No D
"It has been claimed that even the most 'Progressive' theoretician
believes at the bottom of his heart in a strictly deterministic,
objective world even if his teachings categorically deny such a view.
(Max Jammer) Others have claimed that the Copenhagen Interpretation
.is positivistic and does not permit the idea of an objective reality.
Do you feel that one's stand on such philosophical issues influences
one's opinion about the interpretation of QM?
(Tick one only.)
Philosophical position is a crucial factor □
Philosophical position is an important factor | i
It is a possible factor jI
One's philosophical stand has no connection with [_j
the physical theories one believes
Please explain briefly why ycu held this view:
In the controversy over hereditary and environmental influence cn
intelligence, it has been suggested that one's political viewpoint
correlates strongly with one's stand on this issue.
Do ycu feel this has any truth in quantum mechanics?
Strong correlation between stand on : ]
QM and political stand
Possibly some correlation dJ
No connection at all g 1
Please./
15.
37) Please explain briefly why ycu held this view:
(ccntd.)
Do you have any evidence (e.g. correspondence) for this view?
Yes jTI
No O
If so, nay we contact ycu for further details?
Yes Li
No Q
38) What has been achieved by work done on the interpretation of QM?
(Tick one or mere)
Positive contribution to physics | i
Negative results but useful analysis j i
Confusing proliferation of theories j J
Little or no worthwhile results 'CD
Any other comments:
39) Lastly, are there any changes ycu would like to make to the present









Thank you for your cooperation. May we remind you of cur
request for a curriculum vitae, bibliography, and preprint
names ana addresses lisbs. We hope that you have not been
inconvenienced by this survey, and that perhaps ycu found
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Details of Interviews
Interviewee Location Date
J.S.Bell Edinburgh March 4th 1?'76




A.Aspect II April 22nd 1976
E.Fitchard Stirling April l4th 1977
J.Dorling London July 4th 1977
D.Bohm II July 5th 1977
B.J.Hiley II II
D.O'Brien Dundee July 11th 1977
T.Tonietti Edinburgh August 19th 1977
L.Kasday New York September 20th 1977
D.Scarl Farmingdale, NY September 21st 1977
A.Komar New York September 23rd 1977
A.Petersen II II
D.Finkelstein II II
J.Ullraan II September 24th 1977
M.Bunge Montreal September 26th 1977
D.Blohm II IV
R.Holt London, Ontario September 28th 1977





S .Prugovecki Toronto September 30th 1977
P.Pearle Clinton, NY October 4th 1977
M.Sachs Buffalo, NY October 7th 1977
G.Smith Philadelphia October 9th 1977
S.Kochen Princeton, NJ October 10th 1977
S.Reynolds II October 11th 1977
E .Wigner II II
E.Nelson II II
F.M.Pipkin Cambridge, Mass. October 13th 1977
M.Horne II II
A.Siegel Boston October l4th 1977




















Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch also interviewed the following
scientists on my behalf, using lists of questions which I had
prepared: J.F.Clauser, S.Freedman, N.Herbert, J.Sarfatti, P.Werbos
and O.Costa de Beauregard.
Andy Pickering also interviewed John Bell on my behalf, again using
a list of questions which I had prepared.
io 4
Bibliography
Aleksandrov, A.D., Kolmogorov, A.N., and Lawrent'ev, M.A. (eds)
Mathematics: Its Content, Methods, Meaning (English translation by
American Mathematical Society; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969).
Allen, R.E. 'Consistency of Language and Interpretations of Quantum
Mechanics' (College Station, Texas: unpublished mimeo, Physics
Department, Texas A & M University, 1977)•
Aspect, A 'Proposed Experiment to Test the Nonseparability of
Quantum Mechanics' , Physical Review Vol Dl4 (1976), 1944-51.
Aspect, A., Grangier, P and Roger, G 'Experimental Tests of Realistic
Local Theories via Bell's Theorem', Physical Review Letters Vol 47
(1981), 460-3.
Augelli, V., Garuccio, A., and Selleri, F. 'La Mecanique Quantique
et la Realite', Annales de la Fondation Louis de Broglie Vol 1 (1976),
154-73.
Ballentine, L.E., 'The Statistical Interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics', Reviews of Modern Physics Vol 42 (1970), 358-81.
Ballentine, L.E., 'The Formalism is not the Interpretation', Physics
Today Vol 24 (April 1971), 36-38.
Ballentine, L.E., 'Can the Statistical Postulate of Quantum Theory
Be Derived - a Critique of the Many-Universes Interpretation',
Foundations of Physics Vol 3 (1973), 229-40.
Ballentine, L.E., Book Review of 'A Survey of Hidden Variable
Theories', Physics Today (October 1974), 53-5°
Baracca, A., Bohm, D.J., Hiley, B.J., and Stuart, A.E.G, 'On Some
New Notions Concerning Locality and Nonlocality in the Quantum
Theory', Nuovo Cimento Vol 28b (1975), 453-65*
Barbour, I.G., Issues in Science and Religion (New York: Harper
Torchbooks, 1966). ~~~
Barnes, S.B., (ed) Sociology of Science (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1972).
Barnes, B., Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974).
Barnes, B., Interests and the Growth of Knowledge (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1977)•
Barnes, B., and Shapin, S., (eds) Natural Order (Beverley Hills: Sage,
1979).
Bates, D.R., (ed) Q.uantum Theory Vol 3 (London: Academic Press, 1962).
Bates, D.R., and Bederson, B. (eds) Advances in Atomic and Molecular
Physics Vol 14 (New York: Academic Press, 1978).
Becker, H., Outsiders (New York: Free Press, 1963).
Bedau, H.A., 'Complementarity and the Relation between Science and
Religion', Zygon Vol 9 (1974), 202-24.
Belinfante, F.J., A Survey of Hidden Variable Theories (Oxford:
Pergamon, 1973)•
~3>O~7
Belinfante, F.J., Measurement and Time Reversal in Objective
Quantum Theory (Qxford: Pergamon, 1976).
Bell, J.S., 'On the Einstein Podolsky Rosen Paradox', Physics
Vol 1 (1964), 195-200.
Bell, J.S., 'On the Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics',
Reviews of Modern Physics Vol 38 (1966), *447-52.
Bell, J.S., 'The Theory of Local Beables', Epistemological Letters
Vol 9 (1976), 11-24.
Bell, J.S., 'Free Variables and Local Causality', Epistemological
Letters Vol 15 (1977), 79-8*4-.
Bentley, R., The Relationship between Dialectical Materialism and
Soviet Quantum Mechanics (unpublished M.Sc. thesis, University of
Sussex, 1972).
Berger, P., The Social Reality of Religion (London: Faber and Faber,
1969).
Berger, P., and Luckmann, T., The Social Construction of Reality
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971)•
Bergstein, T., Quantum Physics and Ordinary Language (London:
MacMillan, 197^)-
Blokhintsev, D.I., The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics (Dordrecht:
Reidel, 1968).
Bloor, D., Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1976).
Blumenthal, R.B., et al., 'Deviation from Simple Quantum
Electrodynamics', Physical Review Letters Vol 1*1 (1965), 660-3.
Bohm, D., Quantum Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ; Prentice-Hall, 1951).
Bohm, D., 'A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in
terms of "Hidden Variables", Part I', Physical Review Vol 85 (1952)
166-79; 'Part II', ibid., 180-93.
Bohm, D., Causality and Chance in Modern Physics (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1957)•
Bohm, D., and Aharonov, Y., 'Discussion of Experimental Proof for
the Paradox of Einstein, Rosen and Podolsky', Physical Review
Vol 108 (1957), 1070-6.
Bohm, D. and Bub, J., 'A Proposed Solution of the Measurement
Problem in Quantum Mechanics by a Hidden Variable Theory', Reviews
of Modem Physics Vol 38 (1966), 453-69°
Bohm, D. and Hiley, B.J., 'On the Intuitive Understanding of
Nonlocality as Implied by Quantum Theory', Foundations of Physics
Vol 5 (1975), 93-109.
Bohm, D. and Hiley, B.J., 'Some Remarks on Sarfatti's Proposed
Connection between Quantum Phenomena and the Volitional Activity
of the Observer-Participator', Psychoenergetic Systems Vol 1 (1976)
173-8: -
JO?
Bohr, N., Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge (New York: Wiley, 1958).
Bom, M., Atomic Physics (London: Blackie, 1961).
Born, M., Physics in My Generation (New York: Springer, 1969).
Brody, T.A. and de la Pena-Auerbach, L., 'Real and Imagined
Nonlocalities in Q.uantum Mechanics' , Nuovo Gimento Vol 54b (1979),
455-62.
de Broglie, L., 'The Reinterpretation of Wave Mechanics', Foundations
of Physics Vol 1 (1970), 5-15.
de Broglie, L., 'Basic Principles of Wave Mechanics', Gomptes Rendus
Vol B277 (16th July 1973), 71-3.
de Broglie, L., Lochak, G., Beswick, J.A., and Vassalo-Pereira, J.,
'Present, Predicted and Hidden Probabilities', Foundations of Physics
Vol 6 (1976), 3-14.
Bruno, M., D'Agostino, M., and Maroni, C., 'Measurement of Linear
Polarization of Positron-Annihilation Photons', Nuovo Gimento Vol 40B
(1977), 142-52.
Brush, S.G., 'The Chimerical Gat:. Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics in
Historical Perspective', Social Studies of Science Vol 10 (1980),
393-447.
Bub, J., 'Hidden Variables and the Copenhagen Interpretation: A
Reconciliation', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,
Vol 19 (1968), 185-210.
Bub, J., 'What is a Hidden Variable Theory of Quantum Phenomena?',
International Journal of Theoretical Physics Vol 2 (1969), 101-23.
Bub, J., 'On the Possibility of a Phase-Space Reconstruction of
Quantum Statistics: A Refutation of the Bell-Wigner Locality
Argument*, Foundations of Physics Vol 3 (1973)> 29-44.
Bub, J., The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (Dordrecht: Reidel,
1974).
Cameron, I., and Edge, D., Aspects of Scientism (Siscon Report,
Dept. of Liberal Studies in Science, Manchester University, 1975);
now published by Butterworth (London, 1979)-
Capra, F., The Tap of Physics (London: Fontana, 1975)*
Castaneda, C., The Teachings of don Juan, A Yaqui Way of Knowledge
(Berkeley, Calif.:University of California Press, 1968).
Chalmers, A.F., What is this thing called science? (Milton Keynes:
Open University Press, 1978).
Chant, C., and Fauvel, J. (eds) Darwin to Einstein: Historical
Studies on Science and Belief (Harlow: Longman, I98O).
Clark, P.M. and Turner, J.E., 'Experimental Tests of Quantum Mechanics'
Physics Letters Vol 26a (1968), 447.
Clauser, J.F., 'Proposed Experiment to test Local Hidden-Variable
Theories', Bulletin of the American Physical Society Vol 14 (1969), 578.
Clauser, J.F., 'Experimental Limitations to the Validity of
Semiclassical Radiation Theories', Physical Review Vol 6a (1972), 49-54.
Clauser, J.F., 'Experimental Distinction between the Quantum and
Classical Field-Theoretic Predictions for the Photoelectric Effect* ,
Physical Review Vol QD (1974), 853-60.
Clauser, J.F., 'Experimental Investigation of a Polarization
Correlation Anomaly', Physical Review Letters, Vol 36 (1976), 1223-6.
Clauser, J.F., 'Measurement of the Circular-Polarization Correlation
in Photons from an Atomic Cascade', Nuovo Cimento Vol 33B (1976), 743-6.
Clauser, J.F., 'Philosophical Motivations of Bell's Theorem and the
Experimenter's Problem' (Berkeley, Calif.:Lawrence Berkeley Lab.,
University of California, unpublished mimeo LBL-5418, April 1976).
Glauser, J.F., Home, M.A., Shimony, A., and Holt, R.A., 'Proposed
Experiment to Test Local Hidden-Variable Theories', Physical Review
Letters Vol 23 (1969), 880-4.
Clauser, J.F. and Home, M.A., 'Experimental Consequences of Objective
Local Theories', Physical Review Vol D10 (1974), 526-35-
Clauser, J.F. and Shimony, A., 'Bell's Theorem: Experimental Tests
and Implications', Reports on Progress in Physics Vol 4l (1978), 1881-927-
Collins, H.M., 'The TEA Set: Tacit Knowledge and Scientific Networks',
Science Studies Vol 4 (1974), 165-85.
Collins, H.M., 'The Seven Sexes: A Study in the Sociology of a
Phenomenon or the Replication of Experiments in Physics', Sociology
Vol 9 (1975), 205-24.
Collins, H.M., 'Upon the Replication of Scientific Findings: A
Discussion Illuminated by the Experiences of Researchers into
Parapsychology', Proceedings of the 4S/BSA Conference on Social
Studies of Science, Cornell University, November 1976 (School of
Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Bath, unpublished mimeo).
Collins, H.M., 'The Investigation of Frames of Meaning in Science:
Complementarity and Compromise', Sociological Review Vol 27 (1979),
703-18.
Collins, H.M., 'The Role of the Core-Set in Modern Science: Social
Contingency with Methodological Propriety in Discovery', History of
Science Vol 19 (1981), 6-19.
Collins, H.M., 'Stages in the Empirical Programme of Relativism',
Social Studies of Science Vol 11 (198I), 3-10.
Collins, H.M., 'Son of Seven Sexes: The Social Destruction of a
Physical Phenomenon', Social Studies of Science Vol 11 (1981), 33-62.
Collins, H.M. and Cox, G., 'Recovering Relativity: Did Prophecy
Fail?', Social Studies of Science Vol 6 (1976), 423-44.
Collins, H.M. and Harrison, R.G., 'Building a TEA Laser: The Caprices
of Communication', Social Studies of Science Vol 5 (1975)> 441-50.
Conn, G.K.T. and Fowler, G.N., (eds) Essays in Physics Vol 2 (London:
Academic Press, 1970).
Crane, D., Invisible Colleges (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1972).
Curtis, J.E. and Petra, J.W. (eds) The Sociology of Knowledge (London:
Duckworth, 1970).
3 ) o
Daneri, A., Loinger, A., and Prosper!, G.M., 'Quantum Theory of
Measurement and Ergodicity Conditions', Nuclear Physics Vol 33
(1962), 297-319.
Daneri, A., Loinger, A., and Prosperi, G.M., 'Further Remarks on
the Relations Between Statistical Mechanics and Quantum Theory of
Measurement', Nuovo Cimento Vol 44b (1966), 119-28.
Davies, P., Other Worlds; Space, Superspace and the Q.uantum Universe
(London: Dent, I98O). ~
Day, T.B., 'Demonstration of Quantum Mechanics in the Large',
Physical Review Vol 121 (1961), 1204—6.
DeWitt, B.S., 'Quantum Mechanics and Reality', Physics Today Vol 23
(September 1970), 30-35.
DeWitt, B.S., 'Replies to Critics', Physics Today Vol 24- (April 1971),
4-1-4-.
DeWitt, B.S. and Graham, N.R., 'Resource Letter IQM-1 on the
Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics', American Journal of Physics
Vol 39 (1971), 724-38.
DeWitt, B.S. and Graham, N. (eds), The Many-Worlds Interpretation
of Quantum Mechanics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).
Dolby, R.G.A., 'Controversy and Consensus in the Growth of Scientific
Knowledge' (Canterbury, Kent: Unit for the History, Philosophy and
Social Relations of Science, University of Kent, unpublished mimeo).
Durbin, P.T. (ed) A Guide to the Culture of Science, Technology and
Medicine (London: MacMillan, 1980).
Eberhard, P.H., 'Tests of Unitarity* (Berkeley, Calif.: Lawrence
Berkeley Lab, University of California, unpublished mimeo LBL-4885,
May 1976).
Edge, D.O., 'Quantitative Measures of Communication in Science: A
Critical Review', History of Science Vol 17 (1979)» 102-34.
Edge, D.O. and Mulkay, M.J., Astronomy Transformed (New York: Wiley-
Interscience, 1976).
Edwards, J., and Ballentine, L.E., 'Sufficient Conditions for
Objective Local Theories, Part I', Nuovo Cimento Vol 29B (l975)>
100-10, and 'Part II', ibid., Vol 34b (1976), 91-6.
Einstein, A., Podolsky, B., and Rosen, N., 'Can Quantum-Mechanical
Description of Physical Reality be Considered Complete?', Physical
Review Vol 47 (1935), 777-80.
Eppley, K., and Hannah, E., 'The Necessity of Quantizing the
Gravitational Field', Foundations of Physics Vol 7 (1977), 51-68.
D'Espagnat, B., Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (Reading,
Mass.: Benjamin, 1976).
D'Espagnat, B., 'The Quantum Theory and Reality', Scientific
American (November 1979), 128-40.
Faraci, G., Gutkowski, S., Notarrigo, S., and Pennisi, A.R., 'An
Experimental Test of the'EPR Paradox', Nuovo Cimento Letters
Vol 9 (1974), 607-11.
in
Faraci, G., and. Pennisi, A.R., 'Polarization of the Annihilation
Photons of Triplet Positronium', Nuovo Gimento Vol 31B (1976), 289-95.
Faraci. G. and Pennisi, A., 'Polarization Correlation of a Photon
Pair', Physics Letters Vol 66a (1978), 15-6.
Faraci, G. and Pennisi, A., 'Polarization of Triplet Ps Photons in
Assymmetrical Decay', Nuovo Cimento Vol 55B (I98O), 257-63.
Fisher, C.S., 'The Death of a Mathematical Theory: a Study in the
Sociology of Knowledge', Archives for the History of the Exact
Sciences Vol 3 (1966), 137-59.
Flato, M., Marie, Z., Milosevic, A., Sternheimer, D., and Vigier, J. P.,
(eds), Quantum Mechanics, Determinism, Causality and Particles
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976).
Forman, P., 'Weimar Culture, Causality and Quantum Theory, 1918-1927:
Adaptation "by German Physicists and Mathematicians to a Hostile
Intellectual Environment', Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences,
Nc- 3 (R. McComack, ed.) (Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1971).
Forman, P. 'The Reception of an Acausal Quantum Mechanics in Germany
and Britain', in S.H.Mauskopf (ed) The Reception of Unconventional
Science (Washington: American Association for the Advancement of
Science, 1978), 1-50.
Fox, R., 'Low-Energy Proton-Proton Scattering as a Test of Local
HVT', Nuovo Cimento Letters Vol 2 (1971), 565-7>
Fox, R., and Rosner, B., 'Proposed Experiment to test Local HVTs',
Physical Review Vol D4 (1971), 1243-4.
Freedman, S.J., and Clauser, J.F., 'Experimental Test of Local
Hidden-Variable Theories', Physical Review Letters Vol 28 (1972),
938-4-1.
Freedman, S.J. and Holt, R.A., 'Tests of Local Hidden-Variable
Theories in Atomic Physics', Comments in Atomic and Molecular Physics
Vol 5 (1975), 55-62. " " "
Freedman, S., and Wigner, E., 'On Bub's Misunderstanding of Bell's
Locality Argument', Foundations of Physics Vol 3 (1973), 29-44.
Frieden, B.R., 'Uncertainty Product for a Subensemble of Particles',
International Journal of Theoretical Physics Vol 15 (1976), 389-91*
Friedberg, R., 'Verifiable Consequences of the Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen Criterion for Reality', (Columbia University, New York:
unpublished mimeo, 1970).
Fry, E.S., 'Two-Photon Correlations in Atomic Transitions', Physical
Review Vol A8 (1973), 1219-27.
Fry, E.S., and McGuire, J.H., 'An Experimental Test of Local Hidden
Variable Theories' (unpublished proposal to Texas A & M University
Research Council, November 1971).
Fry, E.S., and Thompson, R.C., 'Experimental Test of Local Hidden-
Variable Theories', Physical Review Letters Vol 37 (1976), 465-8.
Garfinkel, H., Studies in Ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, 1967).
3 ll_
Garuccio, A., and Seller!, F., 'Quantum. Mechanics and Society'
(unpublished mimeo, Istituto di Fisica, Universita di Bari, I977).
Gaston, J., Originality and Competition in Science; A Study of the
British High Energy Physics Community (Chicago; University of Chicago
Press, 1973)-
George, A. et al (eds) Louis de Broglie: Sa Conception du Monde
Physique (Paris: Gauthiers-Villars, 1973)•
Georgescu-Roegen, N., The Entropy Law and the Economic Process
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971)•
Gilbert, G.N., 'Referencing as Persuasion', Social Studies of Science
Vol 7 (1977), 113-22.
Gilbert, G.N., 'Being Interviewed - a Role Analysis', Social Science
Information Vol 19 (I98O), 227-36.
Graham, L., 'Quantum Mechancis and Dialectical Materialism', Slavic
Review Vol 25 (1966), 381-^-10.
Graham, L., Science and Philosophy .in the Soviet Union (London:
Allen Lane, 1973)•
Green, H.S., Matrix Mechanics (Groningen: Noordhoff, 1965).
Gutkowski, D., and Masotto, G., 'An Inequality Stronger than
Bell's Inequality', Nuovo Cimento Vol 22B (197^)» 121-30.
Gutkowski, D., Masotto, G., and Valdes, M .V., 'On the Sufficiency of
Bell's Conditions', Nuovo Cimento Vol 50B (1979)» 323-^3•
Hagstrom, W.O., The Scientific Community (bW • Sasic ).
Hall, J., Kim, C., McElroy, B., and Shimony, A., 'Wave-Packet
Reduction as a Medium of Communication', Foundations of Physics
Vol 7 (1977), 759-67.
Hanson, N.R., The Concept of the Positron (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1963).
Harvey, B., 'Cranks and Others: Science as a Sociological Phenomenon',
New Scientist (l6th March 1978), 739-^1.
Harvey, B., 'Rationality, Relativism and the Sociology of Science:
The Case of Local Hidden Variable Theory' (unpublished mimeo:
Science Studies Unit, University of Edinburgh, April 1978).
Harvey, B, 'The Effects of Social Context on the Process of
Scientific Investigation: Experimental Tests of Quantum Mechanics',
in K.D.Knorr, R.Krohn and R.D.Whitley (eds), The Social Process of
Scientific Investigation, Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook, Vol k
(Dordrecht: Reidel, I98O), 139-63•
Harvey, B., 'Plausibility and the Evaluation of Knowledge: A
Case-Study of Experimental Quantum Mechanics', Social Studies of
Science, Vol 11 (1981), 95-130.
Heisenberg, W., Physics and Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1958).
Hesse, M., The Structure of Scientific Inference (London: MacMillan,
197*0 •
"5\1
Hiley, B.J., 'Ghostly Interactions in Physics', New Scientist
(6th March, 1980), 7^6-9.
Holroyd, S», Psi and the Consciousness Explosion (London: Bodley
Head, 1977).
Holt, R.A., Atomic Cascade Experiments (unpublished PhD thesis,
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1973)•
Holt, R.A. and Pipkin, F.M., 'Quantum Mechanics Versus Hidden
Variables: Polarization Correlation Measurement on an Atomic
Mercury Cascade', (Cambridge, Mass.: Department of Physics, Harvard
University, unpublished mimeo, 197^)•
Inglis, D.R., 'Completeness of Quantum Mechanics', Reviews of Modern
Physics Vol 33 (1961), 1-7.
Jammer, M. , The Philosophy of Q.uantum Mechanics (New York: Wiley, 197^)
Jauch, J.M., Are Q.uanta Real? (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana
University Press, 1973)-
Jauch, J.M., and Piron, C., 'Hidden Variables Revisited', Reviews of
Modern Physics Vol ^0 (1968), 228-9.
Jauch, J.M., Wigner, E.P., and Yanase, M.M., 'Some Comments Concerning
Measurements in Quantum Mechanics', Nuovo Cimento Vol ^B (1967),
l^J-51.
Joravsky, D., Soviet Marxism and Natural Science, 1917-32 (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, I96I).
Joravsky, D., The Lysenko Affair (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1970).
Kasday, L.R., The Distribution of Compton Scattered Annihilation
Photons and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument (unpublished PhD
thesis, Columbia University, New York, 1972).
Kasday, L.R., Ullman, J.D., and Wu, C.S., 'Angular Correlation of
Compton-Scattered Annihilation Photons and Hidden Variables',
Nuovo Cimento Vol 25B (1975), 633-61.
Kershaw, D., 'Is There an Experimental Reality to Hidden Variables?',
(College Park, Maryland: unpublished mimeo, University of Maryland,
1973, Technical Report 7^-03^)-
Knorr, K.D., Krohn, R., and Whitley, R.D., (eds) The Social Process
of Scientific Investigation, Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook, Vol ^
(Dordrecht: Reidel, I98O).
Kocher, C.A., and Commins, E.D., 'Polarization Correlation of Phtons
Emitted in an Atomic Cascade', Physical Review Letters Vol 18 (1967),
575-7.
Kuhn, T.S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970).
Lakatos, I., Proofs and Refutations (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1976).
Lakatos, I., 'History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions',
in Buck and Cohen (eds), Boston Studies Vol 8 (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1971)
Lamehi-Rachti, M., Mecanique Quantique et Theories des Variables
Cachees Locales (unpublished PhD thesis, Universite de Paris-Sud,
19wr.
1 \ lv
Lamehi-Rachti, M., and Mittig, ¥., 'Quantum Mechanics and Hidden
Variables', Physical Review Vol DlA, (1976) 25^3-55*
Latour, B., and Woolgar, S., Laboratory Life (Beverley Hills:
Sage, 1979).
Livi, R., 'New Tests of Quantum Mechanics for Multi-Valued
Observables', Nuovo Cimento Letters Vol 19 (1977)» 189-92.
T A^Vip lr H ' Ua C? "QqI 1 ' C* Triomial n -l"Tr CJ riesv* al Mnovyiiorr -p TJA ,-3 vtJ_J f j _lj^ J—u >>J uj( UCiiCj-W/j. i iOCLj.i_LJ.i0, ibl iiJ_vo.vJ.Oix—
Variable Theories?', Foundations of Physics Vol 6 (1976), 173-8^-.
Lopes, J.L., and Paty, M., (eds) "Quantum Mechanics, a Half Century
Later (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977).
Mackay, D.M., The Clockwork Image: a Christian Perspective on Science
(London: Inter-Varsity Press, 197^)•
Mackenzie, D.A., Statistics in Britain 1865-1930: The Social
Construction of Scientific Knowledge (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1981).
Maiocchi, R., Book Review of M.Flato et al (eds), Quantum Mechanics,
Determinism, Causality and Particles in Scientia Vol 111 (1976), 505-9.
Mandel, L., and Wolf, E., (eds) Coherence and Quantum Optics,
Proceedings of the Third Rochester Conference on Coherence and
Quantum Optics, June 1972 (New York: Plenum Press, 1973).
Matthys, D., An Experimental Approach to the Uncertainty Principle
(unpublished PhD thesis, Washington University, St Louis, Missouri,
1975).
Mazur, A., 'Disputes between Experts', Minerva,Vol 11 (1973). 2^3-62.
Mcdawar, P.B., 'Is the Scientific Paper a Fraud?', The Listener
(12th September 1963), 377-8.
Mehra, J. , The Quantum. Principle: Its Interpretation and Epistemology
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 197^)*
Merton, R., 'Singletons and Multiples in Scientific Discovery: A
Chapter in the Sociology of Science', Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Society Vol 105 (1961), ^70-86.
Mills, C .W., 'Situated actions and vocabularies of motive',
American Sociological Review Vol 5 (19^-0), ^39-52.
Monod, J., Chance and Necessity (Glasgow: Fontana, 197^).
Moravcsik, M.J., and Murugesan, P., 'Some Results on the Function
and Quality of Citations', Social Studies of Science Vol 5 (1975).
86-92.
Mulkay, M.J., 'Methodology in the Sociology of Science: Some
Reflections on the Study of Radio Astronomy', Social Science
Information Vol 13 (197^0 > 107-19*
Mulkay, M., Science and the Sociology of Knowledge (London: Allen
and Unwin, I98O).
Mulkay, M., 'Sociology of Science in the West', Current Sociology
Vol 28 (1980), I-I83.
3is
Nelkin, D., 'The political impact of technical expertise', Social
Studies of Science Vol 5 (1975)- 35-53.
Notarrigo, S., 'Polarization Correlation of Annihilation Radiation',
Progress in Scientific Culture Vol 1 (1976), 352-3•
Opher, R., 'Are Quantum Processes Cosmologically Induced?',
Foundations of Physics Vol 5 (1975)» 309-21.
Papaliolios, C., 'Experimental Test of a Hidden-Variable Quantum
Theory', Physical Review Letters Vol 18 (1967), 622-5.
Pearle, P., 'Alternative to the Orthodox Interpretation of Quantum
Theory', American Journal of Physics Vol 35 (1967)» 732-53*
Pearle, P., 'Hidden-Variable Example Based upon Data Rejection',
Physical Review Vol D2 (1970), 1318-25.
Pearle, P., 'Quantum Theory Fails the Single System', Physics Today,
Vol 23 (April 1971). 38.
Pearle, P., 'Reduction of the State Vector by a. Nonlinear Schrodinger
Equation', Physical Review Vol 13D (1976), 857-68.
de la Pena, L., Cetto, A.M., and Brody, T.A., 'On Hidden-Variable
Theories and Bell's Inequality', Nuovo Cimento Letters Vol 5 (1972),
177-83.
Pickering, A., 'Constraints on Controversy: the Case of the Magnetic
Monopole', Social Studies of Science Vol 11 (1981), 63-93.
Pinch, T.J., 'What Does a Proof Do if it Does Not Prove? A Study of
the Social Conditions and Metaphysical Divisions Leading to David
Bohm and John von Neumann Failing to Communicate in Quantum Physics'
in E.Mendelsohn, P. Weingart and R.Whitley (eds), The Social Production
of Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook, Vol 1
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977), 171-215.
Pinch, T.J., 'The Sun-Set: The Presentation of Certainty in
Scientific Life', Social Studies of Science Vol 11 (1981), 131-58.
Polanyi, M., Personal Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1958).
Popper, K., The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1968).
Reiser, S.J., 'Smoking and Health: The Congress and Causality', in
S.Lakoff (ed), Knowledge and Power (London: Collier-MacMillan, 1966).
Restivo, S.P., 'Parallels and Paradoxes in Modern Physics and
Eastern Mysticism: I - a Critical Reconnaissance', Social Studies
of Science Vol 8 (1978), 133-81.
Rietdijk, C.W., On Waves, Particles and Hidden Variables (Assen:
Van Gorcum, 1971-7*
Rose, H., and Rose, S., The Radicalisation of Science (London:
MacMillan, 1976).
Rosenfeld, L., 'Strife about Complementarity', Science Progress
Vol 61 (1953)» 393-310.
Ross-Bonney, A.A., 'Does God Play Dice?', Nuovo Cimento Vol 30B (1975)»
55-79.
ML
Sachs, 'Comment on "Alternative to the Orthodox Interpretation of
Quantum Theory"' , American Journal of Physics- Vol 36 (1968), 463-4.
Sachs, M., 'An Alternative to Quantum Mechanics', Physics Today
Val 24 (April 1971), 39-41.
Sanders, P., 'Can Atoms Tell Left from Right?', New Scientist
(31st March, 1977), 764-6.
Sarfatti, J., 'A Modest Proposal to the Foundation for the
Realization of Man' (unpublished mimeo, Physics/Consciousness Research
Group, San Francisco, 11th February 1976).
Sarfatti, J., Letter to the Editor, Psychoenergetic Systems Vol 2
(1976), 1-8.
Sarfatti, J., 'Towards a Quantum Theory of Consciousness, the
Miraculous and God' (unpublished mimeo, Physics/Consciousness
Research Group, San Francisco, 1977).
Schiavulli, L., and Selleri, F., 'Further Consequences of Einstein
Locality', Foundations of Physics Vol 9 (1979), 339~52.
Schilpp, P.A., (ed) Albert Einstein; Philosopher-Scientist (New York:
Harper and Row, 19597*
Schrodinger, E., Science, Theory and Man (New York: Dover, 1957).
Shapin, S., ^History of Science and its Sociological Reconstruc¬
tions' (unpublished mimeo, Science Studies Unit, University of
Edinburgh, June 1981).
Shimony, A., 'The Role of the Observer in Quantum Theory', American
Journal of Physics Vol 31 (1963), 755~73*
Shimony, A., Home, M.A., and Clauser, J.F., 'Comment on "The Theory
of Local Beatles'" , Epistemological Letters Vol 13 (1976), 1-8.
Societa Italiana di Fisica (B .D'Espagnat, ed) Foundations of Q.uantum
Mechanics, Proceedings of the Enrico Fermi International Summer
School, Course 49 (New York: Academic Press, 1971).
Staop, H.P., 'S-Matrix Interpretation of Quantum Theory', Physical
Review Vol 4l (1978), I88I-927.
Stapp, H.P., 'Bell's Theorem and World Process', Nuovo Cimento
Vol 29B (1975), 270-6.
Stern, P.M., The Oppenheimer Case (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).
Storer, N, The Social System of Science (New York: Rinehart and
Winston, 1966).
Suppes, P. (ed) Studies in the Foundations of Q.uantum Mechanics
(East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association, I98O).
Swenson, L.S., 'The Michelson-Morley-Miller Experiments Before
and After 1905*, Journal for the History of Astronomy, Vol 1 (1970),
56-78.
Toben, B., Space-Time and Beyond (New York: Dutton, 1975).
Travis, G.D.L., 'Replicating Replication? Aspects of the Social
Construction of Learning in Planarian Worms', Social Studies of
Science Vol 11 (1981), 11-32.
3 I 7
Turner, R. (ed), Ethnomethodology (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975)•
"Putsch, J.H., 'Collapse-Tine for the Bohm-Bub Hidden Variable
Theory' , Reviews of Modern Physics Vol <90 (1968), 232-9.
Tutsch, J.H., 'Simultaneous Measurement in the Bohm-Bub Hidden-
Variable Theory', Physical Review Vol 183 (1969), 1116-31.
Tutsch, J.H., 'Mathematics of the Measurement Problem in Quantum
Mechanics', Journal of Mathematical Physics Vol 12 (1971), 1711-8.
Wallis, H., (ed), On the Margins of Science: The Social Construction
of Rejected Knowledge (Keele: Sociological Review Monograph No 27,
1979).
Wangsness, R., 'Hidden Variables and Magnetic Relaxation', Physical
Review Vol 160 (1967), 1190-2.
Werbos, P.J., 'Experimental Implications of the Reinterpretation
of Quantum Mechanics', Nuovo Cimento Vol 29B (1975)» 169-77•
Werbos, P.J., 'Experiments on the Reinterpretation of Quantum
Mechanics: Corrections and New Ideas', Nuovo Gimento Vol 37B (1977)1
29-39.
Werbos, P.J., 'A New Cosmology: Physical Aspects of the Universe',
The Rosicrucian Digest (August 1976), 8-11.
Werbos, P.J., 'A New Cosmology: Psychic Aspects of the Universe',
The Rosicrucian Digest (September 1976), 6-7 and 32-33*
Wiener, N., and Siegel, A., 'A New Form of the Statistical Postulate
of Quantum Mechanics', Physical Review Vol 91 (1953), 1551-60.
Wigner, E.P., Symmetries and Reflections (Bloomington, Indiana;
Indiana University Press, 1967) •
Wigner, E.P., 'Are We Machines?', Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Society Vol 113 (1969), 95-101.
Wilson, A.R., Lowe, J., and Butt, D.K., 'Measurement of the Relative
Planes of Polarization of Annihilation Quanta as a Function of
Separation Distance', Journal of Physics Vol G2 (1976), 613-29.
Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953)*
Woolgar, S, 'Writing an Intellectual History of Scientific
Development: The Use of Discovery Accounts', Social Studies of Science
Vol 6 (1976), 395-922.
Wynne, 3., 'C.G.Barkla and the J Phenomenon: A Case Study in the
Treatment of Deviance in Physics', Social Studies of Science Vol 6
(1976), 307-97.
Young, M.F.D. (ed), Knowledge and Control; New Directions for the
Sociolrgy of Education (London: Collier-MacMillan, 1971)*
Young, R.M., 'Evolutionary Biology and Ideology: Then and Now',
Science Studies Vol 1 (1971), 177-206.
Zebrowski, G., The Monadic Universe (New York: Ace Books, 1977)*
Zemansky, M.W., Heat and Thermodynamics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968).
Zukav, G., The Dancing Wu Li Masters (London: Fontana, 1980).
